

*Amiran BICHASHVILI*

*Georgia*

## CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS OF HYBRID RESILIENCE OF GEORGIA

*Abstract:* Hybrid resilience has become a central concept in the contemporary security discourse, particularly for small states situated in geopolitically sensitive regions. Defined as the capacity of a state and its society to anticipate, withstand, and adapt to multifaceted hybrid threats, resilience serves as both a theoretical framework and a practical strategy. Yet, the application of this concept to specific national contexts remains problematic. Georgia, a post-Soviet state facing persistent challenges from Russia’s hybrid warfare, illustrates many of the conceptual ambiguities associated with hybrid resilience. This article argues that the principal difficulties in conceptualizing hybrid resilience in Georgia stem from three interrelated domains. First, the strategic framework for resilience is fragmented, with governmental policies often lacking coherence and continuity. While Georgia has adopted multiple strategic documents referencing resilience, these efforts remain scattered and reactive rather than anticipatory. Second, the institutional environment demonstrates limited coordination among state agencies, compounded by politicization and elite competition, which undermines the sustainability of resilience initiatives. Third, the societal dimension is particularly vulnerable due to deep political polarization, low levels of public trust, and weak civil society engagement, which collectively erode the foundations of societal resilience. Moreover, technological and cyber-related vulnerabilities further expose Georgia to external manipulation. The study situates Georgia’s experience within the broader theoretical debates on resilience, noting that international scholarship offers diverging definitions—ranging from resilience as a process of adaptation to resilience as a structural capacity. By engaging with these perspectives, the article highlights that Georgia’s case exemplifies the difficulty of translating an abstract concept into effective practice under conditions of limited resources, external pressure, and internal division. A brief comparative discussion with other small states, notably the Baltic countries, underscores that conceptual clarity, institutional coherence, and societal consensus are prerequisites for effective hybrid resilience. The findings sug-

<sup>1</sup> Amiran Bichashvili, PHD Student of Political Science Caucasus International University

*gest that unless Georgia addresses these conceptual problems, resilience risks becoming a rhetorical rather than operational tool. The article concludes that enhancing conceptual clarity, fostering inter-institutional cooperation, and cultivating societal trust are essential for transforming resilience from a contested theoretical notion into a functional security paradigm.*

**Key Words:** *hybrid threat, hybrid warfare, state institutions, social polarization, political environment, resilience, national security, global security, international experience*

## Introduction

The concept of hybrid resilience has emerged as one of the most debated notions in contemporary security studies, especially in the context of small states exposed to complex geopolitical pressures. While resilience is widely acknowledged as a necessary response to hybrid threats, its conceptual boundaries remain fluid and contested. For Georgia, a state located at the intersection of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, the urgency of hybrid resilience is particularly acute. Since regaining independence in 1991, Georgia has faced continuous challenges from Russia, ranging from military aggression to information warfare, energy embargoes, and cyberattacks. These multidimensional pressures have made resilience not merely a theoretical issue but a vital element of national survival.

The relevance of hybrid resilience to Georgia arises from two interlinked realities. On the one hand, Georgia's security environment is persistently unstable due to unresolved territorial conflicts, the presence of Russian military forces on its soil, and Moscow's continuous resort to hybrid tactics. On the other hand, Georgia is simultaneously pursuing Euro-Atlantic integration, which exposes it to both opportunities and vulnerabilities. In such a context, the resilience of state institutions, political processes, and society at large is indispensable. Yet, as this article argues, the very notion of hybrid resilience in Georgia suffers from conceptual ambiguities that weaken its applicability and operational value.

The scholarly discourse on resilience presents diverse interpretations. Some scholars conceptualize resilience as the adaptive capacity of societies and institutions in the face of shocks, emphasizing flexibility and learning. Others interpret it more structurally, as the existence of robust systems capable of absorbing disruptions without losing essential functions. Applied to hybrid threats, resilience is often viewed as the ability of states to deter, withstand, and recover from coordinated hostile actions that combine military and non-military instruments. However, when transposed to Georgia, these interpretations reveal inconsistencies: strategies often remain declarative, institutions fragmented, and societal dimensions neglected.

