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THE ROLE OF KREMLIN PROPAGANDA MACHINE IN THE ‘FRAME-GAMES’ OF INTERNATIONAL AGENDA²

Abstract:

Nowadays, when the international agenda resembles a training ground for ‘frame-games’ of influential international players, all political actors try to strengthen their interpretation and position themselves as a force to be reckoned with. Among the propaganda machines that are operating at full capacity the Russian propaganda machine is the one one of which we should talk about today. Although Russia's soft power is not named among the influential soft power forces in the international rankings, its influence in the post-Soviet space is still noticeable. The Kremlin is not a dominant interna-tional actor that would be able to use widely the components of economic or cultural soft power, but the informational influence is still high. Moscow successfully exploits the contributions of other forces and adopts them to its own interests. Therefore, it is impossible to talk about strengthening the Regional Cooperation in Europe and the Euro-Atlantic Area without considering Russia's factor. I will try to briefly illustrate the obvious and hidden scale of information pressure by which Russia, as an external force, is able to realize its political, military and economic goals. I would also like to point out that the military actions aimed at expanding the Kremlin's influence outside Russia have started with military aggression against Georgia.

Keywords:

Propaganda, Russian policy, fear factor, the Immortal Regiment, Russia, Georgia

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Propaganda as a tool of the soft power

According to the political theorists propaganda can have the most powerful influence through activating the fear factor in people. That's why it's very important to identify the impact on the political decision-making process made by propaganda indirectly, through the activation of fear factor within the society and instigation of a social turmoil in this way. Nowadays the best example of how it works is the Kremlin Propaganda-machine in action. The main target of Kremlin external propaganda is the post-Soviet area, which is still perceived as the sphere of its own influence by Moscow. Kremlin was reinforcing the propagandistic network since the start of the current century and even today it's capable to provoke some challenges using the old Soviet-era narratives.

Historical examples testify that one of the strategic goals of the external 'soft power' is usually to polarize society. "Intense polarisation exemplifies differences between in-groups and out-groups. In these conditions, it becomes easier to tap into peoples' insecurities and enlarge them, by crafting messages that confirm their biases about the outgroup and directing public anger against it"– wrote H. Grabbe³ in 2018, after the European Parliament elections, in her article 'Polarization as a political strategy', in the *Communication Director* (online edition). Definitely the condition described above is highly desirable even for external actors driven by their own particular interests.

In order to accomplish the goal of polarization soft power needs support – both ideological and institutional.

It's easily understandable how the soft-power works. First, a platform is created - a non-governmental organization, a media network, a public movement and/or a company disguised as a commercial entity, capable of hiring highly paid employees. The existence of such companies is particularly important as it provides possibility of a direct funding for people which is strengthening the soft power actions. Successful organizations gather around people with authority. Among them are real ideological supporters of soft-power, some of them are dependent on funding, so they act solely on material interests. There is also another category, for example, those who are blackmailed and forced by their past mistakes to deliberately stand for a foreign soft power. Thus, through the organizations listed above and the individuals shortened to them the soft power is able to form a kind of pillar, the backbone of the ideologic supporters, whom it can dictate to speak and act when needed. Additionally, a striking example of such a force is the Russian patriotic movement 'The Immortal Regiment.

³ H. Grabbe, *Polarisation as a political strategy*, <<https://www.communication-director.com/issues/making-difference-communicating-corporate-citizenship/polarisation-political-strategy/>> (30.06.2020).

‘The Immortal Regiment’

This regiment organized its first march in Tbilisi on the 72nd anniversary of the victory over fascism in 2017. At first, the march was relatively small. The Russian soft power mobilized only its own resources and a small number of elderly veterans, but this was enough for international Russian news channels to report on the matter. A slightly larger procession took place in 2018. The Russian international media, of course, gave this event an even more important connotation. In May 2019 the Regiment was held in the capital of Georgia, already accompanied by the Soviet propaganda and the Soviet patriotic songs. There was no emphasis on the scale of the march in the international agenda, it was only reported that the march had taken place. However, on October 4, 2019 the Russian Immortal Regiment was transformed into a political organization in Georgia, and the ‘Georgian Patriotic-Social Movement Immortal Regiment’ was officially registered.

