

ANTE PORTAS

ANTE PORTAS

Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem

ISSN 2353 – 6306

czerwiec 2019

NR 1(12)

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CZASOPISMO RECENZOWANE
Strona internetowa: www.anteportas.pl

ISSN 2353-6306

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Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski 2019

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Projekt okładki: Mateusz Lomber

Redakcja techniczna, korekta i adiustacja: Zespół

Wydawca:

Wyższa Szkoła Biznesu i Przedsiębiorczości w Ostrowcu Świętokrzyskim
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Spis treści (Table of contents):

Od Redakcji (Editor's Note).....9

I. Artykuły (Articles)

Vakhtang Maisaia, Koba Kobaladze

Eurasian geopolitics importance to world politics and China's geostrategy11

Henrique Brenner Gasperin, Lucas Guerra

The Dragon and the Condor: China's rise and Latin America's developmental anxieties25

Maya Urushadze

Projecting the foreign propaganda on the Georgian politics53

Marek Leszczyński

Bezpieczeństwo ekonomiczne, zmiany klimatyczne, wyzwania67

Michał Harkot

Odstraszanie jako element strategii bezpieczeństwa Izraela81

Aleksandra Cieslar

Life after ISIS: the problem of the Islamic State foreign fighters93

George Zviadadze

The beginning of the post-modern geopolitical epoch and the peculiarities of the system of contemporary international relations in the 21st century111

Kakhaber Chapodze

Evolution of the war. Issues of variability or invariance of nature and character of war119

Natalia Slukhai

Composition and structure of the ideological matrix of Russian media131

Wiktor Możgin

State security as an element of national culture – the phenomenon of the all-Russian military-patriotic movement of Yunarmia149

Vadim Volovoj
Political and military lessons of the Russian campaign in Syria163

Isabela de Andrade Gama
Russia: Living from its past?171

II. Recenzje (Reviews)

Sean Burges, *Brazilian foreign policy after the Cold War, University Press of Florida, Gainesville 2009*, pp. 248 (Reviewer: Isabela de Andrade Gama) .185

III. Katedra Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego WSBiP w Ostrowcu Świętokrzyski (Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski College's Department of the National Security)

Department of National Security in the Academic Year 2018/2019.....189

Dla Autorów (for Authors).....191

Dla Recenzentów (For Reviewers).....192

OD REDAKCJI

Z przyjemnością oddajemy Państwu kolejny numer czasopisma naukowego „Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem”. Aktualne wydanie poświęcone jest różnym problemom bezpieczeństwa na całym świecie, w wielowymiarowym kontekście.

W numerze znajdują Państwo między innymi dwa artykuły przybliżające meandry polityki zagranicznej Chin, dotyczącej obszaru Euroazjatyckiego (Vakhtang Maisaia) oraz Ameryki Łacińskiej (Henrique Brenner Gasperin, Lucas Guerra). Połączenie obu materiałów pozwala dostrzec zarówno podobieństwa w głównych działaniach chińskiej dyplomacji, jak i zróżnicowane zastosowanie narzędzi i środków w zależności od wybranego regionu.

Autorzy przybliżają także kwestię polityki rosyjskiej w wielu wymiarach i na wielu obszarach. I tak Maia Urushadze zaprezentowała problematykę obecności rosyjskiej propagandy w gruzińskim dyskursie politycznym; Isabela de Andrade Gama ukazała latynoamerykańskie spojrzenie na mocarstwową politykę Federacji Rosyjskiej wobec Zachodu (zwłaszcza Europy Zachodniej); Vadim Volovoj przedstawił rosyjskie działania militarne w Syrii i wskazał na ich znaczenie dla budowania nowoczesnej armii, a Wiktor Możgin szczegółowo omówił utworzenie, organizację i działalność rosyjskiej paramilitarnej organizacji młodzieżowej – „junarmii”. Tematykę wschodnią uzupełniają artykuł Natalii Slukhai, dotyczący matrycy ideologicznej rosyjskich mediów.

Kolejne artykuły zamieszczone w numerze dotyczą nader aktualnych zagadnień, jakimi są bezpieczeństwo ekonomiczne w kontekście zmian klimatycznych (Marek Leszczyński), strategia bezpieczeństwa Izraela (Michał Harkot) oraz problem powrotu brytyjskich ochotników walczących w szeregach tzw. Państwa Islamskiego na Wyspy Brytyjskie (Aleksandra Cieslar). Publikację uzupełniają także dwa artykuły prezentujące problematykę zmieniającej się roli państwa w stosunkach międzynarodowych (George Zviadadze) oraz ewolucji natury i charakteru wojen (Kakhaber Chapodze).

Mamy nadzieję, że wśród tylu zróżnicowanych tekstów znajdą Państwo coś dla siebie.

Życzymy przyjemnej lektury!

*Zespół redakcyjny
„Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem”*

EDITOR'S NOTE

We are pleased to present to you the next issue of the scientific journal "Ante Portas – Security Studies". The current edition is devoted to various security issues around the world, in a multidimensional context.

In the issue, you will find, among others, two articles introducing the meanders of China's foreign policy regarding the Eurasian area (Vakhtang Maisaia) and Latin America (Henrique Brenner Gasperin, Lucas Guerra). The combination of both papers allows you to see both similarities in the main activities of Chinese diplomacy, as well as the diverse application of tools and means depending on the selected region.

The authors also introduce the issue of Russian policy in many dimensions and in many areas. And so Maia Urushadze presented the problem of the presence of Russian propaganda in Georgian political discourse; Isabela de Andrade Gama showed a Latin American view on the power policy of the Russian Federation towards the West (especially Western Europe); Vadim Volovoj presented Russian military operations in Syria and pointed out their importance for building a modern army, and Wiktor Możgin discussed in detail the creation, organization, and activity of the Russian paramilitary youth organization – the "junarmia". Russian theme is complemented by an article by Natalia Slukhai on the ideological matrix of Russian media.

The next articles deal with topical issues such as economic security in the context of climate change (Marek Leszczyński), Israel's security strategy (Michał Harkot) and the problem of the return of British ISIS volunteers to Great Britain (Aleksandra Cieslar). The publication is also complemented by two articles presenting the issue of the changing role of the state in international relations (George Zviadadze) and the evolution of the nature and nature of wars (Kakhaber Chapodze).

We hope that among so many varied articles you will find many interesting news and analysis.

We wish you pleasant reading!

Editorial Board
"Ante Portas – Security Studies"

„Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem”
2019, Nr 1(12)
DOI: 10.33674/220191

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EURASIAN GEOPOLITICS IMPORTANCE TO WORLD POLITICS AND CHINA'S GEOSTRATEGY

Abstract:

Since 1990 after bipolar system demolition and setting up new world order with liberal international order with American leadership endorsement lasted till 2014, the Eurasian space became one of the hottest spots in the world. Considering situational changes in the international security system with diminishing the global hegemony of the USA in case of confrontation with Russia and China, Eurasia has been increasing its geopolitical relevance to international politics. Several implications on endorsing new “Eurasian” alliances (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Collective Security Treaty Organization, Eurasian Union, etc.) with primarily involvement of the countries of Post-Soviet space and China, directed against to NATO policy of enlargement could have created a rim of instability with “flexing muscels” between three nuclear powers – the USA, Russian Federation and People's Republic of China (PRC). Tripolarity agenda confirmed by the international security high-level expert community³, incoming world order is shaping up in the classical balance of power game of international relations⁴. Hence, the China-Russia alliance and strategic cooperation wrenched in the area really

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³ *Munich Security Report 2018*, Munich Security Conference, Munich 2018, pp. 28-29.

⁴ S. McGlinchey, R. Walters, C. Scheinpflug, *International Relations Theory*, Bristol 2017, p. 18.

play an important role in fostering process at any level of the political spectrum: local, regional and certainly global.

Keywords:

CSTO, China, Russia, Eurasia, “Gazprom”, National Security Concept, Military Strategy, NATO, Geostrategy, Geopolitics

Introduction

In a transition period of polarity main attention in the transformation of a nation's power entails composing strategic culture that makes it possible to promote the country's foreign policy goals at the global level⁵. Culture certainly plays a strong role in shaping strategic behaviour in China. There are two main strands of Chinese strategic culture today – the parabellum focused on realpolitik and the Confucian-Mencian strand, a philosophical orientation used mainly for idealized discourse⁶. The transatlantic-dominated world economic and political systems and the liberal world order underpinning it are currently undergoing a transformation so profound it equates to a Copernican revolution. However, after launching of China's “One Belt, One Road” strategic initiative with probably \$400 billion in value, a process of demolition of the liberal world order is quite reliable foreseen and Eurasian world order is forecasted in nearest future⁷.

China's military strategy is coined with the “One Belt, One Road” strategic objectives and relevantly is considered to provide military capabilities for the realization of the project. It is clear that China, by doing so, perceives transforming its status from regional into global actor status holders. The People's Republic of China is undoubtedly becoming an important player in international relations. The unprecedented economic growth China has experienced since the economic opening in 1978 led to the increased presence and importance of the country for regional and global development. Naturally, growing China is seen with suspicions from the existing powers, it is perceived as an important partner and a possible threat at the same time, especially by the United States. Understanding of Chinese intentions and perceptions of the reality of international relations and its own position is, therefore, crucial⁸. In any way, due to China's geopolitical ambiguity the main goals of the

⁵ C. S. Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History*, London-New York 2013, pp. 12-13.

⁶ J. Baylis, J. J. Wirtz, C. S. Gray, *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, New York 2016, p. 92.

⁷ P. W. Schulze, *Multipolarity – The Promise of Disharmony*, Frankfurt 2018, p. 211.

⁸ R. Ondrejcsak, *Introduction to Security Studies*, Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA), Bratislava 2014, p. 123.

military-strategic development of the national defence forces accord to so-called “Great Strategy” principles are the following:

- increase economic growth rates and raise the vital level of population to achieve a stable society;
- complete the modernization of the army;
- create potential for winning in any regional conflicts;
- become the centre of global influence – the strategy of economic hegemony;
- (BRICS, “Big Twenty“, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, “one belt, one road” initiative).

There are key indications of how the national foreign and defence policy implications are promoting the national interests of the country and this is a very important case of other actors. It is interesting to underline that China’s strategic military documents directly underlines the importance of countering other great power interest at the regional level. The Defence Strategy 2012 declares: “Over the long term, China’s emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways”⁹. Therefore there are several options for the Chinese leadership in which ways have really achieved the mission with assistance of the allied powers, in case of the Russian Federation.

China-Russia Gas Eurasian Deal Leads to New World Order

It has already become a historical event Russia’s President Vladimir Putin’s official visit to Beijing on May 20th of 2014 and his meeting with his counter-partner Chinese President Xi Jinping. Later on, he attended Shanghai held a regional conference on Economic Development of the Asian-Pacific area. In this visit, Russia successfully tailored capabilities of two giant monopolies – “Gazprom” and “Rosneft”. It is very interesting to note that “Gazprom” is ruled and owned by President Vladimir Putin and “Rosneft” is under the rulership of his “grey cardinal” Vice-Premier and Chairman of the Energy State Commission Igor Sechin and belonged to so-called “Siloviki” clan in political vertical of Russia¹⁰. Hence, the two leaders are seeking to pursue their own financial backup promotion and drastically changed and shifted the country’s foreign policy priorities. In times of the official visit both Presidents have signed up to 40 agreements and contracts, including such strategic directions as are military-technical cooperation, energy politics

⁹ *The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, 2013*, <<http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/index.htm>> (30.06.2019).

¹⁰ V. Maisaia, *Contemporary Russia’s Power Vertical: Clans Controlled by the Kremlin*, [in:] *New Eastern Europe-Eastern Partnership turns 10*, No. 3-4, Cracow 2019, pp. 82-83.

(for instance, Still, China remains Russia's most promising customer, with oil and gas consumption expected to increase by nearly 90% in 2011-2020), agriculture, cooperation at international political levels with make congruent their foreign policy priorities (reaffirm both states positions at the UN Security Council and transform joint geopolitical project – Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as new type of politico-military coalition combating with US geopolitics at international and regional levels).

By fostering the strategic cooperation with Russia is in hands and national interest of China. This is indicated from the assumption that China's economic development is going on a critical level of transformation of political and military administration and management and is staying at a vital stage of promotion. At the time being, the Chinese GDP rate is composing of 87% of current US GDP figure but by 2020 the figure could be changed at an equal level. Hence, the official Beijing is in need of getting acquired toward vast and enormous natural resources of neighbouring Russia, mainly with energy resources, in order to further boosting national economic development. One of the key successful case-studies of the signed documents in aegis of Putin's visit to China is to be undermined – a signature of a memorandum of intention to create a common economic free zone in one of the regions Far East Region of the Russian Federation bordering with China. The joint mega-business project could be considered as a prerequisite toward the promotion of a more influential geopolitical mission – the creation of a native Eurasian Common Economic Union and Eurasian Common Custom Space. This is to be confirmed by the fact that Russia-China trade turnover reached up to \$100 billion per year. In this regard, it is to be mentioned that Russia and China were not reaching up a consensus on favourable prices for Russian gas delivery to China for at least 10 years and this was a hindering case to promote China-Russia relationship at all. China's Confucianism and Buddhism origin have increased its capabilities in geopolitical merits¹¹. However due to great shifts in contemporary world politics – crises Ukraine and Syrian conflict where Russia and China have demonstrated common positions and expressed anti-Atlantist or anti-Western geopolitical visions. These positions are evidence for claiming from both sides to change unipolarity into multipolarity dimensions¹².

From the Russian perspective, President Putin's "oriental geopolitics" overweight the failed Western trend was used to be at stake. The visit seems to be considered as very successful in that of mission achievement from the

¹¹ J. Haynes, *An Introduction to International Relations and Religion*, Edinburgh 2013, pp. 110-112.

¹² V. Maisaia, B. Oboladze, *New Geopolitical Reality and International Terrorism in 21st Century (Global and Regional aspects)*, Tbilisi 2009, pp. 11-12.

Kremlin authority perspectives and only pure simply indications those concrete geopolitical achievements attained by the parties at global and regional levels:

1. Geoeconomic Partnership;
2. Global Financial Sabotage;
3. Geostrategic Partnership.

Geoeconomic Partnership

Russia reached a \$400 billion deal to supply natural gas to China through a new pipeline over 30 years, a milestone in relations between the world's largest energy producer and the biggest consumer. The gas delivery was to be starting in 2018 but the construction has delays. The amount of gas delivery is 38 billion cubic meters per year with an agreed price for \$350 per thousand cubic meters that is \$30 less than the price for the EU member-states customers. The deal is in hand for China too as Beijing pays for its gas supply from the Asian-Pacific area for \$450 per thousand cubic meters and fewer prices, about \$280 per thousand cubic meters, China pays to only Turkmenistan. The deal between Russia's state gas company, Gazprom, and China's state oil and gas company, CNPC, allows Russia to diversify its customer base, which is heavily dependent on sales to Europe. Moreover, China may make as much as \$25 billion in advance payments under the contract to invest in the necessary infrastructure. Russia will invest \$55 billion in the pipeline named "Siberian Strength" and the Siberian fields to feed it while China, responsible for a pipeline on its territory, will spend at least \$20 billion. Similar steps along with the "Gazprom" have been made by the Russian "Rosneft" taking its own part for promoting the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership – "Rosneft" will be delivered to China by 2020 around 46 million tons of oil and with direct involvement of the merger in Chinese city Tian-Zhen will be building oil processing factory.

Based on its resource assessment, the "Rosneft" expects to increase its oil production level up to 15% by 2020 due to the commitments arranged in China by the merger leadership. In conjunction with that trend, in the realization of the China-Russia energy project development could be involved the American merger "ExxonMobil" that makes ridiculous geopolitical disposition at global scope. As it is known, "Rosneft" signed up a contract with "ExxonMobil" in Sankt-Petersburg World Economic Forum (so-called "Russia Davos Forum") hold on May 22-25 of 2014 on further partnership in developing joint projects. One of the projects is directly linked with realization of the Russia-China joint geoeconomic partnership – "ExxonMobil" together with the "Gazprom" operates one of the Sakhalin fields with a 30% stake, partnering with companies from Japan (30% stake), India (20%) and two Russian companies

(20% combined – “Gazprom” and “Rosneftgas”, a subsidiary company of the “Rosneft”).

Subsidiaries of Gazprom, Netherlands-based Royal Dutch Shell, Japanese corporate group Mitsui and Japanese auto manufacturer Mitsubishi operate the other field. The project is expected to supply South Korea with 10 billion cubic meters of gas each year. It's expected to make China and North Korea into a sort of Ukraine, and it's expected to make South Korea akin to Europe with its present dependence on Russian gas. Russia has planned to build a gas pipeline and accompanying railroad from its offshore Sakhalin Island fields, north of Japan, through North Korea to South Korea. Moreover, “Rosneft” also expects to enlarge its activities beyond the Chinese, Japanese, North, and South Korean territories. “Rosneft” arranged a deal to deliver to Vietnam more than 6 million tons of oil and more expand its “oriental” direction. The other direction is India – “Rosneft” and the Indian ONGC energy merger has signed up a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Russia and India have been negotiating to build a \$30 billion oil pipeline, which would be the world’s most expensive due to its proposed route through rugged terrain. The so-called Silk Road pipeline would link Russia’s Altai Mountain region to the Xinjiang province of China and northern India. Russia exports 70% of its oil, compared to 30% of its gas production, and its oil revenues are nearly seven times its gas revenues. A bit yearly, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Putin issued a joint statement from Moscow on Oct. 21, 2013, that confirmed that the two nations are collaborating “to study the possibility of direct ground transportation of hydrocarbons. In that respect and in aegis of the “oriental” geopolitics, the “Rosneft” with the Kremlin’s direct influence, has arranged a geopolitical contract on the creation of a joint venture with Azerbaijan State Oil Company to extract and develop oil and gas fields in the Caspian Basin. By doing so, Russia seeks to monopolize the whole Eurasian energy resources under its control and deprive of West on diversifying its energy supplies options, including via Georgia transit routes. Russia-China geoeconomic alliance truly can subvert Western energy security and geopolitical stability.

Global Financial Sabotage

Russia and China have been reaching a consensus to impinge USA-EU financial “backbone”. In Shanghai between two leaders of the countries have made a deal implying on neglecting the American dollar payment in trade transactions performed in aegis of the governmental agreements. The agreement was signed by the Russian bank VTB and the National Bank of China. The financial sabotage act is aimed to strike to the USA and EU against their sanctions imposed on Russia. In trade transactions and future types, financial-economic deals will be using only Russian Rouble and Chinese Yuan as direct

payment entities. In that stance, it is interesting why the contract was signed by VTB bank: “VTB Capital can expect to be informally crowned Russia’s investment banking state champion by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin at its inaugural investor forum starting tomorrow in Moscow. It will be the first time the Russian leader has appeared at a brokerage event, underlining the rise of VTB Capital, which has become pivotal in managing the state’s interests since its launch a little over a year ago. Its parent, VTB Bank, is 77% owned by the Russian Government”¹³.

Recently, China has suspended its transactions in American dollars with international commercial banks in Afghanistan and in South Asia. On its turn, Russia sold its own state bonds invested in the American state properties and in 2013 Russia sold 1/3 of its bonds. The deal is a more dangerous weapon against West rather than relevant steps in energy geopolitics.

Geostrategic Partnership

Russia-China has reinforced its military-strategic partnerships. This fact was evidently demonstrated whilst Putin’s visit to China. In Shanghai Russia-China naval forces held a joint military drill in the Eastern-Chinese Sea named “Naval Interpartnership of 2014” with the participation of 8 Chinese Naval combat ships and 4 Russian ones with drones. The drills were commanded especially for that reason created joint Naval Command HQ. At the drills, the first time was demonstrated new Russian reconnaissance helicopter KA-28 at the Chinese Naval ships on board. Russia besides its novelty KA-28 has already handed over to China heavy fighters SU-27 and SU-30, transport jets IL-76, missile complex C-300 and some diesel submarines, class of “Varshivanka”.

In summary, China-Russia ties are boosted and aimed to swart to decrease of the dominance of the USA at the global political level. This factor is to be considered by the Georgian current leadership. All these elements and factors make China an important actor in the coming decades¹⁴.

Russia-China Strategic Partnership – Stretching from Pacific Ocean till Black Sea Area

The new Cold War scenario brings fresh realities in geopolitical distribution of power polarity in international politics. In conjunction with EU-

¹³ *VTB Capital: Putin’s Favourable Bank? Bank Has Become The Kremlin’s Adviser of Choice*, “Financial News”, 28.09.2009, <<https://www.vtbcapital.com/events/2009/moscow/news/681967/>> (30.06.2019).

¹⁴ J. S. Goldstein, J. C. Pevehouse, *International Relations – 2013-2014 Update*, New York 2014, p. 38.

NATO-USA polarity configuration Russia-China strategic alliance seems more logical and real story. Apart from fencing down strategic partnerships in energy security, geoeconomic and security spheres, the Sino-Russia cooperation is deepening in the military sphere. Lately, two Chinese missile frigates have entered the Russian Black Sea naval base of Novorossiysk for the first time in history. They will then conduct joint exercises with Russia in the Mediterranean. The Linyi and the Weifang entered the port of Novorossiysk on May 8 to take part in Victory Day celebrations, according to the Russian Defence Ministry. Each is a 4,000-ton vessel of the relatively new Type 054A (also known as Jiangkai II), which first entered service in 2007. They are accompanied by a support ship. This is the first time Chinese warships will have entered the Russian base. The ships will then head to the Mediterranean for joint drills with Russian forces. “It is planned that the People’s Liberation Army Navy warships will leave Novorossiysk on May 12 and relocate to the designated area of the Mediterranean Sea for the Russian-Chinese exercise Sea Cooperation-2015”, the Russian Defence Ministry said in a statement before the drills taken place¹⁵.

The exercise took place from May 11-21 of 2015. Nine ships are scheduled to take part in total in the first drill of its kind to happen in the Mediterranean. The drills' goal has been stated as deepening friendly cooperation between China and Russia and strengthening their combat ability in repelling naval threats. The exercise comes at a time when NATO and its allies are holding a massive wave of military drills all across Europe. Collectively codenamed Operation Atlantic Resolve, NATO commanders and European leaders have said the training sends a message to Russia over its alleged aggression and the crisis in Ukraine. Some states are also conducting their own training manoeuvres parallel to Atlantic Resolve. Russia has been conducting a series of military exercises within its territory throughout winter and in early spring, including massive drills in the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the Arctic, and the Far East. The Chinese and Russian Navies have conducted exercises together since 2012 in waters off Russia’s far eastern coast. Russia Deputy Defence Minister Mr. Antonov said there would be further Sino-Russian exercises in the Sea of Japan in August. Beijing’s foray into the Mediterranean is seen as an attempt to extend its naval reach worldwide and emphasis a growing strategic partnership with Moscow against the West. A joint command centre for the exercises has been set up in Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, to which the Chinese vessels sailed before heading out with Russian ships for the Mediterranean. Russia’s defence ministry said the drills were not targeted at a specific country but aimed “to

¹⁵ *Chinese warships to join Russian Navy in Black Sea, Mediterranean for historic drill*, “Russia Today”, 7 May 2015, <<https://www.rt.com/news/256573-russia-china-novorossiysk-ships/>> (30.06.2019).

further deepen friendly and practical interaction between the two countries and strengthen joint efforts for countering naval security threats at sea”. It is interesting to stress that demonstrative military “muscle” show in the Black Sea Basin was not accidentally fixed. Sometime before the drills, as Russia expresses its concern by increasing military presence in the Black Sea Region of the American and its ally NATO forces – just visiting of 600 American military instructors to Ukraine to train and equip the Ukrainian National Guard formation as well as holding in Georgia joint American-Georgian military exercises – about 600 U.S. and Georgian soldiers were taking part in the manoeuvres, for which the U.S. army for the first time transported an entire mechanized company, including 14 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, across the Black Sea from Bulgaria. In addition to that, the NATO Alliance intends to deploy at a constant basis a brigade-size coalition military unit in Baltic Region in Lithuania in response to the reinforcement of the Russian military forces in Kaliningrad Oblast with the deployment of the tactical missile system “ISKANDER-M”. Hence, Russia by doing joint military drills with China is seeking to demonstrate how the Kremlin could counter-balance military configuration in the Black Sea geostrategic gateway key location to get entrance to the Caucasus-Caspian Basin with widening the scope to the Central Asia where China holds its geostrategic interests¹⁶.

Moreover, China has been openly developing a naval strategy aimed at challenging American dominance of the western Pacific, including in the waters around Japan and Taiwan. China criticized an announcement last month by Barack Obama, the US president, and Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister, that the two countries were beefing up military cooperation. Hence, China with its military presence in the Black Sea close to Georgian seashore protects its own national interests to the western Pacific Rim to prevent American military-political hegemony in the area. China-Russia is going to deepen its economic ties with considering the possibility to create a common trade and economic zone in and even a fragile opportunity to get China joined the Eurasian Economic Union and create a common Eurasian Grand Coalition with security, energy, economic and military components of strategic cooperation¹⁷. It was not surprising an initiative stemming from the Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu reflected at Anatolia NATO Foreign Affairs Minister session to launch so-called “access talk” procedures with four NATO member candidates: Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Georgia. A new geopolitical muscle race is ahead and where Georgia is to be placed in another case of debates.

¹⁶ E. Gvenetadze, *Aspects of International Security*, (in Georgian) Tbilisi 2017, pp. 67-68.

¹⁷ J. Gakhokhidze, *Main Problems of International Security*, Tbilisi 2017, pp. 56-58.

Russia, Iran and China Create anti-NATO Alliance: What's for?

Iran and Russia have launched to promote a new trend of military cooperation. The Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dekhan, Brigadier General, has come out with a proposal to create more close military cooperation and strategic partnership among Iran, Russia, India, and China to prevent and cope with the NATO enlargement policy to East and with deployment U.S. Missile Defence Program elements in the Mediterranean and Black Sea Areas. He made the statement at the Fourth International Conference on Security Issues hold in Moscow on April 15-18 of 2015. The initiative was in conjunction with Russia's Defence Minister Sergey Shoigus's adherence to set up a distinct military alliance to stop NATO further enlargement. Sometimes before three countries with similar political authority provisions and structures – Iran, Syria, and Russia have exposed to increase politico-military strategic partnerships to cope with common challenges and threats. Having considered the fact that Russia is pending on further reinforcement of the military ties with its allies in aegis of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) with involvement of the seven post-Soviet states: Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, mainly in way of creation of Rapid Reaction Forces and Anti-Air Defence Common System with incursion of Anti-Missile Defence elements, it becomes clear why Russia is seeking to create so-called “second rim” of collective defence system in Eurasian geopolitical space¹⁸.

By doing so, the Russian authority will set up a counter-balance condition to counter-weight successfully the NATO engagement into the Black Sea-Caucasus-Caspian regional entity. Moreover, Russia is promoting its strategy to bilaterally reinforce its linkage with China and India, including in the military field of cooperation. Russo-China's strategic cooperation is being stipulated in aegis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a “third rim” of the collective defence system enlarged Eurasian Global Security postures. In the aegis of the SCO is possible of joint cooperation in combating terrorism with military means and promoting regional security principles among the countries, like China, Russia, Iran, and India. The three-tier system of collective defence will be a new modality to counter-weight EU-USA hegemony at the global level¹⁹.

The first “tier” of the collective defence includes very close cooperation in the military sphere of Russia with de-facto republics of Abkhazia and South

¹⁸ W. N. Konyszew, A. A. Siergunin, *Sowriemiennaja wojennaja stratigija*, Moscow 2014, pp. 85-86.

¹⁹ G. Magradze, V. Maisaia, *21st Century International Politics and “Cooperation Security” Theory: Myth and Reality – Regional and Global Levels*, Tbilisi 2017, pp. 118-120.

Ossetia arranged with proper agreements at so-called “inter-state” conditions and more reinforce the Russian military presence in the Black Sea-Caucasus area. According to the Russian experts and specialists of international politics, for instance, Dr. Andrei Sushentsov and Dr. Andrei Bezrukov, who claim that international organizations do not reflect the real balance of power, and entering with West in new Cold War conditions Russia has attained several positive geostrategic missions, never ever before achieved before²⁰. The positive missions could be defined in the following manner:

- Russia has managed its dominance and reached hegemony at the Black Sea basin and pursuing national interests in the area forgetting about ethical and moral principles of international relations origins. Russia has openly demonstrated its true Realpolitik in action and repulsed the USA attempts to contain Russia as in the case of the Soviet Union in geopolitical borderlines of the Eurasian “Heartland”. As it clears geography has shaped Russian identity and its rulers understanding of security throughout the entire existence of the Russia’s statehood²¹;
- Russia seized and captured a very strategic place in the Black Sea area Sevastopol port without a frozen duration period of time and with the possibility to really increase Black Sea Naval Fleet capabilities and deploy Strategic Command HQ of the Fleet in Crimea. With forging an agreement with de-facto Abkhazia, Russia has more increased its geostrategic presence in the area;
- Russia has gained more than 2 million Russian-speaking populations full loyalty of the Crimean peninsula and from the expert’s expectation ended its “historic mission” of regaining control over the originally “Russian” territory. The provision is very alike to Nazi Germany Anschluss of Austria and Sudetes District of Czechoslovakia in 1938;
- Russia managed to avoid full international isolation from the Western community and reached of creation of the strategic partnership arrangements with some other Global Power Centres – India and China.

These are only perceptions dominated at contemporary Russia’s political analyst and expert community circles and these assumptions could have some grounds, possible ones perhaps amid who knows how real or true are they. In addition to Iran’s Defence Minister’s proposal on the creation of the anti-Western military alliance, it should be considering that China, India, Iran, and

²⁰ A. Radin, C. Rich, *Russian Views of the International Order*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica 2017, pp. 34-35.

²¹ J. Gurganus, E. Rumer, *Russia’s Global Ambitions Perspectives*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <<https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/20/russia-s-global-ambitions-in-perspective-pub-78067>> (30.06.2019).

Russia with the possible incursion of Syria could be pursuing some concrete geopolitical implications as are:

- suppression of NATO's enlargement to the Caucasus and Central Asia direction and halt its domination at the Black Sea basin;
- coping with the common military asymmetric threat in the face of Islamic Caliphate threaten to all engaged parties personally;
- stopping deployment of U.S. National Missile Defence Program elements at the Black Sea area;
- dealing with the situation in Afghanistan mostly after the post-ISAF period of time and preventing of "Taliban" back to power in Kabul that makes great troubles to the countries supposed to be a member of the alliance;
- providing full-pledge support to Syrian ruling Assad authoritarian regime and reinforcing of Russo-Iran presence in the Middle East region;
- promoting probable alliance member-state national military industry complexes cooperation and fostering joint armament project development.

This hypothetical scenario is very easily transforming into the reality that makes possible to shift present world order in a proper manner. "Eurasian Alliance" could be a signal on the reorientation of international society priorities from the Western direction toward Eastern one²².

Conclusion

In retrospect to contemporary world order being still in transition is becoming an uprising topic of what kind of new global actors emerged. The USA declining in the global hegemony mission that made it possible for coalition two Eurasian powers – China and Russia at least in spheres of energy security, defence policy, and foreign policy cooperation. Having considered the development of multipolarity system arrangements in aegis of international politics several times increases the role of the regional geopolitics²³. China's new military geopolitics implicates the transformation of regional power hegemony status into global hegemony one. Therefore new Eurasian world order pattern requires the creation of new military alliance as well as economic and political unions for fostering the order in the proper final end. China and Russia rapprochement in spheres of military strategic cooperation, energy security, political solidarity, foreign policy task coordination and environmental security has demonstrated how far the process of the "Eurasian Alliance" could

²² P. W. Schulze, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

²³ See: N. Chitadze, *Politology*, Tbilisi 2016, pp. 432.

be promoted and reached their successful story end. Moreover, Russia and China have been modifying their efforts to promote their national interests in such geostrategic important regions as are: the Caucasus-Caspian region, Black Sea Area, Middle East and Persian Gulf and what is curious the Central and South American regions (Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Bolivia, etc.) where accord to Monroe Doctrine of 1823 rests the USA vital national interests and the area is considered as the most domain influence of the White House in Washington D.C. Even more, Russia, China, and Brazil are the members of the global “South” domain organization – BRICS count-balancing the USA global hegemony or at least to have to try to. The “Eurasian Alliance” could be supplemented by the other actor of the geopolitical space – the Islamic Republic of Iran whose geopolitical ambitions are very high and promoting its nuclear project despite severe economic sanctions imposed by the Trump Administration at the time being, means to fulfil the mission. By doing so, Russia cast itself as the bastion of global protection against “aggressive” West and a hegemonic America²⁴. The combination of the powers: China with Iran and Russia indeed manage to outweigh the American hegemony ambiguities not only at regional but also at global levels and re-shaping liberal international order modality. As it is known, Brzezinski’s Eurasian Balkans concept is the apex of American geopolitical thinking²⁵ and by doing so, the USA interests only flatter enough to consider the area from new type asymmetric challenges dealing agenda and is less attentive to cast its global geopolitical missions. However, the configuration and projections of “three power” capabilities into common unity, several times increase the role of the Eurasian space in geopolitical games and stipulate pushing ahead of new world order provisions.

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²⁴ J. Bugajski, M. Assenova, *Eurasian Disunion: Russia’s Vulnerable Flanks*, Jamestown Foundation, Washington 2016, p. 20.

²⁵ A. Korybko, *Hybrid Wars: The Indirect Adaptive Approach to Regime Change*, Moscow 2015, p. 17.

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„Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem”
2019, Nr 1(12)
DOI: 10.33674/220198

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THE DRAGON AND THE CONDOR: CHINA'S RISE AND LATIN AMERICA'S DEVELOPMENTAL ANXIETIES

Abstract:

In the present article, we aim to present a critical analysis of China's rise to the position of a global power in the international scenario focused on some related political inflexions in Latin America. Holding on a qualitative methodology, based on the analysis of primary and secondary sources, we argue that China's rise and its growing presence in Latin America, mostly regarding commercial and financial flows and also infrastructural project, is reinforcing a neo-extractivist paradigms the new hegemonic model of development for the region. This process has been generating a series of social and environmental conflicts, providing us a space to discuss the ambivalence and the contradictions presented in Chinese discourse, which alludes to the establishment of a pacific world order that is committed to ecologic sustainability, win-win relations and the harmonious development of the actors in the international scenario. This work will be critically oriented by some concepts presented in contemporary Latin American developmental thought. Some examples are neoextractivism, com-modity consensus and reprimarization. For us to better situate the discussion, some illustrative cases will be brought to the fore.

Keywords:

Peoples Republic of China, China, Latin America, neoextractivism, economy

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Introduction

In this article, our main objective is to think the relation between the rise of People's Republic of China in the international scenario and some inflexions over models of development and international insertion followed by Latin American countries. It is paramount to highlight that we acknowledge that categories such as “China”, “PCR” “Latin-American countries” and “Latin America” are massive generalizations, which usually do not account for the multiple diversities, fractures and particularities that compose those major categories. Even though, we opt to recur to these simplifications in order to make the argument more didactic. Thus, given that this paper aims to promote a discussion regarding Latin America in a regional perspective, we will abstain ourselves of deeply detailing some important differences and asymmetries that permeate and compose the sub-continent.

In relation to our methodology, we opt for a mostly qualitative one, based on bibliographical revisions of primary (notably, official documents of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party) and secondary sources. At some points, we briefly introduce specific cases to better illustrate our arguments. Structurally, the paper is divided in three sessions. In the first one, we discuss China's rise in the international scenario. In the second, we show some considerations regarding the increasingly close ties between China and Latin America in the XXI century. Finally, in the last sessions, we present a critical perspective regarding some impacts felt in the Latin American region in relation to its ties with China. Especially through the concept of “commodity consensus” and “neoextrativism” – respectively brought up by Maristela Svampa (2013) and Eduardo Gudynas (2009) – we point out some socio-environmental conflicts driven by the rising Chinese demand for natural resources provided by Latin American markets.

The rise of the Dragon: China and its ascension in the international scenario

The notable rise of China in the international arena occurred in the last decades, and it certainly figures among the main events of contemporary international politics. Since its foundation in 1949 until the late 70's, People's Republic of China³ (PRC) had a foreign policy orientation mainly concerned with acquiring international recognition for the new communist regime and

³ For better suiting the scope of the text, we opt here to make reference to China departing of its (re)foundation as a Popular Republic in 1949, with the establishment of a communist regime over Mao Zedong's leadership.

the making of pragmatic alliances in the Cold War bipolar conjuncture⁴. Thus, the country alternated between ties with the Soviet Union and with the United States, sometimes also siding itself with the Non-Aligned Movement⁵.

In 1954, when Zhou Enlai was heading the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of RPC, one of the main axis that would guide China's foreign policy over the next years was established. This axis was composed by the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence": (1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) Mutual non-aggression; (3) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (4) Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit and (5) Peaceful co-existence. It is visible, since those days, how China aimed an international insertion based on a non-conflictive approach, rendering possible the establishment of bilateral relations with every country, driving away from the bipolar ideological imperatives that shaped international politics at the time.

A new paradigm regarding China's international insertion emerged with the rule of Deng Xiaoping. The governmental transition happened in an internationally favourable moment, marked by a closer relationship between PRC and the US and the globalizing reach of financial flows, generating new opportunities of foreign direct investment in peripheral regions of the world system. Based on the integration of the country to the world capitalist economy on top of the "modernizing reforms", Eduardo Pinto⁶ defines Xiaoping's government as having made possible the "Chinese economic miracle".