This article seeks to address the research question: What are the conceptual problems of hybrid resilience in the case of Georgia? By focusing on this inquiry, the paper aims to move beyond a purely descriptive account of Georgia's vulnerabilities and instead interrogates the conceptual underpinnings of resilience as applied to the Georgian context. In doing so, the study underscores that Georgia's challenges are not only practical but also stem from the lack of clarity and consensus over what hybrid resilience should mean in a small, resource-constrained state under constant external pressure.

The argument unfolds in several steps. The first section reviews the theoretical dimensions of hybrid resilience, highlighting key debates in the international literature. The second section situates Georgia's security environment within the broader framework of hybrid threats, illustrating how Russia's multifaceted tactics create persistent instability. The third section constitutes the core of the analysis, examining the conceptual problems of hybrid resilience in Georgia, including fragmented strategic frameworks, institutional weaknesses, societal vulnerabilities, and technological challenges. A comparative perspective is then introduced, drawing lessons from small states such as the Baltic countries, which have made significant progress in operationalizing resilience. The conclusion summarizes the findings, providing recommendations for enhancing conceptual clarity and policy coherence in Georgia.

This structure reflects a dual ambition: to contribute to academic debates on resilience and to provide policy-relevant insights for Georgia. In theoretical terms, the article emphasizes the need to refine the definition and scope of hybrid resilience so that it becomes analytically coherent and practically useful. In empirical terms, it demonstrates how Georgia's case exemplifies the difficulties faced by small states in translating resilience from abstract concept into operational reality.

Ultimately, the introduction sets the stage for an argument that hybrid resilience, unless carefully defined and consistently implemented, risks being reduced to a rhetorical device. For Georgia, whose survival depends on withstanding and adapting to hybrid pressures, such rhetorical use is insufficient. Instead, resilience must be conceptualized as a multidimensional framework that integrates strategic clarity, institutional coordination, and societal cohesion. Only then can Georgia transform resilience from a contested idea into a meaningful component of national security.

### **Theoretical Dimensions of Hybrid Resilience**

Resilience has gradually become a cornerstone concept in contemporary security studies, yet its meaning, scope, and practical relevance remain contested. Originally introduced within ecological and systems theory, resilience referred

to the capacity of a system to absorb shocks and maintain its core functions<sup>2</sup>. Over time, this concept migrated into political science, international relations, and security studies, where it has been adapted to describe the ability of states and societies to withstand disruptions caused by external threats, crises, or hostile interventions. In the twenty-first century, with the proliferation of hybrid warfare and complex threats that blur the line between war and peace, resilience has taken on renewed significance<sup>3</sup>.

One influential perspective interprets resilience primarily as adaptation<sup>4</sup>. In this view, states and societies are constantly exposed to unpredictable shocks, whether natural disasters, cyberattacks, or disinformation campaigns. Resilience is therefore not the elimination of threats but the capacity to adjust and reorganize in response. Applied to hybrid threats, this interpretation emphasizes learning, flexibility, and rapid institutional adjustment. For instance, if a state is subjected to an information operation aimed at polarizing its society, resilience would be measured not by the prevention of such an attack but by the ability of institutions, media, and civil society to adapt, counter false narratives, and recover social trust. A related perspective focuses on recovery, where resilience is understood as the capacity to return to normal functioning after disruption<sup>5</sup>. Here, resilience overlaps with concepts such as crisis management or disaster recovery, but it carries a broader scope because it applies to deliberate, hostile actions rather than purely accidental shocks. Within this framework, resilience is less about avoiding harm and more about ensuring that disruptions do not cause irreversible damage to political institutions, societal cohesion, or economic stability.

A different strand of scholarship conceptualizes resilience not as adaptation but as robustness<sup>6</sup>. In this structural interpretation, resilience reflects the strength and durability of institutions, infrastructures, and societal bonds. The underlying assumption is that states with strong institutions, effective governance, and cohesive societies are less vulnerable to hybrid threats. Here, resilience is more static, focusing on the preexisting strength of a system rather than its capacity to dynamically adapt. For example, a well-established rule of law, high trust in government, and a diversified economy are all seen as indicators of resilience because they reduce the effectiveness of hybrid tactics such as corruption, disinformation, or economic blackmail. While this approach provides a valuable

---

<sup>2</sup> C.S. Holling, *Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems*, “Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics” 1973, 4, <<https://shorturl.at/iRcFP>> (20.09.2025).

