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## HYBRID WARFARE: MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS

**Abstract:** *The predominance of non-military means in waging hybrid warfare requires various non-military responses supported by adequate military tools. The article outlines a package of possible military response options applicable in hybrid warfare. The authors point out the absence of a universal definition of hybrid warfare, set the frame for its concept and describe fundamental pillars for countering hybrid threats. The need to disposition constantly prepared and updated packages of response options, including military response options, are discussed. The paper menu results of possible military response options are presented. A suggested simplified and generalized package of options is compiled based on observations of recent and ongoing conflicts.*

**Keywords:** *Hybrid warfare, military response options, hybrid threats*

### Introduction

Recently, we have witnessed that conflicts are not conducted in the usual ways. Wars are not declared and do not end by peace agreements. Clashes are still waged with military toolbox instruments. Still, these are getting increasingly outweighed by non-military tools: economic sanctions, restrictions on the energy supplies, information operations, propaganda and dissemination of misinformation, terrorism and increased involvement of non-state actors.

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Systematic attacks on states are called colour revolutions, grey zone conflicts, unconventional wars, unrestricted wars, or non-linear wars. The boundaries between peace and war, combatants and non-combatants, are blurred.

This way of waging wars is usually referred to as a hybrid war, and threats associated with current conflicts as hybrid threats. Due to the blurred or missing boundaries between war and peace, often unclear or covert actors, it is not easy to face such threats. Just as hybrid warfare is conducted by a mixture of military and non-military means, the response to hybrid war must include a mix of military measures complementing a comprehensive package of political, economic, diplomatic and other criteria.

The paper outlines a package of possible options for a military response to hybrid threats. These can be aimed to build resilience and deter the aggressor from attacks, but also as a response to a kinetic or non-kinetic attack. The proposed military response options (MROs) do not represent a response to a specific situation. Therefore, they are not elaborated in the details necessary to serve as a basis for decision-making within crisis response planning. These are simplified and generalized descriptions of possible MROs and their estimated advantages and risks.

A package of MROs was compiled based on observations of recent and ongoing conflicts, particularly of the use of military tools and reactions to them. Before the authors set up a package of possible MROs, they introduced and framed the concept of conducting hybrid wars and introduced general options for response to hybrid threats.

### **Defining the Concept of Hybrid Warfare**

Particularly concerning the security events in Ukraine since 2014, the term hybrid warfare is frequently used in the media, on social networks and in political debates. Hybrid warfare is a topic of security forums and academic discussions, and the term also appears in official documents of national governments and international institutions. The chapter aims to point out different views on the definitions of the hybrid war concept and identify their standard features.

Major William J. Nemeth is considered the first author to use the term ‘Hybrid war’ in his thesis at the US Naval Postgraduate School in 2002. In his work, Nemeth pointed out an unprecedented complex of regular and irregular warfare in a highly flexible and efficient way conducted by Chechens during their 1994-1996 war against Russia<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> W. J. Nemeth, *Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare*, Monterey 2002, <<https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/5865>> (1.11.2022).

To emphasize the complexity of current wars, James N. Mattis and Frank Hoffmann wrote in the 2005 article “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars”<sup>4</sup> defining the concept of hybrid warfare. Evaluating the US military's efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, they concluded that in addition to conventional threats, there would be a significant rise in irregular challenges in future conflicts. In addition to state actors, US troops will have to fight paramilitary groups and radical terrorists simultaneously and face unconventional attacks by non-state actors. Critical infrastructure, communication and computer networks and military and financial targets might also be attacked.

The authors also pointed out the complexity of the operational environment, adding aspects of information and psychological operations. In his later work, Hoffman defined hybrid war as: “Hybrid threats incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder. Hybrid wars can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors. These multi-modal activities can be conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit, but are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions of the conflict”<sup>5</sup>.

NATO's principal documents do not provide an exact definition of hybrid warfare. According to its official statements: “hybrid warfare, where a broad, complex, and adaptive combination of conventional and non-conventional means, and overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures, are employed in a highly integrated design by state and non-state actors to achieve their objectives”<sup>6</sup>.