Thanks to that, China gets to the XXI century as a "global player". Besides its political relevance with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, PRC has also been presenting rising military investments, having the third biggest personnel in the world, with growing incidence mostly in the naval area, with its first overseas military base in Djibuti inaugurated in 2017. Economically, China currently stands on top of the world ranking regarding GDP (Purchasing Power Parity) and second in nominal GDP, having scaled up its gross domestic product from US\$ 1,3 trillion in 2001 to US\$ 12,2 trillion in 2017. It is also the first country regarding world exports and the second in imports⁷.

⁴ G. A. Amaral, „Ascensão Pacífica” da China na Evolução da Diplomacia Chinesa nas Últimas Décadas. “Aurora”, Marília, 2012 v. 6, n. 1, pp. 73.

⁵ B. Jaeger, *Investimentos chineses em infraestrutura na América do Sul: impactos sobre a integração regional*, „Conjuntura Austral”, Porto Alegre, 2017, v. 8, n. 39-40, pp. 6.

⁶ E. C. Pinto, *O Eixo Sino-Americano e as Transformações do Sistema Mundial: Tensões e Complementariedades Comerciais, Produtivas e Financeiras*. [in:] ed. R. Leao, R. Pinto, E. Acioly, *A China na Nova Configuração Global: impactos políticos e econômicos*, Brasília 2011, p. 22.

⁷ Central Inteliligency Agency (CIA), *The World Factbook*, 2019. <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>> (09.02.2019).

Such international prominence led to a series of external and internal political reformulations in China, now aware of its great power status. In this sense, mostly between 2002 and 2006, concepts of “peaceful rise”/“peaceful development”⁸ appeared as core guidelines in China’s official foreign policy discourses⁹. These concepts were anchored in two main premises: (1) the idea of “open doors” for pacific and mutually beneficial (win-win cooperation) economic relations with every country in the world, without distinctions and (2) a certain notion of gradualism in the evolution of the international system, situating China’s rise as a harmonious and negotiated hegemonic transition¹⁰.

Directly quoting the Chinese regime through its *White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development*: “China’s peaceful development has broken away from the traditional pattern where a rising power was bound to seek hegemony. [...]. With a keen appreciation of its historical and cultural tradition of several thousand years, the nature of economic globalization, changes in international relations and the international security landscape in the 21st century as well as the common interests and values of humanity, China has decided upon peaceful development and mutually beneficial cooperation as a fundamental way to realize its modernization, participate in international affairs and handle international relations”¹¹.

Generally speaking, then, the term “peaceful development” reflects a self-awareness of the Chinese regime regarding its protagonist role in the international scenario. According to the same document, “China cannot develop itself in isolation from the rest of the world, and global prosperity and stability cannot be maintained without China”¹². Besides, we share the view of Gabriela Amaral¹³, who understands that the concept of rise/development meets a double objective in the guidance of the Chinese regime regarding its foreign affairs. In one front, it aims to assuage the perception of other global powers – notably the United States – that China’s economic rise could possibly lead to a harsh imposition of another kind of global hegemony. In the other front, it seeks to present China as a partner who is committed to the development of the countries it cooperates with, avoiding itself to be seen as an imperialist

⁸ For a didactical purpose, we hereby locate both concepts as if they were synonyms. For a more elaborated discussion regarding the distinctions between them and the transition from the first to the second in the discursive axis of Chinese foreign policy along the XXI century, see (G. A. Amaral, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-87).

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 83.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 84.

¹¹ *People’s Republic of China (PRC). White Paper: China’s Peaceful Development*, 2011 <<http://in.chineseembassy.org/eng/zt/peaceful/t855717.htm>> (15.02. 2019).

¹² *Ibidem*.

¹³ G. A. Amaral, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

or (neo)colonial economic agent, a label that is commonly ascribed to other countries in similar conditions of power.

China's notable caution in presenting itself as a respectful country regarding the dictates of the world order went through some changes after the 2008 global financial crisis. According to Alexandre Carriço¹⁴, the financial crisis of 2008, from which the country left unharmed, was seen by the Chinese leaders as a sign of decline of the American incidence over the international system, opening a wider space for China to develop its protagonist aspirations. Facing this scenario, Pautasso and Ungaretti¹⁵ state that China's rhetoric of "pacific rise/development" was gradually substituted by an active role of the country in defending and promoting structural reforms in the global financial architecture.

On the one hand, the concretization of the "Chinese dream", new motto of China's post-2008 foreign policy – added to the huge internal changes experienced by Chinese society over the last decades (urbanization, rising middle-class, changing lifestyle patterns...) – urged the country to deepen its ties with other regions of the world. This movement was seen as necessary to ensure the permanence of a consumer market for its exports and the access to natural, energetic and food resources to sustain its industrial activity¹⁶. On the other hand, China's growing international incidence, described by Barton and Rehner¹⁷ as "going out", also demands the country some degree of adaptability to international principles such as the defence of the liberal capitalist economy, in spite of China's will to promote structural change in this terrain¹⁸.

The first movements of PRC towards the effectuation of this project were conducted in a multilateral way. Generally, China succeeded to present itself as a leader in South-South Cooperation initiatives, articulating blocs and institutions based on reformative claims over the global financial architecture and the development of projects based on win-win logics¹⁹. A paradigmatic example in this sense was the consolidation of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) as a formal association, in 2008. More recently, we

¹⁴ A. Carrico, *Grande Estratégia e o "Sonho da China" de Xi Jinping*, "Relações Internacionais", 2013, No 38, pp. 27.

¹⁵ D. Pautaso, C. R. Ungaretti, *A Nova Rota da Seda e a recriação do sistema sinocêntrico*, „Estudos Internacionais”, 2017, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 27-28.

¹⁶ J. Barton, J. Rehner, *Neostructuralism through strategic transaction: The geopolitics of China's Dragon Doctrine for Latin America*, "Political Geography", 2018, Vol. 65, pp. 80-81.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 80.

¹⁸ W. Callahan, *China's "Asia Dream": The Belt Road Initiative and the new regional order*, "Asian Journal of Comparative Politics", 2016, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 10.

¹⁹ H. Moreira Jr, *Os BRICS e a recomposição da ordem global: estratégias de inserção internacional das potências emergentes*. „Conjuntura Austral”, 2012, Vol. 3, No. 9-10, pp. 71-90; A. Szucko, *A China e a ordem internacional: uma discussão sobre transição de poder no século XXI*, „Conjuntura Austral”, 2015, Vol. 6, No 32, pp. 51.

have the creation of the New Development Bank (NDB), besides the founding of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the revival and strengthening of already existing initiatives such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), ASEAN+1, G-20 among others²⁰. Moreover, the country has sought to institutionalize cooperation projects with regional blocs composed by countries of the Global South, exemplified by the creation of FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation) and the China-CELAC Forum, which will be presented in more details in the following section²¹.

An important element that characterizes the process of “going out” towards the concretization of the “Chinese dream” is the attachment of the “peaceful development” discourse with the moral legitimacy of China as a leader meant to be a “shared destiny community”²². In the report of the XIX National Congress of the Communist Party of China – a meeting that gathers together the leaders of the party in every five years –, China’s leading elite expressed its self-recognition of the country as a global power. At the same time, the leaders of the Communist Party insisted on the affirmation of a harmonious and non-conflictive projection of China in the international hierarchy²³. Thus, among the guidelines for the quinquennium 2016-2021, the document states: “13. Promoting the building of a community with a shared future for mankind. The dream of the Chinese people is closely connected with the dreams of the peoples of other countries; the Chinese Dream can be realized only in a peaceful international environment and under a stable international order. We must keep in mind both our internal and international imperatives, stay on the path of peaceful development, and continue to pursue a mutually beneficial strategy of opening up. We will uphold justice while pursuing shared interests, and will foster new thinking on common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security. We will pursue open, innovative, and inclusive development that benefits everyone; boost cross-cultural exchanges characterized by harmony within diversity, inclusiveness, and mutual learning; and cultivate ecosystems based on respect for nature and green development. China will continue its efforts to safeguard world peace, contribute to global development, and uphold international order”²⁴.

As it can be seen, at the same time it acts toward the expansion of its presence around the globe with the early mentioned initiatives, China also starts

²⁰ D. Pautaso, C. R. Ungaretti, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

²¹ P. Carmody, F. Owusu, *A Expansão da China para a África: interesses e estratégias*. [in:] ed. R. Leao, E. Pinto, L. Acioly, *A China na Nova Configuração Global: impactos políticos e econômicos*, Brasília 2011, p. 246.

²² W. Callahan, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

²³ Communist Party of China, *Relatório do XIX Congresso Nacional do Partido Comunista da China*, Beijing 2016.

²⁴ *Ibidem*.

to adequate itself to the expected behaviour of a global power, presenting a rising commitment with the discourses and agendas that compose the international “good practices”²⁵. In the already mentioned CPC Report (2016), for example, China commits itself with the building of an “eco-civilization”, the fight against world poverty and inequality, the strengthen of democracy and the rule of law and efforts for the maintenance of world peace. This commitment with structuring principles of the current world order is also seen in other recent moves, such as the Chinese defence of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, assuming a leading role in response to the anti-environmental posture assumed by the US under Trump administration²⁶.

The Dragon and the Condor: China-Latin America relations on the XXI century

During the first decades following the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, and even after Xiaoping’s modernizing reforms, China and Latin America had a quite distant relationship, mostly summarized by collective claims under the banner of Third-World countries and inside the Non-Aligned Movement²⁷. Thus, even after China’s vigorous economic rise between the 80’s and the early 2000’s, China was an economic actor with small relevance from a Latin American perspective²⁸.

It turns out that, however, following what was stated in the previous section, China’s “modernizing reforms” gradually lead the country to attain the position of an industrial producer of highly added-value products with intensive technology. This, in turn, enacted a growing Chinese dependency over natural resources and primary products, from hydrocarbons to attend its productive activities to food supply to feed its growing urban population²⁹. In face of that, developing close ties with Latin America – a region with an export basket mostly composed by minerals, oil, gas and agricultural products – became imperious to the maintenance of China’s growing process³⁰. China’s growing

²⁵ A. Szucko, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-52.

²⁶ W. Callahan, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

²⁷ P. S. Leite, *O Brasil e a cooperação Sul-Sul em três momentos: Jânio Quadros/João Goulart, Ernesto Geizel e Luís Inácio Lula da Silva*, Brasília 2011, pp. 55-56.

²⁸ R. Bernal-Meza, *China and Latin America Relations: The Win-Win Rethori*, “Journal of China and International Relations”, 2016, Vol. Special Issue, pp. 31.

²⁹ A. Slipak, *América Latina y China: ¿cooperación Sur-Sur o "Consenso de Beijing",?* “Nueva Sociedad”, 2014, Vol. 250, p. 106.

³⁰ F. Flores, D. Jatoba, *Domestic Reactions to China’s Presence in Three Latin American Countries: Brazil, Nicaragua and Venezuela*, “Journal of China and International Relations”, 2016, Vol. Special Issue, pp. 129.

ties with Latin America, then, attended both the country's internal material demands and its agenda of rising protagonism in international politics.

Notably, the beginning of the XXI century was especially favourable for the establishment of close strategic ties between China and Latin America. From one side, national governments with left-wing tendencies, mostly committed to diminishing the region's historical dependency to the US by aligning themselves with other regions, were coming to power³¹. Complementarily, Chinese growth led to a sharp increase in the *commodities* prices in the international market, presenting – at least in a first moment – a viable alternative for a non-US-dependant Latin American insertion in the world economy. Moreover, it also generated income to finance the distributive policies that characterized what has been conventionally called the “pink tide” of progressive governments in the region³².

Latin America, then, started to occupy a central role in enabling the Chinese movement of “going out”³³. According to Ariel Slipak³⁴, an essential aspect of this relationship was based on China's self-presentation as part of the “Global South”, a discursive strategy that allowed the projection of PRC as an actor committed to the establishment of “win-win” relations under the banner of “South-South” cooperation. Thus, in 2008 – which marked a growing incidence of China in the international arena – the CPC made public its first “China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean”.

In this document, China identifies both itself and Latin America and the Caribbean as being “at a similar stage of development and [facing] the common task of achieving development”³⁵. In this sense, China aims to “deepen cooperation and achieve win-win results. The two sides will leverage their respective strengths [...] and seek to become each other's partner in economic cooperation and trade for mutual benefit and common development”. China proposes, then, a cooperation agenda with the region based in four main fields: (1) political; (2) economic; (3) cultural and social and (4) peace, security and judicial.

China commits itself in “promoting South-South cooperation, bringing about a more just and equitable multilateral trading regime and ensuring a bigger say

³¹ M. A. Garcia, *Nuevos gobiernos en América del Sur: Del destino a la construcción de un futuro*, “Nueva Sociedad”, 2008, Vol. 217, pp. 122-123.

³² U. Brand et al., *Neo-Extractivism in Latin America: One Side of a New Phase in Capitalist Dynamics*, “Ciencia Política”, 2016, Vol. 11, No 21, p. 127; C. Moreno, *O Brasil Made in China: para pensar as reconfigurações do capitalismo contemporâneo*, São Paulo 2015, p. 31.

³³ J. Barton, J. Rehner, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

³⁴ A. Slipak, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

³⁵ People's Republic of China, *China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean 2008*, <http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2008-11/05/content_1140347.htm> (12.02.2019).

and greater role in decision-making for developing countries in international trade and financial affairs³⁶. With this, under the banner of win-win relations and mutual benefits, China paves the way for an intensification of its financial and commercial bonds with Latin America and the Caribbean, relying both on bilateral agreements and on commercial blocs and regional organizations. The country encourages the investment of its qualified companies in manufacturing, agriculture, forestry, fishing, energy, mineral resources, infrastructure and the service sector in Latin America and the Caribbean as a practical pathway to put forward its agenda for the region. Financially, the opening of Chinese banks' branch offices in Latin America and Caribbean is suggested.

Under this hallmark of cooperation, the relations between China and Latin America became more intense, granting the Asian Dragon the position of first political and economic partner of a considerable set of countries in the Latin American region. Slipak³⁷ interestingly points out that while China would not figure among the "top 3" commercial partners with any Latin American country except Paraguay in 2000, in 2012, it had already become among the top 3 of every Latin American Country but El Salvador. Besides, China exponentially grew as an importer of Latin-American products, figuring among the ten main importation partners of 17 countries in the region, and standing among the top 3 for seven of them³⁸. As to the flows, it is notable how China imports mostly hydrocarbons (mostly oil and gas), minerals (mostly copper and iron ore) and food (mostly soy) and exports mostly manufactures with intensive technological character³⁹. The figures below illustrate this tendency.

³⁶ *Ibidem.*

³⁷ A. Slipak, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-108.

³⁸ *Ibidem.*

³⁹ J. Barton, J. Rehner, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-82.

Figure 1: China's rise as a commercial partner of Latin-American countries. Comparison between the years 2000 and 2012. Elaborated with data of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

Posición que ocupa China como socio comercial de países seleccionados de América Latina, 2000-2012

País	Posición de China como destino de exportaciones		Posición de China como origen de importaciones	
	2000	2012	2000	2012
Argentina	6	3	4	2
Bolivia	18	9	7	2
Brasil	12	1	11	1
Chile	5	1	4	2
Colombia	36	2	9	2
Costa Rica	30	8	15	2
Ecuador	18	11	10	2
El Salvador	49	32	18	4
Guatemala	43	29	15	3
Honduras	54	8	18	2
México	19	4	7	2
Nicaragua	35	25	20	3
Panamá	22	33	17	2
Paraguay	15	25	3	1
Perú	4	1	9	2
Uruguay	4	2	7	3
Venezuela	35	2	18	2

Source: A. Slipak, *América Latina y China: Cooperación Sur-Sur o “Consenso de Beijing”?*, “Nueva Sociedad”, 2014, Vol. 250, p. 106

Figure 2: “Top 5” exports between Latin America and the Caribbean and China from 2009 to 2013. Elaborated with UN Comtrade Database

TABLE 1: Top 5 exports between LAC and China, 2009-2013

Top LAC Exports to China		Top Chinese Exports to LAC	
Item	Share of total	Item	Share of total
1. Iron ore and concentrates	20%	1. Telecom equipment, parts	10%
2. Soybeans and other oilseeds	18%	2. Data processing equipment	4%
3. Copper	14%	3. Ships, boats, floating structures	4%
4. Copper ores, concentrates	10%	4. Optical instruments	3%
5. Crude petroleum	9%	5. Refined petroleum products	3%
Total of top 5	69%	Total of top 5	23%

Source: R. Ray, K. P. Gallagher, *China-Latin America Economic Bulletin*, 2015 Edition, p. 5 <<https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2015/02/Economic-Bulletin-2015.pdf>> (02.02.2019)

Sipak also reminds us that the financial presence of China over Latin America must be taken into account. One of the country's main platform towards its consolidation as a global power was becoming the main creditor of the US debt and figuring among the main sources of Foreign Direct Investments in Africa and Latin America⁴⁰. Barton and Rehner indicate that from 2007 onwards, China became the main source of investments and loans to Latin-American countries, outperforming the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank⁴¹. Qualitatively speaking, most of these financial flows are directed to joint-ventures in areas of natural resources extraction – mostly minerals – and projects of infrastructure. Another distinctive characteristic of Chinese financial flows for the region is the strategy of accepting fixed-priced commodities as payments and guarantees for controlling its assets⁴².

Still regarding the agenda posed by the 2008 Policy Paper, a special incidence over the financing and even execution of projects of infrastructure is noted. According to Bruna Jaeger⁴³, in a discursive perspective, the Chinese projects of infrastructure for the region are coherent with the principles of mutual development and win-win relations, given that they allow both the inflows and the outflows of products between China and Latin America. In practice, however, the author sustains that: “Almost every investment in South-American infrastructure looks forward to increasing security and efficiency in the transport of commodities to China. As an example of the main initiatives, we may cite: the construction of the Nestor Kirchner and Jorge Capernic dams in Santa Cruz river, Argentina; the participation in the auctions for exploring the Libra oil fields in Brazil; the construction of the Metro in Quito, Ecuador; the development of a deep-water harbour in Suriname as well as a roadway connecting it to Manaus; the modernization of Boaventura port in Colombia; construction of a 600 km-long road connecting the central area of Colombia to the Venezuela border; the expansion of Venezuelan port of Palúa; the improvement of Desierto port in Chile; the expansion of San Antonio Oeste port in Argentina and the construction of the Central Bi-Oceanic Railway connecting Brazil and Peru [...]”⁴⁴.

In this sense, Jaeger converges with the critics made by Brand by pointing that these projects asymmetrically benefit China⁴⁵. The lowering costs for China to import its manufactures to Latin America would account for an important driver towards the deindustrialization of the Latin American region.

In 2014, president Xi Jinping personally attended to the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Summit, in Fortaleza, and

⁴⁰ A. Slipak, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

⁴¹ J. Barton, J. Rehner, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

⁴² A. Slipak, *op. cit.* p. 111.

⁴³ B. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.

⁴⁴ B. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

⁴⁵ U. Brand et al., *op. cit.*, pp. 144.

in 2015, a China-CELAC Forum was consolidated. The first meeting resulted in the elaboration of the China-CELAC Cooperation Plan (2015-2019)⁴⁶. In the document, 14 areas for the intensification of the relationship between China and the region are established under the banner of South-South cooperation. They are: (1) Policy and Security; (2) International Affairs; (3) Trade, Investment and Finance; (4) Infrastructure and Transportation; (5) Energy and Natural Resources; (6) Agriculture; (7) Industry, Science and Technology, Aviation and Aerospace; (8) Education and Human Resources Training; (9) Culture and Sports; (10) Press, Media and Publication; (11) Tourism; (12) Environmental Protection, Disaster Risk Management and Reduction, Poverty Eradication and Health; (13) People-to-People Friendship and (14) Implementation of Initiatives⁴⁷.

Generally speaking, the document corroborates the practices and perspectives already mentioned in the 2008 Policy Paper. Few months after the concretization of the China-CELAC Forum – sealed with a US\$ 35 billion Chinese loan for investments in the region⁴⁸, the PRC published the Second China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean. In sum, this document reinforces the perspectives already established in the previous ones, once again basing its discourse on a win-win rhetoric (PRC, 2016). A conceptual innovation is the new 1+3+6 framework for pragmatic cooperation, with three main drivers: (i) commerce; (ii) investment; (iii) financial cooperation and six priority areas: (1) energy and resources; (2) infrastructure construction; (3) agriculture; (4) manufacturing; (5) scientific and technological innovation and (6) information technology. The Chinese government intends to: “Support its strong enterprises to participate in major resources and energy development projects and infrastructure construction projects in Latin American and Caribbean countries and, using these projects as the basis, to build production lines and maintenance service bases in the region for construction materials, non-ferrous metals, engineering machinery, locomotives and rolling stock, electric power and communication equipment, with the purpose of reducing costs for resources and energy development and infrastructure construction in Latin American and Caribbean countries”⁴⁹.

⁴⁶ J. Vadell, *El Foro China-CELAC y el nuevo regionalismo para un mundo multipolar: desafíos para la Cooperación 'Sur-Sur'*, “Carta Internacional”, Belo Horizonte, 2018, Vol. 13, No 1, pp. 28-29.

⁴⁷ *Plan de Cooperación de los Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños-China (2015-2019)*, <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/images/ed_integracao/docs_CELAC/PLCOOP.2015ESP.pdf> (06.02.2019).

⁴⁸ C. Moreno, *op. cit.*, pp. 29.

⁴⁹ People's Republic of China, *China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean 2016*, <http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2016/11/24/content_281475499069158.htm> (15.02.2013).

It is clear that, in spite of Chinese commitment to the promotion of industrial parks with technological transfers for added-value production in Latin America and the Caribbean, China's main focus revolves mainly on having access to natural and energetic resources of the region⁵⁰. As we mentioned before, the effective impacts of the "mutual development" model proposed by China in its relationship with Latin America has been generating a series of problems in many ambits, carving up the space for a critical evaluation of the Chinese presence in the region. The following section intends to bring up a reflection over some of these tensions.

The *commodity boom* and the new political and economic paradigms of Latin America

In this section, having already mentioned with some depth the guidelines leading China's foreign policy to Latin America, we aim to explore some political and economic regional reflexes related to its growing proximity with the Asian Dragon. Our temporal framework will be based on the diplomatic initiatives brought up in the second section. For a better conceptualization, we will start with a short history of economic development ideas and policies in Latin America over the last years. Thereafter, we will bring data and discussions to highlight and locate the current political-economic situation of the region.

When we talk about development thinking in Latin America, it is impossible not to mention the role assumed by ECLAC, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean founded in 1949. Among its most notable thinkers was the Argentinean economist Raúl Prebisch⁵¹ whose famous thesis advocates for the industrialization of peripheral countries in order to deal with the deterioration of the terms of trade of primary-product based economies over time. Based on a structuralist framework, he saw Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) programs as the lynchpin policy for promoting economic diversification and transformation that would generate sustainable growth and well-being for Latin American societies⁵².

The ISI model, though, was not capable of disrupting highly inequitable class structures of political and economic power deeply and historically rooted in Latin American societies⁵³. In the face of the mostly unsuccessful attempt

⁵⁰ J. Barton, J. Rehner, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

⁵¹ R. Prebisch, *O desenvolvimento econômico da América Latina e seus principais problemas*, "Revista Brasileira de Economia", 1949, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 47-111.

⁵² L. L. North, R. Grinspun, *Neo-extractivism and the new Latin American developmentalism: the missing piece of rural transformation*, "Third World Quarterly", 2016, 37(8), p. 8.

⁵³ T. Dos Santos, *A estrutura da dependência*, "Revista da Sociedade Brasileira de Economia Política", São Paulo, 2011, Vol. 30, pp. 6-7; A. Gunder Frank, *The Development*

of application of the ISI model in Latin American countries, and in the wake of the 1980's debt crisis that ravaged the region, neoliberalism came to front as the core economic paradigm for Latin America. Then, the process of reprimarization of the productive capacity of the region mentioned above had its start with the prevalence of policies anchored on the Washington Consensus' neoliberal standing over the continent. Land ownership and concentration was generally liberalized and transnational corporations from Latin America and abroad became even more powerful in the political arena⁵⁴.

In the 90's, as a response to the outcomes of the neoliberal period, which involved what became known as the "lost decade" of the 80's and the deterioration of social conditions⁵⁵, a new paradigm for development, distinct from the Prebisch-inspired one, started to be discussed under the banner of ECLAC. Mainly centered on Fernando Fajnzylber's ideas⁵⁶, neostructuralism started to have more practical incidence over policies within the "pink tide" of left-leaning governments. Neostructuralism points to "international competitiveness" and "progressive modernity" as the two main roads to be pursued by Latin American countries. In contrast with "old" structuralist thinking, it sees state and market as strategic partners, in whose relationship the former should assume the function of assuring that the latter's operation is resulting in proper social returns.

According to Leiva⁵⁷, this should be matched by policies directed to the promotion of competitive exporting and the construction of strategic alliances between national and international firms. Globalization is seen both as inevitable and as an opportunity for active engagement of the national governments towards equitable development based on systemic competitiveness. This call for a "new pragmatism" focuses on development more as a process than as an end. In this sense, governments should promote (in partnership with private actors) technological development in accordance to world market tendencies. The proposal of an "open regionalism" policy for sub-continental regions – such as the Andes or the Southern Cone – resonates with the principles stated above in a regional perspective, aiming to establish a multilateral coordinated approach towards global market opportunities⁵⁸.

of *Underdevelopment*, [in:] ed. C. Chewe, P. Lauder-Dale, *Theory and Methodology of World Development: The writings of Andre Gunder Frank*, New York 2010, p. 8.

⁵⁴ A. Slipak, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

⁵⁵ L. L. North, R. Grinspun, *op. cit.*, pp. 10.


⁵⁶ F. Fajnzylber, *Industrialización en América Latina: de la caja 'negra' al 'casillero vacío'*. *Comparación de patrones contemporáneos de industrialización*, "Cuadernos de la Cepal", 1990, No 60; F. Fajnzylber, A. Schejtman, *Agricultura, industria y transformación productiva*, [in:] J. L. Reyna, *América Latina a fines de siglo*, México 1995.

⁵⁷ F. I. Leiva, *Latin American Neostructuralism: the Contradictions of Post-Neoliberal Development*, Minneapolis 2008.

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*.

The narrowing of the China-Latin America relations sided with the crystallization of neostructuralism as a determinant paradigm in thinking and acting towards Latin America's international insertion. In a way, as said in the previous section, this proximity was based mostly on China's demand over commodities to supply its industries and its growing urban middle-class⁵⁹. This led to a favourable political space in Latin America for the promotion of policies driven by the paradigm of "modernization through internationalization"⁶⁰. Barton and Rehner point to the prevalence of a "variegated capitalism" involving a new pattern of relations between states with heterodox economic orientation and private agents both domestic and internationally⁶¹.

Figure 3: Absolute values of the commodity exports from Latin America to China



Source: J. Barton, J. Rehner, *Neostructuralism through strategic transaction: The geopolitics of China's Dragon Doctrine for Latin America*, "Political Geography", 2018, Vol. 65.

⁵⁹ A. Slipak, *op. cit.*, p. 106; R. Bernal-Meza, *op. cit.*

⁶⁰ F. I. Leiva, *op. cit.*

⁶¹ J. Barton, J. Rehner, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

The image above illustrates the dimension assumed by the commodities trade in the China-Latin America relations. The budget destined to its exploration in the region rose more than five times between 2003 and 2010, going from US\$ 566 million to US\$ 3 billion annually⁶². The boom made possible for Latin American countries to reach average economic growth standards around 5%/year between 2000 and 2010. Other numbers estimate that China has granted, from 2005 to 2013, an amount of US\$ 86 billion in loans for Latin America.

Figure 4: Price indexes according to different commodities.



Source: M. Arboleda, *Spaces of Extraction, Metropolitan Explosions: Planetary Urbanization and the Commodity Boom in Latin America*, “International Journal of Urban and Regional Research”, 2016, Vol. 40, issue 1.

The data presented above helps us to grasp what Svampa described as the “commodity consensus”. This phenomena marks the entrance of Latin America in a new geo-economic and political-ideological order, sustained and led by the Chinese demands. After a significant increase in the terms of trade of the commodities in the international market (especially from 2005 to 2012, illustrated in figure 4), Latin American elites would have “signed” an agreement over the irrevocable and irresistible character of the extractivist

⁶² M. Arboleda, *Spaces of Extraction, Metropolitan Explosions: Planetary Urbanization and the Commodity Boom in Latin America*, “International Journal of Urban and Regional Research”, 2016, Vol. 40, issue 1, pp. 96-112.

practices in the region. The (re)incorporation of the “Eldorado” imaginary⁶³ over Latin America denotes an imaginative continuity over the role of the region in being a primary-goods provider of the world⁶⁴.

Despite the wide range of different policies adopted by Latin American governments, the consensus has presented itself regionally⁶⁵. Facing this scenario, Uruguayan ecologist Eduardo Gudynas has coined the concept of neo-extractivism⁶⁶ to make sense of the new development model⁶⁷ enacted in the region. Materially speaking, “[...] in Bolivia, gas production tripled in quantity between 2000 and 2008; while petroleum production in Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Mexico, and Venezuela rose by between 50 and 100 per cent between 1990 and 2008. The growth in extraction and production quantities in mining is also notable in Brazil, Chile, and Peru. The expansion of mining in countries in which it has not traditionally been a sector, such as Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and Ecuador, is a particularly important indicator of the change in the political and economic constellation of neo-extractivism”⁶⁸.

In the same direction, a tendency towards “reprimarization” and deindustrialization is observed in Latin America, especially when one looks

⁶³ The term “Eldorado” goes back to some myths that were cultivated by the first European colonial conquerors regarding the mineral-abundant regions in America. The analogy drawn with the present moment allows us to note a continuity in this depiction of America as an abundant repository. What marks a change, according to M. Svampa, is the way these resources (and the processes for their extraction) are now inserted in a political economy of extractivism in a global scale. M. Svampa, *Consenso de los Commodities” y lenguajes de valoración en América Latina*, „Nueva Sociedad”, 2013, No 244, pp. 35.

⁶⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁶ The most compelling difference between neo-extractivism and the “classical” one resides to its binding with national governments that justify and stimulate it through discourses and distributive practices. For Svampa, neo-extractivism is based on a national-populist socio-political *dispositive* that strategically functions as a source of political legitimacy. It is undeniable that, drawing on the famous metaphor of Eduardo Galeano regarding Latin America’s open veins, a difference can be seen in the moment that the “blood flow” does not only benefit the domestic or the *comprador bourgeoisie*, allowing the states to use the obtained revenue to sustain some distributive policies. E. Galeano, *As veias abertas da América Latina*. São Paulo 2010; E. Gudynas, *Diez tesis urgentes sobre el nuevo extractivismo*, “AAVV, Extractivismo, Política y Sociedad”, 2009; M. Svampa, *op. cit.*

⁶⁷ We understand “development model” as a determined set of social practices and mental schemes that are put forward on a more or less defined territorial unit through an institutionalized commitment in national or sub-national scale. Practically speaking, a development model is a complementary combination of a more or less stable regime of accumulation, a paradigm of industrial development and regulative norms that mobilize the former two institutionally (U. Brand et al., *op. cit.*, p.128).

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*, p.131.

at the region's exporting patterns⁶⁹. This phenomenon has been leading to important macroeconomic debates. In this sense, Maristela Svampa points out to the intimately asymmetrical relationship involving China and Latin America, which challenges China's official win-win discourses. For the ends of this article, it is paramount to emphasize that the revenues obtained by the Latin American states are becoming increasingly dependent on the extraction of primary resources, which is generating a new framework for conflicts involving the relations between state, society and the environment⁷⁰.

Among the main impacts on productivity driven by the commodity consensus, it is the expansion of the intensive agribusiness, industrial mining and large-scale extraction of hydrocarbons⁷¹. In this sense, the growing economic importance of primary resources has led to an expansion of the productive frontiers towards spaces that had not yet been exposed to the international capitalist system⁷², a process that may be understood according to what David Harvey⁷³ names "accumulation by dispossession". This new dynamics between state, society and environment are leading to reterritorialization practices that mark a new phase for Latin American insertion in global economic chains. Regionally speaking, the continental infrastructure of Latin America, that has China as one of its main facilitators, is imbricated in processes that reorganize and produce space towards a different valorisation of nature and land⁷⁴.

⁶⁹ M. Svampa, *op. cit.*; A. Slipak, *op. cit.*; C. Moreno, *op. cit.*

⁷⁰ J. Barton, J. Rehner, *op. cit.*

⁷¹ C. Dietz, B. Engels, *Contested Extractivism, Society and the State: An Introduction*. [in:] B. Engels, C. Dietz, *Contested Extractivism, Society and the State*, London 2017; E. Lander, *El Neoextractivismo como modo de desarrollo en America Latina y sus contradicciones*, Berlin 2014.

⁷² C. Dietz, B. Engels, *op. cit.*

⁷³ D. Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, New York 2003.

⁷⁴ IIRSA (Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America) initiative is a pertinent case of an organization that has already mobilized investments over US\$ 70 billion in the constructions of infrastructure projects mostly aimed at the reorientation of the land towards the dynamics of neo-extractivism. U. Brand et al. *op. cit.*, p.143; R. Zibechi, *Brasil Potência. Entre la integración regional y un nuevo imperialismo*, Bogotá 2012.

Figure 5: Relative value of primary goods over total export value.

Country	2002	2011
Argentina	69.5	68.5
Bolivia	84.2	95.5
Brasil	47.4	66.2
Chile	83.2	89.2
Colombia	62.2	82.5
Ecuador	89.7	92.0
Mexico	15.7	29.3
Peru	83.0	89.3
Uruguay	63.7	74.3 ⁽²⁰¹⁰⁾
Venezuela	86.2	95.5
MERCOSUR	54.3	67.1
Total Latin America and the Caribbean	40.7	60.7

Source: E. Lander, *El Neoextrativismo como modo de desarrollo en America Latina y sus contradicciones*, Berlin 2014.

In relation to national policies, especially after the relative decrease in the prices of the commodities after 2012, Brand et al.⁷⁵ observe a severe setback regarding environmental regulation, control, transparency and democratic, decentralized decision-making. The competition for foreign investment in face of a less-attractive international environment is visible, for example, in the Presidential Decrees 2195 (2014) and 2366 (2015), in Bolivia, which threaten indigenous self-determination and prior consultation, allowing hydrocarbon exploitation in protected areas. The same is seen in Venezuela with the dismantling of the ministry of Environment in 2014, and in Ecuador, with the reallocation of the Ministry of Environment under the same coordination desk that commands the Ministries for Hydrocarbons and Energy, and with the end of the “leaving oil in the soil” policy announced by former president Rafael Correa⁷⁶. In Brazil, president Jair Bolsonaro is effectively waging a war over indigenous territories and natural reserves by trying to pass presidential decrees

⁷⁵ U. Brand et al., *op. cit.*, p.146.

⁷⁶ *Ibidem*, pp.146-147.

allowing mining in these lands, supporting commercial farming in the Amazon and trying to move the organ responsible for land demarcation over the Ministry of Agriculture domain⁷⁷.

Drawing on Carlos Larrea's⁷⁸ work on Ecuador as an example, although he does not deny that social improvements were made possible by the revenues obtained by the state in the commodity boom, he emphasizes that concentration of lands and assets within left-leaning Alianza País government are reaching new heights. Similarly, the overvaluation of exchange rates, especially in Brazil and Mexico, contributed to the decline of the manufacturing sector and operated in the deepening of and asset/land concentration model. The increasingly mechanized large-scale agriculture (typical of Latin America), for North and Grinspun⁷⁹, is the antithesis of broad-based development, eliminating work opportunities and ejecting labor to urban sectors that are already overwhelmed with unemployment and underemployment. As for negative consequences of mineral extraction, mining operations threaten the lands and water of peasant farmers and indigenous peoples in many parts of Latin America, even in radical populist Bolivia and in progressive Ecuador⁸⁰.

Through the expansion of the productive frontiers and the flexibilization of protective norms on indigenous lands and natural reserves, we can say that Latin America is seeing, especially facing the falling prices of the commodities, a logic of accumulation by dispossession⁸¹. Maristela Svampa understands this tendency as violent and destructive, promoting the massive disqualification of other logics of land valorisation by the institution of "sacrifice areas" over territories that are considered "unproductive"⁸². Neo-extractivism installs a vertical dynamic (with direct action of the state) that disrupts local

⁷⁷ R. Shenoy, *Bolsonaro Reignites Decades-old fight over land between Indigenous people and farmers*. PRI, jul. 2019. <<https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-07-16/bolsonaro-reignites-decades-old-fight-over-land-between-indigenous-people-and>> (20.03. 2019).

⁷⁸ C. Larrea, *Inequidad social y redistribución del ingreso en el Ecuador. Paper prepared for the Fundación Rosa Luxemburgo and UISA-UASB*, 2014.; L. L. North, R. Grinspun, *op.cit.*, p. 14.

⁷⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 15.

⁸⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁸¹ In their work, Luis Felipe Rincón and Bernardo Fernandes look carefully at the cases of Argentina, with the expansion of the soybean industry, Brazil, regarding de-territorialization processes suffered by small-scale peasants over the prevalence of agribusiness and Colombia, regarding the rising land-concentration over a small number of big owning landlords as symptomatic cases for analyzing the prevalence of accumulation by dispossession in Latin America. L. Rincon, B. Fernandes, *Territorial Dispossession: dynamics of capitalist expansion in rural territories in South America*. „Third World Quarterly”, 2018.

