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Alika GUCHUA¹
Georgia

**CANCELLATION OF THE TREATY OF 1987
ON THE ERADICATION OF INTERMEDIATE AND SHORTER-
RANGE MISSILES AND ITS IMPACT ON PAN-REGIONAL
SECURITY IN AEGIS OF THE ‘THREE SEAS’ AREA
(BALTIC-ADRIATIC-BLACK SEA SPACE)**

Abstract:

The issue of the international security has become more pressing actual in 21st century due to the appearance of new dangers and challenges in the modern world, which were not typical for the previous century. On the background of geopolitical transition, the role of strategic offensive arms and weapons of mass destruction has become more important. In the modern world, it is important to maintain strategic parity on arms when global challenges pose a serious threat to all humanity. In this paper, we discussed the reasons for the cancellation of the Treaty on the Elimination of intermediate-range and short-range missiles of 1987 and the dangers that are threatening the world. The USA and Russia have officially announced that they are starting modernizing and producing ballistic missiles and what is more important, their policies are forcing other countries to produce similar arms. The paper focuses on the security environment of the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Sea regions, the dangers that resulted from the cancellation of the abovementioned agreement. The Politics of Strategic Bullying in the Bipolar Era, the “Cold War” phenomenon and geopolitical processes of New Cold War is also discussed in this paper. Also, discussing the role of strategic offensive arms and defining NATO's role in ensuring international security has an important place in this paper.

Keywords:

INF Treaty, Nuclear War, Security, Russia, United States, NATO, New START Treaty, New Cold War, Balance of power, Arms control

¹ Alika Guchua, PhD student at Caucasus International University, Assistant Head of the MA Program in International Relations and International Security Studies and Assistant in international Relations at CIU. Email: alika_guchua@ciu.edu.ge

Introduction

The issue of security in the modern international system has become quite urgent in the light of development of crises, new threats and the latest technologies existing in the world. The states are powerless to handle dangers, threats, and challenges facing global security that are increasing day by day without a single effort. The importance of international organizations is therefore increasing, with NATO's role and function becoming more relevant. It is imperative for global policy actors to better understand that their inaction to secure peace and aggressive politics can do great harm to humanity as a whole. In the system of international relations, states create a certain order on which the global security is based on and in this process every state must be equally involved.

Research on contemporary international security issues focuses primarily on global ('vertical') problems. This is explained by the fact that traditional and a number of new threats have a global scope and require global interaction to counter them.

As the nuclear age progressed and technology matured, modernization programmes extended the range and accuracy of delivery vehicles, which allowed planners to lower the yield needed to destroy a target. As weapons became more effective, strategies changed from a blunt spasm of all-out nuclear attack to more refined strike plans with multiple options directed against different combinations of targets for different objectives at different levels of intensity. Shorter-range weapons were developed for battlefield use below the strategic level to defeat military forces in limited scenarios while strategists toiled with theories about controlling or managing escalation below all-out nuclear war. Usability of nuclear weapons was a key factor in this chapter of the nuclear age².

The lack of in-depth information concerning the precise nature of nuclear risk is especially problematic in the contemporary global environment. Rising tensions involving nuclear-armed and other States, lower thresholds in nuclear use driven by technological developments, growing automation in command and control and weapons systems, and new threats in terms of both actors and crises are prominent features of the current international security situation. Detailing the overall risk 'picture' is a critical first step to any mitigation effort³. Global players in world politics must understand the risks associated with international politics and the architecture of global security.

One of the functions of the military force in international relations means to threaten to retaliate and punish the adversary in the event of adverse behavior. Intimidation is a stand-alone example of forceful relationships that

² J. Borrie, T. Caughley, W. Wan, *Understanding Nuclear Weapon Risks*, "United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research", 2017, p. 33.

³ *Ibidem*, pp. 9.

only involves negative sanctions. Intimidation as a strategy is one of the main subjects of research of realism. In its research, the invention of nuclear weapons created particular importance because nuclear intimidation, due to its mutually destructive nature, proved to be not very trustworthy credible foreign policy instrument. When using intimidation strategy, the main point becomes the credibility of the threat, the process by which the threat is given importance.