Trying to avoid the exact definition of hybrid war, the EU describes the issue by defining hybrid threats instead: “Hybrid warfare can be more easily characterised than defined as a centrally designed and controlled use of various covert and overt tactics, enacted by military and/or non-military means, ranging from intelligence and cyber operations through economic pressure to the use of conventional forces. By employing hybrid tactics, the attacker seeks to undermine and destabilise an opponent by applying both coercive and subversive methods. The latter can include various forms of sabotage,

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<sup>4</sup> J. Mattis, F. Hoffman, *Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, <<http://milnewstbay.pbworks.com/f/MattisFourBlockWarUSNINov2005.pdf>> (1.11.2022).

<sup>5</sup> F. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, Arlington 2007, <[http://www.potomac institute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac\\_hybridwar\\_0108.pdf](http://www.potomac institute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf)> (1.11.2022).

<sup>6</sup> NATO, *Warsaw Summit Communiqué. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw on 8-9 July 2016*, <[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133169.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm)> (1.11.2022).

disruption of communications and other services including energy supplies. The aggressor may work through or by empowering proxy insurgent groups, or disguising state-to-state aggression behind the mantle of a 'humanitarian intervention'. Massive disinformation campaigns designed to control the narrative are an important element of a hybrid campaign. All this is done with the objective of achieving political influence, even dominance over a country in support of an overall strategy"<sup>7</sup>.

Russia's view on new wars being fought in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century was presented by Russian Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov in his article "The Value of Science in Prediction"<sup>8</sup>. Western scholars refer to the article as a 'Gerasimov doctrine', describing methods to be developed and used in future operations. Many of those methods can be recognised by analysing the events happening in Ukraine in 2014. According to the leading expert in modern Russia and its security politics Mark Galeotti, Gerasimov "*talk about: how Russia can subvert and destroy states without direct, overt and large-scale military intervention*"<sup>9</sup>.

*Typical features of warfare of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, according to Gerasimov doctrine, are: the borders between war and peace are blurred, the role of non-military means has exceeded the power of military force, the concealed character of military means is prevailing, informational operations and actions of special operations forces are present. The overt use of force should be conducted at the final stage of the conflict, masked as a crisis response or peacekeeping operation, to reach final success*<sup>10</sup>.

Hybrid war is not different from the wars fought in the past. Conflicts in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Chechnya constituted a mixture of regular and irregular tactics, information operations, actions of state and non-state actors and other military and non-military means characteristic of what is now known as hybrid warfare. Even Clausewitz, in his famous work "On War"<sup>11</sup>, wrote about indirect war, which aims to achieve the desired political goals by exhausting the enemy's forces, but without trying to achieve a decisive military victory and/or the conquest of territory.

The concept of hybrid warfare can be traced even deeper in history. Its emergence was caused by technological advance which has provided tools that

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<sup>7</sup> EU, European External Action Service, Working Document EEAS (2015) 731, *Food-for-thought paper "Countering Hybrid Threats"*, <<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/may/eeas-csdphybrid-threats-8887-15.pdf>> (1.11.2022).

<sup>8</sup> R. Coalson, *Translation of Gerasimov's article*, <<https://inmoscowshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russiannon-linear-war/>> (1.11.2022).

<sup>9</sup> O. Manea, *Hybrid War as a War on Governance: Interview with Mark Galeotti*, <<https://csc.asu.edu/2015/08/23/manea-interviews-galeotti-on-hybrid-war-at-swj/>> (1.11.2022).

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>11</sup> C. Clausewitz, *On War* <<http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1946/1946-h/1946-h.htm>> (1.11.2022).

enable the concept of hybrid warfare to be fully developed in current conflicts. Hybrid warfare combines conventional, unconventional, cyber and asymmetric strategies, tactics, methods and processes to achieve a set of military goals. This type of warfare connects the civil-military environment, where three parties of the conflict are formed – the armed forces, the population and the opposition forces<sup>12</sup>. Mark Galeotti described this phenomenon as: “This is less of a new way of war so much as a way of fighting a war in a new world. It is the world that it has changed rather than the tactics and the ideas“<sup>13</sup>.