⁸² M. Svampa, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

economies, threatens biodiversity, promotes the expelling of *campesinos* and indigenous peoples from their lands⁸³. This new shape of relationships involving public bureaucracies, Latin American (rural) elites and global finance is interestingly translated by Farthing as a resource-fuelled bargain process based on the division of the rents of commodity production⁸⁴. If the prices go down, as it was the case after 2012, specially for metals, the agreement over land access needs to be redrawn in order to re-accommodate the interests. For Rehner, “the ideological war of capitalist right and communist left has been replaced by a postmodern, pragmatic hybrid that emphasises a flexible approach to attaining strategic goals. However, it is the resource base that lies at the heart of this new commercial relationship”⁸⁵.

Drawing on Edgardo Lander’s work, the processes of mercantilization and financierization of nature that started on the neoliberal aegis are fastening with the “commodity consensus”⁸⁶. In this sense, we should point out to the growing presence of the latifundary in rural landscapes of the region and to growing dynamics of land grabbing⁸⁷. A report from the Observatory of Mining Conflicts in Latin America⁸⁸ shows how the growing importance of the mining activity has contributed for the criminalization of social movements that resist its presence. The figure below illustrates the growing number of people murdered for standing up against it. Also a tendency of disrespecting the ILO 169 convention norms of prior consulting for the realization of projects on indigenous lands is seen in Bolivia, Ecuador and Brazil⁸⁹.

⁸³ E. Lander, *op. cit.*; M. Svampa, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

⁸⁴ L. Farthing, *Charting the Social, Economic, and Political Contours of the New Extractivism in Latin America*, “Latin American Perspectives”, 2018, Issue 222, Vol. 45, No. 5, pp. 4-17.

⁸⁵ J. Barton, J. Rehner, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

⁸⁶ E. Lander, *op. cit.*

⁸⁷ L. Rincon, B. Fernandes, *op. cit.*

⁸⁸ Ocmal, *Minería, violencia y criminalización en America Latina, Dinámicas y tendencias. Informe OCMAL-CENSAT*, 2017.

⁸⁹ E. Lander, *op. cit.*

Figure 6: People murdered in conflicts over land involving mining projects.

	2002	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	Total
Argentina	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	1	3	-	-	-	7
Brasil	43	73	39	39	39	29	28	27	34	28	36	33	29	50	527
Chile	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Colombia	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	27	8	15	25	26	103
Costa Rica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	2
Ecuador	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	3
El Salvador	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	1	-	-	-	-	4
Guatemala	-	3	-	1	-	-	-	-	5	-	6	6	5	10	36
Honduras	-	2	-	-	2	1	3	1	26	36	28	10	12	8	129
México	-	2	-	2	2	2	1	7	7	4	10	3	3	4	47
Nicaragua	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	12	15
Panamá	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	2
Paraguay	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	3	-	13
Perú	1	1	2	1	3	1	5	9	3	11	15	6	9	12	79
Venezuela	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	2
Total	44	83	41	44	46	33	38	47	79	11	115	77	88	122	970

Source: *Minería, violencia y criminalización en América Latina, Dinámicas y tendencias. Informe OCMAL-CENSAT, 2017.*

Final considerations: the new landscapes of Latin America under the Chinese presence

As we have pointed out in the first two sessions, China's policy orientation towards Latin America is discursively grounded in a commitment with mutual benefit and win-win relations under the banner of South-South cooperation. This self-presentation of the Chinese foreign policy, however, is many times instrumentalized as an attenuation device of the county's ascension in international hierarchies of power. As we argued, one of the characteristics of this recent emergence of the Asian Dragon was its growing hunger for commodities, due to its prominent industrial production and rising middle-class urban population.

This Chinese appetite for commodities opened up which appeared as a window of opportunities for Latin American countries. Most of the countries in the region, generally coming out of a neoliberal era marked by the deterioration of social conditions of living, enjoyed a period of "bonanza", led by the rising prices of the commodities in the international market. This situation allowed Latin American left-wing governments to conduct distributive policies that had a notorious impact on the region's social well-being and human development, with the cases of Brazil and Argentina being

paradigmatic in this sense. Some states were actually able to go further and uphold structural reforms that had some impact over class structure, most notably in the Venezuelan case. Others promoted paradigmatic changes regarding land tenure and indigenous and *campesinos* groups. In this sense, the case of Bolivia and Ecuador are paradigmatic, with the re-foundation of the states under the condition on “plurinational” ones, with the legal incorporation of indigenous conceptualizations of *Buen Vivir/Vivir Bien* in their Constitutions and the assignment of juridical personality over nature⁹⁰.

These structural changes, however, fell short of what they proposed when commodity prices started to decrease and, thus, Latin American states (and the national and international elites under which they are subordinated) were unable to obtain as much revenue as before. What happened was a wide dismantling of many protective norms and social commitments towards the flexibilization of land grabbing processes leading to intensive agri-business and mineral exploration, mostly allowing aggressive practices of accumulation by dispossession⁹¹. Ironically or not, Chinese companies stand among the main driving forces of these processes.

This movement may be seen as a sign of an even higher degree of dependency in Latin America, a kind of dependency that is now reaching new lands and spaces. The overvaluing of local currencies at the higher peaks of the boom and the relative loss of attractiveness of manufacturing industries contributed, as said before, to a deep reprimarization of the region’s production. This has carved up the space to a reterritorialization process that opened up new frontiers of conflict and social tensions, mostly regarding environmental protection and indigenous peoples’ rights over land⁹². If we look at neostructuralism as a component of this equation, it is worth noting that the main critiques made by Fernando Leiva⁹³ revolve around the question of “market adaptability”. Two of them are its short-term perspective and the legitimation of old forms of export-oriented regimes of accumulation under new drapery towards new spatial frontiers. Its main failure, according to Leiva, would be the neglecting of the structural asymmetries that permeate and locate Latin American states and land in world political economy.

In this sense, what is presented in Chinese policy papers towards Latin America as “peaceful development” should be seen with caution by those who aim to have a critical look at the regional outcomes. Drawing on Brand et al’s,

⁹⁰ L. L. North, R. Grinspun, *op. cit.*

⁹¹ L. Rincon, B. Fernandes, *op. cit.*

⁹² L. Guerra, *Globalização, desenvolvimento e Buen Vivir: A América Latina na construção de alternativas contra-hegemônicas à ordem mundial neoliberal*, “Cadernos de Campo: Revista de Ciências Sociais”, No 24, pp. 85-111.

⁹³ F. I. Leiva, *op. cit.*

Leiva's and Slipak's critique, China's claims to be promoting a horizontal kind of relationship with Latin America must be put into serious question. Going beyond the understanding of the state as a monolithic unit, some of the premises of the mutually beneficial South-South cooperation may be potentially disastrous for some actors – mostly indigenous peoples and nature (whose existence can barely be conceived separately) – and render the historically persistent “open veins of Latin America” scenario even more difficult to revert.

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„*Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem*”
2019, Nr 1(12)
DOI: 10.33674/220194

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PROJECTING THE FOREIGN PROPAGANDA ON THE GEORGIAN POLITICS²

Abstract:

From 2016, the powerful and permanent ideological impact of the Russian messages on the global community is perceived as one of the most important challenges for the western civilization at the beginning of the 21st century. It is without a doubt that the challenge is more acute for the so-called “young democracies”. Georgia is considered to be one of such states. Thus, we have decided to use Georgia as the example to discuss the general essence of propaganda, the mechanisms of its use, the level of resistance by the local societies towards it and the influence that this phenomenon can have on a small country. There is no doubt that the success of the propagandist attacks on the sovereignty of a state directly depends on the level of trust of the wide layers of the society towards the governmental structures of the target state. The higher the level of mistrust, the more successful is the propagandist campaign conducted against a state, and vice versa: the higher the level of adequacy between the government and society, stronger the society is in withstanding the propagandist attacks. In case of Georgia, the ideological frame of the Georgian society is saturated by the mix of the right-conservative ideas with the left-socialist directions, where all the narratives of outside political actors definitely find their support. Based on this, we can suppose that their rhetoric places the society at the risk of negative radicalization.

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² This research (PHDF-18-280) has been supported by Shota Rustaveli National Science Foundation of Georgia (SRNSFG) and by Small Grants Programme of Caucasus International University.

Keywords:

Propaganda, Hybrid War, Informational warfare, Georgia, Russia, agenda, political communication

Introduction

After the 2016 presidential elections, the United States administration has raised the issue of Russian propaganda on the international agenda. The conversation about the detrimental effects of the Kremlin narratives has been intensified. As a result, the powerful and permanent ideological impact of the Russian messages on the global community has been perceived as one of the most important challenges for the western civilization at the beginning of the 21st century.

The strongest gravity centres of the global politics – the US and European governments have openly declared several times that they were not ready for suppressing the Kremlin's propagandist interventions in their national politics. The political and academic societies have started the discussion in the format of international organizations in order to find possible ways of counterbalancing the Russian narratives.

It is without a doubt that these circumstances present an even more acute challenge for the so-called “young democracies” who aim to build a western liberal, polyarchic societies and who are at the stage of their development where the formation of their statehood is still not fully complete. Georgia is considered to be one of such states. Thus, we have decided to use Georgia as the example to discuss the general essence of propaganda, the mechanisms of its use, the level of resistance by the local societies towards it and the influence that this phenomenon can have on a small country.

The essence of propaganda

Propaganda, literally, [“propago” (Lat.) – “I spread”], is perceived in the nowadays political discourse as the information – ideas or rumour, which are deliberately spread in order to achieve some specific goals³.

According to another definition, propaganda is any – true or false information, points of view or ideas, which are purposefully and widely spread across the society in order to achieve specific political, economic, or military goals. Such definition is also used to define the essence of the informational warfare⁴.

³ *Britannica. British Encyclopaedia. Propaganda*, <<https://www.britannica.com/topic/propaganda>>

⁴ G. G. Počepcov, *Informacionnye Vojny*, Kiev 2000.

According to the definition by Jacques Ellul, propaganda is a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated into a system⁵.

In the political discourse we also encounter a definition, according to which a propaganda is solely false information, point of view (arguments) or ideas, which are purposefully distorted and spread by one client with the aim of misguiding another client and thus gaining political, economic or military advantage over them⁶.

Nevertheless, it needs to be taken into consideration that different schools of propaganda (including the Russian school) categorically advise us not to confuse propaganda with the manipulation of the mass consciousness, since propaganda is solely a targeted action which is conducted with the aim of influencing the mass consciousness, while manipulating the mass consciousness is one of the results of different purposeful activities. Moreover, the formation of the social consciousness is conducted in the same way – through propaganda and persuasion – as manipulation, i.e. deception.

Why does it matter? Because propaganda, in general, is a phenomenon, which is present not only in media and politics, but in any space where there is a point of view and a possibility to interpret it, i.e. in any form of communication: religion, culture, the educational system, arts, including cinema, theatre, literature, architecture and painting, music and even scientific theories. In its essence, every religion is an act of sharing one specific representation of the god and the universe and thus, is a form of communication. The process of upbringing is also a form of communication, no matter where the child is being brought up, in a family, in a specialized institution or on the streets, without any care; the child learns the ways of interacting with the environment through the verbal and nonverbal communication with other individuals. Needless to state that the system of education also belongs to this category: it is clear as a day that in this segment an individual is subjected to the most powerful direct influence, which is inevitable and crucial for their socialization, i.e. shaping them into individuals.

Thus, if we speak in general terms regarding the essence and appropriateness of propaganda, we will end up at an intellectual dead-end, since propaganda is an inseparable part of any communication (wherever there is communication, there always is a propagatable idea, fact, interpretation). Hence, there is a need to differentiate between the propaganda, which is aimed at forming an individual's consciousness and the propaganda, which is aimed at misguiding them.

⁵ J. Ellul, *Propaganda. The formation of men's attitudes*, New York, 1973.

⁶ G. G. Počepcov, *Teoriâ komunikacii*, Kiev 2014.

This is why we prefer the definition, according to which propaganda is the interpretation, favourable for the propagandist, of a fact, a point of view, an argument, an idea or a value, including the purposefully distorted information, which shapes the society's opinion and can be used for misleading the society.

The capabilities of the propaganda

We have indicated above that propaganda is present in any space, where there is a point of view and the possibility to interpret it, i.e. communication. Clearly, the propaganda in religion, culture, the system of education and arts are the issues that need to be discussed separately from one another, but, at the same time, all these vectors intersect and unite at the point where the conversation about politics starts, since politics is the entirety of all matters concerning the principles and rules of cohabitation of a society, a state. This unity is the cornerstone, around which consolidates the state ideology and creates the propagatable narratives, and the spreading of these narratives serve the interest of a state (or a movement, or an union) which is the author of the said propaganda.

Hence, it will be reasonable to narrow down the definition of propaganda even more and focus only on the purposeful background propagandist campaigns, which, at the first sight, preach the truth, but, on the other hand, plant anchors in our consciousness⁷, and the activation of the said anchors prompts us the need to conduct activities favourable for the propagandists.

Moreover, unlike a regular, or even an aggressive advertising, this "prompting" is not only emotional in our perception, but also logical, since it forms "our" points of view based on the amalgam of our own values and the information stored in our own mind (our "informational storage"). Consequently, sometimes the effect of propaganda is so unnoticeable that a question arises: how much of what the propaganda prompts us is "our own" and why should we protect ourselves from it?

The problem is that propaganda is able to give harmfully intense emotional connotation pertinent to truly important values to the issues that are in reality not a priority for us. As a result, we can assume that individuals influenced by propaganda can disregard or altogether harm their key interests while chasing the ideals that have been "rammed down their throats".

For example, humans often act based on their emotions, "not using one's head" which is proven by our latest history (the post-soviet public tensions at the beginning of 90s and the "colourful revolutions", when we united in order to gain freedom and independence, as well as being easily provoked in favour of the groups with specific political interests). Most of political theorists

⁷ A. Tversky, D. Kahneman, *Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases*, "Science" 1974, no. 185 (4157).

share the opinion that it is better to change the political rule in a state through elections rather than through a revolution. Despite this, we went through the stages, when we forgot about this knowledge and changed an unfavourable government through a revolution. As a result, we gave up certain things, we improved on other things, but whether these moments of our political life were a hindrance of growth or a step forward will be evaluated by history, and, we hope that we will have political maturity not to spend 70 years on coming to our senses. On the other hand, we are now facing new challenges, and the future of the young democracies, in general, depends on whether our political systems will withstand the powerful propaganda attacks.

The aspects of using propaganda

Because of a multilateral use of propaganda, it is reasonable to distinguish the following aspects of using it:

1. for the internal politics – the role of propaganda in forming the civil consciousness in a state;
2. for international politics – the role of propaganda is realizing a country's foreign interests;
3. for ensuring the international security – the role of propaganda in the functioning of international security system.
4. apart from these, propaganda can also be viewed as an effective political tool used:
 - a) in order to realize long term goals (forming/expanding an ideology),
 - b) in order to realize medium-term goals (election/image campaigns),
 - c) in order to realize short-term goals (positioning the specific decision of the establishment, inspiring a social turmoil, a quickly escalating revolution).

In addition, while picking an ideal propagandist strategy aimed at realizing long-term goals and permanently conducting it in a background regime, it is possible to gain such a strong influence on the social opinion that it will “cheapen” the cost of conducting medium and short-term propagandist campaigns, and in case of need will be able to achieve the targeted goal simply by activating a combination of necessary “anchors”.

The main “anchors” of propaganda and its mechanisms of action

It has been said above that the main “anchors” of propaganda are our values, more precisely, specific systems of values, which present certain ready-made constructs used by us for evaluating the processes, facts, circumstances

and objective reality around us though our subjective point of view⁸. This is a framework of our own morality and conscience, which guides us on how to act in a specific situation. Based on this framework, i.e. based on our values, we pick the right from wrong and form our attitude towards various issues.

According to Charles Fillmore, this “frame” is a cognitive structure of schematizing one’s experiences⁹. Shank and Abelson considered, that this scheme can be perceived as the structural context of the everyday interactions¹⁰.

According to Erving Goffman, the “frame” is recursive, and, thus, stable even when undergoing changes¹¹. In other words, it can be unconsciously broken down into simple elements – primal “anchors”, regrouped and constructed into a new frame consisting of unchanging old elements.

Batigin, a Russian scholar of Goffman’s works, considers that typically it is impossible to consciously perceive these frames and the attempts to explicate (define) them often end up with perception disorganization. For example, if we try to manage our speech patterns, the continuity of our thoughts will break, while the analysis of our own motivations and actions can result in the deviations of our behaviour¹².

It should be taken into consideration that, according to Goffman, all primal “frames” of any social group are the central elements of the group’s culture¹³, but as the later researches of propaganda demonstrated, there is a possibility to artificially plant such central cultural elements in the consciousness of a group. For example, the definition of Robert Entman states that the term “frames”, in general, stands for such schemes of digesting information, which strengthen the specific perception and understanding of events. In this case Entman is implying the media “packaging”, through which the media hands the society the ready-made interpretations. According to Entman, the components of the “frames” of the media often coincide with the already established discourse in the society and shape such form of thought regarding a certain event, that is already familiar for the audience from its former experience¹⁴.

⁸ C. Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology*, New York 1963.

⁹ Č. Fillmor, *Frejmy i semantika ponimaniâ*, NZL 1988, Vyp. 23, “Kognitivnye aspekty âzyka”, p. 24-25.

¹⁰ R. S. Shank, R. P. Abelson, *Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding*, New Jersey 1987.

¹¹ E. Goffman, *Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience*, London 1974.

¹² G. S. Batygina, *Kontinuum frejmov: sociologičeskaâ teoriâ Irvinga Gofmana – stat’â* G. S. Batygina, [in:] *Institutsociologii RAN*, pp. 7-57, 42-43.

¹³ E. Goffman, *op. cit.*

¹⁴ R. M. Entman, *Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm*, “Journal of Communication” 1993, no. 43(4), pp. 51-58; Idem, *Cascading activation: Contesting the white house’s frame after 9/11*, “Political Communication” 2003, no. 20, pp. 415-432; Idem, *Projections of power: Framing news, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy*, Chicago 2004.

How do these schemes work? For example, if in regular circumstances family is more important for us than human rights according to our value systems, then we will never interfere in a family conflict, even if a married couple is physically harming each-other in front of us, or even if parents keep their defenceless children in unbearable conditions. On the other hand, if a family is a priority for us but human life and human rights are even more sacred and represent the values of the highest category, we will try to prevent and stop the family violence. How we'll do this? This is also defined by our value priorities. If the rule of law is of the utmost value for us, then we will contact the law enforcement, but if we accept the forceful regulation, the so-called "street rules", then we could possibly swing a fist or engage in a "face off".

The formation of the political taste (or the political culture) also happens according to the similar system of ranking. If the ideal environment for us is to live in a powerful state, then we put the interests of the state over our own, individual interest and we justify the attempts of the government to impose different types of politically motivated restrictions over the society. On the other hand, if we believe that the ideal environment is a state, where human rights are the highest value, we protest against any attempt to limit these rights. At the same time, as stated above, there also is a way of artificial, enforced "suggesting" ready-made schemes to the society and in this case it is possible to temporarily (or, sometimes, even permanently) change the ranking of priorities through the aggressive propaganda (frequent repetition, focusing on the other values, interpreting through different angles, etc.) and to put emphasis on a value, that is in reality of a lesser importance to us.

The conflict of propaganda with the existing values

There is no doubt that the success of the propagandist attacks on the sovereignty of a state directly depends on the level of trust of the wide layers of the society towards the governmental structures of the target state. The higher the level of mistrust, the more successful is the propagandist campaign conducted against a state, and vice versa: the higher the level of adequacy between the government and society, stronger the society is in withstanding the propagandist attacks.

Hence, the target of the permanent propagandist attacks is this very function – the indicator of trust towards the government institutions: the supposed "enemies", or the entities, which aim at realizing their specific tasks towards a sovereign state, as well as the healthy forces, discuss and interpret the ongoing events inside the country in the prism of the adequacy of the relationship between the government and the society.

For example, living in a corruption-free, rule-of-law state is a natural and healthy need of a society. At the same time, we can assume that the exaggerated myth about the inevitable corruptness of the government can be a successful attempt to pass off the single cases of corruption as a trend, a tendency and ignite nihilism or a desire to take action against the government. The ex-aggerated myth about the inevitable self-willed behaviour of the law enforcement institutions can be used as a foreword for justifying the need for the armed resistance against them. Emphasized inevitable division of the citizens according to national, religious, or any other aspect and stressing the differences can be a precursor for igniting national, religious (and etc.) conflicts inside the state.

While in the conditions of a closed, non-transparent society it was a much easier task for the author of the propaganda to impose their own interpretation on the wide layers of the society, the accessibility of information has made this considerably more difficult. As a result of a fast development of informational technologies and online media, the possibility of unlimited broadcasting of different interpretations has arisen, which is, on the one hand, confusing for the society, but, on the other hand, protects it from being “imprisoned” by some specific imposed system of values.

Thus, nowadays informational field represents a form of a combat theatre, where propagandist interpretations of different internal and external political, economic, ideological and religious interests (including the outside powers oriented at weakening a state) are engaged in an open struggle with each-other. This is why frequently in our society there is a conflict between the existing system of values and the elements replaceable/created through the ways of propaganda.

The common platforms of Russia and the West and the contrasts between the two

In the reality of the Georgian state today we can differentiate between two main gravity centres in terms of outside propagandist influences. These are the west and Russia. However, the lesser heavyweight actors, such as Turkish, Azerbaijanian and Armenian propagandist flows also constantly intrude in the informational field of the country. It should also be taken into account that while the abrupt “invasions” are relatively easier to identify, it is much more difficult to detect the pressure, the scheme of which largely coincides with the state interests. In such cases the difference is so minor that mostly it goes

unnoticed, but it can still be identified (for example, using Goffman's or Entman's frame-analysis method)¹⁵.

Among the different systems of values (ideological, religious, cultural, etc.) this time we have picked the ideological "frame", and have tried to analyze the propagandist information streams only through this context and determine, what concurrences and contradictions follow the propagandist narratives of the significant political actors excessively present in the country's informational field (we should also emphasize here that the concurrences are not always positive, just like the contradictions are not always negative).

Despite the fact that during the discussions regarding the world political order there are frequent attempts to find a resolution based on a consensus in the form of a "third way", a so-called "measured ideas", it is evident from observing the current state of media that ideologically, the western propagandist informational flows and narratives are mainly aimed at establishing the values of the liberal democracies, which implies such state propaganda, where in the state of representative democracy, inviolability of the individualism, human rights and the right of private property are the supreme values. In a liberal state the economy is liberal, based on market demand. Consequently, around this type of economic dynamics are shaped the social relations, and also happens the determination of upper-lower levels of society. Of course, an ideal political system does not yet exist, and thus it is natural that the most successful model of such a state – the US – still is facing a number of challenges which it is trying to solve taking into consideration the same core values that have been mentioned above.

Despite the fact that the ideas of the "third way" have received quite a strong resonance in the Russian political system, the consciousness of the society in the post-soviet Russia, the 70-year stage of the development of which was saturated by the propaganda of the socialist ideas, is still not fully free from the charms of the impressive slogans shaped on the idea of collectivization and it always puts the state interests ahead of the inviolability of the right of private property. Ideologically, such a ranking of value system is typical for etatism, or, say, a type of totalitarianism. Thus, for the post-soviet mentality limiting the private freedoms because of the state interest are fairly acceptable. On the other hand, the consciousness shaped this way places the care for individual's social and economic well-being fully under the responsibilities of the state, because of which, achieving the economic wellbeing is associated not with a private effort, but with "a strong hand" ("a good leader"), "the government protection"

¹⁵ R. M. Entman, J. Matthes, L. Pellicano, *Nature, sources, and effects of news framing*, [in:] K. Wahl-Jorgensen, T. Hanitzsch (Eds.), *The handbook of journalism studies*, New York 2009, pp. 175-190; E. Goffman, *Frame analysis...*, *op. cit.*; Idem, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, University of Edinburgh Social Sciences Research Centre 1959.

and “inevitable corruption” (if you become a part of corruption chain – you won). From the propagandist point of view, spreading the brazen socialist ideology in the world, which has seen the breakdown of the socialist camp with its own eyes, would be politically disadvantageous. This is why the post-soviet Russian propaganda has returned to the state of criticizing the opposing camp and has shaped its narratives so as to demonstrate the flaws of the western model of government.

Here we should also mention the common propagandist platform of Russia and the west: because Kremlin has the ambition to position itself as a global political player, it is important for Russia, just like it is for USA, to be represented as a force to be reckoned with, a powerful state that is determining the international rules of the game.

As a result, in order to conduct their foreign propagandist strategies, both Russia and the west use the “anchors”: tolerance, family values, multiculturalism and a leader-state. But together with this compilation, the US is actively lobbying for the democracy and the cliché of the “American dream” (the chance to achieve wellbeing through an individual effort), emphasizing the rule of law and the technologic predominance, and under tolerance, together with the religious, ethnic and cultural diversity, it also recognizes the right to the diverse gender identity. As for The Russian propagandist machine, its main accents are on the “Russian spirit” (open-hearted, “simple” people, which unite against an enemy), the wealth of the natural resources on the country’s territory (where the economic well-being is in itself-expected), military superiority and the strong leader. According to the Russian understanding, “justice” is not a rule of law but some form of a naturally existing “public justice”, while tolerance is solely cultural, ethnic and religious diversity and the issue of gender identity is perceived as a challenge for the family institution.

It should also be noted that while in case of the US the foreign propagandist vector is in full harmony with those state values, which are the bases for the country’s political agenda, in case of Russia these is a serious dissonance in this direction (for example, the economic well-being never comes on its own, nor can justice exist in itself, the military predominance is highly arguable, tolerance is selective and neither can the “strong leader” alone ensure the orderly functioning of a political system in the scopes of a democratic paradigm). This is why the Russian propaganda has to artificially strengthen its narratives, for which it often has to resort to the instruments of the “soft power” and falsifying facts.

Projecting ideological narratives on the local mentality

Nevertheless, which of the anchors propagated by the powerful political centres are acceptable for us and which are unacceptable? Which narratives

come in disagreement with our real interests and which are the ones that help us in the global integration?

First of all, we should note that in Georgia, despite the country's choice of a western direction which has no alternative, the political culture is not yet fully formed. The reason for this could be the historical changes in the country's political preferences, which on a historic scale, were quite frequent and which resulted in a picture where the frame of none of the political cultures could fully establish its roots. To be more specific, according to the political theorists, the political culture is forged by ancient values and it is passed from generation to generation not genetically, but through teaching and learning¹⁶. Thus, when different generations had to live in the cultural frames of different civilizations, none of the frames of a political culture have been fully absorbed by the consciousness of the society and as a result we get some form of a mix of the cultural achievements of different civilizations. It is highly probable that this is exactly the reason why for the consciousness of the Georgian society the dogmatic doctrines of the Christian and Islamic civilizations, the cornerstones of the eastern and the western cultures, are equally acceptable. On the one hand, the politicians' bold, insulting comments regarding their colleagues are unacceptable and on the other hand, there always exists a window for discourse in the society, where these "unacceptable" comments find explanation and justification.

We encounter the same ideological mix in the political culture of Georgia, where the platforms of the party spectrum mostly coincide with the rightist and the centre-rightist ("third power") ideological values. For example, as a result of studying the ideologies of the Georgian party spectrum we have determined that the classic rightist views are shared by the "National-Democratic Party" (Christian Democracy), "Freedom" (conservatism), "the National Forum" (moderate conservatism), "the Movement for Just Georgia" and "the Conservative Party"; while the centre-rightist ideas are shared by "the New Rightists", "the Industry Will Save Georgia", "United National Movement" (liberal conservatism and civil nationalism), "Georgia's Way" (national-democracy), "Democratic Movement – United Georgia" (nationalist state, Unitarianism, traditions), "the Patriotic Alliance" (conservatism), "Georgian Republican Party" (liberalism, individualism), "Free Democrats" (liberalism), "Girchi (pinecone)" (classic liberalism, libertarianism). The spectrum of the parties with the leftist ideologies is much more humble – here, among the centre-leftists (social democracy) are the "Labour Party", "People's Party", "Social Democrats for the Development of Georgia" and one of the most potent and formidable power, "the Georgian Dream". There are only two parties with the classic leftist ideology in Georgia: "Independent Georgia" and the "Green Party".

¹⁶ A. Heywood, *Politics*, 4th Edition, Palgrave Foundations 1997.

Obviously, the narratives of the political powers are represented the media daily agenda in appropriate doses. Because of this, the ideological frame of the Georgian society is saturated by the mix of the rightist ideology and the socialist directions, where the narratives of both outside political actors definitely find their support. The society's political taste, its political culture is also being shaped accordingly. In these circumstances it is disadvantageous for a party entity to conduct their political communication in an ideological context and these communications are instead conducted in the context of diminishing one another. Based on this, we can suppose that their rhetoric places the society at the risk of negative radicalization.

Conclusion

If we take into account the ever-growing trend of globalization, we can suppose that the ideological mix which characterizes our nowadays society is, in fact, advantageous, since the globalization brings such a mixture in the minds of the citizens of all states across the world. Thus, we can even consider the immaturity of the Georgian culture as its “bonus” at this point, since it is being refined and shaped in synchronicity with the world’s new political culture, taking into account the modern political realities.

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„*Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem*”
2019, Nr 1(12)
DOI: 10.33674/2201910

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BEZPIECZEŃSTWO EKONOMICZNE, ZMIANY KLIMATYCZNE, WYZWANIA

(ECONOMIC SECURITY, CLIMATIC CHANGES, CHALLENGES)

Abstrakt:

Bezpieczeństwo ekonomiczne stanowi jedno z głównych obszarów badań przedstawicieli nauk o bezpieczeństwie, jego poziom jest warunkowany wieloma czynnikami o charakterze ekonomicznym, politycznym, prawnym czy kulturowym. W artykule wskazano na uwarunkowania związane z procesem ocieplenia klimatu i ich znaczenie dla kształtowania bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego. Jako hipotezę przyjęto, iż niezbędne jest dokonanie istotnej zmiany w zakresie kształtowania modelu konsumpcji oraz roli państwa w kształtowaniu procesów rozwoju służącego tworzeniu potęgi ekonomicznej przy jednoczesnym zrównoważonym podejściu do wykorzystania zasobów przyrodniczych. Artykuł ma charakter przeglądowy, celem jest wskazanie na konieczność zmiany na bardziej aktywną rolę państwa w kształtowaniu bezpieczeństwa i ład ekonomicznego. W tym kontekście wykorzystanie dorobku wypracowanego przez szwedzką szkołę ekonomii oraz skandynawskie studia na pokój (w tym zwłaszcza ekonomię pokoju) stać się może podstawą do stworzenia modelu rozwoju wykorzystującego podejście godzące interesy ekonomiczne, przyrodnicze i instytucjonalne. Tworzenie podstaw bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego państwa musi w sposób pragmatyczny i odpowiedzialny uwzględniać ograniczoność zasobów przyrodniczych i jednocześnie uwzględniać cele społeczne związane z jakością życia ludzi.

Słowa kluczowe:

bezpieczeństwo ekonomiczne, rozwój, ekonomia pokoju

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Abstract:

Economic security constitutes one of the main areas of research carried out by representatives of security studies. Its level is conditioned by many factors of economic, political, law or cultural character. The article points out the conditions connected with the process of climate warming and their meaning for shaping the economic security. As a hypothesis it has been assumed that it is crucial to make a significant change in the scope of shaping the consumption model and the role of the state in shaping the processes of development. It serves the creation of economic force with a simultaneous balanced approach to the use of natural resources. The article has a review character, it's aim is to indicate the necessity of a change into the more active role of the state in shaping the security and economic order. In this context, the use of works developed by the Swedish school of economy and Scandinavian studies over peace (including mainly the peace economics) can become the basis to create the development model which uses the approach that connects the economic, natural and institutional interests. The creation of economic security bases of a state must, in a pragmatic and responsible way, include the limitation of natural resources and at the same time take into account the social aims connected with the quality of people's lives.

Keywords:

economic security, development, peace economics

Wprowadzenie

Bezpieczeństwo ekonomiczne stanowi jedno z głównych obszarów badań przedstawicieli nauk o bezpieczeństwie, poziom bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego kraju jest warunkowany wieloma czynnikami o charakterze ekonomicznym, politycznym, prawnym czy kulturowym. W artykule wskazano na uwarunkowania związane z procesem ocieplania klimatu i ich znaczenie dla kształtowania bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego. Wśród specjalistów toczy się dyskusja, na ile obserwowane zmiany klimatyczne wiązać można jedynie z działalnością człowieka a na ile przyczyny mają charakter niezależny – naturalny cykl życia Ziemi czy zmiany na słońcu. Zmiany klimatyczne wywołują określone skutki dla m.in. bezpieczeństwa żywnościowego, procesów migracyjnych, roli państw i aktorów pozapaństwowych w kształtowaniu systemów współczesnego bezpieczeństwa. Jako hipotezę przyjęto, iż niezbędne jest dokonanie istotnej zmiany w zakresie kształtowania modelu konsumpcji oraz roli państwa w kształtowaniu procesów rozwoju służącego tworzeniu potęgi ekonomicznej przy jednoczesnym zrównoważonym podejściu do wykorzystania zasobów przyrodniczych. Nieodpowiedzialne podejście do zasobów przyrody stwarza

napięcia o charakterze społecznym, będąc jedną z głównych przyczyn współczesnych konfliktów.

Wzrost i rozwój gospodarczy, kształtowanie bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego kraju

Ekonomiści zajmujący się bezpieczeństwem prowadzą badania w dwóch głównych nurtach badań: ekonomice bezpieczeństwa i ekonomice pokoju. Pierwsza z nich jest lepiej znana w Polsce, ma swój rodowód w ekonomice obrony wykładanej na studiach ekonomicznych w Polsce przez wiele lat. Ekonomia bezpieczeństwa jest szczegółową dyscypliną naukową, badającą formy i metody przygotowania i funkcjonowania gospodarki gotowej do spełnienia zadań z zakresu bezpieczeństwa. Przedmiotem zainteresowania ekonomiki bezpieczeństwa jest kształtowanie gospodarki narodowej w warunkach trzech stanów: pokoju, kryzysu oraz wojny². W warunkach współczesnych szczegółowe problemy badawcze J. Płaczek formułuje jako:

- podział obciążeń obronnych w ramach sojuszu;
- system kierowania zasobami obronnymi w okresie kryzysu;
- kształtowanie bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego państwa (żywnościowe, finansowe, surowcowo-energetyczne);
- współpraca cywilno-wojskowa w zakresie wypełniania zadań państwa-gospodarza;
- ekonomiczno-techniczne warunki wsparcia sił w czasie klęsk żywiołowych;
- skuteczność współczesnych środków wojny gospodarczej;
- społeczno-ekonomiczne koszty konwersji przemysłu zbrojeniowego;
- klasyfikację i wykorzystanie surowców strategicznych;
- rekonwersję personelu sił zbrojnych³.

Druga wspomniana dyscyplina – ekonomika pokoju wywodzi się ze studiów nad pokojem, w tym zwłaszcza pokoju pozytywnego w ujęciu Johana Galtunga. Ekonomia pokoju ma charakter normatywny – wskazuje jak być powinno, a nie jak jest. Ekonomia pokoju dotyczy ekonomicznego studiowania i projektowania instytucji politycznych, gospodarczych i kulturalnych, ich wzajemnych powiązań i ich polityk w celu zapobiegania, łagodzenia lub rozwiązywania wszelkiego rodzaju ukrytych lub rzeczywistych destrukcyjnych konfliktów wewnątrz i między społeczeństwami⁴.

² J. Płaczek, *Metodyczne podstawy ekonomiki bezpieczeństwa*, [w:] *Ekonomia bezpieczeństwa państwa w zarysie*, J. Płaczek (red.), Warszawa 2014, s. 44.

³ *Ibidem*, s. 45.

⁴ J. Brauer, R. Caruso, *Peace economists and peace economics*, Working Paper. Draft (v. 5), 21.11.2011 Draft chapter for Roger MacGinty (ed.) *Handbook on Peacebuilding*, Londyn 2011.