In 2016, the Immortal Regiment also reached Warsaw⁴. In 2019, according to the official website of the ‘Russkiy Mir’, hundreds of people joined the procession of the Immortal Regiment on May 9 in Warsaw⁵. The Immortal Regiment held its memorial march in Bucharest for the first time in 2016 at the Center for Russian Science and Culture⁶. Since then the event has become an annual one. The website of the Immortal Regiment indicates that there are more than a 100 members of the Romanian Immortal Regiment⁷. In 2019 this event was also supported by the Russian Patriarch, who was visiting Romania at that time.

In 2019 the Immortal Regiment marched in the cities of the U.S., Canada, France, Italy and Spain⁸. The story of this organization is as follows. The idea of an immortal regiment was established in the Russian city of Tomsk in 2011-12, officially registered in 2014, as a non-governmental organization, but with the Kremlin's financial backing it received international attention in 2015 when the action was held in 17 countries. In 2016 the Immortal Regiment has been already deployed in 42 countries. Last year, on May 9, they marched in about 50 countries, and today the movement has expanded to 80 countries. Traditionally, this organized Russian march is considered the most important event in Russia itself and in the territories occupied by Russia – in case of Georgia – in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region, and in case of Ukraine – in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.

⁴ *Immortal Regiment march held in Warsaw for first time*, <<https://tass.com/society/874606>> (30.06.2020).

⁵ *Hundreds of People Took Part in Immortal Regiment in Warsaw*, <<https://www.russkiy-mir.ru/en/news/256693/>> (30.06.2020).

⁶ R. Ionescu, *ROMANIA, BUCHAREST - MAY 9 2016: Veterans, young people took part in Russian Science and Culture Center in Bucharest celebrating the victory against German Nazi paying tribute to World War Two heroes*, <<https://www.shutterstock.com/video/clip/24248003-romania-bucharest---may-9-2016-veterans>> (30.06.2020).

⁷ *Akcyja «Biessmiertnyj polk» w trzecie raz proszla w Buchariestie*, <<https://iregiment.com/news/romania/1354/>> (30.06.2020).

⁸ *Immortal Regiment marches across the globe*, <https://www.rbth.com/lifestyle/330343-immortal-regiment-2019-world>> (30.06.2020).


This military-patriotic march has become a powerful ideological weapon of Putin's Russia in recent years. The official idea of the movement is to honor the memory of the soldiers who died in World War II. In fact, this large-scale 'international movement' sponsored by Moscow, as the Russian president says himself, serves to 'preserve the historical truth' that 'society and people must be spiritually reconciled and do not have the right to revise history'. Of course, here they mean that the only truth is Russian official interpretation of history.

Experts in Georgia explicitly state that "this is a weapon of information warfare. Their official transformation into a political organization means that the doors are open to the Russian hybrid war with its propaganda components, as well as to other components, for example the economic one: trade dependence of Georgia on the Russian market is raised, which is traditionally used by Russia against the Georgian statehood".⁹

We are far from thinking that ordinary participants of this march support the interests of foreign countries. These are the only deceived people who, in pursuit of their ideals, unwittingly support Russian propaganda. However, it is clear that the organizers of these actions are usually those who act in the scopes of foreign interests. They gather like-minded people around themselves and provide them with both ideological and financial interest, the so called influence agents.

Kremlin's 'Propaganda Machine' and its structure

Fig. 1. Structure of the Kremlin's 'Propaganda Machine'.



Source: own work.

⁹ D. Sikharulidze, The Atlantic Council of the Chairman of the Board interview to TV "Mtavari Arkhi" ("The Main Channel"), October 11, 2019.

The Kremlin's propaganda machine today, if you look at its structure, looks like the picture shown above. 'Propaganda machine' is a strictly hierarchical propaganda system. It is staffed by specialists from different professions. The system consists of subsystems, most of which are disguised as 'independent' or 'public' media holdings. The subsystems can be set up as independent units, such as media and online-media, NGOs, institutes, etc., or successfully integrated into an existing organization, as its part or a branch. Directives come straight from Kremlin, which communicates directly with the propaganda machine management, which includes leading Russian media owners (including international 'Russia Today', 'TASS', 'Ria Novosti', etc.) and top executives, Russian President's ideologists, lobbyists and the political consultants. This environment is itself a guarantee that the main message coming from the Kremlin will be disseminated to the public through various media controlled by members of the same group.