Although the term hybrid warfare has been generally accepted by security experts and international organizations and is extensively used in media, a universal definition of its concept does not exist. Some of them prefer to avoid this term. For example, Josef Procházka and Richard Stojar did not use the term hybrid warfare in their article “Approach to the Assessment of the Military Potential of the State – an Example of the Russian Federation”. Nevertheless, their strategic analysis of military potential is provided in political, economic, social, technological, and ecological domains<sup>14</sup>. It probably suggests that they were thinking in hybrid warfare dimensions.

Similarly, Radoslav Ivančík avoids using the term hybrid warfare in the article “Information War – One of the Multidisciplinary Phenomenon of Current Human Society”. But he claims that victory in the war will much sooner destroy or disrupt online facilities or services (such as attacking and decommissioning military computers and the commanding communications network) or physical structures that can be attacked through the network (such as launching a dam), interruption of electricity supply, breaking into the information systems of banks, insurance companies, hospitals, etc.). Physical as well as virtual objects accessible via the network thus become increasingly promising targets of potential conflict<sup>15</sup>. Signs of hybrid warfare are appearing here as well.

For this article, the authors tried to frame the concept of hybrid warfare by identifying its most common features:

1. Battlespace. Being also fought by non-kinetic means, hybrid war often does not require physical components of the battlefield. Cyberspace is getting more and more important domain. The area of operations is usually non-continuous and non-linear, and the borders of the conflict

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<sup>12</sup> V. Vyklický, I. Pikner, J. Procházka, *Approaches to Modernizing the Land Forces of Selected Countries*, “Vojenské rozhledy” 2022, Vol. 31 (1), pp. 003-020.

<sup>13</sup> O. Manea, *op. cit.*

<sup>14</sup> J. Procházka, R. Stojar, *Approach to the Assessment of the Military Potential of the State – an Example of the Russian Federation*, “Vojenské rozhledy” 2019, Vol 28 (1), pp. 003-015.

<sup>15</sup> R. Ivančík, *Information war – One of the multidisciplinary phenomennes of current human society*, “Politické Vedy” 2021, Vol 24 (1), pp. 135-152.

zone are blurred. The effects of information operations often exceed the location of physical influence and can reach the global population. When fought as a proxy war, decisive actions take place on the third actor's territory. McCuen identified hybrid warfare as "three decisive battlegrounds: within the conflict zone population, home front population and international community"<sup>16</sup>.

2. Participants. Adversaries often tend to try to cover their involvement in the conflict. ('Little green men' and 'Russian soldiers on leave' during the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2014). Traditional state actors are replaced or supplemented by guerrillas, private security forces, and terrorist and criminal organizations cooperating in a very sophisticated manner. The distinction between combatants and non-combatants is blurred. The civil population is often involved in direct actions and can overreach the number of engaged military personnel.
3. Methods. Coordinated use of covert and overt kinetic and non-kinetic means, ranging from intelligence, information and cyber operations through small-scale special operations and ending up with high-intensity large-scale combat operations. Supported by disinformation, propaganda and economic pressure.

### **Hybrid War – Hybrid Response**

Hybrid attacks are aimed at exploiting the victim's critical vulnerabilities. The ability to face hybrid threats is based on identifying those weak points, building resilience to deter the adversary, and responding to attacks effectively.