The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty

In the early stages of the Cold War, the US global geopolitical code was a 'containment policy'. The main point was that the United States of America did not allow for the expansion of communism and the increase of Soviet influence outside the communist area. According to neutralization of the Heartland, the policy was to surround the Soviet Union with military-political blocs the members of which were supposed to be loyal to the United States of America. During the Cold War, NATO, SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS, ASPAC, along with other military-political blocs, took over the function of containment of communism and created a containment arc and surrounded the socialist countries. The creation of intercontinental ballistic missiles, the use of military aviation, the assimilation of space, the progress and appearance of nuclear submarines have made clear the ineffectiveness of the containment policy over time. And in the 1960s, the US changed its containment policy and tactics by so-called intimidation policy which has become a major geopolitical code. The main purpose of this policy was to frighten the Soviet Union by increasing US military nuclear weapons, improving military infrastructure, and producing new types of weapons and thus take full advantage. This policy proved to be very effective and resulted in the defeat of the USSR in the arms race. Along with many other factors, economic crisis of the USSR and economic upswing of the US, the significant difference in scientific and political progress along with the collapse of Gorbachev's reforms has made clear the role of the intimidation policy that eventually led the world to the end of the Cold War. The defeat of one pole has resulted in the destruction of the bipolar system.

Implementation of a nuclear intimidation policy has led to the restriction and reduction of strategic weapons – which is a complex of measures and aims at reducing the production and potential of nuclear missile weapons. One of the most important directions of international politics for the prevention of nuclear war, confidence building and security strengthening. Strategic weapons include: land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles; Submarine Ballistic Missiles; long-range wing missiles of different bases; their launching installations; Strategic cruise missile submarine; Heavy bombers; Intercontinental ballistic missiles, Combatting installations of submarine ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, armament for heavy bombers; Air defense facilities; Space defense facilities; Missile attack detection and warning systems and more.

One of the main achievements of the Nuclear Intimidation Policy is to consider the 1972 US-USSR Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I). Then the 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II). One of the most important treaties may be considered the 1987 Agreement on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. An additional agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons came into force in 1994. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union by the Lisbon Treaty of 1992, the nuclear weapons that had been deployed in the former republics of Soviet Union – in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, were eliminated, and a certain number of nuclear warheads were transferred to the Russian Federation. In 1997, the United States of America and Russia signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Anti-Missile Surveillance and Strategic Arms Limitation and Mitigation. In 2010, the United States of America and the Russian Federation signed a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. We must also consider the conflict between India and Pakistan on February 26, 2019, when both sides had to make smart decisions as part of a nuclear intimidation policy, and the existing conflict did not escalate into a large-scale nuclear war. Which greatly threatens the global security environment.

In the mid-1970s, first in the US, and then in the USSR, laser, infrared, and television systems were developed for guiding missiles to targets. This made it possible to achieve high accuracy of their hitting the target (according to various estimates – up to 30 meters). It is important how the INF Treaty appeared, in the mid-70s of the last century, the USSR began deploying SS-20 medium-range missiles on its territory, which could be equipped with nuclear warheads. In response to this, the Americans, in agreement with NATO, began the deployment of Pershing-2 missiles in Belgium, Great Britain, Italy and Germany in 1983. The armament of Europe provoked massive protests in Germany – the largest in post-war history.

US-Soviet negotiations began in 1981, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan announced the zero-zero proposal under which the United States would forgo its planned deployments if the Soviet Union eliminated its SS-20 and other intermediate-range missiles. Moscow rejected zero-zero, and the first two years of negotiations yielded little common ground between the sides. When the first U.S. GLCMs and Pershing II's arrived in Europe in November 1983, the Soviets broke off the negotiations. The Kremlin seemed to hope that public opposition within NATO countries would derail the U.S. missile deployments. In 1985 the Soviets agreed to resume negotiations. The negotiations made progress in 1986-1987 along the lines of the 'zero-zero' proposal⁴.