However, the Kremlin's propaganda machine has a background support – the so called Web Brigades, which create an artificial web of supporters on the Internet, who replicate the Kremlin's narrative. These brigades have their own content managers, including copywriters, bloggers and creative staff, such as photo and graphic specialists, caricatures and demotivators, their own SEO groups and commentary specialists – the so called Internet Trolls.

Some subsystems of the Propaganda-machine have the so-called Wiki-groups, which are engaged in constant editing of the Wikipedia articles (not only Russian but articles on various languages, including English) and conforming them to official Kremlin interpretations.

We won't waste your time on a detailed description of this machine, as its structure already has been much talked about and written about. We can only say that this machine successfully penetrates the international media agenda today and affects the media, which show international affairs to the politically active societies of our countries.

Hence, the question in our focus is: what influence does Kremlin's propaganda have on a policy-making process in post-soviet countries? We examine who can give a hand to the Kremlin from internal political actors of post-soviet countries (doesn't matter if done on purpose or unwittingly) to have an impact on people's minds, what kind of influence it might be and what outputs might Kremlin get *when* the real campaign is turned on.

Saying 'when' instead of 'if' was an artificial accent, because our history shows that ignoring the alert signals might be harmful for European society and it takes a lot of financial resources to fix the mistakes caused by ignorance.

Kremlin's key messages

To identify the influence of Moscow propaganda we measure its weight in the international agenda. We distinguish harmful and useful narratives for long-term strategic development of the country and find some similarities in the

political preferences of the post-soviet countries, namely, in Georgian, Romanian and Polish local political actors' agendas and narratives, which activate fear factor in local society's consciousness and which intersect with outside propaganda.

Still, what are the Kremlin's key messages to our countries that it still considers its sphere of influence? First, soft power seeks values that are emotionally charged, painful, and therefore important to society at a given time, such as young people's lives, social welfare and justice.

It is well known that the Kremlin uses the cliché of 'centuries-old friendship' and 'elder brother' in its positioning (of course, 'elder' among the brothers means Russia).

In the international agenda, the Kremlin is also positioning itself as a 'defender of fairness' and the 'supporter of the oppressed', including the interests of ethnic and religious minorities. We will return to this question since the Kremlin uses this narrative to gather minorities and their organizations around its soft power.

Of course, the Kremlin uses these clichés when explaining its actions in international politics, which is natural. It is well known that the Kremlin used as an excuse the imaginary need to protect the ethnic Abkhazians and South Ossetians living on the territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a pretext for aggression against Georgia, as well as the need to protect the ethnic Russians living in eastern Ukraine during the aggression against Ukraine.

At this point, however, we will not focus on clichés that are easy to read. Even more important is the timely and accurate identification of narratives beyond which the Kremlin does not appear directly, but the dominance of the idea is its straightforward interest.

One of the narratives of the Kremlin, which is spread among various, politically active social groups in our countries, is that we can give ourselves the right to be neutral, and if we strive for large alliances, this harms our national interests.

Of course, like all other considerations, this assumption has a right to exist, since membership in any alliance carries additional obligations. Therefore, it can be attractive to the part of society that is not deeply knowledgeable in political science and establishes logical connections situationally, based only on the information directly offered by local agenda makers.

How we define useful and harmful narratives

However, when we talk about harmful and useful narratives for the long-term strategic development of the country we mean that these narratives are relevant to the main documents on national security in force or contradict them. And these documents were adopted taking into account key national interests that ensure the long-term strategic development of the country.

For example, Georgia's national security concept explicitly states that the European and Euro-Atlantic integration is the country's national interest.

Thus, the Russian narrative that a small country can remain neutral, that it doesn't need an alliance with anyone else, directly contradicts the core values by which the country chose the pro-European and pro-Atlantic path. These values are democracy and human rights, including the right to private property.

It should be noted here that the most cunning (insidious, treacherous) propaganda attacks aimed to provoke politically active circles to demand a revision of constitutions and key legislative security documents. Therefore, mostly, external propaganda intersects with precisely those political statements that directly or indirectly contradict these laws.

It should also be noted that Russian propaganda is quite flexible, though it usually and steadily uses social and economic factors to strengthen its narrative.