Dość naiwna wiara w stały postęp ekonomiczno-społeczny, która przyświecała ekonomii głównego nurtu zaczęła ulegać zmianie stosunkowo niedawno. Co prawda już ekonomiści związani ze szkołą szwedzką i ekonomią rozwoju akcentowali w latach 60. konieczność bardziej odpowiedzialnego podejścia do gospodarowania to jednak zdefiniowanie zrównoważonego rozwoju nastąpiło dopiero w 1972 roku na konferencji ONZ „Środowisko a dobrobyt ludzkości”. Mianem rozwoju zrównoważonego określono zaspokojenie podstawowych potrzeb wszystkich ludzi łącząc tę kwestię z zachowaniem równowagi ekosystemu w perspektywie następnych pokoleń⁵. Rozwój zrównoważony wymaga holistycznego ujmowania celów i działań w oparciu o inkluzywność, dostęp społeczności różnych państw do globalnych korzyści wynikających z wymiany międzynarodowej a także nieprzekraczaniu granic wydolności środowiska naturalnego⁶. Jednocześnie pisząc o rozwoju zrównoważonym należy rozróżnić dwa zasadniczo różne kategorie ekonomiczne, a mianowicie wzrost i rozwój gospodarczy. Wzrost gospodarczy jest to powiększanie się zdolności wytwórczych gospodarki związane z wielkością produkcji dóbr i usług. Poziom wzrostu gospodarczego zależy od wielu czynników o charakterze ekonomicznym takich jak: wielkość zasobów kapitału, stopy oszczędności i inwestycji w gospodarce, postępu technicznego, poziomu kapitału ludzkiego czy sprawności instytucji⁷. Natomiast pojęcie rozwoju gospodarczego jest znacznie szersze. O ile wzrost gospodarczy mierzony jest zmianami o charakterze ilościowym, to rozwój gospodarczy opisywany jest zmianami jakościowymi. Zmiany te mają charakter strukturalny i instytucjonalny. Chodzi tu o zmiany w strukturze branżowej i gałęziowej, zmiany w strukturze zatrudnienia w układzie sektorów gospodarki, zmiany w charakterze podaży dóbr i popytu na dobra i usługi w danym czasie. Rozwój gospodarczy ma zatem charakter złożony. Wymaga stosownych impulsów zarówno o charakterze endo-, jak i egzogenicznym. Procesowi wieloletniego wzrostu gospodarczego nie musi towarzyszyć rozwój ekonomiczno-społeczny. Sam wzrost gospodarczy bez zmian o charakterze jakościowym związany z koniecznością zmian zachowań i postaw podmiotów na rynku, może jedynie petryfikować przestarzałą strukturę gospodarki. O ile koncentrowanie się na wzroście gospodarczym w krajach o niskim poziomie rozwoju może mieć swoje uzasadnienie, o tyle lekceważenie

⁵ E. Frejtag-Mika, K. Sieradzka, *Granice wzrostu gospodarczego – dylematy współczesności*, [w:] *Globalizacja i regionalizacja we współczesnym świecie. Wyzwania integracji i rozwoju*, (red.) E. Molendowski, A. Mroczek, Warszawa 2015, s. 17.

⁶ W. Rutkowski, *Nierówności ekonomiczne a rozwój gospodarczy i dobrobyt społeczny*, „*Ekonomista*” nr 2/2016, s. 171.

⁷ J. Kot, *Wzrost i rozwój gospodarczy w warunkach globalizacji i umiędzynarodowienia*, [w:] *Zarządzanie i gospodarka. Wybrane zagadnienia i procesy. Wybrane aspekty współczesnej gospodarki*, (red.) J. Kot, Kielce 2016, ss. 9-10.

zmiennych jakościowych w krajach o co najmniej średnim poziomie rozwoju i średnim dochodzie jest wysoce nieuzasadniony.

Złożoność procesu rozwoju ekonomiczno-społecznego wynika z konieczności uwzględniania różnych czynników o charakterze rozwojowym takich jak:

- polityki gospodarczej;
- reguł gry, w ramach których funkcjonuje gospodarka;
- kultury organizacji;
- wyznawanych wartości;
- stosunków społecznych, stosowanych technik i technologii;
- ryzyka przedsięwzięć;
- oddziaływań środowiskowych;
- sposobów zarządzania⁸.

Minione lata, po kryzysie energetycznym z początku lat siedemdziesiątych XX wieku upłynęły pod hasłem globalizacji procesów gospodarczych. Wyłonił on nowych aktorów w architekturze gospodarki światowej, którzy będą mieli prawdopodobnie kluczowe znaczenie dla kształtowania procesów rozwoju w obecnym stuleciu. Niewątpliwie należą do nich Chiny i Indie, ale także inne państwa Azji oraz o czym należy pamiętać podmioty pozapaństwowe – korporacje transnarodowe⁹.

Tabela 1: Prognoza zmian w gospodarce światowej w latach 2004-2050 (udział w światowym PKB w %)

Podmiot	2004	2025	2050
Chiny	4	15	28
Stany Zjednoczone	28	27	26
Indie	2	5	17
Unia Europejska	34	25	15
Japonia	12	7	4
reszta świata	20	21	10
Świat	100	100	100

Źródło: J. Kot, *Wzrost i rozwój gospodarczy w warunkach globalizacji i umiędzynarodowienia*, [w:] *Zarządzanie i gospodarka. Wybrane zagadnienia i procesy. Wybrane aspekty współczesnej gospodarki*, J. Kot (red.), Kielce 2016, s. 16.

⁸ E. Frejtag-Mika, K. Sieradzka, *op. cit.*, s. 18; także G. Kołodko, *Wędrujący świat*, Warszawa 2008.

⁹ M. Leszczyński, *Wzrost i rozwój gospodarczy a problem zatrudnienia w gospodarce czarnorynkowej*, „Roczniki Ekonomii i Zarządzania, Towarzystwo Naukowe Kul, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła IP”, Tom 10(46), nr 2, 2018, ss. 9-10.

Rzeczywistość globalizacji wyłania nowy obraz konkurencji między podmiotami, tym procesom towarzyszy jednak dysproporcjonalny rozwój. Unifikacja i standaryzacja modeli biznesu, ale także innych sfer ludzkiej działalności przynosi obok korzyści również szereg napięć i konfliktów związanych z dysproporcjami społecznymi, ekonomicznymi i politycznymi. M.G. Woźniak wymienia jako znaczące następujące procesy, które stanowią swoisty koszt modernizacji i globalizacji dla wielu gospodarek¹⁰:

- nierównomierne rozkładanie się kosztów i korzyści modernizacji;
- narastanie ryzyka zagrożeń dla przyszłych pokoleń w postaci: głodu i ubóstwa, wykluczenia przez utratę pewnych praw, katastrof naturalnych w ekosferze i spowodowanych deficytem niektórych surowców, genetycznych, epidemii biologicznych, informatycznych, związanych z radioaktywnością, kryzysu demograficznego, terroryzmu i lokalnych konfliktów, relatywnego spadku wydajności pracy, piractwa własności intelektualnej, negatywnych skutków ekspansji potrzeb nieelementarnych, relatywizmu moralnego;
- konfrontacja neoliberalnych reguł gry, związana z konfliktem procesów o charakterze globalnym z tradycyjnymi zwyczajami, sposobem pracy, systemem wartości, kulturą społeczeństwa przemysłowego – „walka” idei postmodernizmu i ponowoczesności z tradycjami epoki przemysłowej.

Do powyższych zagrożeń dodać można kwestię polaryzacji rozwoju ekonomicznego w świecie przy ogólnym postępie w walce ze skrajnym ubóstwem. Jednocześnie w zasadniczy sposób zmienia się funkcja państwa narodowego a także postrzeganie jego roli dystrybucyjnej. Nastąpiła zasadnicza zmiana i ewolucja tzw. państwa dobrobytu związana m.in. z deindustrializacją i globalizacją.

Ekonomizacja bezpieczeństwa. Bezpieczeństwo jako dobro publiczne

Ekonomizacja bezpieczeństwa wynika z kilku czynników takich jak: postęp naukowo-techniczny, zmiany postrzegania i znaczenia przestrzeni dla państw (ewolucja od geopolityki w stronę geoekonomii), wzrostu rywalizacji między państwami o zasoby i kapitały. Ponadto w wyniku globalizacji rosną współzależności między państwami wynikające z przepływów towarów, kapitałów, ludzi i idei. Wzrasta poziom zadłużenia międzynarodowego (zjawisko zależności finansowej i politycznej), pojawiają się nowi aktorzy stosunków międzynarodowych – korporacje transnarodowe, występują na szeroką skalę

¹⁰ M. G. Woźniak, *Holistyczna modernizacja refleksyjna kapitału ludzkiego odpowiedzią na wyzwania i zagrożenia rozwojowe współczesnej fali globalizacji*, [w:] *Gospodarka Polski 19990-2011. Droga do spójności społeczno-ekonomicznej*, Warszawa 2012, s. 194.

strefy głodu, niekontrolowanych migracji, lokalnych konfliktów zbrojnych o zasoby wody i zasoby przyrodnicze¹¹. „W prowadzonych badaniach nad bezpieczeństwem ekonomicznym bezpieczeństwo ekonomiczne zdefiniowano jako niezakłócone funkcjonowanie gospodarek, to znaczy utrzymanie podstawowych wskaźników rozwojowych oraz zapewnienie komparatywnej równowagi z gospodarkami innych państw”¹². K. M. Księżopolski wyodrębnia cztery zasadnicze wymiary bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego: finansowy, surowcowo-energetyczny, żywnościowy oraz dostępu do czystej wody. „W ramach każdego z tych wymiarów występują zagrożenia, które wpływają na bezpieczeństwo ekonomiczne państw, czyli terytorium, ludność, władzę, suwerenność oraz poziom i jakość życia obywateli”¹³. Poza zagrożeniami, których źródłem są inne państwa coraz częściej obserwujemy zagrożenia ze strony aktorów pozapaństwowych, takich jak banki, fundusze inwestycyjne, różnego rodzaju lobby i grupy nacisku skupiające kapitał i władzę.

Zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa to jedna z podstawowych funkcji państwa, warunki jej spełnienia leżą w obszarze zainteresowania wspomnianej dyscypliny. Badacze min. J. Kleer wskazują, iż bezpieczeństwo stało się globalnym dobrem publicznym. Każdy człowiek ma prawo do poczucia bezpieczeństwa, mimo iż terytorium na którym mieszka nie zawsze takie poczucie zapewnia. Kształtowanie bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego pozostaje domeną państwa narodowego, przy czym obecnie ze względu na proces globalizacji akcentuje się podejście geoekonomiczne, które w stosunkach międzynarodowych zastępuje podejście geopolityczne. Bezpieczeństwo jest przykładem dobra publicznego, o charakterze nierywalizacyjnym, z konsumpcji którego nie można wyłączyć żadnego członka danej zbiorowości. Decyzje o dostarczaniu dóbr publicznych są efektem wyborów publicznych i decyzji politycznych¹⁴. Bezpieczeństwo, będąc dobrem publicznym posiada wspólne cechy z innymi dobrami zaliczanymi do tej kategorii, jak użyteczność, traktowaną jako miarę satysfakcji z konsumpcji. Dostarczenie bezpieczeństwa wymaga odpowiednich środków i związanych z nimi nakładów w czasie. Bezpieczeństwo jako dobro publiczne warunkuje także konsumpcję innych dóbr i usług, stanowiąc dobro podstawowe oraz jednocześnie będąc dobrem komplementarnym w stosunku do wartości objętych przedmiotowo zakresem bezpieczeństwa. Za dostarczanie i wytwarzanie bezpieczeństwa odpowiada państwo, w wymiarze instytucjonalnym. Warunkiem skutecznego kształtowania

¹¹ K. M. Księżopolski, *Bezpieczeństwo ekonomiczne – przedmiot badań i praktyka*, [w:] *Współczesne bezpieczeństwo ekonomiczne. Wymiar międzynarodowy*, (red.) M. Gębska, M. Kubiak, Warszawa 2016, ss. 14-15.

¹² *Ibidem*, s. 16.

¹³ *Ibidem*, s. 17.

¹⁴ Z. Stachowiak, *Teoria i praktyka mechanizmu bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego państwa. Ujęcie instytucjonalne*, Warszawa 2012, s. 42.

bezpieczeństwa jest suwerenność podmiotu, w tym przypadku państwa. „Mimo postępującej integracji i dynamiki tworzenia ugrupowań integracyjnych suwerenność pozostaje wyłącznym atrybutem państw i stanowi o istocie państwowości. Nasilenie procesów globalizacji i fragmentacji wywołało pytania dotyczące możliwości i sposobów odpowiedzi na nowe wyzwania i zagrożenia w stosunkach międzynarodowych, w tym dotyczące suwerenności państwa. Dylemat ten odnosi się w głównej mierze do dalszego funkcjonowania międzynarodowego systemu opartego na państwach narodowych i ich zdolności do skutecznego działania w globalizującym się świecie”¹⁵. Bezpieczeństwo coraz częściej traktowane jest w kategoriach globalnego dobra publicznego, ponieważ gospodarka staje się współzależna, zmieniają się zagrożenia i coraz częściej patrzy się na bezpieczeństwo z perspektywy globalnej a nie tylko narodowej. Coraz powszechniej zaczyna przyjmować się, że konsumpcja pewnych globalnych dóbr publicznych przez jedne kraje, czy ich społeczeństwa nie może uszczuplać konsumpcji tych dóbr przez inne państwa. Chodzi tu o takie dobra jak¹⁶: woda, powietrze, pokój, zdrowie, prawo do nauki i wykształcenia, wiedzy, prawo do informacji, prawo do ludzkiego traktowania. „Globalne dobra są efektem powiązań i porozumień między co najmniej dwoma państwami, w sprawie korzystnych rozwiązań nie tylko samych podmiotów państwowych, ale i ich społeczeństw. Oznacza to, że w korzyściach uczestniczą państwa i pośrednio lub bezpośrednio również społeczeństwa tych państw, które mogą z nich korzystać zarówno jednostkowo jak też zbiorowo”¹⁷.

Tabela 2: Klasyfikacja dóbr przy użyciu kryteriów własności, konkurencji i wyłączności

Dobra konkurencyjne	Dobra podlegające wyłączeniu	Dobra niepodlegające wyłączeniu
	Dobra prywatne: żywność, ubranie, meble, sprzęt trwałego użytku	Ogólny zbiór zasobów/wspólne dobra publiczne: woda, powietrze, środowisko, rybołówstwo, łowiectwo
Dobra	Dobra podlegające	Dobra publiczne: obrona

¹⁵ M. Grącik-Zajaczkowski, *Suwerenność w warunkach globalizacji*, [w:] (red.) K. Żukrowska, *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Przegląd aktualnego stanu*, Warszawa 2011, ss. 234-246.

¹⁶ *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Przegląd aktualnego stanu*, (red.) K. Żukrowska Warszawa 2011, ss. 32-33.

¹⁷ J. Kleer, *Dobra publiczne: wczoraj-dziś-jutro*, Warszawa 2015, s. 185.

niekonkurencyjne	wyłączeniu (ekskluzywne, klubowe)	narodowa, zdrowie, nauka, przekaz radiowy i telewizyjny
	Dobra prywatne	Dobra publiczne

Źródło: *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Przegląd aktualnego stanu*, red. K. Żukrowska, Warszawa 2011, s. 31.

Zmiany klimatyczne a problem bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego

W nauce trwa dyskusja nad rzeczywistymi przyczynami ocieplania się klimatu, kwestią sporną pozostaje określenie wpływu działań ludzkich na ten proces – czy jest to czynnik jedyny, czy jeden z kilku. Uważa się, że trwające ~120 tys. lat oscylacje temperatury i towarzyszące im cykle lodowcowe są wywoływane przez zmiany orbity Ziemi – precesję (obrót w przestrzeni osi obrotu Ziemi, jak w kręcącym się bąku), czyli zmiany nachylenia osi obrotu Ziemi do płaszczyzny orbity oraz zmianę jej mimośrodę (oscylacje między orbitą kołową i eliptyczną). Zmiany orbity Ziemi powodują okresowe zmiany w ilości otrzymywanej od Słońca energii. Są to tzw. cykle Milankovicia, które wskazują, że klimatem Ziemi steruje energia otrzymywana od Słońca. Szczególnie mocno podkreślają to sceptycy negujący wpływ człowieka na globalne ocieplenie. W długich skalach czasowych zmienia się orbita Ziemi, a w krótszych skalach czasowych (dziesiątki, setki i tysiące lat) zmiany klimatu mogą być wywoływane zmianami aktywności samego Słońca, które w ten sposób dostarcza do Ziemi mniej lub więcej energii¹⁸. Większość badaczy zwraca jednak uwagę, że rozrost populacji Ziemi, rozwój przemysłu i rolnictwa może mieć istotne znaczenie dla zmian w ekosystemie, w tym na procesy ocieplenia klimatu. Specjaliści wskazują zwłaszcza na rolę emisji tzw. gazów cieplarnianych (dwutlenek węgla i metan). Szacuje się, iż obecny poziom koncentracji dwutlenku węgla jest najwyższy od 420 tys. lat. Około 80% emisji dwutlenku węgla pochodzi ze spalania paliw kopalnych, pozostałe 20% jest efektem wycinki lasów oraz produkcją rolnictwa (zwłaszcza zwiększenie pogłowia bydła w związku ze wzmożonym popytem na mięso)¹⁹. Na skutek przyrostu liczby ludności, rozszerzenia się obszarów zurbanizowanych, zwiększania zakresu upraw oraz generalnie rozrostu działalności gospodarczej dochodzi do wzrostu temperatury przy powierzchni Ziemi. Efektem tego jest topnienie lodolodu i zalewanie terenów nadbrzeżnych skutkujące zmniejsza-

¹⁸ *Długookresowe zmiany temperatury – cykle Milankovicia*, <<https://ziemianarozdrozu.pl/encyklopedia/125/wplyw-slonca-na-zmiany-temperatury-ziemi>>, (27.06.2019).

¹⁹ R. Bartkowiak, *Ekonomia rozwoju*, Warszawa 2013, ss. 199-200.

niem się terenów możliwych do wykorzystania przez człowieka – zachodzi swoista kwadratura koła. Już dzisiaj około 5% ludności świata zamieszkuje tereny zalewowe – narażone na katastrofalne powodzie i tsunami. Najsilniej zjawisko to występuje przy ujściach wielkich rzek (Indie) czy ekstremalny przypadek Bangladeszu (kraj o powierzchni połowy Polski, zamieszkały przez czterokrotnie więcej ludności, z której połowa narażona jest na powodzie i huragany). Zmiany klimatyczne wywierają już istotny wpływ na produkcję rolnictwa i jej strukturę. Na skutek podnoszenia się temperatury pojawią się możliwości upraw na terenach dotychczas zbyt zimnych (północna Rosja, Kanada), jednocześnie następuje pustoszenie wszędzie tam, gdzie temperatury są zbyt wysokie do upraw (Afryka – zagrożona pustoszeniem, które obejmie ok. 30 % powierzchni kontynentu, Azja Południowa, czy Bangladesz i Indie – obszary gęsto zaludnione). Ze względu na wzrost temperatury mogą zanikać uprawy pszenicy i ryżu, w ich miejsce pojawi się proso – bardziej odporne na wysokie temperatury, ale jednocześnie mniej wydajne. Jeżeli nadal będzie rosła populacja Ziemi to skutkować to może stałym niedożywieniem i klęskami głodu. Ocieplenie klimatu poprawi warunki upraw w krajach o klimacie umiarkowanym i chłodnym, a spowoduje potężne problemy w krajach już uznanych za ubogie i przeludnione.

Prawdopodobnym skutkiem tych procesów będzie wzmożona presja migracyjna (zob. tab. 3), ale także lokalne konflikty o dostęp do zasobów ziemi, wody i żywności. Nastąpi dalsza polaryzacja w rozwoju (a być może przeciętne obniżenie poziomu życia we wszystkich państwach świata).

Tabela 3: Skumulowana liczba migrantów (znak ujemny oznacza emigrację), w milionach.

Grupa krajów	Lata 1950 - 1960	do 1970 roku	do 1980 roku	do 1990 roku	do 2000 roku	do 2010 roku	do 2020 roku	do 2030 roku
Kraje zamożne	-0,03	5,5	16,4	31,7	56,6	85,6	108,3	131,0
Kraje ubogie, w tym:	0,03	-5,5	-16,4	-31,7	-56,6	-85,6	-108,3	-131,0
- Afryka	-1,3	-3,1	-6,6	-9,2	-12,3	-16,5	-20,3	-24,2
- Azja	1,9	1,7	-2,1	-6,6	-20,0	-33,1	-45,2	-57,4
- Ameryka Łacińska	-0,7	-3,6	-7,8	-15,6	-23,3	-34,4	-40,6	-46,5

Źródło: R. Bartkowiak, *Ekonomia rozwoju*, Warszawa 2013, s. 205.

Ludność z obszarów dotkniętych pustynnieniem, brakiem dostępu do wody, ofiary klęsk głodu nieuchronnie przemieszczać się będzie w stronę miast przyczyniając do żywiolowej urbanizacji (zob. tab. 4).

Tabela 4: Ludność miejska w %.

Grupa państw, państwa	Lata				
	1990	1950	2000	2007	2050
Świat	14	29	47	50	70
Kraje zamożne	30	53	73	75	86
Kraje ubogie, w tym:	9	18	40	44	67
- Brazylia	-	36	81	85	94
- Chiny	-	13	36	42	73
- Indie	-	17	29	34	55
- Nigeria	-	10	43	42	75

Źródło: R. Bartkowiak, *Ekonomia rozwoju*, Warszawa 2013, s. 216.

Wraz ze wzrostem ludności miejskiej zwiększa się liczba miast powyżej 10 mln mieszkańców (zob. tab. 4), powstają tzw. megamiasta, gdzie w przypadku krajów słabo rozwiniętych rozrastają się slumsy. W najgorszej sytuacji znajduje się Afryka Subsaharyjska (3/4 mieszkańców miast żyje w slumsach). Stałym problemem slumsów jest wysokie bezrobocie, brak dostępu do podstawowych usług komunalnych, edukacji, ochrony zdrowia, niedożywienie i przestępczość.

Tabela 5: Liczba miast o liczbie mieszkańców powyżej 10 mln.

Grupa krajów	Lata				
	1950	1970	2000	2030	2050
Świat, w tym:	1	3	19	34	59
- kraje zamożne	1	2	4	5	5
- kraje ubogie	0	1	15	29	54

Źródło: R. Bartkowiak, *Ekonomia rozwoju*, Warszawa 2013, s. 217.

Podsumowanie

Zmiany klimatyczne, nierównomierność rozwoju ekonomicznego, które skutkują zawirowaniami na rynkach żywności przynoszą m.in. skutki w postaci niekontrolowanych migracji i lokalnych konfliktów o żywność i wodę. Skutkiem tego może być postępująca destabilizacja w skali świata i napięcia nie tylko

w krajach dotkniętych głodem, ale również w państwach wysoko rozwiniętych – nieprzygotowanych instytucjonalnie na współczesne wyzwania. W wymiarze ekonomicznym narastać mogą praktyki protekcjonistyczne, ograniczanie mobilności osób, eskalacja nierówności w dostępie do zasobów naturalnych i ziemi uprawnej. Należy w sposób znacznie bardziej odpowiedzialny podchodzić do roli państwa jako aktora kształtującego współczesne procesy rozwoju. W tym kontekście wykorzystanie dorobku wypracowanego przez szwedzką szkołę ekonomii oraz skandynawskie studia na pokój (w tym zwłaszcza ekonomikę pokoju) stać się może podstawą do stworzenia modelu rozwoju wykorzystującego podejście godzące interesy ekonomiczne, przyrodnicze i instytucjonalne. Tworzenie podstaw bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego państwa musi w sposób pragmatyczny i odpowiedzialny uwzględniać ograniczoność zasobów przyrodniczych i jednocześnie uwzględniać cele społeczne związane z jakością życia ludzi, korzystając z doświadczeń koncepcji państwa dobrobytu.

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„*Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem*”
2019, Nr 1(12)
DOI: 10.33674/220196

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ODSTRASZANIE JAKO ELEMENT STRATEGII BEZPIECZEŃSTWA IZRAELA

Abstrakt:

Położenie geopolityczne Izraela w regionie Bliskiego Wschodu posiada nad wyraz niekorzystny charakter. W rezultacie, izraelscy decydenci zmuszeni zostali do wypracowania rozbudowanych mechanizmów reagowania na rzeczywiste czy też potencjalne zagrożenia. Obecnie jednym z takich mechanizmów są działania ukierunkowane na odstraszenie. Należy zauważyć, że w odniesieniu do polityki bezpieczeństwa Izraela, na przestrzeni ostatnich lat to właśnie inicjatywy związane z zapobieganiem zaczęły odgrywać decydującą rolę. Zgodnie z izraelską strategią bezpieczeństwa, odstraszenie należy utożsamiać z trzema elementami: wiarygodną groźbą przeprowadzenia przez Izrael ofensywnych działań odwetowych, rozbudową sił zbrojnych oraz dążeniem do ograniczenia zasobów oraz możliwości rozwoju ugrupowań wrogo nastawionych do Izraela. Uwzględniając bieżące wydarzenia polityczne na Bliskim Wschodzie, postaram się tym samym wykazać istotę izraelskiej doktryny odstraszenia.

Słowa kluczowe:

Izrael, Bliski Wschód, odstraszenie, polityka bezpieczeństwa

Abstract:

The geopolitical location of Israel in the Middle East region is extremely unfavorable. As a result, Israeli policymakers were forced to develop a comprehensive mechanism of responding in relation to real or potential threats. Currently, one of these mechanisms is focused on deterring. It should be noted that in the context of Israeli security policy, in recent years initiatives devoted to prevention have started to play a decisive role. According to the

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Israeli security strategy, deterrence should be connected with three elements: a credible threat of conducting by Israel forces offensive retaliatory actions, the extension of armed forces and seeking to reduce resources and development opportunities in the context of groups hostile to Israel. Taking into account current political events in the Middle East, I will try to point out the essence of the Israeli deterrence doctrine.

Keywords:

Israel, the Middle East, deterrence, security policy

Wstęp

Przedmiotem niniejszego artykułu jest charakterystyka polityki odstraszenia w ramach izraelskiej strategii bezpieczeństwa. Zaproponowana tematyka posiada nie tylko walor deskryptywny, ale przede wszystkim eksplanacyjny, albowiem pozwala ona zrozumieć tendencje związane z obecnym kształtem izraelskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa. Zastosowane w artykule ramy czasowe odnoszą się do okresu po 2010 roku, w nawiązaniu do wybuchu masowych protestów społecznych na Bliskim Wschodzie (tzw. arabska wiosna), które w konsekwencji wymusiły na Izraelu redefinicję bieżących wyzwań oraz zagrożeń². Ramy przestrzenne pokrywają się zaś z granicami regionu Bliskiego Wschodu, bowiem jak zostanie wykazane w dalszej części, to właśnie na tym obszarze izraelscy decydenci dokonali identyfikacji głównych zagrożeń bezpieczeństwa.

W artykule podjęto próbę odpowiedzi na następujące pytania badawcze. Po pierwsze, co jest istotą izraelskiej polityki odstraszenia? Po drugie, dlaczego po raz pierwszy w historii upubliczniono treść Strategii Sił Obronnych Izraela? Po trzecie, w jaki sposób aktualna Strategia Sił Obronnych Izraela wpływa na kształt polityki odstraszenia? Po czwarte, w jakim kierunku ewoluuje strategia bezpieczeństwa Izraela?

Na podstawie postawionych pytań badawczych, weryfikacji poddano cztery hipotezy. Po pierwsze, w wyniku obecnych wyzwań oraz zagrożeń, istota izraelskiej polityki odstraszenia zawiera się w trzech komponentach: wiarygodnej groźbie ofensywnych działań odwetowych, rozbudowie sił zbrojnych oraz ograniczaniu zasobów i możliwości rozwoju wrogich ugrupowań. Po drugie, Strategia Sił Obronnych Izraela została upubliczniona pierwszy raz w historii z dwóch powodów: obecności nowych zagrożeń, jak również w celu jasnego zadeklarowania regionalnym przeciwnikom Izraela o obowiązujących „regułach gry”, których nieprzestrzeganie automatycznie wiązać ma się ze

² Vide: A. Dzisiów-Szuszczkiewicz, „Trzęsienie ziemi” w środowisku bezpieczeństwa Izraela, „Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe” 2011, nr 19, III.

zdecydowaną reakcją. Po trzecie, autorzy Strategii Sił Obronnych Izraela w wyniku akcentowania konieczności zwiększania nakładów finansowych na rzecz armii, zwracają równocześnie uwagę na rozwój polityki odstraszenia. Po czwarte, w rezultacie aktualnych wyzwań oraz zagrożeń, strategia bezpieczeństwa Izraela ewoluje od dominującej roli środków wojskowych (twardych), w kierunku środków niewojskowych (miękkich).

W artykule wykorzystano dwa rodzaje metod badawczych. Po pierwsze, badania ilościowe, które zilustrowały nakłady finansowe państw Bliskiego Wschodu w latach 2010-2018 na rzecz armii (potencjał militarny jako filar polityki odstraszenia). Po drugie zaś, badania jakościowe w postaci analizy przypadku (*case study*). W związku z powyższym charakterystyce poddano wydarzenia zapoczątkowane 30 marca 2018 roku, dotyczące masowych demonstracji ludności palestyńskiej wzdłuż granicy pomiędzy Izraelem a Strefą Gazy (ograniczone działania ofensywne w ramach akcji odwetowej jako kolejny filar polityki odstraszenia).

Struktura artykułu obejmuje wstęp, rozwinięcie składające się z trzech elementów (zarys strategii bezpieczeństwa Izraela, polityka odstraszenia – ujęcie teoretyczne, polityka odstraszenia – ujęcie praktyczne) oraz zakończenie. Najważniejszym źródłem pierwotnym przeprowadzonych badań jest Strategia Sił Obronnych Izraela, w której autorzy zilustrowali kształt izraelskiej polityki odstraszenia. Istotną okazała się również analiza Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), która przedstawiła dane dotyczące nakładów finansowych państw Bliskiego Wschodu na rzecz armii. W artykule posłużono się również publikacjami poszczególnych *think-tanków*.

Zarys strategii bezpieczeństwa Izraela

Aktualna strategia bezpieczeństwa Izraela opiera się na kilku niezmiennych fundamentach, gdzie do najważniejszych należą: wczesne ostrzeżenie (*early warning*), rozstrzygające uderzenie (*decisive victory*) oraz odstraszenie (*deterrence*)³. W niniejszym artykule uwaga skupiona została przede wszystkim na ostatnim z wymienionych elementów, a więc na polityce mającej na celu zniechęcenie przed potencjalnym atakiem. Najprościej, istotę odstraszenia można zdefiniować jako dążenie do utrzymywania rozbudowanych sił zbrojnych, zdolnych do pokonania wroga w sposób, który generuje jak najmniejsze straty własne⁴.

³ E. Lerman, *Reasserting Israel's Deterrence in Gaza*, The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, 11.12.2018, <<https://jiss.org.il/en/lerman-reasserting-israels-deterrence-in-gaza/>> (15.04.2019).

⁴ J. M. Newhard, *A Strategic Doctrine of Disproportionate Force For Decentralized Asymmetric Warfare*, "Libertarian Papers" 2018, Vol. 10, No. 2, <<http://libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/post/2018/09/lp-10-2-3.pdf>> (15.04.2019).

Kształt tego typu działań zilustrowano w oficjalnej Strategii Sił Obronnych Izraela (*Strategy of the Israel Defense Forces*), opublikowanej przez Szefa Sztabu Generalnego, generała Gadi'ego Eizenkota w sierpniu 2015 roku (co znamienne, dokument tej rangi został przedstawiony publicznie po raz pierwszy w historii Izraela). Na wstępie należy wyjaśnić, z jakich powodów izraelska armia podjęła decyzję o publikacji tego typu tekstu. Po pierwsze, była to reakcja na zmiany zachodzące w regionie Bliskiego Wschodu. Nowe rodzaje zagrożeń o charakterze asymetrycznym, niekontrolowany dostęp do nowoczesnego uzbrojenia czy też postępująca zależność od sprawnych systemów informatycznych, wymusiły na Izraelu redefinicję dotychczasowego kształtu polityki bezpieczeństwa. W związku z powyższym za racjonalne uznano pierwszeństwo działań o charakterze defensywnym, prewencyjnym i w jak najmniejszym stopniu angażujących izraelskie wojsko⁵. Po drugie zaś, publikacja oficjalnej Strategii Sił Obronnych Izraela to swoista forma komunikatu skierowanego do nieprzyjaciół, w którym zawarto jasno sprecyzowane „reguły gry” oraz konsekwencje ich nieprzestrzegania. Jak zostanie wykazane w dalszej części artykułu, tego typu klarowność w przekazie stanowi obecnie jedną z podstaw skutecznej polityki odstraszenia.

Struktura omawianej strategii obejmuje wstęp, pięć rozdziałów oraz konkluzję. W rozdziale pierwszym przedstawiono podstawowe zadania izraelskiej armii, do których należą przetrwanie państwowości, zapewnienie integralności terytorialnej, ochrona ludności cywilnej, utrzymanie żydowskiego charakteru państwa, umacnianie demokratycznych wartości, ochrona społeczno-gospodarczej stabilności oraz wzrost międzynarodowej pozycji Izraela. W dalszej części rozdziału zilustrowano też największe zagrożenia, zaliczając do nich: państwa (Iran, Liban), państwa upadłe (Syria), organizacje subpaństwowe (Hezbollah, Hamas), jak również organizacje terrorystyczne („Państwo Islamskie”, Islamski Dżihad czy też Palestyński Islamski Dżihad). W rozdziale drugim wskazano na najistotniejsze procesy polityczne o charakterze wewnętrznym, jak też zewnętrznym. Do tych pierwszych zaliczono dążenie izraelskiej klasy politycznej do pokojowego rozstrzygnięcia sporów oraz nacisk na społeczno-gospodarczy rozwój, nawet kosztem inwestycji na rzecz wojska. Procesy o charakterze zewnętrznym odnosiły się przede wszystkim do aspiracji islamskich ugrupowań w kierunku redefinicji aktualnego *statusu quo*, a więc narzucenia islamskiego panowania w całym regionie bliskowschodnim. W rozdziale trzecim zilustrowano zasady, stojące u podstaw właściwego funkcjonowania izraelskiej armii, a więc prymat działań o

⁵ *Detering Terror. How Israel Confronts the Next Generation of Threats. English Translation of the Official Strategy of the Israel Defense Forces*, “Belfer Center Special Report” August 2016, s. 4, <<https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/IDF%20doctrine%20translation%20-%20web%20final2.pdf>> (15.04.2019).

charakterze defensywnym, prewencyjnym oraz odstrasającym. Rozdział czwarty dotyczył izraelskich struktur wojskowych. Największe kompetencje przypisano Sztabowi Generalnemu oraz szefowi tegoż organu, wskazując jednocześnie na konieczność zwiększenia współpracy z instytucjami o charakterze cywilnym, takimi jak Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości czy Gabinet Prezesa Rady Ministrów. W rozdziale piątym przedstawiono zaś niezbędne kierunki rozwoju i modernizacji izraelskich struktur wojskowych, odwołując się przede wszystkim do systemu szkoleń i rekrutacji, technologii, ćwiczeń wojskowych oraz sprawności procesu decyzyjnego⁶.

Polityka odstraszenia – ujęcie teoretyczne

Istota izraelskiej polityki odstraszenia oparta została w pierwszej kolejności na samym potencjale wojskowym tego państwa. Dążenie do ilościowej oraz jakościowej przewagi militarnej nad pozostałymi państwami regionu Bliskiego Wschodu ma na celu zniechęcenie przeciwnika przed dokonaniem potencjalnego ataku na Izrael (ze względu na małe szanse powodzenia tego typu przedsięwzięcia, jak również możliwość zwielokrotnionej akcji odwetowej). Warto jednak zaznaczyć, że ze względu na nowe zagrożenia, dominująca pozycja militarna w regionie nie stanowi już tak silnego filaru bezpieczeństwa jak chociażby w okresie zimnowojennym⁷. Wzrost zagrożeń o charakterze asymetrycznym znacznie ogranicza bowiem skuteczną odpowiedź na atak poprzez wykorzystanie regularnej armii. Izraelscy decydenci za najbardziej adekwatną i skuteczną metodę uznali więc zniechęcanie i odstraszenie wrogo nastawionych ugrupowań. Były szef izraelskiego wywiadu wojskowego Amos Yadlin stwierdził wprost, że nie jest możliwe całkowite wyeliminowanie potencjału Hezbollahu oraz Hamasu, jednak wykonalnym jest już skuteczne odstraszenie tych organizacji przed potencjalnym atakiem. Yadlin wskazał w tym miejscu na dwa podstawowe elementy, ściśle ze sobą korelujące. Po pierwsze, na zdecydowane akcje odwetowe, po drugie zaś na semi-państwowy charakter Hamasu oraz Hezbollahu. W momencie kiedy przedstawiciele tych organizacji zaczęli być odpowiedzialni za gospodarkę, szkolnictwo oraz szeroko pojęte życie społeczne, wykorzystywanie przemocy oraz terroru jako środków polityki zagranicznej, przestało być w ich oczach tak „atrakcyjnym” kierunkiem działań. Świadomość odpowiedzialności za życie własnych obywateli wymusiła na Hamasie oraz Hezbollahu prowadzenie zdecydowanie bardziej

⁶ *Ibidem*, s. 1-49.

⁷ *Ibidem*, s. 24.

racjonalnej polityki zagranicznej⁸. W obliczu powyższych uwarunkowań, realizowanie przez Izrael skutecznej strategii odstraszenia wydaje się być jak najbardziej uzasadnionym kierunkiem działania.

Kolejnym elementem charakterystycznym dla izraelskiej strategii odstraszenia jest uwzględnianie indywidualnej specyfiki każdego przeciwnika, przede wszystkim w oparciu o bieżącą analizę dostępnych informacji dotyczących uwarunkowań, posiadanego potencjału, tożsamości czy chociażby mechanizmów związanych z samym procesem decyzyjnym nieprzyjaciela.

Co ciekawe, w treści Strategii Sił Obronnych Izraela znajduje się rozróżnienie na dwa rodzaje odstraszenia. Pierwszym z nich jest tzw. ogólne odstraszenie, które związane jest z utrzymywaniem militarnej supremacji w regionie Bliskiego Wschodu, a co za tym idzie – budowaniem reputacji oraz swego rodzaju szacunku. Drugi zaś to tzw. szczegółowe odstraszenie, dotyczące konkretnego zagrożenia oraz konieczności podjęcia odpowiednich działań⁹.