Identification of vulnerabilities. To be able to prevent and prepare for a possible attack, it is crucial to identify own weaknesses. These differ from country to country and also change over time; assessment of vulnerabilities should be a continual process. Countries creating international societies should also pay particular attention to the openness of their member states. The adversary will often try to find and exploit a 'soft underbelly', the weakest place to mount an attack and disrupt a closely cooperating society. The interconnectedness of computer networks, energy supply chains and economics allows the attacker to cause massive damage in a single successful strike. Possible adversaries constantly work on the identification of victims' vulnerabilities. Several cases of Russian spies working under cover of diplomacy within EU member states were revealed in past years. Weak and incompetent governance, widespread corruption, economic dependence, and a

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<sup>16</sup> J. McCuen, *Hybrid Wars*, "Military Review", 2008, Vol. LXXXVIII, No. 2, pp. 107-113.

low level of diversification of strategic resources are examples of vulnerabilities calling for attention.

Building resilience. EU and NATO declare that countering and responding to hybrid threats is a national responsibility but also express platforms and tools to support the effort of individual member states to counter hybrid threats. One of the cornerstones for strengthening the country's or alliance's resilience is a robust and reliable political system able to withstand destabilisation attempts. The ability to resist hybrid threats can be increased by increasing the degree of preparedness in various areas: energy security, civil protection, critical infrastructure protection, and strategic communication. To test and increase resilience and to support decision-making processes, it is appropriate to regularly perform exercises with simulated hybrid attacks and practice reactions to them.

Deterrence. It is vital to demonstrate determination, stability, consistency and speed in determining measures to deter a potential enemy. The adversary must be aware that the consequences of his action will cause a significant and painful strike back. The strength of countermeasures and the determination and readiness to use them must be demonstrated regularly and proactively. It is appropriate to use military force as a deterrent, but military actions must be aligned with the overall strategy to contribute to achieving the political goal. NATO has not yet shown much in terms of deterrence. The measures concerning Russia are reactive rather than proactive and do not appear to meet their objectives fully. In a NATO review video<sup>17</sup>, Kurt Volker, former US ambassador to NATO, pointed out: "What creates de-escalation is a strong response, that causes Russia to think twice about going any further, stabilizes a tense situation and then allows it to deescalate. This has all been still very reactive, very slow, many of the statements we have heard from NATO leaders have been: If Russia goes further, then we will take additional steps. It ought to be other way around."

Response. Minor or non-kinetic attacks can often be carried out covertly to conceal the actual attacker and thus avoid responsibility and consequences. Hybrid attacks require a hybrid reaction. Diplomatic, economic, cyber, information or kinetic attacks must also be replied to by a whole range of synchronized countermeasures; otherwise, the desired effect will not be sufficient. Swift and firm responses require rapid and coordinated decision-making at the strategic political and military levels. Therefore, it is essential to have constantly prepared and regularly updated packages of countermeasures that the victim or allies can take in a relatively short time and with good effect.

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<sup>17</sup> NATO Review, *Hybrid war – hybrid response?*  
<<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ferbM4hqkUA>> (1.11.2022).

## Military Response Options

The frequent predominance of non-military means in waging hybrid warfare requires various non-military responses. Economic sanctions, counter-disinformation campaigns, and political and diplomatic pressure can achieve success, mainly in the non-kinetic phase of the conflict. However, they have to be supported by adequate military tools.

In particular, it means the deployment of experienced individuals to reach the level required by national authorities. This requirement cannot be met only by transforming the doctrinal environment but also requires the systematic training of key individuals and their supervision. At the same time, the need to understand the local specifics comes to the fore<sup>18</sup>.

In addition to the mentioned personnel, it can also be the deployment of military capabilities, which are oriented towards applying physical phenomena to the armed forces equipment. A typical example is non-lethal weapons that can use chemical substances, electrical or electromagnetic waves, sound waves, optical and other effects<sup>19</sup>.

The deployment of autonomous systems, which are gradually becoming a reality in armed conflicts, also comes into consideration<sup>20</sup>. On the one hand, they show significant effectiveness; on the other hand, they are controversial and offer many negative psychological aspects. Nevertheless, we should reckon with them<sup>21</sup>.