For example, the aspiration of Georgia for the European and Euro-Atlantic integration runs counter to the narrative of 'the country's economic dependence on the Russian market'. After the Russian embargo on Georgia stimulated development rather than paralyzing the Georgian economy, the aforementioned narrative was temporarily transformed into the 'Advantages of the Russian Market' propaganda. Today, however, there is a tendency to think that the Russian propaganda will return to the old harsh wording and to make apocalyptic predictions for Georgia's economy, such as a 'complete disaster' without the Russian market.

Due to our ongoing research, our focus is the fear factor, which is widely used by Russian propaganda for countering the pro-European and pro-Euro Atlantic direction of development of post-soviet countries. The main narrative of the Kremlin for the frame-games in the international agenda is that openness forces us to open the borders and adds threats from outside. In the case of Georgia, there is the unchanged mainstream narrative of the Kremlin about, on the one hand, the threat of 'Turkization' in the region, and on the other hand, the international problem of the 'Islamic threat' – these narratives are still in use. Against this backdrop, in case of Georgia, there is a widespread interpretation that 'without Russia Georgia will face all these serious international challenges alone, because the small country is insignificant for the West, and neither Europe nor NATO and the United States will risk spoiling their relations with strong Russia because of small Georgia.'

It is interesting that the Turkish campaign against the Kurds in mid-October 2019 and the confrontation between Russia and Turkey in Syria led to a significant increase in the Russian narrative of the 'threat of Turkization' in social networks and information space in Georgia. At the moment, when the attention of the whole world is focused on events in Syria and the actions of Turkey, the various forms of this narrative were spread in the Georgian media agenda, and the main distributors were the representatives of ethnic Armenian minorities, which are affiliated with the Russian soft power. Despite some efforts this harmful narrative did not take the form of a real informational

campaign. This may be explained by the fact that the narratives about ‘Turkization’ and ‘Islamic danger’, which coincide with the Russian narratives and arouse rational and irrational fears in Georgian society, came into conflict with each other and, thus, at this time have been balanced with one another.

Fear Factor in Propaganda

Definitely, here we must outline the fear factor in propaganda. Here is the opinion of Dr. Simon Scheller, researcher at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy: “Fear appeals constitute a frequent theme of populist rhetoric. One potential motive for this is that they decrease people’s reliance on partisan habits and increase openness to new information. Political actors can use this effect to attract more ideologically distant groups of voters, but not without drawbacks.”¹⁰ Dr. Scheller speaks about the strategic use of fear appeals in the framework of the Bounded-Confidence model, where he found that attracting undecided voters between two opinion clusters is decisive for the success of a party’s fear appeal strategy. “Hence, fear appeals can increase a party’s reach for new supporters, yet only if the party manages to clearly differentiate itself from ideological competitors”¹¹, Dr. Scheller said.

Of course, this opinion is true even when supporters need to gather not around any internal party, but in general over a particular rhetoric. So, when we speak about the fear-factor, used by the Russian propaganda against Georgian society, we must also mention the common fears, for instance the interpretations about ‘Western threats to erase nationality in Georgia’. This kind of narratives are permanently reproduced and translated to Georgian society in the background mode. In particular, in this context, special emphasis is placed to perceive certain ideas as negative, for example liberalism as a ‘harmful’ ideology, tolerance as a ‘harmful’ value, and sexual minorities as an ‘unhealthy’ part of society. Ultimately, the narrative is aimed at radicalizing society and reaching out to sexual minorities.

Religious fears are also intensified in the background campaigns. Of course, it is directed to radicalize society - the Kremlin also successfully uses its religious identity. For example, in November 2019 in Georgia a huge campaign was started and aimed to discredit the Church.

Here are some fear appeals forced by the Kremlin to spread in Georgian media agenda. One fear-factor-based anti-NATO narrative claimed that Georgia’s NATO membership would lead to the loss of Georgian territories and further conflict with Russia. Here we have a different interpretations – some of them warn Georgia of an increased risk of military conflict with Russia and negative consequences if Georgia joins NATO. Another interpretation asserted

¹⁰ S. Scheller, *The Strategic Use of Fear Appeals in Political Communication*, “Political Communication”, vol. 36, issue 4, 2019, pp. 586-608.

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

that the Alliance is providing a false promise of membership to Tbilisi. In this version, Georgia's NATO integration process came to a halt in 2008 when Russia asserted its position by waging a war against Georgia. According to another interpretation, NATO is preparing for a war with Russia, quoting an 'expert' insinuated that NATO officers were training to fight an armed conflict in the Caucasus.