The INF Treaty was signed on 8 December 1987 by the United States and the former Soviet Union, and entered into force on 1 June 1988. It required both

⁴ S. Pifer, O. Meier, *Are We Nearing the End of the INF Treaty?*, Arms Control Today, January-February 2018, <<https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-01/features/we-nearing-end-inf-treaty>> (31.12.2019).

countries to eliminate their ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles that could travel between 500 and 5,500 kilometres (between 300 and 3,400 miles) by an implementation deadline of 1 June 1991. By the deadline, the two countries had together destroyed a total of 2,692 short- and intermediate-range missiles: 1,846 Soviet missiles and 846 American missiles. It marked the first elimination of an entire category of weapons capable of carrying nuclear warheads⁵. The INF Treaty's protocol on missile elimination named the specific types of ground-launched missiles to be destroyed and the acceptable means of doing so. Under the treaty, the United States committed to eliminate its Pershing II, Pershing IA, and Pershing IB ballistic missiles and BGM-109G cruise missiles. The Soviet Union had to destroy its SS-20, SS-4, SS-5, SS-12, and SS-23 ballistic missiles and SSC-X-4 cruise missiles. In addition, both parties were obliged to destroy all INF Treaty-related training missiles, rocket stages, launch canisters, and launchers. Most missiles were eliminated either by exploding them while they were unarmed and burning their stages or by cutting the missiles in half and severing their wings and tail sections⁶.

This treaty was then called the beginning of the end of the Cold War. Each side was granted the right to conduct inspections at the facilities of the other side. The contract was unlimited, while each of the parties had the right to terminate it if convincing grounds were found for withdrawing from the agreement.

The signing of the treaty was preceded by decades of the Cold War and the arms race. The United States feared the Soviet Union would strike at its NATO partners in Europe. Moscow understood that missiles of the North Atlantic Alliance are capable of reaching any city of the USSR in less than 10 minutes. The 1987 treaty significantly reduced the threat of nuclear war and missile attacks.

The Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate and Shorter-Range Missiles is one of the key documents that, together with the agreements on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the limitation of strategic offensive arms and missile defense, have provided the world with so-called strategic stability.

Compared to intercontinental missiles with nuclear warheads, medium-range missiles are capable of reaching the target within a few minutes and leave the enemy no chance to prepare for the strike and repel it. In addition, medium-range missiles are mobile, they are transported on special military equipment. If the person to whom the missile attack is directed does not know the exact place from where it will be launched, this further complicates the defense.

⁵ *NATO and the INF Treaty*, North Atlantic Treaty Organization website, 2.08.2019, <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_166100.htm?selectedLocale=en> (31.12.2019).

⁶ D. Kimball, *The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance*, Arms Control Today, August 2019, <<https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty>> (31.12.2019).

According to many experts, the INF Treaty is out of date. The treaty was signed in 1987, when there were two nuclear superpowers, and then short and medium-range missiles posed a great threat to world stability. Now such missiles are being built by many countries, including China. In addition, new weapons have appeared that could violate strategic stability – for example, hypersonic, cybernetic and space weapons.

Following the Soviet Union's collapse at the end of 1991, Russia and several other post-Soviet states assumed the Soviet INF Treaty obligations. The treaty's inspection period ended in 2001. The Special Verification Commission (SVC), established by the treaty as a venue for discussing the treaty's implementation and compliance concerns, with the participation of the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, had its last meeting in 2003 before a 13-year hiatus. In 2005, Russian officials expressed interest in withdrawing from the treaty and suggested to the United States to jointly terminate the accord. Washington refused. In February 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed concern that, although the United States and Russia were banned from having intermediate-range missiles, third countries were developing and fielding such systems, and those countries tended to be in close proximity to Russia. The following October, Putin proposed making the INF Treaty 'global in scope'. The United States and Russia at the UN General Assembly jointly called on third countries to eliminate their intermediate-range missile systems. Moscow did not seriously pursue its proposal, although Russian officials continued to express concern about the proliferation of intermediate-range missiles⁷.

In 2014, the United States first declared Russia in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to produce, possess, or flight-test a GLCM with a range capability between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The United States subsequently identified Russia's violating weapon as the SSC-8 missile system. The Russian designator for this system is 9M729. The United States reaffirmed that Russia is in violation of the INF Treaty in 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019. The violating missile is distinct from the R-500/SSC-7 GLCM and the RS-26 ICBM, and is developed by Novator Design Bureau and Titan Central Design Bureau. Russia has attempted to conceal the nature of the SSC-8 program by obfuscating and lying about the missile's test history⁸.