W związku z powyższym, Strategia Sił Obronnych Izraela wskazuje na trzy komponenty odstraszenia. Po pierwsze, na wiarygodną groźbę przeprowadzenia przez Izrael ofensywnych działań odwetowych. Ten filar oparty jest zaś na: rozbudowie sił zbrojnych (częściowo widocznych dla przeciwnika w celu uwypuklenia gotowości do działania), utrwalaniu wizerunku państwa, które jest w stanie podejmować ryzyko oraz ograniczonych działaniach ofensywnych (*limited offensive actions*), realizowanych w sytuacji wrogich poczynań przeciwnika. Po drugie, na rozbudowę sił zbrojnych, co ma na celu przekonanie potencjalnego agresora o bezsensowności prowadzenia działań ofensywnych z powodu militarnej dysproporcji na korzyść Izraela. Po trzecie zaś, na dążenie do ograniczania zasobów oraz możliwości rozwoju ugrupowań wrogo nastawionych do Izraela¹⁰.

Wskazuje się, że chcąc osiągnąć maksymalną efektywność, polityka odstraszenia powinna cechować się przejrzystością, właściwym potencjałem oraz wiarygodnością. Przejrzystość związana jest z wyznaczeniem „czerwonej linii”, której przekroczenie automatycznie skutkować ma akcją odwetową ze strony Izraela. Ważnym elementem jest to, aby komunikat wystosowany był w odpowiednim języku, formie oraz miejscu, celem skutecznego przekazania ostrzeżenia. Odpowiedni potencjał związany jest ze zdolnością do ponoszenia kosztów, które niejednokrotnie mogą przewyższać pożądane korzyści.

⁸ G. Allison, *Why ISIS Fears Israel*, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 8.08.2016, <<https://www.belfercenter.org/index.php/publication/why-isis-fears-israel>> (18.04.2019).

⁹ *Deterring Terror. How Israel...*, s. 24.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, s. 24-25.

Natomiast wiarygodność dotyczy gotowości do ponoszenia wspomnianych kosztów¹¹.

Polityka odstraszenia – ujęcie praktyczne

Chcąc zilustrować dążenie Izraela do militarnej supremacji w regionie, a w konsekwencji – do rozwoju skutecznej polityki odstraszenia, można posłużyć się bazą danych sporządzoną przez SIPRI, który dokonał zestawienia wydatków wojskowych współczesnych państw. Do celów artykułu wykorzystano dane odnoszące się do państw Bliskiego Wschodu, a więc regionu, w granicach którego Izrael identyfikuje obecnie największe zagrożenia dla swojego bezpieczeństwa.

Zgodnie z informacjami zawartymi w Tabeli 1, państwem o największym wskaźniku wydatków o charakterze wojskowym w roku 2018 była Arabia Saudyjska (65,84 mld \$) oraz Turcja (22,09 mld \$). Izrael w tym zestawieniu znajduje się na miejscu trzecim (15,69 mld \$). Jednak warto zwrócić uwagę na fakt, że zarówno Arabia Saudyjska, jak i Turcja nie zagrażają Państwu Izrael w sposób bezpośredni. Posiłkując się Strategią Sił Obronnych Izraela, do największych zagrożeń należą bowiem: państwa odległe (Iran), państwa sąsiedzkie (Liban), państwa upadłe (Syria), organizacje subpaństwowe (Hamas, Hezbollah) oraz ugrupowania o charakterze terrorystycznym (na przykład „Państwo Islamskie”)¹². Odnosząc się do wymienionych podmiotów, Izrael zdecydowanie przewyższa je pod kątem potencjału militarnego, dążąc tym samym do realizacji skutecznej polityki odstraszenia, opartej na wojskowej supremacji w regionie. Warto również w tym miejscu przytoczyć dane zawarte w Tabeli 2, gdzie przedstawione zostały wydatki na zbrojenia przypadające na jednego mieszkańca w regionie Bliskiego Wschodu w 2017 roku. Izrael z wartością 1 788 \$ uplasował się na drugim miejscu, ustępując jedynie Arabii Saudyjskiej (2 137 \$). Powyższe zestawienie w jeszcze większym stopniu wskazało zatem na militarny potencjał Izraela.

Co więcej, treść Strategii Sił Obronnych Izraela wskazuje z jednej strony na konieczność dalszej modernizacji armii oraz doskonalenia systemu szkoleniowego, z drugiej zaś uwypukla mnogość i różnorodność współczesnych zagrożeń. Należy zatem przypuszczać, że treść opublikowanego dokumentu skłonić ma izraelskie społeczeństwo, a w konsekwencji izraelskich decydentów do zwiększenia nakładów finansowych na rzecz armii. W niniejszej strategii można odnaleźć nawet zawoalowany zarzut odnoszący się do przeznaczania

¹¹ G. Allison, *Why ISIS Fears...*

¹² *Detering Terror. How Israel...*, s. 4.

przez izraelskie władze coraz większych środków na społeczno-gospodarczy rozwój kosztem pozycji militarnej¹³.

Tabela 1: Wydatki na zbrojenia w latach 2010-2018 na Bliskim Wschodzie (mln \$).

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Arabia Saudyjska	53 396	54 122	61 251	70 194	82 732	88 233	63 141	70 400	65 843
Bahrajn	971	1 195	1 331	1 468	1 566	1 503	1 526	1 533	1 357
Egipt	3 209	3 117	3 033	3 008	3 281	3 479	3 277	2 766	2 564
Irak	4 427	4 771	4 338	7 999	6 963	9 536	5 971	7 416	6 200
Iran	14 204	12 809	13 497	10 661	10 574	11 123	12 604	13 931	12 612
Izrael	16 062	16 625	16 778	17 213	18 119	18 174	15 740	15 582	15 690
Jemen	2 847	2 581	2 365	2 176	2 093	b.d.	b.d.	b.d.	b.d.
Jordania	1 859	1 827	1 614	1 511	1 574	1 656	1 827	1 940	1 874
Katar	2 174	b.d.							
Kuwejt	5 100	5 827	6 306	5 966	5 955	5 998	6 559	6 765	7 211
Liban	1 863	1 821	1 846	1 940	2 234	2 289	2 686	2 441	2 606
Oman	4 126	5 402	9 706	9 103	8 443	7 739	8 063	6 803	6 611
Syria	b.d.								
Turcja	13 087	13 214	13 504	13 838	13 917	14 355	16 630	17 824	22 088
ZEA	19 885	21 600	21 282	26 070	24 601	b.d.	b.d.	b.d.	b.d.

Źródło: SIPRI, *Data for all countries from 1988-2018 in constant (2017) USD*, <<https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>> (22.04.2019).

Tabela 2: Wydatki na zbrojenia przypadające na jednego mieszkańca w regionie Bliskiego Wschodu w 2017 roku.

	Wydatki na zbrojenia (mln \$)	Liczba ludności ¹⁴	Wydatki na zbrojenia przypadające na 1 mieszkańca (\$)
Arabia Saudyjska	70 400	32 938 210	2 137
Bahrajn	1 533	1 492 580	1 027
Egipt	2 766	97 553 150	28

¹³ *Ibidem*, s. 8.

¹⁴ The World Bank, *Population, total*, <<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sp.pop.totl>> (10.05.2019).

Irak	7 416	38 274 620	194
Iran	13 931	81 162 790	172
Izrael	15 582	8 713 300	1 788
Jemen	b.d.	28 250 420	b.d.
Jordania	1 940	9 702 350	200
Katar	b.d.	2 639 210	b.d.
Kuwejt	6 765	4 136 530	1 635
Liban	2 441	6 082 360	401
Oman	6 803	4 636 260	1 467
Syria	b.d.	18 269 870	b.d.
Turcja	17 824	80 745 020	221
ZEA	b.d.	9 400 150	b.d.


Opracowanie własne.

Po zilustrowaniu polityki opartej na militarnej dominacji w regionie, w tej części artykułu analizie poddany zostanie kolejny komponent odstraszania, związany tym razem z wiarygodną groźbą ofensywnych działań odwetowych. Dla pełnego scharakteryzowania niniejszego punktu analizie poddane zostaną gwałtowne protesty ludności palestyńskiej w Strefie Gazy na przełomie marca i kwietnia 2018 roku. Demonstracja zorganizowana pod hasłem „Wielkiego Marszu Powrotu”¹⁵, zapoczątkowana została dokładnie 30 marca. Około 40 tysięcy protestujących rozlokowało się w wybranych punktach granicznych pomiędzy Strefą Gazy a Izraelem. Głównym motywem demonstrantów był sprzeciw wobec trwającej od kilku dekad polityki wysiedleńczej oraz społecznej marginalizacji. Uczestnicy pojmowali swój pochód jako demonstrację o charakterze pokojowym, jednak strona izraelska odebrała zorganizowany protest jako polityczno-militarne zagrożenie, mogące zostać wykorzystane przez członków Hamasu. Istniały poważne obawy, że aktywiści mogą ukryć się wśród nieuzbrojonych demonstrantów i w odpowiednim momencie zaatakować pogranicznych żołnierzy, umożliwiając w ten sposób

¹⁵ Wielki Marsz Powrotu (ang. *Great March of Return*) – kilkumiesięczne demonstracje ludności palestyńskiej w Strefie Gazy. Głównym postulatem protestujących było przyznanie prawa powrotu do ziem, z których zostali wysiedleni w związku z wieloletnią polityką Izraela. Palestyńczycy sprzeciwili się również blokadzie Strefy Gazy oraz przeniesieniu przez Stany Zjednoczone swojej ambasady z Tel Awiwu do Jerozolimy. Data rozpoczęcia marszu nawiązuje do wydarzeń z 30.03.1976 roku, kiedy ludność palestyńska po raz pierwszy w sposób masowy zaprotestowała przeciwko ogłoszonemu przez Izrael planowi wywłaszczenia znacznych obszarów ziemskich znajdujących się pod kontrolą palestyńską. Współcześnie 30 marca uznawany jest wśród Palestyńczyków za święto o charakterze narodowym.

sforsowanie izraelskiej granicy¹⁶. W rezultacie zaostrzającej się sytuacji, izraelska armia użyła gazu łzawiącego, pocisków niepenetracyjnych, a ostatecznie ostrej amunicji. W wyniku starć śmierć poniosło ponad 130 Palestyńczyków¹⁷. Poniższy wykres ilustruje skalę demonstracji oraz liczbę ofiar w okresie pomiędzy lutym a czerwcem 2018 roku.

Wykres 1: Skala palestyńskich demonstracji oraz liczba ofiar (luty-czerwiec 2018 rok).



Źródło: A. Orion, *The Gaza Spring Offensive: Hamas Hybrid Warfare Threat and Israel's Response*, s. 13, <http://www.friendsofisraelinitiative.org/contents/uploads/papers/pdf/FOI_Paper48.pdf> (22.04.2019).

Zestawione dane wskazują wyraźnie na fakt, że w sytuacji rosnącej skali protestów, zaostrzona reakcja ze strony izraelskiej armii w krótkiej perspektywie czasu hamowała determinację demonstrantów, a tym samym rozmiar pochodów. Do najważniejszych założeń izraelskiej polityki odstraszenia w kontekście scharakteryzowanych demonstracji zaliczono: utrzymanie względnego porządku publicznego, osłabienie politycznej pozycji Hamasu oraz odstraszenie przed wznowieniem ataków skierowanych w Izrael, przy jednoczesnym uniknięciu działań wojennych i ponownej okupacji Strefy Gazy¹⁸.

Należy ocenić, że przyjęte założenia w znacznym stopniu zostały zrealizowane. W wyniku przeprowadzonych akcji odwetowych, w przeciągu kilku miesięcy poziom społecznych protestów na pograniczu palestyńsko-izraelskim został zredukowany do zera. Jednak z powodu liczby ofiar,

¹⁶ A. Orion, *The Gaza Spring Offensive: Hamas Hybrid Warfare Threat and Israel's Response*, Friends of Israel Initiative, 29.06.2018, <http://www.friendsofisraelinitiative.org/contents/uploads/papers/pdf/FOI_Paper48.pdf> (22.04.2019).

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, s. 1.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, s. 8.

wydarzenia te odbiły się szerokim echem wśród światowej opinii publicznej, co również wśród samych izraelskich decydentów wywołało szereg dyskusji na temat podjętych przez armię środków oraz metod. Według emerytowanego generała izraelskiej armii Shlomo Broma, celem Palestyńczyków było przede wszystkim zwrócenie uwagi światowej opinii publicznej na problemy mieszkańców Strefy Gazy. Gwałtowna i bezkompromisowa reakcja Izraela pozwoliła w ten sposób na ponowne podniesienie kwestii palestyńskiej do rangi debaty o charakterze międzynarodowym¹⁹. Brom zaznaczył, że w przypadku zminimalizowania przemocy ze strony Izraela, demonstracje zostałyby załagodzone o wiele sprawniej²⁰. Nie zmienia to jednak faktu, że zastosowana przez Izrael polityka odstraszenia, oparta na ofensywnych działaniach odwetowych przyniosła oczekiwane rezultaty, tzn. zneutralizowała palestyńskie protesty, zniechęciła Hamas do dalszych ataków oraz zapobiegła eskalacji konfliktu.

Zakończenie

W artykule dokonano ilustracji izraelskiej polityki odstraszenia, zarówno od strony teoretycznej, jak też praktycznej. Należy stwierdzić, że w wyniku wzrostu zagrożeń o charakterze asymetrycznym, „miękkie” środki polityki bezpieczeństwa, do których z pewnością zaliczyć można działalność na rzecz odstraszenia, w kontekście izraelskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa zaczynają odgrywać dominującą rolę. Warto też zauważyć, że dopiero gdy działania ukierunkowane na wczesne ostrzeżenie bądź odstraszenie okażą się nieskuteczne, izraelscy decydenci dążą do rozstrzygnięcia konfliktu w sposób siłowy. Co więcej, znaczenie opinii publicznej oraz rola prawa międzynarodowego również wymusza na Izraelu uwzględnianie mniej konfrontacyjnych metod reagowania. Należy zatem skonstatować, że strategia odstraszenia stanowi obecnie racjonalny kierunek w relacjach z potencjalnymi bądź rzeczywistymi przeciwnikami Izraela.

¹⁹ Sytuacja w Strefie Gazy była szeroko komentowana na forum międzynarodowym. Sekretarz generalny ONZ Antonio Guterres zaapelował o powstrzymanie działań militarnych oraz wezwał do przeprowadzenia śledztwa. Prezydent Turcji określił izraelską odpowiedź na demonstracje „niehumanitarnym atakiem”, zaś samego premiera Benjamina Netanjahu „terrorystą”. Sytuacja w Strefie Gazy była również relacjonowana w międzynarodowych mediach i prasie, na przykład w BBC, CNN, The Guardian, New York Times, The Washington Post, Reuters czy Al Jazeera.

²⁰ I. Kershner, *After Gaza Clash, Israel and Palestinians Fight With Video and Words*, “The New York Times”, 1.04.2018, <<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/01/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-fighting.html?moduleinline>> (25.04.2019).

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<<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/01/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-fighting.html?module=inline>>
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<<http://libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/post/2018/09/lp-10-2-3.pdf>>
- ✓ Orion A., *The Gaza Spring Offensive: Hamas Hybrid Warfare Threat and Israel’s Response*, Friends of Israel Initiative, 29.06.2018,
<http://www.friendsofisraelinitiative.org/contents/uploads/papers/pdf/FOI_Paper48.pdf>
- ✓ SIPRI, *Data for all countries from 1988-2018 in constant (2017) USD*,
<<https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>>
- ✓ The World Bank, *Population, total*,
<<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sp.pop.totl>>

„*Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem*”
2019, Nr 1(12)
DOI: 10.33674/220195

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LIFE AFTER ISIS: THE PROBLEM OF THE ISLAMIC STATE FOREIGN FIGHTERS

Abstract:

After the collapse of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria many states faced the problem of the foreign fighters wanting to return. Some governments refused to accept their citizens arguing that they pose too much of a threat to the public. Are the governments across the world justified to revoke the citizenships of the former members of the Caliphate? Do states have a responsibility for their own citizens and are obligated to help them no matter the circumstances? These are the questions that this article examines from the legal and political point of view. The article examines a high profile case study of Shamima Begun – a former jihadi wife, who travelled to Syria as a teenager, caught in a battle for her British citizenship.

Keywords:

ISIS, Syria, terrorism, foreign fighters, citizenship

Introduction

In March 2019 the alliance of Syrian forces backed by the USA announced that the last territories of the so called Islamic State had been taken². The falling Caliphate left behind its former residents and fighters. The remaining men, women and children were left without anywhere to go. With the former ISIS territory turning into a war zone majority of the members have been forced to leave and either return to their home countries or seek alternative shelter, such

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² *IS 'caliphate' defeated but jihadist group remains a threat*, “BBC News”, 23.03.2019 <<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-45547595>> (12.05.2019).

as refugee camps. Returning to their home countries, however, caused a problem as many of them are not welcomed home. The term foreign fighters is used by the national security agencies in UK and the USA to describe the individuals who for different reasons joined the armed conflict abroad³. The term foreign terrorist fighters is sometimes used to specify the type of armed conflict that was joined.

The opinions regarding the fate of the Islamic State former fighters and their families are divided among the media and public opinion. How to best handle the returning fighters of Islamic State is a question many governments have been asking recently. Although, there are frameworks in place assembled by multiple organizations, such as the UN or the OSCE, most governments choose to ignore them and refuse to take back their citizens.

This paper explores the issue of returning foreign fighters and their families from the Islamic State to their homelands. The issue caused many controversies in the Western states, such as the United Kingdom or the USA, beginning a discussion on whether the fighters should be accepted back and if so, on what conditions. The paper explores both the international legal framework and the public opinion. The analysis also include a case study of Shamima Begum, a young women recruited as a child by the ISIS. Due to the limited capacity of the paper the examination of the issues is brief and intended to give a reader a short overview of the current situation of the returning foreign fighter.

The Islamic State of Syria and Iraq

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also known as IS, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL or DAESH) began as a group of ex-Al Qaeda members⁴. The main objective of the cell was to create a state based on Sharia Laws and return to the original version of early Islam, namely a caliphate on the territory of Syria and Iraq. After Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took the leadership the group grew stronger⁵. By 2013 the forces from Iraq and Syria had been merged into what is now known as the Islamic State.

The infamous group started to be known for streaming online videos of executions and for its brutality against the Yazidi people on Mount Sanjar

³ See: International Center for Counterterrorism in the Hague, *Foreign Fighters*, <<https://icct.nl/topic/foreign-fighters/>> (12.05.2019).

⁴ *ISIS: how a global terror network was born*, "The Week", 24.04. 2019 <<https://www.theweek.co.uk/islamic-state/59001/what-is-isis-and-can-the-terror-group-be-stopped>> (12.05.2019).

⁵ *Ibidem*.

north Iraq⁶. It was estimated that around 9900 people had been captured and either killed or taken as slaves during the attack on the Yazidis⁷. However, the true scale of what is now called a genocide of the Yazidi may never be known. The details of the attack sent a shock wave across the world. The survey conducted showed very little support for the group among Muslims in the West deeming the group “un-Islamic”⁸. However, there were still people willing to leave their lives in order to join the forming Caliphate.

Many of those who went to Syria had been radicalized by ISIS either online or in person and promised freedom to practice Islam freely in the newly emerging Islamic State⁹. Many citizens flocking to Syria felt disappointed by the West and disattached from the Western culture. The second generation immigrants could not identify with either Western way of life or with that of their parents. Joining ISIS for many was a way of protest and escape. However, the reality and conditions came as a shock to the newcomers. A number of those who left for IS wanted to come back but couldn't due to various reasons.

Daniel L. Byman from the Center for Middle East Policy estimates that at its peak the Islamic State covered the territory the size of the Great Britain and ruled around 8 million people. As the Islamic State gradually lost its territory the fighters and their families scattered around. Some travelled home, others became stuck in the war zone. The local groups in Iraq and Syria slowly withdrew its support for the Islamic State. The alliances were made as the IS appeared to be winning against the West. Many local groups joined the IS out of fear of becoming vulnerable to the growing Caliphate. As the power of the IS declined so did the support of both foreign and local fighters¹⁰.

The scale of the problem

There is no confirmed data regarding the number of people from Europe who travelled to Syria and neighbouring Iraq to fight or live in the Islamic

⁶ S. Tagay, D. Ayhan, Cl. Catani, U. Schnyder, M. Teufel, *The 2014 Yazidi genocide and its effect on Yazidi diaspora*, “The Lancet”, 2017 390 (10106), pp. 1946-1951.

⁷ V. Cetorelli, I. Sasson, N. Shabila, G. Burnham, A. C. Tsai, *Mortality and kidnapping estimates for the Yazidi population in the area of Mount Sinjar, Iraq, in August 2014: A retrospective household survey*, “PLOS Medicine”, 2017:14 (5).

⁸ A. Schmidt, *Public Opinion Survey Data to Measure Sympathy and Support for Islamist Terrorism: A Look at Muslim Opinions on Al Qaeda and IS*, International Center for Counter-Terrorism The Hague 2017.

⁹ E. Benmelech, E. F. Klor, *What explains the flow of foreign fighters to ISIS?* Cambridge, MA National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, MA National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017.

¹⁰ D. L. Byman, *What happens when ISIS goes underground?*, “The New York Times”, 18.01.2018, <<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2018/01/18/what-happens-when-isis-goes-underground/>> (13.05.2019).

State. The US National Bureau of Economic Research estimates that in December 2015 there had been 30000 foreign nationals on the Islamic State territory¹¹. The Global Counterterrorism Forum determines that the number could be as high as 40000¹². The majority of them came from the Middle East and North Africa. However, a considerable number still came from the so called Western countries, including European Union, USA and Australia. According to the European Union Radicalisation Awareness Report around 5000 Europeans left their homes to join Islamic State¹³. The numbers decline sharply after 2015. There is research available that explains the reasons for such radicalisation. It is crucial to analyze these reasons not only to understand why citizens join terrorist organizations but also to prevent future recruitment.

In comparison to the entire populations of the states that the Islamic State fighters came from the numbers are small. An estimated 850 citizens of Great Britain travelled to Syria in order to join the Islamic State. It is approximately 0.0013% of the population of 65 million. The number so statistically small can easily be dismissed. However, the methods and scale of ISIS recruitment, especially online, presented a new and dangerous form of radicalisation, which involved not just single cases but entire families. This has not been observed ever before in regards to other terrorist groups.

The number of women flocking to the Islamic State was also unprecedented. Although women were present in terrorists organizations before their role and purpose changed in case of ISIS. According to the researchers from the RUSI journal women were mostly driven by the promise of empowerment and the significant role they would play in the rise of the Caliphate¹⁴. In majority of the cases the children were either brought to Syria by their parents or were born there.

How safe is it to received the foreign terrorist fighters back?

ISIS was the best equipped, trained and financed terrorist group the world has know. It is safe to assume that the lost of the territory in Syria and Iraq is not the end of the organization. Daniel L. Byman speculates that IS might “go

¹¹ The National Bureau of Economic Research, *Where are IS fighters coming from*, 3.06.2019 <<https://www.nber.org/digest/jun16/w22190.html>> (13.05.2019).

¹² Global Counterterrorism Forum, *Addressing Returning Families of Foreign Terrorist Fighters* <<https://www.thegctf.org/Initiatives/Addressing-Returning-Families-of-Foreign-Terrorist-Fighters>> (18.05.2019).

¹³ European Union Radicalisation Awareness Report, *Responses to returnees: Foreign terrorist fighters and their families*, July 2017 <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/ran_br_a4_m10_en.pdf> (17.05.2019).

¹⁴ E. Pearson, E. Winterbotham, *Women, Gender and Daesh Radicalisation*, “The RUSI Journal”, 2017 vol. 162 No 3, p. 60-72.

underground, disrupt politics and foster sectarianism; wage an insurgency; and then come roaring back”¹⁵. The idea of the Islamic State is dangerous and the campaign of terror across the globe is unlikely to end. Considering this, the foreign fighters pose a substantial threat to their home communities. However, it may still be safer to allow them to come back.

The returning foreign fighters caused a strident political and public debate in the UK. Part of the society favoured the acceptance of the returning members of the Caliphate, especially children. Majority, however, perceived the fighters as terrorists and a great security threat to their homelands. It is estimated that around 30% to 40%, depending on a source, of all those who joined the Islamic State have now returned to their home countries or want to return in the near future¹⁶. The rate is higher for certain European states, such as the United Kingdom where around 50% have or want to come back¹⁷. The problem of the foreign terrorist fighters needs urgent addressing. The growing challenge of accommodating the former fighters and their families became a pressing issue for countries such as the United Kingdom. Although the returning of a terrorist fighters is not a new issue the scale and circumstances of the process is novel because of the high number of IS residents.

The Islamic State posed a threat not just to the people of Syria and neighbouring states but to the whole international community. The IS “weaponized” the foreign fighter. The common conception is that the fighters travelled to Syria to be trained and indoctrinated only to return with a new network of contacts making it much easier to plan and organize terrorist attacks on their homeland. The foreign fighters were needed to operate in other countries not just in Syria. This poses a great security issue for many states. The Islamic State fighters and others who came in close contact with ISIS are considered dangerous. However, as pointed out by Hegghammer and Nesser in the research from 2015, only 1 person in 360 becomes involved in terrorist activity after returning to the home country¹⁸.

A number of the foreign fighters captured are now remanded in the prisons run by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in the north-east Syria. It is

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ *ISIS Members Returning to the UK*, “House of Commons Hansard”, vol. 656 23.03.2019 <<https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2019-03-18/debates/42259394-C90B-4670-BFC9-A5F91518A5FF/ISISMembersReturningToTheUK>> (15.05.2019).

¹⁷ *ISIS: Fast Facts*, “CNN News”, 1.05.2019 <<https://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts/index.html>> (12.05.2019).

¹⁸ T. Hegghammer, P. Nesser, *Assessing the Islamic State’s Commitment to Attacking the West*, “Perspectives on Terrorism”, 2015, 9 (4), pp. 14-30.

estimated that around 800 to 1000 fighters are held in the Kurdish prisons¹⁹. All prisoners pose a credible threat of radicalisation and terrorism to their home countries. Leaving them in Syria seems equally dangerous as they might work to restore the Caliphate. Considerable number of women and children lives in the refugee camps.

There are in general three approaches that the governments can adopt in dealing with the returning foreign fighters considering that joining the Islamic State was a crime. Firstly, the governments can opt to prevent the fighters from returning home and leave them at the disposal of the Iraqi Justice system. There is a moral and legal concern attached to this solution as the justice system in Iraq has been found to fail to prevent arbitrary imprisonment or torture²⁰. The fair trials cannot be guaranteed. Furthermore, European states oppose death penalty which is a possibility if the former ISIS members are tried in the Iraqi courts²¹.

Secondly, the foreign fighters cases could be passed and tried at the International Criminal Court. However, the prosecutor of the ICC Fatou Bensouda stated recently that there is no jurisdiction over ISIS former territory²². In addition, the International Criminal Court is an institution design to process the most serious crimes, for examples the leaders of the Islamic State rather than the their foreign fighters²³.

Lastly, the foreign fighter could be allowed to return, prosecuted by the rule of law and rehabilitated into the society. There are significant problems with all three options but most political analysts and academics tend to lean towards the third opinion. Dr Catherine Brown argues that by allowing the ISIS fighters to return home the governments can observe their movements and associations but also challenge the belief that the West does not care about Muslim citizens²⁴. In addition, the European states are obliged to observe

¹⁹ M. Peel, A. England, Ch. Cornish, *Europe battles problem of returning Isis fighters*, "The Financial Times" 19.02.2019, <<https://www.ft.com/content/acf5a70e-3384-11e9-bd3a-8b2a211d90d5>> (11.05.2019).

²⁰ H. Haider, *Formal Justice in Iraq*, 12.12.2014 research prepared for the UK Government's Department for International Development, <<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a089a6ed915d622c00032d/hdq1175.pdf>> (11.05.2019).

²¹ A. Cuthbertson, *France backs Iraq court but opposes death sentences for Isis members* "The Independent". 26.05.2019, <<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/france-iraq-isis-members-death-penalty-a8932106.html>> (15.05.2019).

²² The International Criminal Court, *Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the alleged crimes committed by ISIS*, 8.04.2015 <<https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-08-04-2015-1>>, (18.05.2019).

²³ S. McLintock, *ISIS Foreign Fighters and the International Criminal Court*, Australian Institute of International Affairs.

²⁴ C. Brown, *Returning Foreign Fighters – what are the ethical and practical responsibilities?*, University of Birmingham bulletin for Islamic Studies, October 2018.

the Human Rights, one of which is the right to a fair trial. The picking and choosing which human right to respect and which to ignore creates a dangerous precedent for the international community.

The legal framework

The issue of the returning ISIS foreign fighter had been addressed before the fall of the Islamic State. There is a number of ways to deal with the returning fighters depending on their level of involvement and commitment to the Islamic State ideology, as Aiden Flynn from Staffordshire University argues²⁵. He proposes a range of tools from implementing a rehabilitation program to criminal prosecution. However, the prosecutor must be satisfied that the prosecution lays within public interest and that there is sufficient evidence. This condition is what steers the public opinion against letting the Islamic State back in the country. The evidence of planning, preparing or even executing terrorist acts in places like Syria would be difficult to obtain. It would mean that in consequence the justice might not be served.

The IS fighters with British citizenship would be tried under the Terrorism Act 2006 that deems encouraging, training and preparing for terrorism acts illegal²⁶. The case of Mohammed Uddin is an example of a successful conviction under the Terrorism Act 2006²⁷. He has been jailed for 7 years after travelling to Syria and returning to the UK a few months later.

There is a number of internationally approved documents that provide guidelines and support for governments struggling to deal with returning members of the Islamic State. The Global Counterterrorism Forum started the Initiative on Addressing the Challenge of Returning Families of Foreign Terrorist Fighters in order to develop a successful approach to the former members of the Islamic State and their families²⁸. The Good Practice documents were developed in London in November 2017. The main purpose was to examine potential security risks regarding the returning families. The document serves as a guideline for international assistance, engagement

²⁵ A. Flinn, *How the authorities can prosecute IS fighters who return to Britain – explained*, “The Conversation” 31.10.2017 <<https://theconversation.com/how-the-authorities-can-prosecute-is-fighters-who-return-to-britain-explained-86101>> (19.05.2019).

²⁶ See: *Terrorism Act 2006*, text (revised version) <<https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/contents>> (18.05.2019).

²⁷ B. Mitchell, C. Mortimer, *Mohammed Uddin: British man jailed after going to Syria to join Isis*, “The Independent” 10.02.2016, <<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/isis-syria-british-man-mohammed-uddin-a6865291.html>> (22.05.2019).

²⁸ Global Counterterrorism Forum, *Initiative on Addressing the Challenge of Returning Families of Foreign Terrorist Fighters*, November 2017, <<https://www.thegctf.org/Initiatives/Addressing-Returning-Families-of-Foreign-Terrorist-Fighters>> (30.05.2019).

and training. Another document addressing the problem of the returning fighters is the Guidelines for Addressing the Threats and Challenges of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” within a Human Rights Framework designed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe²⁹. The document also provides guidelines for governments based on the rule of law and human rights to address the issue of returning fighters and their families.

Another document is the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 introduced in 2014 that put a requirement on member state to stop, accept, prosecute and reintegrate any terrorist fighters upon their return³⁰. The framework for the UN member states is called the UN Foreign Terrorist Fighters Implementation Plan. The resolution further address other issues such as restricted travel, preventing the spread of radicalisation and stopping the financial aid to terrorism. However, some governments including the United Kingdom or Australia actively look for ways to prevent their citizens from coming back, mainly by removing their citizenship. UN Foreign Terrorist Fighters Implementation Plan puts certain obligations on the United Nations member states. The signatory states to the resolution are required to monitor all aspects of lives of the returning fighters, such as their level of radicalisation, communication, finance, movement and potential resumption of terrorist activity³¹. There are legal guidelines and frameworks for the governments to follow while dealing with the returning fighter.

The children of Islamic State

The issue of the ex-residents of the Islamic State territory is more complicated in case of the children, both born there and those brought in by their parents. The Global Observatory estimates that at least 12% of the 40000 IS foreign fighters are underage³². It is also estimated that there are around

²⁹ Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Guidelines for Addressing the Threats and Challenges of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” within a Human Rights Framework*, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Warsaw 2018.

³⁰ See: United Nation Security Council, *Resolution 2178 (2014)*, 24.09.2014, <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/SCR-2178_2014_EN.pdf> (18.05.2019).

³¹ UN Office of Counterterrorism, *Foreign Terrorist Fighters Implementation Plan*, 2014 <<https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/foreign-terrorist-fighters-implementation-plan>> (29.05.2019).

³² A. Athie, *The Children of ISIS Foreign Fighters: Are Protection and National Security in Opposition?* “The Global Observatory” 18.12.2018, <<https://theglobalobservatory.org/2018/12/children-isis-foreign-fighters-protection-national-security-opposition/>> (22.05.2019).

1400 European children in Syria and Iraq, including those born there³³. There is a serious security concern regarding children and young people recruited by the Islamic State who were subjected to intense indoctrination through social and educational means. Many of them as young as 9 were trained for combat or suicide missions³⁴.

The children who were born within the borders of the Islamic States are in even more complicated situation. The Human Rights Watch data estimates, citing a research done by Quilliam Foundation and Iraqi Interior Ministry, that 31000 pregnant women had been living under the ISIS rule. Additionally, 300 children were found without citizenship and, therefore, unable to enrol into Iraqi schools, however the numbers are likely to be much higher³⁵. The question arose regarding their nationalities. The lack of appropriate documentation, such as birth or marriage certificates, puts the children born in the caliphate at a great risk of becoming stateless.

Gilles de Kerchove, the EU's counterterrorism coordinator, recently called the children born under ISIS rule "a ticking time bomb", suggesting that without appropriate approach there may grow up to become the next generation of suicide bombers³⁶. The ISIS itself called the children the guardians of their ideology, a so called "cubs generation".

Undoubtedly, the children have been exposed to violence from a young age and indoctrinated by the authorities of the Islamic State rendering them a security threat and delaying their repatriation. However, as the Global Observatory argues, leaving them in Syria, isolated and with unaddressed trauma might be more dangerous than accepting their return. In addition, De Kerchove also mentioned that de-radicalisation of the female IS recruits might be key for future security in Europe. The mothers in turn would help de-radicalise the children.

Norwegian Refugee Center warns in its recent report that it could take years for children of the Islamic State to receive documentation and have their case

³³ T. Renard, R. Coolsaet, *Children in the Levant: Insights from Belgium on the dilemmas of repatriation and the challenges of reintegration*, "Egmont Security Policy Brief", No. 98 July 2018, <http://aei.pitt.edu/94374/1/SPB98%2DRenard%2DCoolsaet_v2.pdf> (23.05.2019).

³⁴ *Responses to returnees: Foreign terrorist fighters and their families*, "European Union Radicalisation Awareness Report", July 2017, <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/ran_br_a4_m10_en.pdf> (12.05.2019).

³⁵ N. Houry, *What to Do About Kids Born Under ISIS*, Human Rights Watch <<https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/23/children-caliphate>> (23.05.2019).

³⁶ T. Kington, *45,000 children of Isis 'are ticking time bomb'*, "The Financial Times" 8.05.2019, <<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/45-000-children-of-isis-are-ticking-time-bomb-lp0nq9q2m>> (18.05.2019).

considered by the Western governments³⁷. In the meantime they will be forced to live marginalised lives in isolation. According to the Paris Commitment from 2007 the children in conflict zones, that have been recruited or used by armed groups, should always be considered victims³⁸. To date no government has taken efficient and proactive approach to claim those children and repatriate them.

The Shamima Begum case study

Shamima Begum was a British citizen when she disappeared from her East London home in February 2015³⁹. She and two of her classmates travelled to Syria through Turkey in order to join the Islamic State and become brides for the IS fighters. Within few days of arriving Shamima was married to a Dutch fighter. Her story made the headlines as her family pleaded for her return. Eventually, she became one of the best known people from the United Kingdom to join the Caliphate and was made into a poster child for IS recruitment.

She was 15 years old and legally a child under the UK law when she left for Syria. Since then her two friends have died and she had 3 children all of which also died due to various health problems. The public was sympathetic to start with regarding the girls as young and vulnerable but changed their mind gradually⁴⁰. The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police announced that the three girls would not face terrorism charges if they decide to come back as they posed a low risk to the country⁴¹. The moods, however, were different in February 2019 when *The Times* war correspondent Anthony Lloyd found Shamima Begum at an Al-Hawl refugee camp in northern Syria⁴².

³⁷ *Barriers from birth: Undocumented children in Iraq sentenced to a life on the margins*, “Norwegian Refugee Agency Report”, April 2019, <<https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/iraq/barriers-from-birth/barriers-from-birth---report.pdf>> (17.05.2019).

³⁸ Text: *The Paris Commitments to protect children from unlawful recruitment and use by armed forces or armed groups*. 2007 Paris, <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/pariscommitments_en.pdf> (18.05.2019).

³⁹ *Two London girls in Syria have married, families say*, “BBC News”, 4.07.2015 <<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33394986>> (30.05.2019).

⁴⁰ *Syria girls: Families 'cannot stop crying'*, “BBC News”, 22.02.2015, <<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-31575908>> (15.05.2019).