Permanent repetitions of these accents by the media in the background regime have led to the fact that today in Georgia Russia is perceived as 'the force to be reckoned with' twice as often as it was 10 years ago. That is why it met a fertile ground in Georgian society, experiencing the permanent propaganda pressure to get frightened, when a message from Dmitriy Medvedev was received on October 19 2019, when the Russian Prime Minister said that Russia would respond to Georgia's NATO aspirations by military action. It is noteworthy that the main purpose of Medvedev's interview with the Serbian media was not a threat to Georgia but a message to Europe that it was time for Europe to find a model of security without NATO. However, reinforcing this message with Georgian examples, in the scopes of the current reality, of course also included threats. The announcement made by Medvedev was preceded by a new wave of Russian creeping occupation of territories of Georgia, when Russian troops occupied new villages and continued 'borderization'. What was the official reaction of Georgia? The weakest, I can say. The only thing that the frightened government took care of was, on the one hand, the excuses to Russian government that Georgia's aspiration to NATO is not against Russia but only for the well-being of Georgian citizens, and, on the other hand, forcing Georgian society to 'calm down'. Of course, the public became more outraged. As a result we got escalated polarization of the society, additional homeless people and new Georgian villages controlled by the Russian military forces. That is the tactical success of Russian both forces in a particular round – soft power with military power.

Polarization of the society as a goal of the harmful propaganda

During the last year there were a number of conversations about polarization in Georgia. The President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, even commented on the issue in his Batumi speech¹². One of the components of polarization, though not the sole factor, is division in society over actors, issues, and institutions.


With persistent and growing talk of 'polarization' in Georgia, CRRC-Georgia¹³ examined the actors, issues, and institutions that people think divide the society. The April 2019 research of CRCC (Caucasus Research Resource

¹² *President of European Council: 'Don't Let Yourself Become Divided'*, <<https://civil.ge/archives/312983>> (30.06.2020).

¹³ *CRCC/NDI, What Divides and What Unites Georgian Society?*, <<http://crrc.ge/ka/blog/what-divides-and-what-unites-georgian-society/1113>> (30.06.2020).

Center)/NDI¹⁴ shows that there are fewer perceived reasons for division in rural areas and among ethnic minorities.

Fig. 2. What factors divide or unite Georgian society



Source: *Public attitudes in Georgia, Results of the survey of April 2019*, <<https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/na2019ge/codebook/>> (30.06.2020).

The results of the poll are interesting. Although ethnic minorities perceive fewer divisions, they also think that different issues divide the country: minorities are more likely to think that western actors create division, while ethnic Georgians are more likely to blame Russia and domestic institutions. One factor does unite ethnicities however: the most commonly cited source of division, no matter the respondent’s ethnicity, was politicians.

The study shows that minorities that receive information mainly from Russian-language sources perceive the West as a divisive factor, and Russia as a unifying factor, while the Georgian-speaking population calls Russia one of the main factors that divide them.

Does this mean that minorities in Georgia really have problems? If we look at the official sources, then we will clearly see that the vast majority of non-governmental organizations operating in the country study the issues of

¹⁴ *Public attitudes in Georgia, Results of the survey of April 2019*, <<https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/na2019ge/codebook/>> (30.06.2020).


minorities and work to deal with these problems. Nevertheless, the language barrier remains a problem, since it is well known that the soft power of Russia usually works especially effectively with minorities who receive information in Russian.

Of course, all this indicates the fact that much work remains to be done with ethnic minorities in Georgia, in contrast to other post-Soviet countries, which due to their geographical location integrated much faster and closer to Europe.

Fig. 3. What factors divide or unite Georgian society.

Do the following divide or bring us together as a society? (% of those responding either divides or unites)

(NDI/CRRC-Georgia, December 2018/April 2019)



Source: *Public attitudes in Georgia, Results of the survey of April 2019*, <<https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/na2019ge/codebook/>> (30.06.2020).

The table shows the differences between positions of the ethnic Georgian, ethnic Armenian and ethnic Azerbaijani citizens of Georgia. Pay your attention to the chart, where the data is shown for Russia, NATO and Europe.

With ethnicity, there are three sources of the observed differences. First, ethnic minorities express uncertainty more often than ethnic Georgians. This is particularly true of ethnic Azerbaijanis who report ‘don’t know’ more often than ethnic Armenians.