<sup>3</sup> B. Walker, S. David, *Resilience Thinking: Sustaining Ecosystems and People in a Changing World*, Washington DC Island Press 2006.

<sup>4</sup> D. Chandler, *Resilience: The Governance of Complexity*, Routledge, London 2014.

<sup>5</sup> J. Joseph, *Resilience as an Emergent Form of Governance: A Genealogical Account*, Cambridge University Press 2018.

<sup>6</sup> A. Boin, A. McConnell, P. Hart, *Governing After Crisis: The Politics of Investigation Accountability and Learning*, Cambridge University Press 2008.

structural lens, it risks overemphasizing stability at the expense of adaptability. Hybrid threats are inherently dynamic, exploiting the vulnerabilities of open societies in unexpected ways. Consequently, an exclusive focus on robustness may leave states unprepared for novel forms of hybrid pressure<sup>7</sup>.

The term hybrid resilience specifically integrates these interpretations into the security discourse shaped by the rise of hybrid warfare. Hybrid threats combine military and non-military instruments, ranging from cyber operations and disinformation to economic coercion and covert military interventions. Because these threats target multiple domains simultaneously – political, economic, societal, and technological – resilience in this context must be multidimensional<sup>8</sup>. Hybrid resilience, therefore, refers to the ability of states and societies to anticipate, withstand, adapt to, and recover from coordinated hybrid threats without losing their fundamental political, social, and economic integrity. This definition merges adaptive and structural approaches, emphasizing both the preconditions for resilience (institutional strength, societal trust) and the processes that enable dynamic response (learning, innovation, cooperation)<sup>9</sup>.

Despite its growing use in policy and academic circles, hybrid resilience suffers from conceptual ambiguity. Several unresolved questions shape the debate:

- Is resilience a goal or a process? Some scholars argue that resilience is an end state – a level of robustness and security that a society can achieve. Others see it as a continuous process of adaptation, with no final stage of completion<sup>10</sup>.
- Is resilience preventive or reactive? Should resilience be measured by the capacity to deter and prevent hybrid threats, or by the ability to recover once they occur? The answer has implications for how states design their security strategies.
- Where does resilience reside? Is it primarily the responsibility of state institutions (e.g., military, government agencies), or is it equally distributed across society, requiring civil society, private actors, and individuals to share the burden?
- How is resilience measured? Unlike conventional security indicators such as military strength or economic growth, resilience lacks standardized metrics.

---

<sup>7</sup> *Resilience and Article 3*, NATO Official Website 2023, <<https://shorturl.at/AFNgy>> (20.09.2025).

<sup>8</sup> *Building Resilience: The EU Approach*, European Commission 2020, <<https://shorturl.at/EgHU4>> (21.09.2025).

<sup>9</sup> *Hybrid Resilience and the European Union's Security Policy*, Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Policy Insights 2019.

<sup>10</sup> *Disaster Resilience: A National Imperative*, National Research Council, National Academies Press, Washington DC 2012, <<https://shorturl.at/YtTUx>> (21.09.2025).

Measuring societal trust, adaptability, or institutional coherence is complex, making resilience a difficult concept to operationalize<sup>11</sup>.

These ambiguities are not merely academic. They directly influence how governments design policies, allocate resources, and communicate with their societies. Without conceptual clarity, resilience risks becoming a rhetorical device used to justify a variety of policies without clear benchmarks for success.

The theoretical debate on resilience takes on particular significance for small states such as Georgia. Unlike major powers, small states cannot rely on sheer material resources to counter hybrid threats. Instead, their survival depends on building systemic resilience that multiplies limited resources through institutional coherence, international cooperation, and societal solidarity<sup>12</sup>. For small states, resilience is not optional – it is a matter of survival. Moreover, hybrid resilience provides an alternative to traditional deterrence models. Small states cannot deter great powers militarily, but they can reduce their vulnerability by strengthening resilience across multiple domains. This makes the concept especially attractive, yet also problematic, since its vagueness may allow policymakers to invoke resilience without implementing substantial reforms<sup>13</sup>.