In his interview, Mark Galeotti said: “The military provides a series of capacities within a highly integrated military, political, economic, social media, intelligence campaign to achieve your ends”<sup>22</sup>,

This chapter presents a brief overview of possible MROs that could complement other forms of non-military responses. MROs must be chosen to meet the objectives set at the strategic political level. When selecting them, it is necessary to evaluate their mutual advantages and disadvantages and deduce conclusions regarding feasibility and acceptability from this comparison. During crisis response planning, MROs are developed at the military strategic

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<sup>18</sup> J. Kompan, M. Hrnčiar, *The Security Sector Reform of the Fragile State as a Tool for Conflict Prevention*, “Politické Vedy” 2021, Vol. 24 (2), pp. 87-107.

<sup>19</sup> N. Świętochowski, *Broń nieśmiercionośna jako środek umacniania bezpieczeństwa państwa*, Poznań 2018.

<sup>20</sup> J. Ivan, M. Šustr, O. Pekař, L. Potužák, *Prospects for the Use of Unmanned Ground Vehicles in Artillery Survey*, [In:] *Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Informatics in Control, Automation and Robotics*, Lisbon 2022, pp. 467-475.

<sup>21</sup> R. Stojar, J. Fučík, L. Frank, *Wars Without Soldiers and Casualties or Victories in Hearts and Minds?*, [In:] *Modelling and Simulation for Autonomous Systems. 6<sup>th</sup> International Conference MESAS 2019, Palermo, Italy, October 29-31 2019, Revised Selected Papers*, ed. J. Mazal, A. Fagiolini, P. Vasik, Palermo 2020, pp. 372-378.

<sup>22</sup> O. Manea, *op. cit.*



level. MROs are analyzed, adjusted and drafted to ensure their best usefulness using collaborative planning and interaction at military strategic, operational and even tactical levels. Properly designed MROs should enable achieving the strategic military objectives and thus establish conditions to attain desired end state. They must be achievable with available resources and means acceptable to political authorities. It is essential to conduct a risk analysis for each drafted MRO and provide decision-makers with risk -assessment and possibilities for its mitigation.

The following list of possible MROs does not aim to name all possible MROs. Similarly, the assessment of individual options' risks, advantages and disadvantages are considerably simplified and generalized. When planning a crisis response for the conditions of a specific conflict, they must be designed more specifically and adjusted for the results of the analysis of the operating environment. The order of the presented MROs does not mean that they are proposed or applied in a specific order and is not based on any qualitative or quantitative assessment of their risks or benefits. The package is based on observations of recent and ongoing conflicts and contains deduced and fictitious options.

*Table 1. Military response options.*

<b>Military response option</b>	<b>Advantages/Benefits</b>	<b>Risks/Weaknesses</b>
<p><u>1. Share military intelligence</u></p> <p>Example: NATO provides member or partner country intelligence contributing to successful attacks against senior military leaders and other high pay-off targets.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- providing an asymmetric advantage to an ally or partner country facing hybrid threats,</li> <li>- cost-effective,</li> <li>- possible also without direct employment of military units on the battlefield,</li> <li>- ‘clean hands’,</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- provoking the enemy if revealed or conducted overtly,</li> <li>- the risk of conflict escalation after crossing ‘red lines’,</li> </ul>
<p><u>2. Supply of weapons and military equipment</u></p> <p>Example: Donations of weapons and military aid by NATO and allied countries to arm attacked countries.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- large-scale supplies can have a significant impact, and act as a force multiplier, perhaps even reversing the balance of power on the battlefield,</li> <li>- sophisticated modern weaponry can provide the receiver with a whole range of known</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- vulnerable supply chains,</li> <li>- low level of technical interoperability between donating and receiving armies requires additional measures (e.g. training),</li> <li>- delivery of supplies has to be swift to be effective,</li> <li>- attacks on supply chains</li> </ul>