Second, among those that said each of the above issues either united or divided the country, there are differences in attitudes related to foreign policy. Ethnic Armenians and ethnic Azerbaijanis are significantly less likely to report

that Russia divides the country, and significantly more likely, albeit to a smaller degree, to report that NATO divides the country. Ethnic Azerbaijanis also report that the EU divides the country at a greater rate.

Third, ethnic Georgians are much more critical of domestic actors. Georgians are more likely to say that politicians, educational institutions, the Georgian media, the country's leaders, the current economic system, law enforcement, and NGOs divide the country.

We have this picture despite the fact that the European and Euro-Atlantic integration is recognized as a national interest in the main document of national security of the country. That means Georgia still does not use enough tools or channels to provide the minority with an easy-to-understand, clear information and its sufficient interpretation.

In spite of the fact that the Atlantic Council¹⁵, the NATO Information Center on NATO and the EU¹⁶, and a number of other, institutionally quite powerful NGOs work in Georgia, there are still a lot of gaps that point directly to the weaknesses of state policy. Specifically, research shows that it is necessary to establish institutional mechanisms for the process of strategic communication planning, execution, and coordination.

Conclusion

All of the above proves that not only fake news are harmful to our societies. Of course, there is undoubtedly the particular harmfulness of the lies propagated by the fake news and officials due to the propaganda interests. Chernobyl example¹⁷ is the proof of this, when information hidden by the Soviet authorities about the scale of the tragedy claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of people and the health and well-being of millions of Europeans. Yes, false information is harmful. But it is also necessary to protect our societies from the irrational fears generated by external propaganda.

In a given situation, political maturity is crucial. Thus, the only way to raise resistance towards propaganda is education.

Second, it is necessary to coordinate the strategic communication of state organizations. Between 2013 and 2019, both the number and remuneration of public employees in PR in Georgia continued to grow. But the second issue is how coordinated their work has become. This question raises doubts in light of the results that the research on people's attitudes and behaviors show us today.

And third, it is also particularly important. As external forces seek out those weak signs in the governance of our states that will allow their narratives to

¹⁵ See: *The Atlantic Council of Georgia*, <<http://acge.ge/language/en/>> (30.06.2020).

¹⁶ See: *Information Center on NATO and EU for Effective Communication*, <<http://info-center.gov.ge/en>> (30.06.2020).

¹⁷ K. Brown, *Chernobyl: The secrets they tried to bury – how the Soviet machine covered up a catastrophe*, <<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/terror-and-security/chernobyl-secrets-tried-bury-soviet-machine-covered-catastrophe1/>> (30.06.2020).

gain popularity, it is important to pre-detect and cover these niches. Of course, this sounds a bit utopian – what state does not want to fill the gaps in governance. On the other hand, however, understanding and striving for the weaknesses of one's own government to eliminate these weaknesses is a good tool in the fight against the interests of the external forces that direct the propaganda against the state. However, on the other hand, understanding the weaknesses of own governance and eliminating those weaknesses is a good tool against those outside forces acting against the state by using propaganda.

In the case of Georgia, based on the information we have discussed in our study, one of these niches is the timely analysis of minorities' needs, responding quickly to their problems and providing them with accurate and timely information, delivering this information to them via the widest possible range of channels and forms. The other niche is the condition of veterans who do not feel respected enough and appreciated by the state. Apparently, this is what is forcing many of them to gather around the foreign soft power. The same cannot be said in the case of post-Soviet Poland and Romania. Unlike Georgia, these countries have managed to appreciate and provide their veterans with material support. It seems that at the state level it is well-known that veterans should be particularly respected, as these are the people whose example should inspire young militaries and make the desire to defend their homeland even greater.

And the last condition I want to share with you is that Georgia is part of Europe; the turmoil inspired by external forces in Georgia - points to the open possibility of inspiring turmoil in post-Soviet Europe (and not only); External influences that affect Georgia can, in the same way, affect Europe's security. Georgia's example illustrates a scenario that can be used to prevent the likely development of events in any European post-Soviet country. Therefore, when we speak about European security mechanisms, the common instruments of defense, the pursuit of peace through co-operation and the effective peacekeeping mechanisms, it is necessary to consider Georgia in this area, to assess and evaluate its experience. Otherwise, neutralization of the dangers that Europe currently faces, would be much more difficult.

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