In sum, the theoretical dimensions of hybrid resilience reveal both its promise and its problems. On the one hand, resilience offers a flexible, multidimensional framework for understanding how states and societies can survive under persistent hybrid pressure. On the other hand, its conceptual ambiguities – whether it is a process or an outcome, preventive or reactive, institutional or societal – create difficulties in translating the concept into practice. For Georgia, these ambiguities are particularly significant. Without addressing them, the country risks adopting fragmented or inconsistent policies that weaken rather than strengthen its resilience.

### **Hybrid Threats to Georgia: Security Context**

Georgia occupies a geopolitically sensitive position at the crossroads of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, making it particularly susceptible to hybrid threats. These threats, which combine conventional and unconventional instruments such as cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, economic coercion, and limited military interventions, have been consistently employed against Georgia since its independence in 1991<sup>14</sup>. Russia, in particular, has been the primary

---

<sup>11</sup> D. Alexander, *Resilience and Disaster Risk Reduction: An Evolving Concept?*, Overseas Development Institute, London 2013.

<sup>12</sup> *Resilience in Small States Facing Hybrid Threats*, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), Tallin 2017.

<sup>13</sup> *The EU and Resilience: Strategic Guidelines for Member States*, European External Action Service, Brussels 2021, <<https://shorturl.at/Fwnlw>> (21.09.2025).

<sup>14</sup> M. Galeotti, *Hybrid War or Gibridnaya Voyna? Getting Russia's Non-Linear Military Chal-*

external actor exerting hybrid pressure, aiming to influence political processes, destabilize society, and hinder Georgia's Euro-Atlantic integration<sup>15</sup>.

One of the most visible manifestations of hybrid pressure is information warfare. Disinformation campaigns targeting Georgian audiences exploit political polarization, amplify social divisions, and undermine trust in democratic institutions<sup>16</sup>. Social media platforms and state-aligned news outlets have been instrumental in spreading false narratives, particularly during election periods or political crises. The resulting societal fragmentation reduces Georgia's collective resilience, making the population more susceptible to external manipulation<sup>17</sup>.

Economic and energy coercion also play a central role. Georgia's dependence on Russian energy imports has historically been leveraged to exert political influence<sup>18</sup>. Economic pressures, such as trade restrictions or manipulation of critical infrastructure, increase the vulnerability of state institutions and restrict the government's policy flexibility. These measures exemplify the multidimensional nature of hybrid threats, which do not rely solely on military force but exploit vulnerabilities across economic, social, and political domains.

Cybersecurity represents another crucial arena. Georgia has experienced several high-profile cyberattacks targeting government networks, critical infrastructure, and media outlets<sup>19</sup>. These attacks, often attributed to state-backed actors, aim to disrupt governance, steal sensitive information, and erode public confidence. Cyber vulnerabilities thus constitute a persistent challenge to hybrid resilience, highlighting the necessity of technological preparedness alongside institutional and societal measures. Georgia's international partnerships, particularly with NATO and the European Union, have contributed to resilience-building efforts. Technical assistance, training, and strategic guidance support the development of cybersecurity capabilities, strategic communications, and civil preparedness<sup>20</sup>. However, despite these efforts, domestic institutional weaknesses and societal fragmentation limit the effectiveness of these interventions<sup>21</sup>.

*lence Right*, NATO Defense College, Rome 2016, <<https://shorturl.at/ljnLM>> (22.09.2025).

<sup>15</sup> *Russia's Hybrid Influence in Georgia*, Society for Threat Assessment (STAG), Tbilisi 2020, <<https://shorturl.at/axbuf>> (22.09.2025).

<sup>16</sup> P. Pomerantsev, *Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia*, PublicAffairs, New York 2014.

<sup>17</sup> *Georgia: Freedom in the World 2023*, Freedom House 2023, <<https://shorturl.at/mNQVs>> (22.09.2025).

<sup>18</sup> *Georgia: Energy Profile and Risks*, International Energy Agency (IEA), Paris 2021, <<https://www.iea.org/countries/georgia>> (22.09.2025).

<sup>19</sup> *Cyber Threats in Georgia: Case Studies*, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), Tallin 2018, <<https://kntn.ly/3912d4a0>> (22.09.2025).

<sup>20</sup> *EU Support to Georgia's Security and Resilience*, European Union External Action, Brussels 2022, <<https://kntn.ly/167d21dd>> (22.09.2025).