<b>Military response option</b>	<b>Advantages/Benefits</b>	<b>Risks/Weaknesses</b>
	capabilities, - attrition of the aggressor without direct military confrontation with the providing countries,	can cause collateral damage and engage non-interested countries in the conflict,
<p>3. <u>Conduct military exercises in the region of crisis</u></p> <p>Example: Conducting a large-scale military exercise involving allies and partners.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- international military exercise with the involvement of a large number of allies shows coherence and determination,</li> <li>- act as deterrence of an aggression,</li> <li>- real action rehearsal opportunity,</li> <li>- increasing the level of interoperability,</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- cost demanding,</li> <li>- the considerable risk of conflict escalation,</li> </ul>
<p>4. <u>Conduct military advisory and training missions</u></p> <p>Example: EU training mission within the endangered region of interest to contribute to the reform of the regional defence sector.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- strengthening the resilience of receiving country against hybrid threats,</li> <li>- the presence of EU units demonstrates the commitment,</li> <li>- a powerful signal of political support,</li> <li>- low risk of conflict escalation,</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- the long time needed to bring benefits,</li> <li>- limited scope due to the partner's limited capabilities,</li> </ul>
<p>5. <u>Develop military infrastructure, increase storage capacity</u></p> <p>Example: Large-scale investments in the defence infrastructure, military mobility, building up stores of fuel, and ammunition, and preparing a prepositioned stock of heavy armament.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- reducing strategic vulnerabilities,</li> <li>- building resilience against hybrid attacks,</li> <li>- infrastructure investment can enhance deterrence,</li> <li>- improving the efficiency of movement,</li> <li>- allowing rapid strategic movement of forces,</li> <li>- low risk of conflict escalation,</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- long-term actions,</li> <li>- cost demanding,</li> <li>- the effects may not appear immediately,</li> </ul>
<p>6. <u>Enhance military presence in the region of</u></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- a show of force</li> <li>- demonstration of the</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- can be perceived as a conflict provoking,</li> </ul>

<b>Military response option</b>	<b>Advantages/Benefits</b>	<b>Risks/Weaknesses</b>
<p><u>crisis</u></p> <p>Example: NATO members and partners enhance forward presence in the most endangered regions.</p>	<p>ability to act immediately in response to an aggression,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- enhancing readiness and interoperability,</li> <li>- a signal of commitment and coherence,</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- the willingness to accept foreign troops' presence can vary significantly between partners,</li> <li>- must be of sufficient level to act as a natural deterrent,</li> </ul>
<p>7. <u>Relieve or replace partners to free forces for responding to hybrid attacks</u></p> <p>Example: Reduction or replacement of NATO eastern flank countries' contributions to international crisis management operations.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- countering hybrid threats by native forces is less provocative than the involvement of the Alliance or third countries,</li> <li>- not increasing the conflict between other actors,</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- the necessity to replace relieved troops ,</li> <li>- is unlikely to have a significant impact,</li> </ul>
<p>8. <u>Strengthening non-military forces by military units</u></p> <p>Example: Enemy hybrid attacks cause refugee waves exceeding the capabilities of non-military crisis response and law enforcement agencies.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- if the intervention is carried out in the territory of the partner country, the signal of coherence and commitment,</li> <li>- deterrent effect,</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- deployed military units are not immediately available in case of conflict escalation,</li> </ul>
<p>9. <u>Development of 'hybrid aggression response plans' and their integration into long-term planning</u></p> <p>Example: Strategic level exercise focused on Identifying the most likely enemy course of action and creation of contingency plans.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- identification of own weak points and determining requirements for their elimination,</li> <li>- building resilience,</li> <li>- increasing readiness and level of civil-military cooperation,</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- challenges caused by rapidly changing, the complex and unpredictable security environment,</li> </ul>
<p>10. <u>Enhance capabilities for the rapid integration of Allied forces</u></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- a show of permanent NATO presence,</li> <li>- identifying logistical</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- the willingness to accept foreign troops' presence can vary significantly</li> </ul>