⁴¹ D. Barrett, M. Evans, *Three 'Jihadi brides' from London who travelled to Syria will not face terrorism charges if they return*, “The Telegraph” 10.03.2015. <<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/11461693/Sisters-of-the-missing-jihadi-brides-to-face-radicalisation-tests.html>> (19.05.2019).

⁴² J. Walker, *Times website and app break on day it secures 'major scoop' on London schoolgirl who joined ISIS*, “The Press Gazette” 14.02.2019, <<https://www.pressgazette.co.uk/times->

Since the publishing of Lloyd's interview more and more information about Shamima appeared in the UK's press. There was little support for Shamima's plans to return the UK. A witness reported that Shamima was serving in the ISIS "morality police" which was responsible for making sure the strict rules of the Caliphate are obeyed by other members, especially by women⁴³. In a following interview for BBC Begum failed to express regret for the actions of Islamic State which earn her more enemies among the public⁴⁴.

Sajid Javid, the UK Home Secretary, announced on February 19th 2019 that a motion had been made to strip Shamima Begum of her British citizenship⁴⁵. According to the UK law a person can be stripped of their citizenship only if they are eligible for a citizenship elsewhere⁴⁶. A person cannot be made stateless had they been a British citizen before⁴⁷. The case of Shamima Begum has been complex. While there was strong support for the Home Secretary decision to revoke her citizenship, there were equally strong concerns on what that decision really meant. In reality stripping a person of their citizenship can leave them trapped in dangerous places and vulnerable without diplomatic support⁴⁸. The case of Shamima received the most attention from the media but was not isolated. There was 104 other people who have lost their British citizenship since 2017 for being "not conducive to the public good"⁴⁹. It is a considerable increase compared with only 16 in 2016. Although it is illegal to cause anyone to become stateless, the UK immigration law has

website-and-app-break-on-day-it-secures-major-scoop-on-london-schoolgirl-who-joined-isis/> (15.05.2019).

⁴³ J. Ensor, R. Mendick, *Shamima Begum was cruel enforcer in Isis's morality police, say Syrian witnesses*, "The Telegraph" 13.04.2019, <<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/04/13/shamima-begum-cruel-enforcer-isis-morality-police-say-syrian/>> (19.05.2019).

⁴⁴ V. Dodd, S. March, *Girl who left UK for Isis calls killing innocents a 'two-way thing'*, "The Irish Times", 18.02.2019, <<https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/uk/girl-who-left-uk-for-isis-calls-killing-innocents-a-two-way-thing-1.3798311>> (19.05.2019).

⁴⁵ J. Simpson, *Isis runaway Shamima Begum stripped of her British citizenship*, "The Times" 20.02.2019, <<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/isis-runaway-shamima-begum-stripped-of-her-british-citizenship-w97nlm9x3>> (21.05.2019).

⁴⁶ D. Anderson, *Citizenship Removal Resulting in statelessness*, UK Government Independent Reviewer Report April 2016, Presented to Parliament pursuant to section 40B(5) of the British Nationality Act 1981, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/518120/David_Anderson_QC_-_CITIZENSHIP_REMOVAL__web_.pdf> (19.05.2019).

⁴⁷ D. Prabhat, *Shamima Begum: legality of revoking British citizenship of Islamic State teenager hangs on her heritage*, "The Conversation" 20.02.2019. <<https://theconversation.com/shamima-begum-legality-of-revoking-british-citizenship-of-islamic-state-teenager-hangs-on-her-heritage-112163>> (23.05.2019).

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*.

changed in order to honour the UN conventions but at the same time to make revoking citizenships easier⁵⁰.

A number of conditions must be met for the government to be able to stripped anyone of their citizenship. First of all, a person must either have dual citizenship or their citizenship must result from naturalisation⁵¹. Second condition is that the Secretary of State must “reasonable grounds for believing that the person is able, under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, to become a national of such country or territory”⁵². In case of Shamima Begum the citizenship was revoked on the suggestion that she might be eligible for the Bangladeshi citizenship due to her mother’s heritage. This notion has been perceived by many commentators as passing the responsibility to another government. The immigration lawyers and specialists in Bangladeshi law confirmed that a person born to a Bangladeshi parent automatically has a dual citizenship until they are 21 years old. After that time the citizenship expires if it is not claimed. The Bangladeshi government announced, however, that Bangladesh would not allow Shamima to cross their border.

Some questioned the decision of the Home Secretary regarding Ms Begum case as unjustified. Was Shamima a dangerous terrorist and a risk to the security of the UK or was she a victim of indoctrination and an online grooming? She was legally a child when she left the UK and suffered years of indoctrination and severe trauma after all 3 of her children died. There is a strong case for allowing the former inhabitants of the Islamic State like Shamima Begum to be resocialized. There is convincing evidence to suggest that Shamima was made an example of by the UK government for all future recruits wanting to join terrorist organization. She has been already judged by the media and public without even being formally accused. The latest update was that Shamima’s case will be heard in front of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission to review and challenge the Home Secretary decision to strip her of her British citizenship⁵³.

⁵⁰ M. Gibney, *Don’t trust the government’s citizenship-stripping policy*, Refugees Studies Center Oxford 3.02.2014, <<https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/news/dont-trust-the-governments-citizenship-stripping-policy-matthew-gibney>> (23.05.2019).

⁵¹ D. Anderson, *Citizenship Removal Resulting in statelessness*, UK Government Independent Reviewer Report April 2016, Presented to Parliament pursuant to section 40B(5) of the British Nationality Act 1981, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/518120/David_Anderson_QC_-_CITIZENSHIP_REMOVAL__web_.pdf> (19.05.2019).

⁵² *Ibidem*.

⁵³ D. Casciani, *Shamima Begum: IS bride set to be granted legal aid*, “BBC News” 15.04.2019, <<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-47934721>> (21.05.2019).

United Kingdom is not the only country that faces legal and political difficulties caused by their citizens who travelled to Syria to join Islamic State but now request to be allowed back. The US, France and Germany are among those facing the same issue⁵⁴. After the fall of IS territory in Syria and Iraq the Washington led military coalition insisted on the European governments to repatriate their citizens while refusing to take back American citizens⁵⁵. This notion has been since strongly resisted by the European Union states. The foreign fighters and their families remain an unsolved issue for many states that were left with a dilemma of whether to allow them to back or not.

Summary

According to a number of experts on terrorism and political analysts it is highly likely that the defeated Islamic State will continue operating underground while waiting for a right moment to reappear. Both Syria and Iraq offer good conditions for such a comeback. As the sectarianism and discrimination against Sunni Muslims continue in Iraq it will not be difficult to find recruits for the new ISIS. Discrimination policies in America and cuts to the international aid will also contribute to the growing aversion towards the West. Therefore good governance in Syria and Iraq is necessary to fight Islamic State as it goes underground.

In addition, more tools and knowledge is needed to prevent online radicalisation and recruitment into terrorist organizations. As the example of the Islamic State has shown it was fairly easy to reach potential recruits online and convince them to come to Syria and join IS.

Lastly, there is a pressing security issue of how to deal with the returning foreign fighters previously involved with the Islamic State. So far some of the Western governments made attempts to avoid the problem by simply not letting the fighters back or revoking their citizenships. However, there is a growing evidence that concludes that it is better to take the foreign fighters back, put them through the justice system and rehabilitate them into society. Leaving the former residents of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq or stripping them of their citizenship is far more dangerous as they might easily return to terrorist activity without any monitoring. Better approach is necessary.

⁵⁴ M. Peel, A. England, Ch. Cornish, *Europe battles problem of returning Isis fighters*, “The Financial Times” 19.02.2019, <<https://www.ft.com/content/acf5a70e-3384-11e9-bd3a-8b2a211d90d5>> (15.05.2019).

⁵⁵ *Trump tells other nations to ‘take back’ Islamic State fighters. But not the U.S.*, “The Washington Post”, 3.03.2019, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/gdpr-consent/?destination=%2fopinions%2ftrump-tells-other-nations-to-take-back-islamic-state-fighters-but-not-the-us%2f2019%2f03%2f03%2fc215e7dc-3ad4-11e9-a2cd-307b06d0257b_story.html%3f&utm_term=.bf743196a05a> (23.05.2019).

The issue becomes more complex in cases of women and children, especially those born on ISIS territory. All minors still living at refugee camps should be dealt with first. It is also a matter of priority to develop and implement more useful guidelines for receiving back the foreign fighters. The governments should refer to the policies and guidelines and act accordingly. So far the national responses have been influenced greatly by the security threats. At the moment most of the governments are in the process of adopting a way to deal with their citizens who joined the Islamic State and it is too soon to determine whether they are succeeding.

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„Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem”
2019, Nr 1(12)
DOI: 10.33674/220192

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THE BEGINNING OF THE POST-MODERN GEOPOLITICAL EPOCH AND THE PECULIARITIES OF THE SYSTEM OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Abstract:

After transformation of unipolarity and reformatting world order system, a question been forwarded on how new system is to be founded on. As it is known classical international relations system developed since Westphalia Agreement of 1648 has been composed mainly by the state as key actors of international politics. The system has been developed two type of regimes: soft bipolarity and balance of power interchanged in several period of time consequently. One of the characteristic features of globalization is a fundamental change of the international system and world order. It differs from the world of post-Cold War period with the stance of different actors of international relations on each other as well as with the forms of sharing power and that of interconnections. In that context there were four phases of the international relations systems: the system of Westphalia, the system of Vienna, the system of Versailles, the system of Yalta-Potsdam and later international relations were transformed into bipolarity one. Since demolishing classical Cold War order and entering into new epoch of anarchic scenario, the states as key actors of the system have been diminishing in favour of so-called “non-state actors”. However, in the international system of the 21st century, the nation-state still has particular functions. It represents the dominant element of the world politics which can influence the behaviour of the population and non-state actors.

Keywords:

international relations, international law, international system, balance of power, non-state actors, soft bipolarity, treaty of Westphalia, nation-state, EU, League of Nations

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Introduction

The principal element of the contemporary international system is the state; but the nature of international relations is defined by the quality of the stance and relations between the subjects (states, international organizations, etc.). The nature of international relations, the level of interdependence of the states and other subjects of international law is so tight and so interdeterminate that they may be appropriately called an international system. It is a known fact that international relations have a systemic nature, representing a unity of subsystems of various types. The international system is a complex and closed one. Each of its elements, for instance a state, is a system itself in which various groups and interests may be conceived as subsystems. The foreign policy, which states construct, is the form of interconnections and its nature determines the mould of the system².

The external-political objectives and orientations of the principal elements of the international system (the leading states) have a significant impact on its mould. Specifically, the interrelationship of superstates may absolutely change the structure of the international system.

Researchers of the international system mark out two main and fundamental systemic processes – conflict and cooperation, which in effect determine the mould of the system, and actions of states appear to be their reaction to these processes³. For the proper regulation of the mentioned processes and the international system, at large, international organizations are established, norms of international law are formulated, etc. According to the structure, different types of the international structures are marked out and the militant stance of states on one another is considered as main criterion. According to the majority opinion among researchers, basically only two types occur in practice:

- Soft bipolar (the world is divided between two poles where a certain group of countries can be relatively independent and not belong to any of the poles);
- The balance of power where its distribution among several poles engenders stability and, consequently, sustainability⁴.

² K. A. Mingst, I. M. Arreguin-Toft, *Essentials of International Relations*, New York-London 1999, pp. 116-123.

³ A. Clarckson, *Conflict and Cooperation in International Relations*, February 2011, <<https://www.e-ir.info/2011/02/01/conflict-and-cooperation-in-international-relations/>> (30.06.2019).

⁴ A. E. Varisco, *Towards a Multi-Polar International System: Which Prospects for Global Peace?*, <<https://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/03/towards-a-multi-polar-international-system-which-prospects-for-global-peace/>> (30.06.2019).

After the dismantling of the social system and the breakup of the Soviet Union from the soft bipolar system, the world has altered into a multipolar system. However, since the USA has remained the only superpower, some researchers call the contemporary system unipolar (of one pole) and envisions its alteration into a hierarchical system, dependant on the USA. According to a more optimistic prognosis, the world is a future universal system where international organizations, international law and international morals will be the determining factors for the regulation and sustainability of the international system.

One of the characteristic features of globalization is a fundamental change of the international system and world order. It differs from the world of post Cold War period with the stance of different actors of international relations on each other as well as with the forms of sharing power and that of interconnections.

The International Systems in History

A historical analysis of the international system in the period of recent history gives an opportunity to mark out several stages of circumstances in the international relations.

The System of Westphalia (1648) which, in effect, turned the nation-states into the only actors of international relations and, by doing so, changed the previous actors (dynasties, city-states, etc.). This system remained unchanged since the states represented and represent today also the main actors of the international relations. Several decades ago, before the beginning of intensive globalization, world politics was mostly organized as based on the so called the System of Westphalia. The name originates from the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) which represents the earliest official expression of primary principles which were dominant in Europe for three centuries. In the 19th-20th centuries, the states gradually took the form of national states, the terms “international” and “all states inclusive” was widely in use and the System of Westphalia was often described as an “international system”.

The System of Westphalia represented the framework of rule. It was a way of establishing, strengthening and supervising of a certain social order. It was founded on the principle of statehood and sovereignty. The statehood meant that the world was divided into territorial parts, each of which was ruled by an independent government. This modernized state was a centralized, formally organized social governmental apparatus which used legal monopoly in the form of armed violence within its borders. The System of Westphalia was also a sovereign system, which means that it executed all-inclusive, supreme, unrestricted and exclusive control within the frames of a definite territory. All-inclusive rule means that a sovereign state has its jurisdiction over any kind of

activity within its own borders. The supreme rule means that there does not exist a government higher than they and the sovereign state has the decisive word within the framework of the given territory. Unrestricted rule means that despite the fact that in the epoch of the System of Westphalia, at times debates were held on the obligation of humanitarian intervening, the right of the states on the total jurisdiction was considered as impregnable for other states. There does not exist any “shared sovereignty”.

It must be underscored that the System of Westphalia was a historical phenomenon. In other words, the system of sovereign states created a special frame of rule which was established as the result of specific circumstances in a certain period. The statehood based on sovereignty is not a natural phenomenon dependant on time. Concerning the geopolitical order, according to this system the disintegration of Germany and the leading role of France on the European continent were legalized. The subsequent strengthening of England and her coming to the stage as a straightforward hegemon and the loss of positions by France caused a new contention (Napoleonic Wars) which inaugurated a new international system⁵.

The System of Vienna (1815) fundamentally changed the political map of Europe. A new balance of powers emerged under the hegemony of England. The foremost states became Austria and Prussia. The German states made up 38 in all (according to the order of Westphalia, their number had been 300). The establishment of the unified literary language and the common national consciousness lay the foundation to the process of the unification of German states. The shift of North Italy under the rule of Austria galvanized the beginning of the actions for national independence in Italy and the unification of Italy. Further, the unification of Germany and the establishment of the State of Italy, as well as the actions for national independence in the Ottoman Turkish and Austro-Hungarian Empires significantly changed the balance of powers which caused a new contention. This drew humankind into WWI⁶.

The System of Versailles (1919) was the messenger of a new geopolitical system in Europe which was to strengthen the hegemony of Great Britain and France, whereas Germany was to be left in the position of a second rate state. Apart from this, her colonies were to be shifted under the rule of the victorious countries. New buffer states were emerging between Russia and Germany as a kind of section to block the possibility of consolidation of contacts between Russia and Germany (a continental block). A significant novelty was the

⁵ *Treaty of Westphalia; 24.10.1648. Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and their respective Allies*, published on the *International Relations and Security Network: Primary Resources in International Affairs*, <<https://is.muni.cz/el/1423/podzim2008/MVZ430/um/Treaty-of-Westphalia.pdf>> (30.06.2019).

⁶ S. Ghervas, *What was the Congress of Vienna?*, “History Today”, Volume 64 Issue 9 September 2014.

establishment of the universal international organization the League of Nations which was to perform the duties of the guarantor of peace and security in the world. The System of Versailles was very volatile and utopian and therefore it only existed for 20 years. The victory of Nazism in Germany, the Fascist dictatorship in Italy and the militarization of Japan turned the League of Nations into a fictitious organization, leading the world up to WWII⁷.

The Yalta-Potsdam System (1945) was an official confirmation of the post World War reality. The world was split into two camps, with two superpowers at the head each – the United States of America and the Soviet Union, respectively. For the first time in history, the driving forces of the world politics emerged beyond the boundaries of Europe. The Cold War era began and the system assumed a distinctive bipolar mould and, until the mid-50s of the 20th century, it represented a hard bipolar system, later (when a group of un-supportive countries was established, China broke up with the Soviet Union and the idea of the United Europe became more and more realistic), it turned into a soft bipolar system. At the turn of the 80s, the events that took place in the Soviet Union were followed by the disintegration of the Socialist System and the Soviet Union itself. The message was that the Cold War had ended and the Yalta-Potsdam System stopped its existence⁸.

Today, the world is in a period of new geopolitical changes. Unlike all the other systems that existed before, the Yalta-Potsdam System has not ended after the war, and neither has the peace treaty determined the balance of powers. Therefore, the new geopolitical order has not been organized yet, and still, the fundamental issue is quite another matter. The Post Cold War period differs from the periods prior to it substantially. The role of a national state as of an actor of the international relations is diminishing. Globalization has brought about the rapid growth of the role of transnational subjects and the civil sector. Many researchers consider that the core idea of the System of Westphalia is being changed, i.e. states lose their significance in the international system. Exactly for this reason, the events characteristic of the international system and the world order in the epoch of globalization draw great interest.

As it has already been mentioned, the international system is a complex system, consisting of various subjects, among them, states. The foundation for the international system was laid by the Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648. Prior to that, the organization of the European Medieval political government was based on unclearly regulated religious hierarchy. The Treaty of Westphalia introduced the notion of sovereignty which in essence meant that the ruler

⁷ *Treaty of Versailles*, <<https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Versailles-1919>> (30.05.2019).

⁸ S. M. Plokhly, *Yalta: The Price of Peace*, London 2011; M. Neiberg, *Potsdam: The End of World War II and the Remaking of Europe*, New York 2015.

of the state did not recognize another governor with an equal status to his or the one of a higher rank than his, whether in the country or beyond it. Accordingly, the core element of the system has become the nation-state with its sovereignty and power. In the world policy, the state assumed exclusive rights as the main player of the international system who determined the world policy according to its own interests. Many years have passed since the Treaty of Westphalia and one wonders if the circumstances or the role of the nation states have changed. It should be observed, that alongside the state, there have also emerged other subjects in the system, which are international organizations, transnational corporations, etc. They, too, have a significant role and function in world politics.

Contemporary International Relations

Today, especially under the circumstances of globalization, states have come close to each other to such extent that, having found common interests and established cooperating organizations, it may be said that the role of the state has relatively weakened. We have to deal with a new world where decisions are not made solely in favour of the interests of one state, i.e. the role of the state as of the main actor of the international policy is questionable. However, it should also be mentioned, that today we are not facing the tendency of a complete disappearance of the state, rather it is a weakening of its role. The aforementioned has been caused by the radical growth of the role of international organizations on the scene of world politics. Not only the growth of their role but also the growth of their number is to be underscored.

Today, the states can cooperate, they can solve their problems and take necessary decisions in order to maintain peace and security by negotiations around the table. In reality, an international organization has been established for this objective and as time passes, it fulfils its responsibilities on a more regular basis. For instance, the European Union can be named, which is the most outstanding and successful case of the integration of states. The common attributes of its member states are: common market, currency, economics, unimpeded crossing of borders for products as well as for individuals, cooperation in the spheres of justice and internal matters of states, etc. The EU has connected states to each other in such a way that none of them can ever act at its own will and for attaining its private ambitions on the arena of international politics. To conclude, being a member of the EU for a state means to dispense with a part of sovereignty which perhaps was a less conceivable matter earlier.

Apart from international organizations, the growth of the role of transnational corporations in the world politics is also very important. Although, the headquarters of such corporations is in one state, we should not

forget that its branches encompass many countries of the world. This means that the corporation produces its product for many countries of the world and, determining their economy locally, creates a chain in the global economy. This influences international relations, totally, since economy and production are essential for the state and transnational organizations suggest to them the rules of play and means of high standards to carry them out.

It is impossible to speak about the world as it is today without globalization. As its pace has gained speed, which is also expressed in the growth of the aforementioned organizations and transnational relations and also in such close contacts of the states which can bring about a complete elimination of borders. Possibly, it represents a process stretched in time. However, purportedly, the state will maintain its standing for quite a long time, but one cannot deny the fact that globalization has altered sovereignty, the scale of which in political as well as in cultural, economical, communicative, informational and other spheres, has profoundly grown. Although the state governmental rule has been maintained, it is weakened due to its close attachment to sub-state, super state, marketing and civil rule. Therefore, globalization creates such a world where states connected to each other by cultural, political, economical or social unities cannot maintain such policy, which was established by the order of Westphalia.

Despite the aforementioned, I am convinced that in the 21st century, the role of the state does not weaken. On the contrary, it grows or the role of the state does not lose its significance. The core of the arguments to testify this supposition is that the main element in the international relations is the national interest of the state and her sovereignty. Although the states handle their sovereignty and therefore, defend it, at the same time, they join international organizations, and consequently, in accord with the statute of these organizations, they have to give up some part of their sovereignty. In the international system of the 21st century, the nation-state still has particular functions. It represents the dominant element of the world politics which can influence the behaviour of the population and non-state actors.

Conclusion

The contemporary international system represents a system of relations, held on the international level, which encompasses the interactions of state and non-state actors (international organizations, transnational corporations, international non-governmental organizations). The states are trying to carry out their own national interests in opposition of the objective factors, where conflict and cooperation are equally potential. For many years, international organizations have been trying to construct mechanisms for ruling out and regulating of conflicts. In the aforementioned process, a profound role is held

by the states who also establish rules of contacts and behaviour within the international organizations in the entire international system. In accordance with it, we can conclude that in the international system of the 21st century, world politics is determined by relations among the states, however, it does not diminish the role of international organizations whose source of legitimacy are still the states.

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„Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem”
2019, Nr 1(12)
DOI: 10.33674/220199

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**EVOLUTION OF WAR.
ISSUES OF VARIABILITY OR INVARIANCE OF NATURE
AND CHARACTER OF WAR**

Abstract:

The study of the nature and character of the war has probably been the subject of research since the first organized clash between the two opposing groups. My purpose in this paper is to elaborate on specific aspects of evolution of nature and character of war. First, based on the analysis of different theories of study of war and warfare, which includes examination of how warfare has evolved over a long history, analyzing important issues related to evolution of war, consider different considerations specifically what was and is the catalyst for changes in the character of war vs. unchanging nature of war. It is important to analyze the evolution of warfare, regard to revolutions in military affairs and the analysis of four generations of war. Revolutions in the military affairs have analyzed the issue in three directions: technological development, doctrinal innovations, and organizational adaptations, which have been an essential process in light of developments taking place in chronological order throughout the world. Four Generations War Analysis is catalysts for change to understand the real drivers of the generational shift. The discussion of the fourth generation of war leads to the important issue what we today call the dilemmas posed by modern warfare, which brought war into the abstract dimension. Military theorists such as Martin van Creveld, Mary Kaldor, and Max Boot, have analyzed and saw the nature and character of war from a new prism, but to this day abstract nature of war “fog of war” remain unexplained, unresolved issue for modern military theorist.

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Keywords:

Nature of war, Character of war, theories of war, warfare, Generations of war, Evolution of war, Art of war Science of war Dynamics of war, Sun-Tzu,

Problems of changing or unchanging nature or character of war

Before I start discussion of dilemmas relate to changing or unchanging nature or character of war, it's appropriate to discussing the theoretical foundations of evolution nature and character of war with an analysis of some of the assumptions in the first chapter of the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz's book "On War", in which he explains the nature and character of war.

Clausewitz says: "War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will; the aim is to disarm the enemy." According to Clausewitz, this is the most important issue, because if the opponent is disarmed, he will not be able to interfere with your ultimate goals².

"War is never an isolated act". States are interconnected in many ways – diplomacy, trade, movement, etc. After the outbreak of war, activities in these areas do not cease and it is necessary to consider them during the war³.

"War is not a single short blow". Because of the effects of all the various events of war, it is not possible to predict at the outset how it will end. The commander should be able to present the outcome of events in the distant future and update or adjust plans according to the circumstances of the case⁴.

"In war the result is never final" It is very possible that the effects of one war will be rejected by the second war, and in this case being ready is a necessary condition for the future war⁵.

"War is an act of policy; on its own it would drive policy out of office and rule by the laws of its own nature". This is one of Clausewitz's most important insights. The war must be waged by competent powers. War only for the sake of war, which is not aimed at just political ends, is divisive and usually devastating, just as antiquity was pointed out in antiquity⁶.

Clausewitz was a philosopher of early war, never limited to explanations. The papers analyzed in detail and exemplary his particular views on the nature of war or the character of war. To sum up, for Clausewitz, war is eternal and ever-changing. The basic nature of war remains unchanged, but methods

² C. Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Princeton 1976/1984, pp. 75-77.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 78.

⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 79.

⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 80.

⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 87.

and means are constantly evolving and changing⁷. In the Clausewitz era, the cardinal changes in the character of the war were caused by events such as the new weapons, massive recruitment of people, and the use of railroads to move massive armies. One of the major catalysts for change was technology development. According to technology, tactical, operational and strategic approaches to modern technology must also be adapted, which is an important part of the evolution of war.

Classical theories have established certain point of view about aspects of evolution of nature and character of war, following which it is appropriate to discuss aspects of war nature and character variability or stability, which are still controversial to modern military researchers.

New America Foundation's "Future War" program disagrees with Clausewitz's classic approach to the stability of war and character variability. In their view, "technological achievements triggers changes in the nature of warfare"⁸.

In my point of view, in this case we are dealing with the misuse of the terms "the nature of war" and "the character of war" and the widespread misrepresentation of the term over the years. Particularly, if here it is meant the nature of war, of course as a Clausewitz's adherent I disagree with it, because nature of war is always unchanged and the capabilities, methods and techniques used to wage war change over time. In the second case, the term can be understood as it is written in the modified form "nature of warfare" and in this case if we go-by the word "nature" for a little while, "warfare" will remain, which is directly related to the character of war. War has a changing character and depends on the context of the historical period and context in which the war was fought using the methods of that time warfare. War and warfare are different terms and they have different meanings. Therefore, we should exercise caution while using them. Certainly, warfare doesn't have a permanent, irreplaceable phenomenal "nature", as it is simply a method of how war is waged⁹.

Character of war describes the changing way, in which war as a phenomenon is demonstrated in a real world. Since war, as Clausewitz writes, is a political act taking place in societies and among themselves, the specific character of war will be shaped specifically by these policies and societies, which Carl von Clausewitz calls the "spirit of the age"¹⁰.

⁷ O. Pappila, *The nature of war today*, "Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift", No 4/2008, p. 69.

⁸ Ch. Mewett, *Understanding War's Enduring Nature alongside Its Changing Character*, War on the Rocks, 21.01.2014 <<https://warontherocks.com/2014/01/understanding-wars-enduring-nature-alongside-its-changing-character/>> (12.05.2019).

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ C. Von Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 594.

Clausewitz has an opposite opinion on the character of war in the US National Intelligence Council's publication "Global Trends: Paradox of Progress". According to their point of view, nature of conflict is changing. The risk of conflict will increase for the following reasons: Different interests between powerful states, increasing threat of terrorism, continuous instability in weak states, and proliferation of lethal, devastating technologies. Destruction of societies will be simplified by high-precision weapons, cyber and robotic systems, by which it will be able to target infrastructure at a distance and technology will be more easily available to create weapons of mass destruction¹¹.

In this case, I cannot agree with the above mentioned, because as we discussed above, the nature of war doesn't change and is unlikely to change ever. In this case also, the word "nature" is misused and the authors may have meant "the character of war" here.

As U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Rob Taber mentions, the nature of something is the basic structure of it. The nature is essentially this "something". The character of something is a combination of all the different parts and details that make up this "something". In the context of warfare, it is more appropriate to ask Carl von Clausewitz, the hero of all military doctrines developers and find out his standpoints about this issue¹².

Comparison of nature and character of war with war and warfare

The purpose of this section is to compare the nature of war and character of war with war and warfare. According to Christopher Mewett, US Army Department Supporting Contractor, military analyst and strategist, nature of war describes its unchanging essence: it implies what distinguishes war (as a type of phenomenon) from other things. The nature of war is forceful (brutal, violent), interactive and fundamentally political. In case of absence of one of these elements you are talking not about war, but about something else¹³.

While discussing war and the nature of war, it is clear that we are talking about a phenomenon that is war and that it has its own nature as a whole, which in itself is composed of constituents that vary in the context of a particular historical era. It is a war and the nature of war that constitute the character of war and warfare.

¹¹ *Global Trends, Paradox of Progress*, Publication of the National Intelligence Council, January 2017, p. 6.

¹² R. Taber, *Character vs. Nature of warfare: what we can Learn (Again) from Clausewitz*, MAD Scientist Laboratory Forecasting the Future warfare, 27.08.2018, p. 13.

¹³ Ch. Mewett, *op. cit.*

Since war is a political act (action) that takes place within and between societies itself, its specific character will be shaped exactly by these policies and societies. There is no doubt that warfare is influenced by technology, law, ethics, culture, methods of social, political and military organization and other factors that change over time.

Warfare is a technology (technique) of conducting wars. The warfare was developed as the weapons used over time became more and more sophisticated: from cudgel – to spear, bow – to arrow, castle – to cannon, machine gun, tanks, sea-crafts and aviation.

The technique of warfare has changed as new weapons have developed. Tactics have been developed and refined to maximize the impact of technological advances on weapons.

While talking about the nature of war and warfare the following concept is formed: The character of war is conditioned by the technological, doctrinal and organizational development of warfare in a particular historical era. Because of it, it is possible to use these two terms “the character of war” and “warfare” in one context.

Impact of Revolutions in Military Affairs and Four Generations of War on nature and character of war

I think that theories speaking about the changing the nature of war are controversial. When we analyze them in detail, it only deals with the issues of nature in a strategic context, and in other cases, if they talk about one battle or engagement, about the methods and techniques of warfare in general, here we talk about the change in the character of war. And this, as we discussed above, is already axiomatic. The character of war is truly changing, and has to be taken into account in relation to a particular historical period and context

In the context of warfare and the evolution of the character of war, it is important to consider the revolutions in the military affair, which, as mentioned above, studies the development of warfare in three directions: technological development, doctrinal innovations and organizational adaptation

Technological development. Since the Industrial Revolution, there has been a stream of new technologies that were intended or otherwise used militarily. For example, the development of a robust and reliable internal combustion engine has made it possible to design self-propelled cars and aircraft. Of course, mere invention is not enough; new technologies must also be developed in practical military systems (or systems of systems – such as technologies must become more complex). Nonetheless, that tanks appeared in

World War I around Cambrai in 1917, years before they were sufficiently reliable and robust to lead rapidly onshore¹⁴.

Doctrinal Innovation. In order to fully exploit the potential of new systems, operational concepts which combine and integrate new technologies, must be developed in logically consistent doctrines. Military organizations should also be trained in their use and interoperability. After the advent of a tank in World War I, it took more than a decade to develop and conduct doctrinal experiments to create the “Blitzkrieg” rather than the invention of a tank.¹⁵

Organizational adaptation. The most profound changes require significant bureaucratic recognition and institutional (elementary) change. The success of Blitzkrieg required not only the technology of a tank and the logically consistent doctrine of battles using tanks, but also the key organizational and cultural changes which were reflected in the new combined arms operations, which was concentrated on the German armoured division¹⁶.

Revolutions in military affairs work well across the four generations of wars and are actually synthesized using all three of its elements. From the above mentioned examples, if technology was developed in one generation of war, doctrinal innovation and organizational adaptation would take some time to develop accordingly. For example, Blitzkrieg’s theoretical foundation was underpinned during World War I as a doctrinal innovation which was conducive to the technological development but found organizational adaptation and use in the Third Generation of War.

To better understand the character of war and the essence of warfare at this point, it is important to evaluate the four generations of war chronologically and consider how it developed within specific historical contexts.

In the history of modern warfare, the concept of “four generations” of war was developed by a team of US analysts, including William Lind.

Generally dividing into four generations begins in the Peace of Westphalia from 1648, when the Thirty Years' War ended. By the Peace of Westphalia, the state established a monopoly on hostilities. Prior to it, many different entities or groups of organizations could wage a war. For example, families, tribes, religious groups, cities, commercial associations, and others. They could use not only the armies and navy, but many different capabilities, and now the military forces of a state cannot imagine a war otherwise than armed forces with their own opposing armed forces¹⁷.

¹⁴ J. R. Fitzsimonds, J. M. van Tol, *Revolutions in Military Affairs*, “Joint Force Quarterly”, Spring 1994, p. 25.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ W. S. Lind, *Understanding Fourth Generation War*, „Military Review” September-October 2004, p. 12.

The first generation of modern war, by rough calculations, lasts from 1648 to 1860. These were military operations using linear and colonial formation tactics, where battles had an official character and the battlefield was orderly. The value of the first generation wars comes from the fact that the established order and battlefield created order and military culture. Most of the factors which differentiate the “military” from the “civilian” – military uniform, salute, thoroughly keep hierarchy or rank, etc. – were exactly the products of the first generation designed to enhance the culture of order. The problem is that around the middle of the 19th century, the orderly battlefield began to break. There were still mass armies, soldiers who really wanted to fight, gradually rolled-up muskets being to introduce, and then muzzle-loaded rifles and machine guns – all of which led to earlier linear and colonial formation tactics becoming obsolete and later suicidal.

During the second generation war, they still kept the battle line, but were more focused on using technologies. Technological developments such as Maxim machine gun enabled smaller units to operate more independently.

In the second generation war, small units moved quickly, tactically, without mass casualties and took advantage of cover and concealment, unlike the first generation war. Examples of the second generation war are: the American Civil War, the English-Boer War, World War I, the Spanish Civil War.

During and after World War I great importance was given to firepower, which was mostly an indirect artillery fire. Its purpose was to defeat an enemy, whose doctrine was formulated as follows: “Artillery conquers, infantry occupies”¹⁸. Through centralized control, the actions of firepower were highly synchronized, where detailed, specific plans and orders were applied for infantry, tanks and artillery assets.

The third generation war, like the second one, was the product of World War I. It was developed by the German army and is known as the “Blitzkrieg” or the Manoeuvre Warfare.

The basis of the third generation war is not the firepower and defeat of the enemy, but the agility, the unexpectedness, and the disorganization of the enemy both physically and spiritually. From a tactical point of view, the third-generation military forces during attack are trying to penetrate the enemy's rear area and cause its overall collapse from the rear to the front line. Instead of the motto: “Get closer and destroy”, the motto here may be “Bypass and disrupt”¹⁹. In the defence, the military force tried to trick the enemy and then cut him off. War is no longer a clash in which opposing forces try to maintain or advance

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 13.

the battle line (positions); The Third Generation War, unlike the First World War, was no longer a linear combat.

Not only tactics but also military culture changed during the third generation war. Third generation military forces have focused on the outside – on the situation, on the enemy and on the result the situation requires and not on the inside – on the process and method. An important achievement of this time was the leading of troops using mission-orders, mission command in the modern sense. Initiation is more important here than obedience (mistakes are more likely to be allowed if they come from excessive initiative rather than less) and it all depends on self-discipline, not coercion.

The use of the Blitzkrieg by the Germans during the French invasion demonstrated the speed and manoeuvrability against static artillery and trench defence for the first time.

Using tanks, mechanized infantry and close air support, Germans were able to quickly break through the defensive lines and capture the enemy's rear areas.

Features such as decentralization and initiative were transferred from the third to the fourth generation, but in other points of view. The fourth generation mentions the most radical change since the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. In the fourth generation war, the state loses its monopoly over hostilities. Very often worldwide, country military forces fight non-state actors such as al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces. Almost always, the state loses in such kind of war²⁰.

The fourth generation war is also stands out by the conflict not only between states, but also between cultures, non-state actors and organizations.

Revolutions in military Affairs and Four Generations of war talk more about evolution of character of war and warfare and prove the main argument in this article that character of war changed over the historical period while nature remained unchanged. At this moment when we have discussed Revolutions in military affairs and generations of war, it will be appropriate to consider British historian Michael Howard's particular approach to the study of the nature and character of war, that summarizes above mentioned theories and give clear advice for analyzes of war and warfare. Interestingly, in his 1961 seminar essay on how military professionals should develop what Clausewitz described as his own "theory of war". A study of the width of this observation suggests how warfare has evolved over a long history. In-depth study is meant to: study and investigate war campaigns thoroughly, consider original sources, and apply various theories and interdisciplinary approaches. Finally, it must be studied in the context, which means that war and warfare must be studied in the social,

²⁰ *Ibidem.*

cultural, economic, human, moral, political, and psychological contexts²¹ Professor Howard's approach to the study of war and warfare will make it much easier for scholars of military history to reach their goals in analyzing complex nature and character of war.

Generational shift. Abstract character of modern warfare

Recall one of Clausewitz's thoughts before discussing the abstract character of modern warfare: The first, most important, and most difficult decision of the commanders is to identify the type of war they should soon engage in; it is inadmissible here, as a mistaken choice (the wrong assumption about the type), to assign this war to a kind which is unknown to its nature²². This is Clausewitz's second most important point about the nature of war. He is concerned about the major problem that senior commanders are planning a war for which they are prepared rather than a war that will actually take place. In this thesis, Clausewitz emphasizes the most complex forms of warfare that we have seen even today.