<sup>21</sup> H. Smith, *Resilience in Practice: Small States Confronting Hybrid Threats*, Routledge, London 2019.

## Issues of Stable Resilience of Georgia

Hybrid resilience in Georgia faces multiple conceptual and practical challenges. Despite extensive scholarly debate on resilience as a framework for small states confronting multifaceted threats, Georgia illustrates the difficulty of translating theoretical models into coherent national strategies. The primary problems can be grouped into four interrelated domains: strategic framework, institutional weaknesses, societal vulnerabilities, and technological and cyber challenges<sup>22</sup>. The first conceptual problem concerns the lack of a coherent strategic framework for hybrid resilience. Although Georgia has developed multiple strategic documents addressing national security and resilience, these initiatives often remain fragmented and reactive<sup>23</sup>. National strategies refer to resilience in broad terms but seldom integrate adaptive measures across institutions or sectors. For instance, the National Security Concept (2017) and the Cybersecurity Strategy (2020) acknowledge the need to enhance resilience but do not provide a unified operational plan for addressing interconnected hybrid threats<sup>24</sup>. This fragmentation reduces the capacity to anticipate or systematically counter hybrid campaigns, leaving Georgia vulnerable to recurring external pressures.

Institutional capacity and coordination represent a second set of problems. While multiple agencies are formally tasked with resilience-related functions – including the Ministry of Defense, the State Security Service, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs – coordination among these bodies is often limited<sup>25</sup>. Politicization of institutions further undermines consistency in policy implementation. Frequent changes in leadership and the influence of partisan politics hinder long-term planning, creating gaps in resilience measures<sup>26</sup>. As a result, the state's capacity to respond effectively to hybrid threats is inconsistent, with some sectors overprepared while others remain exposed.

The societal dimension of hybrid resilience presents a third critical challenge. Georgia experiences significant political polarization and low levels of public trust in state institutions<sup>27</sup>. Hybrid actors, especially through disinformation campaigns, exploit these vulnerabilities to deepen divisions and weaken social cohesion. Civil society engagement, although active in certain domains, is uneven and often

---

<sup>22</sup> D. Chandler, op. cit.

<sup>23</sup> *National Security Concept of Georgia*, National Security Council of Georgia 2017, <<https://kntn.ly/52ab642e>> (23.09.2025).

<sup>24</sup> *Cybersecurity Strategy 2020–2025*, Ministry of Defence of Georgia (MoD), Tbilisi 2020, <<https://kntn.ly/074b606f>> (23.09.2025).

<sup>25</sup> *Resilience in Small States ...*, op. cit.

<sup>26</sup> *Georgia's Political Institutions and the Challenge of Resilience*, International Crisis Group, Brussels 2019, <<https://kntn.ly/e67ef823>> (24.09.2025).

<sup>27</sup> *Georgia: Freedom in ...*, op. cit.

fragmented, which limits its capacity to contribute to resilience-building efforts<sup>28</sup>. Education, media literacy, and public awareness initiatives are insufficiently coordinated, leaving the population susceptible to manipulation. These societal weaknesses reduce the effectiveness of institutional and strategic measures, highlighting the interdependence between social cohesion and state-level resilience.

A fourth domain concerns technological and cyber vulnerabilities. Georgia has faced multiple cyberattacks targeting government infrastructure, media outlets, and critical services<sup>29</sup>. These attacks demonstrate the limitations of current technological and defensive capabilities. Although international partnerships with NATO and the European Union provide training, technical assistance, and strategic guidance, domestic implementation remains uneven<sup>30</sup>. Cyber resilience requires not only technological solutions but also institutional integration and public awareness, both of which remain incomplete.

The conceptual problems outlined above are mutually reinforcing. Fragmented strategic frameworks and weak institutional coordination exacerbate societal vulnerabilities, while social polarization undermines the adoption of effective technological and cyber measures<sup>31</sup>. Without an integrated approach, efforts to enhance resilience risk being piecemeal, reactive, and insufficiently aligned with the multidimensional nature of hybrid threats. Comparative analysis suggests that other small states facing hybrid threats, such as the Baltic countries, have successfully implemented multidimensional resilience strategies. These states combine coherent strategic planning, institutional coordination, societal engagement, and technological preparedness, creating a holistic framework that is both adaptive and robust<sup>32</sup>. Georgia's experience indicates that conceptual clarity is a prerequisite for operational effectiveness. Policymakers must explicitly define the scope of hybrid resilience, establish interagency coordination mechanisms, and strengthen social cohesion to mitigate external manipulation.