<b>Military response option</b>	<b>Advantages/Benefits</b>	<b>Risks/Weaknesses</b>
<p>Example: NATO opens force integration units in endangered countries to facilitate rapid deployment of high-readiness forces.</p>	<p>infrastructure and transportation routes,  - deliberate planning of rapid integration and movement of forces,  - fostering collaboration between NATO nations,</p>	<p>between partners,  - the considerable risk of conflict escalation,</p>
<p>11. <u>Perform strategic deployment exercises</u></p> <p>Example: USA and NATO members conduct emergency deployment readiness exercises to show the ability to deploy to the zone of conflict worldwide.</p>	<p>- actual combat deployment rehearsal,  - testing the ability to conduct strategic movement with short or no notice to move,  - strengthening the NATO deterrence and defensive posture,  - testing reception and host nation support capability,</p>	<p>- high risk of conflict escalation,  - cost demanding,</p>
<p>12. <u>Conduct hidden special operations in the conflict zone</u></p> <p>Example: US conduct a small-scale special operation to provide military assistance for the endangered country against enemy infiltration efforts.</p>	<p>- enhances partner ties,  - relatively low cost,  - signals commitment,</p>	<p>- very high risk of conflict escalation,</p>
<p>13. <u>Train military forces of the invaded country</u></p> <p>Example: NATO member state provides military training to personnel of the country facing kinetic attacks</p>	<p>- allows continuous replenishment of defending units,  - an effective way to train units for the use of new types of weapons supplied by NATO countries,  - training of mobilized personnel in a safe environment,</p>	<p>- cost and time demanding,  - high risk of the conflict spreading to providing country's territory,</p>
<p>14. <u>Enforce a no-fly zone</u></p> <p>Example: UN security council passes a</p>	<p>- control of the air space over the conflict zone,  - strong deterrent effect,  - a decisive signal of</p>	<p>- direct involvement of military forces in the conflict,  - very high risk of conflict</p>

<b>Military response option</b>	<b>Advantages/Benefits</b>	<b>Risks/Weaknesses</b>
resolution prohibiting unauthorized flights over specific areas by tasking member states to create a no-fly zone.	cohesion of the tasked member states,	escalation, - the necessity to take offensive actions against no-fly zone violations ,
<p>15. <u>Combat operation in response to a kinetic attack</u></p> <p>Example: Based on Article V NATO launches a combat operation to defend the territory of attacked member state(s).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- a clear and vigorous response to the enemy's kinetic action,</li> <li>- a most effective way to deter the enemy from further attacks ,</li> <li>- unprecedented confirmation of collective self-defence mechanism and NATO's cohesion and commitment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- extremely high risk of conflict escalation,</li> <li>- 'no other option' scenario, if NATO fails to conduct direct military action, the basic principles of its existence would be violated,</li> <li>- the risk of world war if global powers are involved,</li> <li>- the risk of use of weapons of mass destruction.</li> </ul>

## Conclusion

The article outlined a package of possible military response options in hybrid warfare. Due to the absence of a universal definition of the concept of hybrid warfare, the authors first introduced several well-known and familiar reports. They tried to determine the concept of hybrid warfare by framing its concept into space, actors and methods commonly used. The need to respond to hybrid threats in a hybrid way, ideally proactive and not reactive, was emphasized in the second chapter, where fundamental pillars of a successful fight against hybrid threats were also discussed.

The results of the work, the MROs package, were presented in the third part of the work. MROs, as an effective supplement to non-military response options, must support the achievement of political goals. Properly designed MROs should enable achieving the strategic military objectives and thus establish conditions to attain desired end state. They must be achievable with available resources and means acceptable to political authorities. The list of presented MROs does not aim to name all possible options.

Similarly, the assessment of individual options' risks, advantages and disadvantages are considerably simplified and generalized. When planning a crisis response for the conditions of a specific conflict, they have to be designed more specifically and adjusted for the results of the analysis of the operating

environment. Due to the rapidly changing, complex and unpredictable security environment, such analysis should be conducted regularly. The menu of MROs, therefore, should be periodically updated, individual response options adjusted and reactions to hybrid threats scrutinizingly rehearsed. We are witnessing so many new, sometimes surprising or innovative responses, including military ones, that it is impossible to create a final menu of military responses.

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