Concerning this issue, in his work "Transformation of War" Martin van Creveld discusses issues which brought war into an abstract dimension that made it so difficult to understand the phenomenon of war.

M. van Creveld's work also has its message – particularly, modern "strategic" ideas about all of the problems above are fundamentally flawed, incomplete, and rely on the "Clausewitz" image of the whole world, which is either outdated or false. In this regard, Creveld contradicts Clausewitz's basic assumptions.

"We are standing today, not at the end of history but at a historic turning point. Just as Alexander's exploits only reached the Middle Ages as a dim, fantastic tale, so in the future people will probably look back upon the twentieth century as a period of mighty empires, vast armies, and incredible fighting machines that have crumbled into dust"²³.

M. van Creveld's view is shared by Mary Kaldor (Professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics). The thesis, which is clearly shown in his work, "New and Old War", eschews the classicist approach to war, formulated as follows:

"War between nation-states takes the form of anachronism (an old remnant that does not fit into modern life)." There is a new kind of war that can be

²¹ H. R. McMaster, *Studying War and Warfare*, Defense Entrepreneurial Forum, 13.01.2014 <<https://mwi.usma.edu/2014111studying-war-and-warfare-by-major-general-hr-mcmaster/>> (12.05.2019).

²² C. von Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

²³ M. Van Creveld, *Transformation of war*, New York 1991, p. 224.

described as war a mixture of organized crime and massive human rights abuses.

Old-fashioned thinking about the war has greatly exacerbated the situation in the typical new Iraq war – with less attention being paid to rebels, chaos and occupation by other types of conflict²⁴.

For M. Kaldor, as for M. van Creveld, the new war was "irregular" – unconventional conflicts in which the participants used the tactics of the "rebels" and tried to avoid the battle, instead of engaging in it. The new war was fought with various combinations of state and non-state networks. War actors sought to achieve political, not physical, goals by controlling people through fear and terror. The war is no longer financed by the state, funded from various sources, and sought to continue the violence²⁵.

As we discussed the contradictory views on Clausewitz's theories, we can also present neutral views by theorists and military historians who mention that Clausewitz's principles are logical and appropriate if they are adjusted at an appropriate time.

Max Boot, a representative of the US Foreign Relations Council, in his book of "Invisible Armies" writes that guerrillas and terrorists were a common story rather than an abstraction of today.

"Guerrilla warfare has been ubiquitous and important throughout history. Tribal warfare, pitting one guerrilla force against another, is as old as mankind and still exists in modified form in some parts of the world. A new form of warfare, pitting guerrillas against »conventional« forces, is of only slightly more recent vintage – It arose in Mesopotamia five thousand years ago. Therefore labelling guerrilla warfare as »irregular« has it backwards: it is the norm; interstate war is the exception"²⁶.

In my opinion, this thesis of Max Boot is a reality and we must perceive it as to face to the truth, as we look at current events, the conventional classic has lost its power (Conventional methods of warfare produced by state actors against non-state actors and state actors).

According to the changing character of warfare, modern challenges are important aspects to be considered by commanders. Commanders, considering the changing character of war, must be adaptable to the modern environment and must be open to the issues of science, art of war, and dynamics of war.

²⁴ Vide: M. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, Stanford 1999.

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁶ Vide: M. Boot, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present*, New York-London 2013.

Science includes many aspects of warfare, such as ballistics law, mechanics; Disciplines such as fires, weapon effects, troop movement and deployment methods and tempo²⁷.

Since science cannot describe the full phenomenon of warfare, let us discuss another important aspect of war art that is the use of creative or intuitive skills that is a matter of the art of war. The art of war through discussion and experience makes creative use of the science of war according to the situation and takes into account science as a whole²⁸.

The art and science of war still does not cover the full phenomenon of warfare. In this particular situation, it is important, according to the abstract nature and character of war, to consider the dynamics of war, which is primarily the competitive interaction of people, not the dynamics of war science and art. Generally, warfare is a dynamic process of human competition that requires knowledge of war science and the creative use of the arts but is ultimately governed by the human mind²⁹.

Understanding science and art of war and applying it effectively in training or in real-world war situations is possible, but as far as the dynamics of what goes on in people's minds (in the minds of two opposing commanders), recognizing them is a big challenge.

Conclusion.

The nature and character of war, war and warfare issues are widely discussed in the works of many military theorists. There are many contradictory opinions and arguments. According to present work, we need to analyze contradictory theories, contemporary approaches, historical experience and context properly. It is necessary to identify the relevance of this difficult issue to the modern era.

From a theoretical analysis of the evolution of the nature and character of the war, we can clearly see that the basis of von Clausewitz's military theories were the wars waged by nation-states. We may or may not wage such wars in the future.

M. van Creveld allowed us to get to know and analyze the warfare and the changing nature of war during and post-World War II period and gave a chance to see a little bit of the future of the 21st century. Exactly these challenges give us reasons for new discussions. By analyzing this challenge and adapting the thinking of war theorists, we can come to the solution of the dilemmas posed by the abstract form of war. It is important to rethink Clausewitz's principles in order to apply it logically in the 21st century, which is quite possible. Also

²⁷ *Warfighting*, Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, D.C. 20380-1775 20.06.1997, pp. 17-20.

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

²⁹ *Ibidem*.

important is van Creveld's different detailed analysis techniques for intelligent analysis of modern war and the use of military force.

Based on the challenges of the modern era, it is necessary to use a wider range of considerations and methods of analysis, then the capabilities of national strengths, to achieve a relevant end state. Particular attention is paid to guerrillas, rebels, the war against terrorists, which in itself requires careful consideration of governmental, political and especially the broad areas of theories in order to succeed in warfare.

Certainly warfare is affected by technology, law, ethics, culture, methods of social, political and military organization and other factors that change over time and with which the techniques and methods of warfare are changing, but the nature of war remains unchanged.

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„*Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem*”
2019, Nr 1(12)
DOI: 10.33674/220197

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COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE OF THE IDEOLOGICAL MATRIX OF RUSSIAN MEDIA

Abstract:

Major Russian media outlets produce narratives which are subordinated to concepts and ideologemes defined by their systemic nature and strong structure. These ideologemes are the binding glue of the seemingly chaotic narratives of the current ideological war. The chief among these concepts is Russianness (“russkost”), in turn connected with others such as the Russian civilization, Russians, the Western civilization, the Western man, Ukrainians and others, which together along with their correlates produce the insidiously enforced worldview. The content of these ideologemes, gleaned from publications of leading Russian media ideologists, diverges widely from the expected, carries a high evaluative load, is suggestive and strongly polarized.

Keywords:

Connotation, ideologeme, information aggression, intention, media, narrative, propaganda, suggestion, worldview war, worldview.

Introduction

Worldview wars are waged when two contrary ideological matrices collide. Each of the matrices, or worldview systems, defines topics, discussion objects and narratives composed into discourses, as well as a selection of value-laden verbal and non-verbal expressions which are best able to deliver the speaker’s intention. “The ideological matrix is a weapon of mass destruction for

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a worldview”² – writes Yevgenii Chernyshev, a prominent author in the Russian media. Making sense of the Russian media discourse via central ideologemes is a cornerstone to understanding which content modern Russian media impose onto generic language forms. It also helps in building up informational defences on behalf of the Ukrainian as well as the European society. The current paper is a continuation of the author’s publication in “Ante Portas – Security Studies” concerning the phenomenon of Russian information aggression³.

The ideological matrix of modern Russian media demonstrates a high repetitiveness and rigid internal organization of concepts and ideologemes which are represented by apex nomens (words, phrases or idioms) – compacted names for extensive situations which are, in the follow-up discourse, unravelled with key statements. It is these mechanisms that steer the seemingly chaotic narratives of the current consensual war. As material for our research we have chosen Ukraine-focused texts in the analytics and news Internet portal “Military review” (“Voyennoe obozrenie”) published over the past 18 months. The overall number of analytical publications dedicated to Ukraine in said portal exceeds 550 (against approximately 70 for Belarus); over 80 new items were published while this research was being conducted.

Central ideologemes of the Russian media

The Russian media narratives which focus on Ukraine present themselves as numerous, thematically varied, having versatile objects, length, scope and intention; they also vary in degree of potential influence and aggression contained in the verbal and non-verbal markers of the attitude towards Ukraine, degree of simulacra prevalence. As a collection of texts, they do not form a system. The only way a system is revealed is when the overall discourse is analyzed by key ideologemes, which are strongly hierarchic in the way they organize the narratives within the discourse.

“The mycelium of narratives” the Russian media create can be traced to a single root concept from which all the narratives radiate, infected with that single system-forming idea. That root concept is the radically stated tenet of “Russianness” (“russkost”) at the top of a triad: the opposition of “the Russian supnation/Russian civilization”, “Russian people” *versus* “the West/Western civilization”, “Western man” and “Ukraine/Ukrainian”, which stand in the

² Ye. Chernyshev, *Kak nam vyigrat' ponjatijnuju vojnu za Ukrainu*, <<https://topwar.ru/76546-kak-nam-vyigrat-ponyatiynuyu-voynu-za-ukrainu.html>> (03.11.2018).

³ N. Slukhai, *The Semiotics of Consensual War in Modern Ukraine: Total Sign Suggestion and Means of Countersuggestion*, “Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem” 2016, No 1(6), pp. 161-174; N. Slukhai, *Narratives of the “other” in times of worldview wars: true face, masked face*, “Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem” 2018, No. 2(11), pp. 345-365.

middle. Occasionally, “Ukraine” is the second member of the opposition, making the triad a diad. The central selection of ideologemes connected with Ukraine numbers as many as 20; apart from the above mentioned it includes “Russia”, “the Russian state”, “Russian-speaking”, “ancestral Russian lands”, “Russian mentality”, “the Russian issue”, “the Russian way”, “the Ukrainian language”, “Ukrainization”, “the Ancient Russian state”, “USSR”, “USSR-2”. Below we analyze the content of the ideologemes as they appear in the “Voyennoe obozrenie” portal. The views expressed there are representative of the ideologists of Russian media. Thus, it is possible to provide definitive proof of the meanings that Russian media vest onto everyday contexts and language.

“Russianness” (“ruskost”) is presented as “the Russian code” which is incomprehensible to the West. It includes conscientiousness, a sense for fairness and proximity to a type of divine knowledge. The “ruskost” is the survival ethics of “the Russian civilization” – a key to maintaining and increasing population as well as preserving territory, language and history. “Ruskost” can be grafted onto someone else: “Russians... have made people of different tribes and cultures also Russian, equal to themselves, inoculating them with their higher-order spiritual and material culture. Foreigners and infidels were not exterminated but offered to become part of a great civilization. The new lands were not plundered but developed, elevated to be on par with the originally Russian regions”⁴. Concept: carriers of “ruskost” traits are morally superior to others and must stay together.

While the substantive “ruskost” is rarely directly defined, it is crucially included into the triad “Russian civilization” (where Russia is the centre) – “the West” – “Ukraine” (as the middle land). Russia is positioned as the homeland of the highly moral “Russian supnation/world/civilization”; “Ukraine” is broken, decaying and fooled by “the West” but still historically and nowadays a part of “the Russian world” and “true Russian orthodoxy”. There is a stark opposition between “the Russian civilization” and “the Western world”, which is nothing short of infernal.

The “ruskost” ideologeme is the intrinsic characteristic of “Russian people” who compose “the Russian supnation”; the lands settled by “Russian people” are “Great Russia/Rus-Russia”; “the Russian people” of “Rus-Russia” create “the Russian civilization/Russian world”; they profess “Russian orthodoxy” and live by “the Russian mentality”. They go through life via “the Russian way” and gather as one “the ancestral Russian lands”, the new wave of “ruskost” resurgence being “the Russian spring” of 2014 (fixedly described with the idiom “to rise from the knees”). It opens the possibility of “USSR-2”,

⁴ A. Samsonov, *Pochemu na Zapade bojatsja i nenavidjat russkih*, <<https://topwar.ru/140405-pochemu-na-zapade-boyatsya-i-nenavidyat-russkih.html>> (13.05.2019).

“the Russian union”. What is currently “the Russian state/Russia” is a federative structure in every way smaller than “the Russian civilization”.

The content of the triad of ideologemes “the Russian supnation/Russian civilization (Russian people)” versus “the West/Western civilization (the Western man)” and “Ukraine (Ukrainians)” as the mediator is closely connected to the central ideologeme of “russkost”.

“The Russian civilization” (realized in the text through “Русь”, “русский суперэтнос”, “великое государство”, “русский мир”, “империя, какою она была во времена Российской империи и Советского Союза”, “русская цивилизационная идентичность”, “Русское “Царство Правды”, “Град Китеж”, “Царство Божье на Земле”) is the age-old antagonist and counterweight to “the Western civilization”. The foundation of “the Russian civilization” are Orthodoxy and collectivism, the communal way of life, the rule of “honor” and social fairness, the cult of sufficiency as opposed to the cult of affluence. In a nutshell, the moral and cultural value is higher by a margin than that of “the Western civilization”. The same “russkost” applies to most of the Ukrainian population, which is mentally close to Russia. Residing predominantly in the industrial South and East, it is juxtaposed to “the Western (Catholic) civilization” which Galicia (Western Ukraine) favors. If Ukraine was to return to “the fold”, its statehood would need a complete rethinking on the foundation of “russkost”. “The Russian supnation” is superior spiritually as well as intellectually and socially to the nations of Western Europe. It is a direct descendant of “the Hyperborea civilization”, “the Aryan civilization” and “Great Scythia”. The cumulative potential of “the Russian civilization” has been dealt a blow by the collapse of the USSR. Its survival could be enabled by maintaining and growing the population carrying the “russkost” traits; preserving the territory, culture, language and history. A state’s external policy must be based on a reunification of the “Russian land” and the whole of “the Russian civilization”: “Velikaya”, “Malaya” and “Belaya” Russia as well as restoring influence across the whole of the Russian Empire and USSR⁵. Intent: the interest of “the Russian civilization” lies in preserving and defending its civilizational space, resurrecting “the Russian civilization”, constructing a new “Velikorossiya” specifically. We find support of this in the paper of Marina Yangliaeva, who refers to text analyses done by experts from the NATO to state that “ideas of the Russian civilization (the Russian-speaking

⁵ Yu. Apukhtin, *Pochemu Ukraina tak vazhna dlja Rossii*, <<https://topwar.ru/148945-pochemu-ukraina-tak-vazhna-dlja-rossii.html>> (19.02.2019); Yu. Apukhtin, *Ukraina – pole bitvy dvuh civilizacij*, <<https://topwar.ru/151142-ukraina-pole-bitvy-dvuh-civilizacij.html>> (19.02.2019); A. Samsonov, *Pochemu na Zapade bojatsja i nenavidjat russskih*, <<https://topwar.ru/140405-pochemu-na-zapade-boyatsya-i-nenavidyat-russskih.html>> (13.05.2019).

Orthodox civilization) as different from the Western are the penultimate focus of Russian propaganda”⁶.

“The Russian people” (as in “русские люди (русы)”, “русский народ”, “русские”, “русь”, “системообразующее ядро объединения народов российской державы”, “наши”, “жители Руси/Русской земли, в том числе жители Киевской Руси”, “потом Малороссии и Украинской ССР, также Беларуси”, “жители, которые этнически, исторически, религиозно, ментально связаны с Россией, составляют один народ”; “наиболее разделенный народ – носитель “русскости””) are a social group or stratum which is viewed as complementary to the “ruskost” trait due to one of the following: language, mentality or behavioral stereotypes, anthropological characteristics, religion, culture or territory of settlement. Alternatively, they are simply viewed as such by ideology masterminds. Writers of the said Internet portal claim that “the Russian people” are strong due to their acceptance of anyone willing to join their ranks. “Russian” is an adjective rather than a noun, a “which?” rather than a “who?” Being “Russian” means being vested with “the mysterious Russian soul” in polar opposition to the “gray race”, “the man of the world”, a sort of ideal slave. For centuries, “Russians” have resisted assaults from the West, have steadfastly carried forth the ethnic and genetic program of a supnation, propelling the civilizational and genetic evolution of mankind. It was Russians, according to the source, who first produced a future’s society – socialism, “the soviet civilization”. Spiritually, civilizationally, genetically and culturally Russians are portrayed as superior to Westerners. Despite the recent decline, “the Russian people” are still capable of a spiritual rebirth, of recreating a Golden Age where the ethics of conscience would dominate. Millions of “Russian people” are in danger of Ukraine forcing them into a Polish-Romanian-Hungarian serfdom. Genetically disjointed by the Tartar-Mongol invasion of the 13th century, “the Russian people” found themselves scattered across three states: the Vladimir-Suzdal principality, later to become Muscovy, the Great Principality of Lithuania and Poland. It was only Muscovy that managed to preserve statehood and restore “the Russian civilization”. The two other “Russian” populations have lost their statehood. The Ukrainians, “malorosy”, are also carriers of “ruskost” trait. For four centuries the Polish kings attempted to assimilate “the Russian people” of Ukraine, to force-convert them to a Polish identity and Catholicism. Elsewhere apart from Galicia “the Russian people” prevailed and kept “the Russian identity” and Orthodox faith. Under the Polish influence a special “Ukrainian branch of the Russian people” was formed. In the later 20th-21st centuries the people of Galicia became part of “the Western civilization”.

⁶ M. M. Yangliaeva, *Rossijskie narrativy v amerikanskom ispolnenii*, <<https://riss.ru/analytics/7154/>> (28.11.2018).

The people of Eastern Ukraine – “Novorossiya” – are “Russians” in spirit and in essence. They are forced to take up arms to prove their place in the “Russian civilization”. “Novorossiya”, the name used for the territory of Eastern Ukraine, is intrinsically “a Russian land”. The population of Kharkiv and Odesa is, without a doubt, “Russian”. Belarusians are, simply put, “Russian” (as in “русские – белорусы”). People living in Transcarpathia (“Carpathian Rus”) are “a Russian population”⁷. Message: “the Russian people” who carry the “ruskost” trait must be united within “the Russian civilization” whose interests lie in maintaining its civilizational space. Russia is tasked with resurrecting “the Russian civilization”, building “a new Greater Russia”, “returning into the fold all the southwestern lands today called Ukraine”.

“The West” (as in “Запад”, “англо-романо-германский мир”, “европейская цивилизация”, “Западная Европа”, “примкнувшие позже и взявшие на себя роль лидера и “командного пункта” западного мира – США, папский престол – Рим”) is the geopolitical enemy of “the Russian civilization” and “supernation”, an adversary to Russia; a global mafia hellbent on “solving the Russian issue”, a predatory and parasitic world of consumption and self-destruction; a civilizational, cultural and spiritual threat to mankind; a modern and materialistic world which occasions the human involution, simplification and degradation of the physical, intellectual, spiritual and moral kind; causes the extinction of “the white race”. The Western framework is, in its nature, one of slave ownership and social parasitism. It survives by subduing the folk masses, connivingly concealing knowledge, employing toxic information technology. It festers with its mass culture, a herd ideology, a worship of the golden calf, materialism, hedonism, racism, a Satanic concept of self-destruction. It is a cesspit, a predatory and cannibalistic society where parasites thrive, a vampire world subsisting on other cultures, nations and civilizations. The Western way of life is founded on Catholicism and individualism; a cult of wealth; a social segregation into the chosen and slaves or servants; it is plainly infernal and governed by rejoicing Satanists, dark forces, misanthropy and mysticism where everything of the Christian and Biblical has been replaced by post-Christianity, or multiculturalism. The aggressive West assaults cultural development with war, invasion, aggression, violence, starvation, dearth, epidemics, prevalence of alcohol and drugs, unhealthy food

⁷ Yu. Alekseev Yu., *Net takoj nacional'nosti – russkie*, <<https://topwar.ru/44516-net-takoy-nacionalnosti-russkie.html>> (10.11.2018); Yu. Apukhtin, *Pochemu umiraet Ukraina*, <<https://topwar.ru/150120-pochemu-ukraina-umiraet-i-umret.html>> (22.01.2019); V. Kuzovkov, *Sensacija! V Rossii pojavjatsja russkie!* <<https://topwar.ru/148881-sensacija-v-rossii-pojavjatsja-russkie.html>> (04.11.2018); A. Samsonov, *Pochemu vymiraet Ukraina*, <<https://topwar.ru/145992-pochemu-vymiraet-ukraina.html>> (04.09.2018); Ye. Makhov, *Voevat' vsjo ravno prishlos' by: ne za jazyk, tak za veru*, <<https://topwar.ru/153032-voevat-vse-ravno-prishlos-by-ne-za-jazyk-tak-za-veru.html>> (13.02.2019).

habits, socioeconomic and cultural genocide (collapse of birth rate, propaganda of perversions and licentiousness; destruction of the nuclear family). It attempts to destroy Russia and “Russians”, who represent a higher spiritual and cultural breed of the human species. As an age-old enemy of “the Russian civilization” the West has captured Ukraine, crossed the red line. Americans are planning to conduct a genetic cleansing of Russia using the material they collected on the Russian genotype⁸. Message: there is a need to resist the West as a civilizational influence. Georgii Pocheptsov aptly remarks that the Russian propaganda “undermines the legitimacy of the West as a normative force on a global scale”⁹.

“The Western man” (as in “западный человек”, “население Запада”) lacks spirituality, is materialistic and predatory, possessed by an animalistic egotism. “Westerners” have built a society of bestial consumption, self-destruction and endless hedonism. They have always plundered and oppressed other nations, scavenged the planet’s resources into their lairs. The “Western population” worships the materialistic; it is zombified, has fallen victim to toxic virtual reality, is destroying the planet and humankind, precipitating a crisis of the biosphere and mankind; a crisis of “the white race”, of capitalism and the Western world¹⁰.

“Ukraine” (as in “Украина-Малороссия”, “Малороссия-Украина”, “Малая Россия (Украина)”, “Малая Россия”, “Малая Русь”, “Западная Русь”, “Западная Русь – Россия”, “западная часть русского суперэтноса”, “одна из трех частей “русской цивилизации”, наряду с Российской Федерацией и Белой Русью”, “часть общерусского культурного дерева”, “анти-Россия”, “проект “Анти-Россия”) is a “limitrophic” (marginal, contingent) state lying on the fission crack between the two civilizations (“the Catholic Western” and “the Orthodox Russian”); a russophobic state; a polyethnic artificially created entity without a united nation and especially without a Ukrainian nation; civilizationally disrupted (most of the population were historically a part of “the Russian civilization”). Today’s Ukraine is “a Nazi colonial place”; the industrial cities of the East and South are mentally on Russia’s side, while Galicia has joined with the West. Ukraine is a part of “the Russian civilization” that is going extinct; “a holy land for Russians”; “consanguineous Russian

⁸ A. Samsonov, *O vozmozhnoj kapituljacji Moskvy*, <<https://topwar.ru/150763-o-vozmozhnoj-kapituljacji-moskvy.html>> (22.12.2018); A. Samsonov, *Scenarii unichtozhenija Rossii*, <<https://topwar.ru/138599-scenarii-unichtozheniya-rossii.html>> (13.05.2019); Yu. Selivanov, *Ognennyj pojas vokrug Rossii: skoro zharom polyhnjot!* <<https://topwar.ru/140319-process-kotoryy-poshel-i-do-sih-por-ne-ostanovilsya.html>> (24.11.2018).

⁹ G. Pocheptsov, *Pole bitvy – socmedia*, <<https://detector.media/withoutsection/article/163555/2019-02-23-pole-bitvy-sotsmedia/>> (01.03.2019).

¹⁰ A. Samsonov, *Vremja zhestkih real'nostej*, <<https://topwar.ru/137604-vremya-zhestkih-realnostey.html>> (23.11.2018).

land”; “the Western anti-Russia project”; an attempt to build a sociobiological rather than political nation (with Galician roots) founded on violence, terror, an assimilation of others and animosity towards Russia. Ukraine’s history is primarily mythical; its governance is done by elitist and nationalistic oligarchs, steeped in Nazism and incapable of building a true statehood. Following the collapse of the USSR Ukraine has spread deceitful ideologies based on an imaginary oppression from the side of Russia. It is a Western satellite market and pressure point on Russia; the battlefield in the global standoff between Russia and the USA. Doomed to deindustrialization and degradation, Ukraine is nothing else but a tool in the hands of the West, employed to stir up crises on its borders and excuses for sanctions. Verbal definitions of Ukraine include “таран Запада”, “марионетка Запада”, “агрессивный монстр”, “большая страна”, “страна безумия”, “цирк”, “зоопарк”, “несуразное образование”, “Цэвропа”, “минимирок”, “страна “404”, “несостоявшееся государство”, “страна умалишенных”, “палата № 6”, “психушка на 40 млн. человек”, “государственное злокачественное образование”¹¹. The temporarily Russia-occupied territories of Ukraine (the Crimea and parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions) are developing well because they carry “the Russian civilizational identity”; are prepared to maintain “the Russian civilizational choice” together with Russia; these regions are “Russian in spirit”¹². Message: a view of Ukraine as a divided state, with the Southern and Eastern parts belonging with “the Russian supernation” through maintaining the matrix of “the Russian civilization”; in Galicia this matrix has collapsed. The leading discourse paints Ukraine, historically and nowadays, as a domain of “the Russian world and true Russian Orthodoxy”; today it is “a puppet of the West”. G. Pocheptsov expresses a similar thought: “Ukraine is evil because the West is an actor within it”¹³.

“Ukrainians” (as in “украинцы”, “малороссы-украинцы”, “русские-малороссы”, “укры”, “этническая химера”, “придуманы в Польше, Ватикане, в Австрии и Германии, а затем в Англии и США (на Западе), чтобы расчлнить единую русскую цивилизацию (Русь) и русский суперэтнос”) are “Russians” who have been brainwashed and zombified with the Ukrainian idea, a Southwestern branch of “the Russian supernation”, a people with “Russian roots”, “the Western Russian people” who managed to preserve their

¹¹ Yu. Apukhtin, *Kakim kursom pojdet Ukraina*, <<https://topwar.ru/157740-kakim-kursom-pojdet-ukraina.html>> (15.06.2019); Yu. Apukhtin, *Pochemu Rossija proigryvaet na ukrainskom fronte*, <<https://topwar.ru/155581-pochemu-rossija-proigryvaet-na-ukrainskom-fronte.html>> (28.04.2019).

¹² Yu. Apukhtin, *Pochemu Ukraina tak vazhna dlja Rossii*, <<https://topwar.ru/148945-pochemu-ukraina-tak-vazhna-dlja-rossii.html>> (19.02.2019).

¹³ G. Pocheptsov, *Mify i narrativy propagandistskoj vojny*, <https://ms.detector.media/trends/1411978127/mify_i_narrativy_propagandistskoj_voyny/> (12.01.2019).

“russkost” and the Orthodox faith as well as language, traditions and memory; one of the two parts of one nation alongside Russians. According to the statement “the history of Ukraine is fiction”, Ukrainians are neither true Slavs nor descendants of Ancient Rus. Ukraine’s titular nation are portrayed as hard-headed nationalists with a hillbilly preference for all things Ukrainian and a rabid intolerance for other cultures and traditions. Some ways to express this thought are “небратья”, “укропейцы”, “сумасшедшие”, “больные”, “смешные”, “неполноценные”, “психически больные”, “физически больные”, “глупые”, “идиоты”, “малоумные”, “невменяемые”, “с подкастрированным мышлением”, “кастрироголовые”, “галлюцинирующие”, “деградировавшие”, “деклассированные”, “игроки”. Galicians are described as having a deep-seated hillbilly mentality. Message: there is a need to denazify Ukraine and return it to the “russkost” way of thinking, “the common Russian faith”, culture, history and language¹⁴. Here statements made by the President of Russia chime in: “[Ukrainians and Russians] are part of the same nation, or two brethernations”¹⁵.

Narratives around “the Russian civilization” are complemented by others, such as Great Romania, which embodies the Panromanian idea by way of annexing Ukrainian lands; there are a few others¹⁶. During the past two centuries, active word-building using the prefix *pan-* has been used to create names of ethnic groups units: Panslavic, Pangermanic, Panmongolian, Panamerican, Panafrican, Panarabic, Panfarsi, Paneuropean, Panceltic and others. Thus, “the Russian world” is promoted as a dominant concept in a worlding context, which can be defined as a civilizational tendency. However, the means employed by Russian media to promote this are very specific: the language is categorical, confrontational and widely negative. The titles of articles themselves contain extremely negative emotional triggers (“предала, умирает, вымирает, жесткие реальности, боятся, ненавидят, сценарии уничтожения, объявлена война, выживание, глобальная смута, огненный пояс, жаром полыхнет”), are manipulative and harshly polarized, which is something Russian media authors are willing to admit: “Russia is a northern land. Half of their lives most Russians see two colours in the street: black trees

¹⁴ A. Staver, R. Skomorokhov, *Nacionalizm. Kakoj bolee vygoden: agressivnyj marginal'nyj ili umerennyj?* <<https://topwar.ru/156062-nacionalizm-kakoj-bolee-vygoden-agressivnyj-marginalnyj-ili-umerennyj.html>> (22.05.2019).

¹⁵ D. Alampiev, *Putin nadeetsja vosstanovit' otnoshenija s Ukrainoj*, <https://ubr.ua/ukraine-and-world/power/putin-nadeetsja-vosstanovit-otnoshenija-s-ukrainoj-3883662?utm_source=traffim&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=34401&utm_content=3663013&utm_placement=951> (22.05.2019).

¹⁶ I. Polonskii, *Velikuju Rumyniju hotjat postroit' za schet Ukrainy*, <<https://pravdoryb.info/velikuyu-rumyniyu-khotyat-postroit-za-schyot-ukrainy.html>> (22.11.2018).

and white snow. One gets used to the fact that Russia is black and white. But what is strange is that lately it has been the same for Russian thinking. Some of our countrymen will stubbornly ignore the colors of the world. It is black, or white, and no half-shades in between”¹⁷.

The system of active ideologemes of the Russian media

Apart from the three concepts represented by seven major ideologemes, there are other, contingent ones, in Russian media texts.

1. “Russia” (as in “Россия”, “Русь-Россия”) is portrayed as a country whose might lies in the unification of the splintered “Russian nation”¹⁸. It is interpreted as the mythical image of the Heartland – the axis, the innermost of the world; the word itself was introduced in the geopolitical concept writings of H. J. Mackinder. Russia is conceptualized as possessing the matrix for a Golden Age and mankind’s salvation. The message is that Russia is the center of “the Russian civilization”, the matrix country. The compound “Rus-Rossiya” calls for special attention as a template copy of the title of the book of first President of independent Ukraine Mykhailo Hrushevskii, *The History of Ukraine-Rus*.
2. “Ancestral Russian lands” are defined as in Russian emperor Nicholas I: “Where once the Russian flag was raised, it should never again be lowered”. This ancestral status is given to all lands once belonging to the ancient state of Rus. This creates the perspective that no “Polish” or Russian-speaking areas exist in Ukraine; all of it is “ancestral Russian land” liberated many times by the Russian army; it is “holy for Russians”; even Galicia, “the Red Rus”, was severed from the rest by the Tartar Mongol invasion but retains traces of “the Russian conscious”. The republics of the former USSR are national reservations, pieces carved from Russian territory, which led to the loss of “ancestral Russian lands” of “the Small (Malaya) and White (Belaya) Rus”. Lviv is “an ancient Rus” town and, thus, also “Russian”, Kyiv is “a Russian city”, “the ancient Russian capital”, “the mother of Russian cities”. This is where the Kyiv Rus’ originated, where Prince Vladimir baptized “the Russian people”, one of the centres of “the Russian civilization”¹⁹.

¹⁷ A. Staver, R. Skomorokhov, *Cherno-beloe patrioticheskoe myshlenie i budushchee*, <<https://topwar.ru/154619-chno-beloe-patrioticheskoe-myshlenie-i-buduschee.html>> (12.05.2019).

¹⁸ A. Samsonov, *Scenarii unichtozheniya Rossii*, <<https://topwar.ru/138599-scenarii-unichtozheniya-rossii.html>> (13.05.2019).

¹⁹ B. Dzhereniyevskii B., *Raschlenit' i razdat' Ukrainu? Ne vyjdet!* <<https://topwar.ru/149683-raschlenenie-ukrainy-konsorciuma-s-limitrofami-ne-poluchitsja.html>> (26.12.2018).

Message: the “Russian civilization’s” territory is where “Russians” reside (see definition above).

3. “Ukrainization” is a form of ethnic genocide: the more Ukrainians, the fewer “Russians”²⁰.
4. “The Ukrainian language” is “a marginal variation of Russian”, “the Southern Russian dialect” purposely corrupted by Polonisms and new borrowings; “a novoyaz”²¹.
5. “The Soviet Union” (as in “Великая Россия”, “большая Россия”, “Россия”, “Советская Россия”) is defined directly with references to Vladimir Putin’s statements: “Russia, which in Soviet times was called the Soviet Union – abroad it was called precisely this, Soviet Russia”; references to Zbigniew Brzezinski “It was Russia, referred to as the Soviet Union”²². Message: the USSR and Russia are the same. Thus, the borders of “the Russian civilization” extend over all of the former USSR, which was successful in its antagonism with the West. This drives the USSR nostalgia. G. Pocheptsov rightly suggested as definitions of the USSR “the land of dreams” and “the land of illusions”²³.
6. “The USSR-2” (as in “Русский союз”, “НОВЫЙ Союз”, “СССР-2”) is a future result of unifying “Russian lands” in a single “Russian state” as the new Soyuz is restored with full-scale animosity with “the West”, “the Eastern threat” (China and Japan) and “the global issues in the south”²⁴.
7. “The Russian state” is a unity of nations where “the Russian people” have always been the core; it is held together by a single culture and civilization founded on the Russian language and culture, the unified heritage of all the peoples of Russia²⁵.
8. “The Russian language” is native for Ukrainians, among others²⁶.

²⁰ Yu. Apukhtin, *Pochemu umiraet Ukraina*, <<https://topwar.ru/150120-pochemu-ukraina-umiraet-i-umret.html>> (22.01.2019).

²¹ V. Kuzovkov, *Get’ vid Moskvy!* <<https://topwar.ru/146188-get-vid-moskvi.html>> (05.09.2018).

²² A. Samsonov, *Rossii ob"javlena vojna*, <<https://topwar.ru/138685-rossii-obyavlena-vojna.html>> (13.05.2019).

²³ G. Pocheptsov, *SSSR kak strana mechty*, <<https://hvylya.net/analytics/society/sssr-kak-strana-mechtyi.html>> (21.11.2018).

²⁴ A. Samsonov, *O vozmozhnoj kapituljacji Moskvy*, <<https://topwar.ru/150763-o-vozmozhnoj-kapituljacji-moskvy.html>> (22.12.2018).

²⁵ V. Kuzovkov, *Sensacija! V Rossii pojavjatsja russkie!* <<https://topwar.ru/148881-sensacija-v-rossii-pojavjatsja-russkie.html>> (04.11.2018).

²⁶ V. Kuzovkov, *Get’ vid Moskvy!* <<https://topwar.ru/146188-get-vid-moskvi.html>> (05.09.2018).

9. “The Russian-speaking ballast of Ukraine” is a phrase used to denote “the Russian population” of towns in Ukraine’s south and east; doomed to extinction due to loss of industry and Ukraine reverting to an agricultural state²⁷.
10. “The Russian mentality” is based on socialist values and aspirations with Orthodoxy at its core²⁸.
11. “The Russian way” is a just and equal life system where consumption and destruction are not employed; a war must be waged to unify all “Russian lands” in a single state which is a restored Soyuz (“СССР-2”, “Русский союз”)²⁹.
12. “Resolving the Russian issue” is the penultimate goal of “the Western project”; a total destruction of “the Russian civilization, Russian nation and the Russian language”³⁰.
13. The Kyiv Rus’ – “an ancient Russian state”, the first stage of “Russian statehood”.

The structure of ideologemes in the Russian media

A number of ideologemes end up being unexpectedly asymmetrical; the ideologeme “Russia” (low activity) is much less frequently employed than “Ukraine” (extremely high activity); “Ukrainization” is an extremely negative process while “Russification” is extremely positive. Instead of the Russian Federation “the Russian state” is used to shift focus to the single civilizational code offered by “the Russian language and culture”. Many ideologemes are strongly value-laden; a few have zero reference (such as “the USSR-2”). A large number of ideologemes refer to very vague objects (“Киевская Русь”, “Русская держава”, the previously unmentioned “глубинное государство”).

What is significantly important is not only the content but the correlation of ideologemes which construct the discourse megaframe where “russkost” is the apex nomen. The main confrontation unfolds along the line “the Russian civilization” (“the Russian man”) *versus* “the Western civilization” (“the Western man”) also on the mythological plane (the divine, Godly, blessed, spiritual nature of “russkost”) is contrasted with the dark, satanic, infernal nature of “the Western

²⁷ Yu. Selivanov, *Poroshenko i ego “pogolov’e”: fejk vmesto industrializacii*, <<https://topwar.ru/138058-dermogaz-ukrainy.html>> (24.11.2018).

²⁸ B. Dzhereniyevskii, *Hotite ponjat’ russkuju dushu? Izbav’tes’ ot nenavisti!* <<https://topwar.ru/151107-putem-samoobmana-ili-osleplennye-nenavistju.html>> (14.01.2019).