Georgia's hybrid resilience faces a series of interlinked conceptual problems. Fragmented strategic frameworks, institutional weaknesses, societal vulnerabilities, and technological challenges collectively hinder the effective translation of resilience from theory into practice. Addressing these problems requires an integrated, multidimensional approach that balances institutional robustness with societal adaptation, and technological readiness with strategic foresight. Enhancing conceptual clarity and operational coherence is essential for transforming resilience from a rhetorical notion into a functional security paradigm for Georgia.

---

<sup>28</sup> *EU Support to Georgia's ...*, op. cit.

<sup>29</sup> *Cyber Threats in Georgia ...*, op. cit.

<sup>30</sup> *Annual Security Report 2022*, Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia (MIA), Tbilisi 2022, <<https://kntn.ly/8fad53a9>> (24.09.2025).

<sup>31</sup> H. Smith, op. cit.

<sup>32</sup> M. Galeotti, op. cit.

## Conclusion

The analysis of hybrid resilience in Georgia reveals a complex interplay between theoretical ambiguity, institutional limitations, societal vulnerabilities, and technological challenges. Throughout this study, it has been argued that while resilience is widely regarded as an essential strategy for states confronting hybrid threats, its practical implementation in Georgia remains fragmented and inconsistent. The country's geopolitical position, historical legacies, and exposure to multifaceted pressures from neighboring powers, particularly Russia, exacerbate these challenges and highlight the urgency of transforming resilience from a conceptual framework into a functional security paradigm.

First, the study has demonstrated that conceptual clarity is a prerequisite for effective resilience-building. Hybrid resilience, by definition, requires a multidimensional approach that integrates strategic planning, institutional coordination, societal engagement, and technological preparedness. In Georgia, however, the lack of a coherent strategic framework has resulted in fragmented policies that fail to adequately address the interconnections among different domains of vulnerability. Strategic documents often emphasize resilience rhetorically without providing actionable guidance or mechanisms for interagency cooperation, leaving gaps that adversaries can exploit.

Second, institutional weaknesses continue to undermine Georgia's capacity to implement resilience measures. Political polarization, frequent leadership changes, and partial politicization of security institutions limit consistency and long-term planning. The absence of robust coordination among agencies responsible for defense, security, and civil protection reduces the efficiency and effectiveness of responses to hybrid threats. Without stronger institutional integration, even well-intentioned resilience initiatives are likely to produce uneven outcomes.

Third, societal vulnerabilities represent a critical dimension of Georgia's hybrid resilience. Low levels of public trust in institutions, combined with political polarization and uneven civil society engagement, create an environment in which disinformation campaigns and external manipulation can thrive. Resilience is not solely an institutional matter; it requires an engaged and informed society capable of critically evaluating information, participating in democratic processes, and cooperating with state authorities to mitigate vulnerabilities. Strengthening social cohesion and public awareness is therefore indispensable for enhancing the overall resilience of the country.

Fourth, technological and cyber challenges further complicate Georgia's resilience landscape. Cyberattacks on government systems, media outlets, and critical infrastructure demonstrate that resilience cannot be achieved without comprehensive technological preparedness. Investments in cybersecurity, digital literacy, and rapid response mechanisms are essential components of an effective

hybrid resilience strategy. However, technological measures alone are insufficient; they must be complemented by institutional coordination, strategic foresight, and societal engagement.