On October 20, US President Donald Trump announced his intention to withdraw from the INF Treaty, according to him, because of "non-compliance with the terms of the Russian side" (claims are made against the 9M729 cruise missile (SSC-8), the radius of which, according to American data, exceeds 500 km, which is prohibited by the INF Treaty) and "the development of these weapons by China" (which is not bound by this treaty).

⁷ S. Pifer, O. Meier, *Are We Nearing...*

⁸ *The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty*, US Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, 2019, <<https://www.state.gov/inf/>> (31.12.2019).

On December 4, 2018, Secretary Pompeo announced that Russia was in material breach of the INF Treaty, and that the United States would suspend its obligations in 60 days should Russia not return to full and verifiable compliance. This finding was fully supported by NATO Allies. On February 1, 2019, Secretary Pompeo announced that the United States would suspend its obligations under the INF Treaty on February 2, and would also provide Treaty parties with six-month notice of its intent to withdraw from the Treaty, pursuant to Article XV of the Treaty. Unless Russia returns to full and verifiable compliance in 6 months, the U.S. decision to withdraw will stand, and the Treaty will end. These actions were again fully supported by NATO Allies⁹.

The Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles or the INF Treaty for decades has been critical to Euro-Atlantic security. It allowed the destruction of a whole category of nuclear weapons that threatened Europe in the 1980s. All NATO countries agree that the SSC-8 / 9M729 missile system, developed and deployed by Russia, violated the INF Treaty, while posing a significant threat to the security of the Alliance. Despite repeated calls for Russia to return to full and verifiable compliance with the Treaty, Russia continued to develop and deploy systems that violate the Treaty, which led to the termination of the Treaty on August 2, 2019¹⁰.

Adapting NATO's deterrence-defence posture and New START Treaty

In responding to the challenges posed by the Russian INF-range capabilities, the Alliance does not have to start from scratch. It can build on its adaptation measures since 2014. These steps alone, however, are insufficient. The expansion of Russia's long-range strike capabilities, including the deployment of the SSC-8/9M729 missiles, has created gaps in NATO's overall posture that need to be closed¹¹.

It is also unclear what the future of arms control and non-proliferation negotiations holds, particularly related to extending the New START Treaty. A day after the United States' formal withdrawal from the INF Treaty, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper announced that he was in favor of deploying short-range ground-based missiles to Asia in response to China's expanding arsenal of a similar range¹².

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ *NATO and the INF Treaty...*

¹¹ J. Durkalec, *European security without the INF Treaty*, "NATO Review", 30.09. 2019, <<https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/09/30/european-security-without-the-inf-treaty/index.html>> (31.12.2019).

¹² R. Ellehuus, *A NATO Strategy for a Post-INF World*, "Center for Strategic and International Studies", 27.08. 2019, <<https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-strategy-post-inf-world>> (31.12.2019).

China's nuclear modernization, which has – to a large extent – improved the quality rather than the quantity of its nuclear arsenal, illustrates its desire to enhance the robustness of its nuclear forces. As such, it is currently replacing its ageing silo-based missiles with the mobile, solid-fuelled DF-41, which has an estimated range of 12,000 km. China has also developed several MIRVed ICBMs. In parallel, China has developed its sea-based nuclear component: four operational JIN class SSBNs, which can be equipped with JL-2 SLBMs. China is already developing its next-next generation Type 096 SSBN, which will be armed with an upgraded JL-3 SLBM; construction is due to begin in the next several years¹³.

Tensions between the two sides are growing now, and disarmament treaties could play an important role in maintaining stability. START III (the Treaty on Measures to Further Reduce and Limit Strategic Offensive Arms), which limits the proliferation of high-precision long-range weapons systems, expires in February 2021.

In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Barack Obama articulated the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons while also stating that the United States would maintain an effective nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. His speech and the U.S.-Russian negotiation that culminated in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) spurred talk in Europe of the contribution NATO might make to the nuclear disarmament process. Meeting in Lisbon in November 2010, NATO leaders issued a new Strategic Concept for the Alliance and mandated a comprehensive Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) that will address, among other things, NATO's nuclear posture¹⁴.