Taken together, these findings indicate that hybrid resilience in Georgia faces both conceptual and practical obstacles. The fragmented strategic framework, institutional weaknesses, societal vulnerabilities, and technological limitations are mutually reinforcing, creating a cycle in which partial measures fail to produce comprehensive security outcomes. Addressing these challenges requires an integrated approach that simultaneously strengthens institutions, engages society, and ensures technological readiness. Only through such a multidimensional strategy can Georgia enhance its capacity to anticipate, withstand, and recover from hybrid threats. In practical terms, several recommendations emerge. Policymakers should prioritize the development of a unified strategic framework that clearly defines the scope, objectives, and responsibilities associated with hybrid resilience. Institutional reforms should aim to reduce politicization, enhance interagency coordination, and establish mechanisms for long-term planning. Civil society initiatives, including media literacy programs and public awareness campaigns, should be expanded to foster social cohesion and reduce vulnerability to disinformation. Finally, investments in technological infrastructure and cybersecurity capabilities should be pursued in tandem with broader institutional and societal reforms, ensuring that the state can respond effectively to contemporary hybrid threats.

In conclusion, the case of Georgia illustrates that resilience is not merely a theoretical or rhetorical concept but a practical necessity in a world characterized by hybrid warfare and complex geopolitical pressures. Transforming resilience into a functional and effective security paradigm requires conceptual clarity, institutional robustness, societal engagement, and technological preparedness. By addressing these challenges in a coordinated and integrated manner, Georgia can enhance its capacity to withstand external pressures, maintain national cohesion, and secure its long-term stability.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Alexander D., *Resilience and Disaster Risk Reduction: An Evolving Concept?*, Overseas Development Institute, London 2013
2. *Annual Security Report 2022*, Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia (MIA), Tbilisi 2022, <<https://kntn.ly/8fad53a9>>
3. Boin A., McConnell A., Hart P., *Governing After Crisis: The Politics of Investigation Accountability and Learning*, Cambridge University Press 2008

4. *Building Resilience: The EU Approach*, European Commission 2020, <<https://shorturl.at/EgHU4>>
5. Chandler D., *Resilience: The Governance of Complexity*, Routledge, London 2014
6. *Cyber Threats in Georgia: Case Studies*, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), Tallin 2018, <<https://kntn.ly/3912d4a0>>
7. *Cybersecurity Strategy 2020–2025*, Ministry of Defence of Georgia (MoD), Tbilisi 2020, <<https://kntn.ly/074b606f>>
8. *Disaster Resilience: A National Imperative*, National Research Council, National Academies Press, Washington DC 2012, <<https://shorturl.at/YtTUx>>
9. *EU Support to Georgia's Security and Resilience*, European Union External Action, Brussels 2022, <<https://kntn.ly/167d21dd>>
10. Galeotti M., *Hybrid War or Gibrinaya Voyna? Getting Russia's Non-Linear Military Challenge Right*, NATO Defense College, Rome 2016, <<https://shorturl.at/ljnLM>>
11. *Georgia: Energy Profile and Risks*, International Energy Agency (IEA), Paris 2021, <<https://www.iea.org/countries/georgia>>
12. *Georgia: Freedom in the World 2023*, Freedom House 2023, <<https://shorturl.at/mNQVs>>
13. *Georgia's Political Institutions and the Challenge of Resilience*, International Crisis Group, Brussels 2019, <<https://kntn.ly/e67ef823>>
14. Holling C.S., *Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems*, “Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics” 1973, 4, <<https://shorturl.at/iRcFP>>
15. *Hybrid Resilience and the European Union's Security Policy*, Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Policy Insights 2019
16. Joseph J., *Resilience as an Emergent Form of Governance: A Genealogical Account*, Cambridge University Press 2018
17. *National Security Concept of Georgia*, National Security Council of Georgia 2017, <<https://kntn.ly/52ab642e>>
18. Pomerantsev P., *Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia*, PublicAffairs, New York 2014
19. *Resilience and Article 3*, NATO Official Website 2023, <<https://shorturl.at/AFNgy>>

20. *Resilience in Small States Facing Hybrid Threats*, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), Tallin 2017
21. *Russia's Hybrid Influence in Georgia*, Society for Threat Assessment (STAG), Tbilisi 2020, <<https://shorturl.at/axbuf>>
22. Smith H., *Resilience in Practice: Small States Confronting Hybrid Threats*, Routledge, London 2019
23. *The EU and Resilience: Strategic Guidelines for Member States*, European External Action Service, Brussels 2021, <<https://shorturl.at/Fwnlw>>
24. Walker B., David S., *Resilience Thinking: Sustaining Ecosystems and People in a Changing World*, Washington DC Island Press 2006