Against the backdrop of the current situation, more importantly, the cancellation of the INF Treaty undermines confidence in arms control and non-proliferation regimes in general. Which poses a serious threat to global security.

Nevertheless, the new world order (or disorder), which replaces the Cold War and the period after it, brings with it new serious threats. Including, first of all, this refers to the role and place of nuclear weapons in the international security system. Indeed, the main result of the first 70 years of the nuclear age, for all its dangers and huge costs, is that mankind has managed to avoid a nuclear war and create a broad legal system of arms limitation. Thanks to her, over the past quarter century, global nuclear arsenals have been reduced in different categories by 5-7 times.

There is another new threat to global peace; the only effective nuclear agreement between Russia and the United States expires in 2021. It is important


¹³ J. A. Day, *A new era for nuclear deterrence? Modernization, arms control, and allied nuclear process*, "Defence and Security Committee, NATO Parliamentary Assembly" (DSC), 12.10. 2019, <<https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2019-modernisation-arms-control-and-allied-nuclear-forces-day-136-dsc-19-e-rev1-fin>> (31.12.2019).

¹⁴ S. Pifer, *NATO, Nuclear weapons and arms control*, "Foreign Policy at BROOKINGS, Arms Control Series Paper 7, July 2011, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0719_arms_control_pifer.pdf> (31.12.2019).

to maintain and continue the START treaty, while the treaty on the elimination of intermediate and shorter-range missiles has been violated. The New START treaty limits US and Russian deployed strategic nuclear forces, and additionally facilitates inspections and exchanges of information on the status and movements of their intercontinental ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. Signed in 2010, the treaty expires in February 2021 but can be extended for another five years¹⁵.

We can clearly see how important it is to continue the agreement on a new start treat of the aggregate of strategic nuclear forces.

Figure 1: Carriers, deployed and non-deployed, offset charges, according to the exchanges of data of the parties, in dynamics over the duration of the Agreement.



Source: H. Kristensen, *The New START Treaty Keeps Nuclear Arsenals In Check And President Trump Must Act To Preserve It*, Dec 10, 2019, p. 1.

¹⁵ H. Kristensen, *The New START Treaty Keeps Nuclear Arsenals In Check And President Trump Must Act To Preserve It*, "Forbes", 10.12. 2019, <<https://www.forbes.com/sites/hanskristensen/2019/12/10/the-new-start-treaty-keeps-nuclear-arsenals-in-check-and-president-trump-must-act-to-preserve-it/#185978726e74>> (31.12.2019).

The preservation of the treaty clearly meets the interests of both countries, especially because other arms control agreements were canceled, and military tensions are steadily growing. We need to look at how things are going to unfold and how both states make a wise decision. The important thing is for the world not to be in crisis and for the nuclear states not to start arms race in the field of nuclear weapons. Because the arms race that this could ignite would be multidimensional.

Without the INF Treaty and the expiration of the new strategic offensive arms period, there will be no legal restrictions on the world's nuclear arsenal. This threatens global security and makes the world community better think and realize what the consequences of a nuclear war can be for humanity and living organisms. We are aware of various facts when the failure of nuclear systems almost led us to the start of the Third World War and to the destruction of the whole world. Failure in computer systems and the misrepresentation of nuclear decision-makers can lead to worse results in the world.

Pan-regional security in aegis of the 'Three Seas' Area (Baltic, Adriatic-black Sea space)

As for the regional threat in the Baltic, Adriatic and the Black Sea region, it is acquiring very significant significance. In this sea area, it is possible to deploy topical ballistic missiles for military purposes, as well as NATO warships. The Three Seas initiative can play an important role in nuclear deterrence policies.

Therefore, the end of the INF Treaty reflects the radical worsening of European and global security. Its demise cannot be isolated from Russia's recent aggressive actions, its ambitious military modernisation and its efforts to undermine the post-Cold War European security order. The Treaty ceased to restrain Russian behaviour at a time when NATO was already absorbed with addressing challenges from the East and other strategic directions. The termination of the Treaty is also not isolated from the strategic developments elsewhere in the world, in particular the proliferation of intermediate-range missiles in Asia¹⁶.

A world without the INF Treaty is not NATO's choice. The Alliance, however, has no other choice but to address its consequences. The demise of the Treaty brings new military challenges from Russia and therefore new demands on the Allies to maintain NATO's deterrence and defence posture in a way that is fit for purpose. It also calls for adapting the NATO arms control playbook to the changing geopolitical, strategic and technological realities. To a greater extent than before, European NATO Allies have to assess how security in Europe is affected by the increasingly turbulent security environment in the

¹⁶ J. Durkalec, *European security without...*

Asia-Pacific. All of this will create new challenges for Alliance cohesion – a key factor in NATO's endurance and effectiveness in the post-INF Treaty world¹⁷.

Security issues became more relevant after the end of World War II during the “Cold War“, when the scale of creation and development of new types of weapons of mass destruction increased with the development of technology. World War II completely changed the international political system when the types of international systems that existed before were based on a balance of power. With the alignment of forces between the leading states, the state and stability of the international system were determined. The collapse of the international system led to an excessive strengthening or weakening of one of the states, which led to the collapse of the balance of power. This process was followed by large-scale wars and the formation of a new international system in accordance with the creation of a new balance of power.

Cancellation of the Treaty is a prime example of a ‘new Cold War’ in international relations. The United States and Russia will begin the modernization of medium and short-range ballistic missiles. The Russians have already begun the modernization of ground ballistic missiles. It is very likely that the Russians will deploy medium and low power missiles in the Kaliningrad region, from where they can cover almost all of Europe and the South Caucasus. As for the United States, they are likely to use the territory of Germany, Poland, the Baltic countries and the Black Sea region to deploy Aegis, Patriots, as well as offensive ballistic missiles – Tomahawks. US ballistic missiles can penetrate and destroy many of Russia's strategic sites; Americans have more coverage than Russians. This means that the world will become even more tense about the nuclear threat.

The actions of the United States and Russia that led to the liquidation of the Medium and Shorter-Range Missile Treaty weaken stability and pose many risks to global security, including the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The cancellation of these agreements will also lead to the resumption of an unrestrained arms race. That will have disastrous consequences for all of humanity. And in order to avoid chaos, in which there are no rules, restrictions and laws, one must once again weigh all the possible dangerous consequences and start a serious dialogue. It is necessary, without delay, to resume full-fledged negotiations on ensuring strategic stability and security.

Conclusion

After the post-Cold War era of relative global peace, the new global security environment has become more complex, and this progression will

¹⁷ *Ibidem.*

likely worsen in the coming years. The termination of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles leads to the destruction of the principles of strategic stability and a new arms race. It may lead to an uncontrolled multilateral arms race involving strategic, intermediate-range, and tactical nuclear and non-nuclear offensive and defensive weapons, as well as space and cyber warfare systems, laser weapons, and other arms innovations. As a consequence, international armed conflicts are more likely and may instantly escalate into a global nuclear war¹⁸. Medium and shorter-range missiles pose the greatest threat to the world, since they are capable of achieving the goal in a few minutes and leave the enemy no chance to prepare for the strike and repel it.

Now that the treaty is over, we will see the development and deployment of new ballistic weapons. Today, the world is facing a security dilemma when all decisions must be made with great care. The cancellation of the historic agreement could lead to a new arms race between the US, Russia and China. Without global players in world politics, it is impossible to achieve and ensure international peace; therefore, neither the United States nor Russia can provide either nuclear stability or strategic stability in the modern world. But they can attract other global policy players to the negotiating table and make mutually important decisions for world security. Global policy makers need to work together to develop new nuclear arms control has to be brought into line with today's political realities.

The question of modernizing an existing one, or of creating a fundamentally new agreement, in any case, will arise. Moreover, the new treaty should include as many states as possible, which have the potential to create the appropriate weapons, and above all, China. The problem can be solved not through ultimatums and blackmail, but through multilateral negotiations, taking into account the views of all interested parties. We should expect a new framework agreement that will be effective and ensure strategic stability in the world. Until they develop a new treaty on intermediate and shorter-range missiles, until then, the United States and Russia will have to continue and defend the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty until 2026.

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