²⁹ A. Samsonov, *O vozmozhnoj kapituljácii Moskvy*, <<https://topwar.ru/150763-o-vozmozhnoj-kapituljácii-moskvy.html>> (22.12.2018).

³⁰ A. Samsonov, *Scenarii unichtozhenija Rossii*, <<https://topwar.ru/138599-scenarii-unichtozheniya-rossii.html>> (13.05.2019).

way”). Ukraine is seen as the middle land where the brunt of the assault on “the Russian civilization” takes place.

Most ideologemes contain the root morpheme rus-/ros- or its derivatives. The expansion of the morpheme’s meaning in the words built from it is not justified by any known versions of the origin of rus-/ros-: the southern (Boris Rybakov), the Norman (Herard Friedrich Muller), the Iranian (Vasilii Abaiev), the Celtic-Slavic (Vitalii Skliarenko), yet it has already made its way into Russian dictionaries. We note wide discrepancies between the ethnic name “Russians” in the 1960s and at the beginning of the 20th century. Compare “Russians are an eastern European people comprising the majority of the RSFSR and residing in significant numbers in other Soviet Republics; representatives of this people”³¹; a correlating definition without reference to the other Republics is found in Dmitry Ushakov’s dictionary³²; is provided by Anastasiia Yevgenieva³³. The definitions in the dictionaries of Sergey Ozhegov and Nataliia Shvedova are very different: “1. See Russian (above “The people constituting the majority of the original population of Russia”); 2. Referring to the Russian people, its language, national character, way of life and culture, as well as to Russia, its territory, internal organization and people; like what is done by Russians or in Russia”³⁴. The latter definition makes it possible to define a broad circle of people from a random country as “Russians”.

The range of ideologemes deployed in the Russian media is wider than the list above; yet even the twenty we have gleaned from the Internet portal should suffice for an understanding of the basic message.

The main intended use of the media’s conceptual apparatus is to affect the recipients’ worldview. This has been stated clearly since the beginning of Russian hostilities in Ukraine: “The one adopting the enemy’s discourse will inevitably be the loser. The discourse contains a worldview. You accept the hostiles’ discourse – you will also have their worldview forced on you... Our aim is simple: to resurrect Holy Rus, which means to unify the Russian Civilization³⁵. The author proceeds to outline the key principles of talking about Ukraine: saying in (B) Ukraine is not permissible because it is not a separate state; instead of “Kyiv Rus” we must say “Old Rus”; there is no Ukrainian language but the southern Russian dialect; instead of brethren peoples we should refer to the unity of three Russian nations; all things Ukrainian

³¹ *Slovar' sovremennogo russkogo literaturnogo jazyka*, in 17 vol., Moscow-Leningrad, 1961, Vol. 12, p. 1582.

³² D. N. Ushakov, *Tolkovyj slovar' sovremennogo russkogo jazyka*, Moscow 2014, p. 606.

³³ A. P. Yevgenieva, ed., *Slovar' russkogo jazyka*, in 4 vol., Moscow 1987, Vol. 3 p. 742.

³⁴ S. I. Ozhegov, N. Yu. Shvedova, *Tolkovyj slovar' russkogo jazyka*, 4-th ed., Moscow 2006, p. 688.

³⁵ Ye. Chernyshev, *Kak nam vyigrat' ponjatijnuju vojnu za Ukrainu*, <<https://topwar.ru/76546-kak-nam-vyigrat-ponyatijnuyu-voynu-za-ukrainu.html>> (03.11.2018).

(ukrainskost') are, in essence, a part of the common Russian heritage. The Russian world is a valid civilizational entity; one must not say "Holodomor" (famine) but only "Holod" (hunger); instead of Russian speakers we have a part of the Russian civilization *etc.*³⁶

The ideological framework of Russian media is not a creation of recent years; the civilizational conflict between "the Russian civilization" and "the Western civilization" had articles dedicated to it long before 2014. One author, Aleksandr Samsonov, has a range of eloquent articles including *On the roots of Western russophobia* (2011), *The death of the Western civilization and Russia* (2011), *The military threat to Russia in the first half of the 21st century* (2011) and others. After 2014 he went on to publish *Why the West wants to destroy the Russian civilization* (2016), *The ideal of the Western world: a global serfdom* (2017) *etc.* The new tendency since 2014 has been the positioning of Ukraine between "the Russian civilization" and "the Western civilization" and the strengthening of the evaluative component of ideologemes, leading to narrative transportation recently referred to by G. Pocheptsov, with references³⁷.

Conclusions

Awareness of the content of Russian media's key ideologemes is an urgent task Ukrainian and Western societies face. This becomes clear from the stated purpose of the information aggression: "To achieve a closure of the nationalistic and russophobic project Ukraine, targeted activities of the Ukrainian counter-elite or active elite need to be supported from outside. For the elites accepting these new rules a system must be created in the post-Ukrainian space to make it into one whole with the country and advocating for common economical and political interests... It is in the interest of the Russian state to take steps to return the seized territory and people into the Russian civilizational space"³⁸. To maintain the sovereignty of Ukraine both Ukrainians and Europeans need to have a wide-angle awareness of the ideologeme system of Russian media and have its tenets comprehensively and professionally commented on. Similar things have been undertaken regarding the Ukrainian historic and linguistic phenomena in publications of academician Hrihorii

³⁶ *Ibidem.*

³⁷ G. Pocheptsov, *Glamur, masskul't, socmedia i teleserialy kak novyj tip real'nosti*, <https://ms.detector.media/trends/1411978127/glamur_masskult_sotsmedia_i_teleserialy_kak_novyj_tip_realnosti/> (02.07.2019).

³⁸ Yu. Apukhtin, *Ukrainskaja elita: sostojanie i perspektivy*, <<https://topwar.ru/155917-ukrainskaja-jelita-sostojanie-i-perspektivy.html>> (03.04.2019).

Pivtorak³⁹. Last but not least, we must elaborate on our own system of worldview-level concepts.

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³⁹ H. Pivtorak, *Istorychna pravda proty impers'koyi obludy*, Kyiv 2018.

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„*Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem*”
2019, Nr 1(12)
DOI: 10.33674/220193

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**STATE SECURITY AS AN ELEMENT OF NATIONAL CULTURE –
THE PHENOMENON OF THE ALL-RUSSIAN
MILITARY-PATRIOTIC MOVEMENT OF YUNARMIA**

Abstract:

Nowadays, the world is back in competition for influence on the international arena. The unipolar arrangement with the leading role of the United States, which was formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has been destroyed. Today, one of the countries that returns to the position of a superpower not only regional but also world-wide is the Russian Federation. The factor that testifies to the power of the Russian state is its military potential. In this context, the issue of human resources is an important aspect that deserves special attention. Russia treats the human factor as one of the priority elements of state development. Today, inside the Russian state, a pragmatic cultural tendency based on the idea of military-patriotic education of youth has been formed. In 2016, the all-Russian military-patriotic Yunarmia movement was created. On the scale of the Russian state, this is a phenomenon of security culture based on the education of patriotic attitudes and defence capabilities among the young generation of Russians. Yunarmia, through its direct connection with the Ministry of National Defence of the Russian Federation, provides a platform for the development of Russian military and thus the potential that translates into Russia's international power position.

Keywords:

Yunarmia, Russian Federation, culture of security, defence capabilities, military-patriotic education, military potential of the state.

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Introduction

The common denominator, which is also the main goal of every participant in international relations, is the issue of security. Contemporary researchers dealing with security issues argue that the scope of this concept is systematically expanding with the progress of civilization which intensified at the beginning of the 20th century. Social development was not only a sphere of mutual interactions but was also a determinant of the emergence of new threats. Janusz Stefanowicz referred to the issue of security in the context of civilization progress as a certain process during which the meaning of this concept was extended. Nowadays, it is not limited only to the scope of military security but it also covers non-military spheres – political, economic, cultural, ecological². The fundamental goal, which so far consisted in guaranteeing the survival of the state as an entity on the international stage, was also redefined. It is today, above all, about ensuring the prosperity of this state and its citizens, the defence of freedom and identity, and, moreover, to prevent the dysfunctionality of the political system³. It is also worth paying attention to the fact that there is a direct relationship between the issue of state security and the international system in which it operates. Therefore, internal security depends largely on external security. Following this direction, it should be noted that the security of the state depends on its position in the system of international interactions.

The end of the 20th century was a period when the international system underwent radical changes. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, which for several decades was in an ideological, economic, military and cultural rivalry with the United States, heralded the advent of a new stage in the development of international relations. The bipolar system of the world was replaced by a unipolar system in which the American state began to play a decisive role

Many researchers in political, economic and cultural life have indicated that a system in which there is only one player who is not able to compete, and with this potential development, will not survive for too long. The euphoria prevailing in the Western world ended with the emergence of the then-reawakening potential of powers, which began to take control of individual regions. Fareed Zakaria at the beginning of the 21st century pointed to the end of America's hegemony and the emergence of its potential rivals in the context of rivalry for control of the world⁴. Robert Kagan, in turn, stated that the peaceful order that was formed after the Cold War was replaced by a harsh

²J. Stefanowicz, *Przedmowa*, [w:] *Współczesne pojmowanie bezpieczeństwa*, red. J. Stańczyk, Warszawa 1996, pp. 6-8.

³ *Ibidem*, pp. 7.

⁴ F. Zakaria, *Koniec hegemonii Ameryki*, Warszawa 2009, pp. 12-16.

reality in which great powers – Russia, China, Iran, India, Japan, Germany, or France – plunged into competition for influence⁵.

The implication of a change in the balance of power in the international arena was the redefinition of the notions of security and war. Nowadays, the traditional “clauswitzian” understanding of war has lost its significance. Today's war is carried out above all about the minds of society. The battlefield is no longer just a battlefield, but an informational and cultural sphere.

The redefinition of the concept of security in the context of a change in the balance of power on the international arena, which is dictated by the phenomenon of reviving powers, especially the Russian Federation, is the object of scientific discussion in many research centres around the world. The prospect of Russia's direct proximity to the region of Central and Eastern Europe creates the need for a broader analysis of security phenomena that currently occur within the Russian state. An interesting element of the defence system of the Russian Federation, which deserves attention, is the issue of the appointment in 2016 in accordance with the initiative of the Minister of National Defence of the Russian Federation, Sergey Shoygu, the all-Russian youth military-patriotic movement Yunarmia. Therefore, this youth movement is worth analysing, especially in the context of considerations regarding the aspect of security culture as an element of national security.

The resurgent post-Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Russian Federation is a consequence of the process of replacing the communist ideology with pragmatic Russian conservatism that has been taking shape in Russia since the early 1990s of the 20th century. It consists in creating a feeling of permanent competition with other countries on the international arena and a special role in this area of the Russian state. The conviction of the uniqueness of the Russian nation in the context of historical events (going beyond the Cold War rivalry) shapes the space of the basic narrative between the state and citizens in Russia. Creating the image of the Russian Federation as a state that has played an important role in the process of civilization development requires incorporation of its phenomenon into a cultural framework. The rationale behind this move is the fact that culture generally covers the non-material and material spheres (often referred to as the civilizational space of a given nation). Non-material culture covers a team of spiritual and intellectual accomplishments of man. Material, in turn, is the whole of the products of the nation, constituting its identity and, above all, its uniqueness in relations to other. Nowadays in Russia, based on the cultural context, the process of shaping the so-called culture of defence, especially among the young generation of Russians.

⁵ R. Kagan, *Powrót historii i koniec marzeń*, Poznań 2010, pp. 27-29.

In connection with this situation, the aim of this article is to present the process of shaping the Russian security culture among young people as part of broadly understood state security. The mentioned Yunarmia youth-patriotic movement is an exemplification of the phenomenon of strengthening the defence potential of the Russian Federation. Essentially, the discussion on this topic boils down to the question – what is the importance of culture and military-patriotic education in the context of the defence capabilities of the Russian state? Therefore, the article presents an analysis of the phenomenon of the Russian Yunarmia as a cultural aspect in the spatial area of national security. The methodology of the work was based on the examination of the organizational and organizational process of the Yunarmia as well as on the analysis of the trends within this youth-patriotic trend movement⁶.

The All-Russia youth-patriotic movement of Yunarmia as part of the Russian security culture

The research perspective based on the assumption that the phenomenon of broadly understood culture is a binder combining security and defence issues, will allow us to better understand the processes and phenomena constituting the basis of these considerations. A high level of security culture is the basis for anticipating potential threats from other participants in international relations and indicating the possibility of preventing crisis situations arising from this background.

In the literature, culture of security is defined as a characteristic of a particular entity way of thinking about security, feeling of security and ways to achieve security. The implication of this last aspect is the broadly understood issue of defence⁷. A more detailed definition of culture of security presents it as a model of basic assumptions, values, norms, rules, symbols and convictions characteristic for a given entity, which influence the way the subject perceives challenges, opportunities and threats in the near and distant surroundings, and the way you feel about security and thinking about it, and related behaviour and actions, in a different way by this entity learned and articulated, in the processes of broadly understood education, including also in the natural processes of internal integration and external adaptation and other organizational processes, as well as the process of strengthening broadly understood defence, serving the harmonious development of this entity

⁶ K. M. Davey, A. Liefoghe, *Critical research and analysis in organizations*, [w:] *Essential Guide to Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research*, ed. by C. Cassell, G. Symon, London 2004, pp. 242-250.

⁷ M. Cieślarczyk, *Spółczeństwa i społeczności na przełomie wieków – od bezpieczeństwa kultury do kultury bezpieczeństwa*, [w:] *Bezpieczeństwo w perspektywie socjologicznej. Materiały 37 grupy roboczej XI ogólnopolskiego Zjazdu Socjologicznego*, Rzeszów-Tyczyn 2000, pp. 34-38.

and achieving the broadest understood security for the benefit for itself and the environment⁸.

The definition presented above explains the entirety and scope of the concept of safety culture. In this context, it is worth referring to the Yunarmia, often mentioned in this work-paper as a cultural phenomenon, which through its ideological and organizational nature is an integral element of the defence of the Russian state.

At the beginning of this article, a situation emerged which took shape on the international arena after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The purpose of this retrospective was to show the context in which modern Russian statehood developed. The processes taking place in the 1990s are also directly reflected today. Actually, Yunarmia is a product of the Russian ideological and cultural transformation. The idea of a military youth movement dates back to the times of the Soviet Union. At that time, there was a sports and preparatory organization "Ready for work and defence". Nevertheless, in 1990 the National Youth Movement was established, whose activity consisted in the organization of military-sports games "Zarnitsa", "Orlenok", or "Gaydarowiets". What's more, the members of this movement were guarded by the eternal fire, which is a symbol of the memory of soldiers who died during World War II, and organized military-patriotic clubs, such as "Young Borderlander" or "Zorgiency"⁹.

Yunarmia began its formal functioning on 01.09.2016. The initiator of the military establishment of the youth-patriotic organization was Sergey Shoygu, Defence Minister of the Russian Federation. Therefore, the Ministry of National Defence is the institutional and organizational facilities for the functioning of the Yunarmia. The ministerial protectorate creates conditions in which the members of Yunarmia, compared to the participants of other youth organizations, occupy a sublime social position. Therefore, Yunarmia from the beginning of its creation enjoyed wide support and interest from the Russian society. Possibility to participate in ranks of young Russian patriots have youths between the ages of 11 to 18. The matter concerning the age of the participants in ranks of Yunarmia is now very widely commented on by the Russian media and the environments related to the protection of children's rights. In a situation when the upper limit is 18 years, and reaching it means an automatic exclusion from the ranks of the Yunarmia, the lower age limit,

⁸ Idem, *Teoretyczne i metodologiczne podstawy badania problemów bezpieczeństwa i obronności państwa*, Siedlce 2009, pp. 153-154.

⁹ A. Anushevskaya, *Chto takoye dvizheniye „Yunarmia” i zachem ono nuzhno?* „Agrumenty i Fakty”, 4.08.2016, pp. 6-8.

i.e. referring to the entry of the Statute of Yunarmia, is 11 years¹⁰, is often not respected. It results above all from the particular interests of the Russian authorities, who want to create a powerful and influential youth-patriotic organization that forms the basis for the functioning of Russian military power in the future. At the beginning of 2019, there were almost 350,000 people in the ranks of the Yunarmia. This number, according to the guidelines of the Russian defence ministry, should reach 500,000 by the beginning of May 2019. It is planned that by May 9, 2020¹¹ there would be a million people in the ranks of the Yunarmia. For this purpose, an informal rule was introduced to include children from the age of 7 in organization of young patriots'. Anna Kuznetsova, an ombudsman for children in the Russian Federation, has issued a regulation to all regional ombudsmen regarding the conclusion of an agreement with institutions of Yunarmia, which allows the inclusion of children who have reached the age of 7 in the ranks of this organization. In addition, the scope of the possibility of acquiring new members was also expanded. Currently, in Russia, members of Yunarmia are increasingly becoming foster of children's homes¹².

Increasing the number of members of the military-patriotic movement has a direct connection with the issue of the security culture of the Russian state. The upbringing of children and young people, which is based on the conviction of the duty to defend their homeland, creates conditions for increasing the defence potential of the state. Despite the wide scope of the definition of security culture presented in this article, the semantic approach to this concept contains a complex structure. The culture of security consists of the sphere of mental culture, the sphere of organizational culture and the sphere of material

¹⁰ *Ustav Vserossiyskogo Detsko-Yunosheskogo Voenno-Patrioticheskogo Obshchestvennogo Dvizheniya „Ynarmiya”*, Utverzhden Sletomuchrediteley 28.05.2016, Ministerstvo Oborony Rossiyskoy Federacyy, nr 5/3498, p. 5

¹¹ 9.05.2020 – the 75th anniversary of the victory in World War II, and therefore is planned the demonstrative celebration of this anniversary. The Russians celebrate the Victory Day on May 9, leaving out some important facts about this event. In the belief of many Russians, on May 9, Soviet soldiers suspended the banner over the Reichstag in Berlin. Despite speculation about this date, the banner over the Reichstag was suspended on 9.05.1945, which is confirmed by a photo taken by Evgeniy Haldiey. It is also important that the Second World War was officially completed on 2.09.1945 by the signing of an act of unconditional surrender of Japan. This event took place aboard the USS Missouri battleship in the Gulf of Tokyo. Russia, on the other hand, date of 9.05.1945, consider as an end of the Great Patriotic War. In this context, shaped conceptual dissonance concerning the date of the end of World War II.

¹² A. Tarasov, *Detstvo – pod ryzhye. Militarizaciyarussskoyzhyni na marshe. „Yunarmia” prihodit v detdoma*, Novaya Gazeta, 15.05.2019, <https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/03/13/79863-detstvo-pod-ruzhie?fbclid=IwAR2BZ1JFOiHxOCmR1jh2Hr0gojWznL_WVE1h2q-1Bv6JKWLzKltpzo80U8E> (12.04.2019).

culture¹³. It is worth to analyse the various spheres of security culture in the further part of the article, which would allow to create a comprehensive picture of the contemporary security culture of the Russian Federation based on the military-patriotic education of the youth.

Security culture – the sphere of mental culture

The mental sphere is the state of the subject's consciousness with its intellectual potential including the state of general knowledge and knowledge strictly related to the area of security¹⁴. The assumptions on which the functioning of Yunarmia is based are directed firstly towards patriotic education and military preparation. It results mainly from the basic tasks resulting from the Statute of Yunarmia. It is indicated that the basic goal of each member of the military-patriotic movement is personal development consisting in nurturing love towards the Homeland. It is getting to know its history, traditions and national heroes. All these activities must be accompanied by military preparation, because it will allow you to defend your country at any time¹⁵.

Constructing consciousness is a technique of propaganda known for decades. It primarily involves limiting access to information sources presenting a different reality, which is in opposition to the one that is presented to the majority of society. Young people are an ideal field of action in this context. The pragmatic nature of this kind of behaviour towards their own society is dictated by the ambitions of the Russian Federation to restore the role of the world's power¹⁶. The contemporary position of Russia within the international arena is a complex phenomenon, and it is worth defining it as a process, because this position is constantly changing. The system of the Russian state, to a large extent omitting the complexity of all phenomena and processes, can be reduced to a simple dependence. Currently, the power of Russia is based on energy resources, military potential and special services, the essence of which is derived from the system at the time. It follows that Yunarmia, or youth raised in the military-patriotic spirit, is an integral element of this dependence, especially considering the latter aspect – military potential. The justification for this claim boils down to two factors, namely: first, the Yunarmia in this form and at the current level of preparation is a direct defensive measure of the Russian state; secondly, with the age of 18, the majority of Yunarmia's

¹³ M. Cieślarczyk, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-158.

¹⁴ R. Rosa, *Filozofia bezpieczeństwa*, Warszawa 1995, p. 46.

¹⁵ A. Kolesnikov, *Parad „Yunarmii”*: *zachem Kremlu marsheruyushchiyeshkolniki*, Forbes, 10.05.2017, <<https://www.forbes.ru/biznes/344025-parad-yunarmii-zachem-kremlu-marshiruyushchie-shkolniki>> (24.04.2019).

¹⁶ J. Bugajski, *Cold Peace: Russia's New Imperialism*, Westport 2004, pp. 13-16.

participants plans a professional military career, i.e. they will continue to be the core of the military potential of the Russian Federation.

Patriotic youth education takes place not only by presenting Russia as a unique country against others who do not have such a rich and heroic history or do not have such outstanding scientists, inventors and athletes. The highlights of these values are meetings with Russian athletes, politicians and military. In this way, the spirit of patriotism and civic attitude towards their own state are being built.

The non-reflective absorption of information that is presented to the members of Yunarmia is caused by the skilfully conducted information policy of the Russian Federation. Interesting in this context is the analysis of an official film that promotes Yunarmia and encourages young people to join its ranks. It is worth paying attention to several aspects contained in this film, namely – geographical, historical and cultural.

The geographical aspect is that the map of the Russian Federation presented at the beginning covers not only the Russian territory, but also the area of Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, the eastern part of Ukraine and Belarus, part of Estonia and Finland. Demonstrative nature of disrupting geographical awareness of the space of your country is an inherent element of propaganda, whose main goal is to provoke the sense of uniqueness and the sense of your own power.

The historical aspect consists in presenting the Russians as a nation that has been waging war with the surrounding countries for over 700 years. Among the nations that attacked Russia we can mention e.g. Tatars, Poles, Turks, French and Germans. This treatment builds a sense of potential threat from the rivals of the Russian Federation in the international arena. Particular importance in the context of historical memory is World War II with the most important battles, including battles in Sevastopol or in Stalingrad. The Great Patriotic War is presented as an event in which the Red Army played a major role, and the Ukrainian, Polish, Belarusian, Georgian, American and English soldiers are neglected.

The cultural aspect is primarily a reference to scientific and sport achievements. The film mentions such people as: Yuri Gagarin and his first flight into space, Leonid Kupriyanov – the creator of the telephone set and Alexey Pazhytnov an inventor of the electronic games for children.

Also recalled the Hermitage, which was created on the initiative of Empress Catherine II, and constitutes an element of the national heritage of the Russian Federation. It is a place where numerous works of art by Russian artists and creators are gathered¹⁷.

¹⁷ *AgiatacyonnyyrolikVserossiyskogovoyenno-patrioticheskogodvizheniya "Yunarmiya"*, 3.01.2017, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZBPDap8oWws>> (2.04.2019).

The content mentioned above shows that the Russian Federation brings up a generation of young people who will be convinced of their own uniqueness and a sense of duty to defend their own country. This is undoubtedly included in the theoretical convention of the state security culture, which Russia now treats as one of the most priority goals of its internal policy.

Security culture – the sphere of organizational culture

The sphere of organizational culture consists in defining legal regulations, principles and norms, or in other words, ways of achieving value. It also includes the organizational structure and rules of its operation¹⁸.

The theoretical justification for the security culture in its organizational aspect presented in this way allows the analysis of the organizational structure of the Yunarmia. Indeed, specific elements are indicated, which will be discussed in the further part of this article. Thus, they can be divided into directly referring to the principles and norms of the functioning of the Yunarmia and intermediaries, which form the ideological and legal basis for the functioning of the young patriots movement.

The first group refers primarily to the Statute of the all-Russia youth military-patriotic Yunarmia movement. The provisions contained in it directly refer to the rules, norms and rules of conduct of its members. In addition, this document contains a description of the organizational structure of the military-patriotic movement. It is indicated that the organs of the Yunarmia are the All-Russian Rally of the Yunarmia, the General Staff, the Central Control and Supervisory Commission and the regional Yunarmia units¹⁹.

Most of the decisions regarding the most important matters are formally taken up on all-Russia gatherings of young patriots. They are being held at least every 5 years. The members of the General Staff in Moscow and the other organizational units of the Yunarmia are elected. At the first Yunarmia Rally held on 28 May 2016 in the Patriot park in Kubinka near Moscow, decisive provisions regarding the rules and functioning of the Yunarmia were made. The General Commander-in-Chief of the General Staff, the Olympic champion Dmitry Trunenkov, was also elected²⁰. An interesting fact in the context of the organizational structure is the fact that representatives of the Ministry of National Defence of the Russian Federation take part in meetings of regional

¹⁸ M. Cieślarczyk, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

¹⁹ *Ustav Vserossiyskogo Detsko-Yunosheskogo Voyenno-Patrioticheskogo Obshchestvennogo Dvizheniya „Ynarmiya”*, Uтвержден Слетомучредителей 28.05.2016, Министерство Обороны Россиyskoy Federacyy, nr 5/3498, p. 6.

²⁰ *Yunarmiya Rossii: dla chegovozrodilos' vserossiyskoyevoyenno-patrioticheskoye dvizheniye*, TASS, 22.02.2018, <https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/3577097?fbclid=IwAR1MyXU8cZk60WtISNsinHIwwar10fjRjQWjXeHTp0Wef_E5UdtpC1uspE> (14.03.2019).

units, or representatives of the Voluntary Assembly of the United Army, Aviation and Navy or the Central Army Sport Committee.

The range of the Yunarmia is not limited only to the territory of the Russian Federation. Regional centres are also open in the territory of other countries, such as Armenia, Georgia or Azerbaijan. The regional centre of Yunarmia functioning in the territory of the annexed Crimea may seem interesting in this context. Patriotic education and attachment to his homeland in the Crimean Peninsula is characterized by a specific attitude towards the Russian state. It manifests itself through demonstrative display of its attachment to the Russian Federation and Russian culture²¹. Crimea is a place where there is a much greater need for interference by Russian authorities and military, who with their authority strengthen the space of patriotic attitude to the Russian Federation of the younger generation inhabiting the Crimean Peninsula.

It is also worth noting that the branches of Yunarmia are present in the territory of the United States of America. They function essentially at the diplomatic missions of the Russian Federation. This is undoubtedly a demonstrative manifestation of Russian intentions in the affairs of the state, which is treated by the Russian state ideology as the largest rival in the international arena²².

The second group, constituting the ideological and legal basis for the functioning of the organization of young patriots, are resolutions of the Russian authorities having a national character. One of them is the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020, approved by Russian President Vladimir Putin on May 12, 2009. The provisions contained therein regarding the potential threat to the state constitute a platform on which the narrative is shaped, then reaching the members of the Yunarmia. In addition, the Strategy includes a point related to the defence and military capabilities of the Russian Federation, taking into account, inter alia, the population potential. The implication of these provisions is the reference to the main principles of the functioning of the Yunarmia, i.e. the education of youth in the spirit of patriotism and the preparation for the defence of their own Homeland²³.

²¹ *Yunarmiya. My – deti Krymskoyvesny* Krymskiy Federalnyy Universitetim V. I. Vernadskogo, 15.03.2019, <https://cfuv.ru/news/yunarmiya-my-deti-krymskojj-vesny?fbclid=IwAR26oJ_a8CCKo1u0oUNmKJHc0pRQntCuPA7c8p9m0L-kq_uUzOPD60CRc> (3.04.2019).

²² I. Katkova, *V USA poyavil sya otryad obshchestvennogo dvizheniya "Yunarmiya"*, Molodezhnoe Informatsionnoye Aгенstwo "Mir", 12.01.2019, <миамир.рф/obschestvo/44837> (21.04.2019).

²³ *Strategiya natsionalnoy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda*, Uтверzhdena Ukazom Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 12 maya 2009 goda nr 537, <<https://web.archive.org/web/20110413220845/http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html>> (3.04.2019).

The implementation of the decisions of the Russian authorities on the platform of the functioning of the Yunarmia is on the one hand an exemplification of the importance of patriotic youth education in the context of national defence and on the other hand, it shapes the ideological and conceptual pillar of the activities of Yunarmia.

Security culture – the sphere of material culture

The Minister of National Defence of the Russian Federation, Sergey Shoygu, at the first Yunarmia Rally in 2016 gave a speech during which he pointed out that the purpose of Yunarmia was to bring up healthy, patriotic citizens of the Russian state. It is a reference to the intangible sphere of security culture. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that Yunarmia, as an element of the defence potential of the state, is a tool in the form prepared for leading and participating in military activities of the youth. From this point of view, referring to theoretical justifications, it can be assumed that Yunarmia is a personal base of the Russian army, and thus it is a sphere of human resources used when necessary in processes ensuring the security of the state.

The theoretical premise boils down to the conclusion that material culture includes techniques and technologies, infrastructure, equipment, technical and financial tools. In the case of Yunarmia, the context of material culture should be considered through the prism of the armament potential of the Russian army. This is due to the fact that Yunarmia is directly connected with the Ministry of National Defence of Russia, and therefore the aspect of material culture should be implemented in the material culture of the Russian army.

Sergey Shoygu, on the occasion of the first Yunarmia' Rally, mentioned also the scope of preparatory youth preparation. He emphasized that they would be given the opportunity not only to participate in actual military training taking place on the training grounds, but also to be their direct participants. To this end, an organizational and preparatory state structure was created, whose primary purpose is to provide the Yunarmia with material resources – military costumes, specially prepared weapons and techniques that will be used in the training process of the members of Yunarmia.

An example of this type of activity is carried out on the territory of the Kostromskoy Military Training Center Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko tactical game “Stalker”. Its main task was to eliminate an opponent who was in a protected fortress. For this purpose, military technical tools enabling the tracking of your opponent were made available to participants of the game. In addition, a part of the training was also

the presentation of new achievements of Russian scientists in the field of armaments²⁴.

The scope of the material culture of the Yunarmia presented above is a clear example that the activities of the Russian Federation are directed at the development of this youth-patriotic movement, which in the future will be a decisive factor in the military potential of Russia. The opportunity to participate in military training and communing with real armaments technology and tools creates a development platform for the defense capabilities of the Russian Federation.

Conclusions

According to the ranking of the strongest armies in the world presented by Global Fire Power, in 2018 the Russian Federation was in the second place. The total number of soldiers, taking into account active and reserve resources, accounted for over 3.5 million people. On a global scale, this is one of the highest indicators determining the capabilities and military potential of the Russian Federation²⁵.

This article presents one of the processes of increasing the military capabilities of the Russian state. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and a decade of relative weakness, the Russian Federation has returned to the path of rebuilding its own power and position of the world power²⁶. To this end, the Russian authorities, in addition to the economic issue, based on trade in energy resources, focused their efforts on the idea of building a citizen's model, which is patriotically oriented towards his homeland and, on the other, is well prepared to defend his country. The realization of these intentions was the establishment in 2016 of the military youth-patriotic Yunarmia movement. The basic task of this organization is to educate Russian youth in terms of defensive adaptation, which is based on the patriotic idea of attachment to their state and nation.

The phenomenon of Yunarmia in the above considerations has been implemented in the cultural context, and more specifically in the context of the security culture of the Russian Federation, which is currently the subject

²⁴ *Luchshyyeyunarmieyey na voyenizirovanoyestafiete „Stalker” – komanda kostromskoyoblasti*, GlavnnyShtabYunarmii, 31.07.2018, <https://yunarmy.ru/news/2679?fbclid=IwAR19ceffXXltPsmOAvU_OVW6kjYwSag8jkw7cMrhVWAoOipxmap8L-tCio> (6.04.2019).

²⁵ *Russia Military Strength*, <https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=russia&fbclid=IwAR1-DLiN5tcfYzN3tzXZ10m1AUE9vfjkeD4ZqLb3zLdXINrKe7zvEBgMUuk#manpower> (2.04.2019).

²⁶ M. Olchawa, *Imperialna rozgrywka. Ukraina w geopolitycznej strategii Stanów Zjednoczonych*, Kraków 2009, pp. 13-15.

of interest of many research centres around the world. Yunarmia is a cultural phenomenon within the Russian state. It is a result of the popularity of this organization in contemporary Russia and the narrative that is shaped around it. The operation of the Yunarmia is widely commented on practically in all Russian mass media. In this context, one should speak about the process of shaping the “yunarmia’s” culture. The most important fact proving its popularity is primarily the number of members, which is growing rapidly from month to month, because it is planned that by 2020 there will have been around one million young people in the ranks of Yunarmia.

The Russian Federation, realizing its policy on the international arena, undoubtedly takes into account the fact that the preservation of the superpower position requires the improvement of its military potential. Therefore, by creating a specific cultural construct based on military-patriotic principles, the Russian state creates a sphere of human resources that give additional strengths in the context of the fight for primacy on the world stage. Yunarmia through appropriate military-defensive preparation is an inseparable element of the military system of the Russian Federation. As a result of a skilfully conducted policy of cultural and military socialization, Russia has achieved unprecedented success. Therefore, in the future conducting various kinds of agonizing about the military and defence potential of the Russian Federation, a strong emphasis should be put on and take into account in this context the military-patriotic organization Yunarmia as an integral element of the Russian defence system.

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„Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem”
2019, Nr 1(12)
DOI: 10.33674/2201913

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POLITICAL AND MILITARY LESSONS OF THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN IN SYRIA

Abstract:

Decision of the Russian Federation to support the regime of Bashar Assad in its fight with terrorists and opposition became a crucial event in the world politics with the long-term consequences for global international relations, for the future of the Middle East and for Russia itself. One of the most important questions in this context is why Kremlin decided to interfere and what are the political and military lessons of its campaign in Syria? It can be said that the main political goal of Vladimir Putin was to make the United States take Russia into account as a serious (if not equal) player in the international arena, and he reached that goal, making his state a key factor in the Middle East. There was a doubt if Russian army is able to act effectively abroad and change Syrian situation at low cost. It proved that it is efficient enough, showing the advantages of Russian weaponry, and got valuable experience in many spheres. At the same time, the end of the Kremlin game in Syria is not clear, but this can be an inevitable price of its revived imperial ambitions.

Keywords:

Middle East, Russia, Russian “Grand strategy”, Syria, Syrian peace process, the United States, fight on terrorism, ISIS, Russian army, Russian weapons, Kalibr, Russian special operations forces, private military companies, Wagner group, Russian military bases in Syria, information warfare.

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Introduction

*Watching, how Russians fight for Syria,
I cannot imagine, how they will fight for Russia.*

Bashar Assad,
President of Syria²

It seems that two main elements of the Russian “Grand strategy” are the following: lead the reintegration of the post-soviet area (for example, creation and development of the Eurasian economic union) and make the West treat Russia as a serious (if not equal) partner, which has its undisputed spheres of influence (like Ukraine) and must participate in global decision-making process.

Europe and especially America do not agree with such role of Moscow (of course, some elite groups there are ready to recognize that “Russia is back”, but the so-called “deep state” in the United States prefer confrontation and forces the EU to act in the same way). Therefore, Kremlin seeks to prove them, that it is better to accept new reality than try to win in a zero-sum game. For instance, Russia did not let Georgia get back South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008, then “took” Crimea and supported separatists in Donbas.

But it was not enough, because those actions did not affect Europe and the U.S. directly. At the same time, the Middle East is a geopolitical arena, where America had been dominating for a long time, and in 2015 Vladimir Putin decided to interfere in the Syrian war (possibly, he was ready to help Muammar Gaddafi in Libya too, but president Dmitri Medvedev was not tough enough to do that).

As Stephen Blank wrote for Atlantic Council: “Essentially, Moscow seeks to exploit crises to create a regional bipolarity against the West in the Middle East and Europe as well as in places like Latin America or Afghanistan. This would force the United States and its allies to take Russia at Moscow’s own self-valuation and cement a system of global multipolarity (with China and the United States) that accords to Russia the status of a great global power whose voice must be heard”³. At the same time, Steven A. Cook noticed for the “Foreign Policy”: “And what better place to start than the Middle East, where the United States is already widely resented even among its allies. (...) In the span of less than a decade, the Middle East has gone from a region in which

² *Aforizmy niedieli ot izwiestnykh ludiej. Wypusk № 48, Argumenty i fakty, 29.11.2017, <http://www.aif.ru/politics/world/aforizmy_nedeli_ot_izvestnyh_lyudey_48> (29.05.2018).*

³ S. Blank, *Beyond Syria: Moscow’s Objectives in the Middle East, Atlantic Council, 17.04.2018, <<http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/beyond-syria-moscow-s-objectives-in-the-middle-east>> (28.05.2018).*

the United States was overwhelmingly predominant to one that Washington and Moscow contest”⁴.

There were several factors, which eased Russian intervention (historical ties and good political relations with Syria; Russian Navy’s support facility in Tartus; participation of Iran – another Russian ally in the region – in the conflict). Also, as in the case of Crimea operation, America was not ready for such a scenario. Still, there was no guarantee that Putin’s plan will succeed, because (a) it is a first military operation of the Russian Federation far abroad of such a scale; (b) in the beginning Russia provided only air support, and Syrian army on the ground was in the pitiable condition at that moment; (c) sooner or later the West had to react in some way, seeking to complicate Russian actions and limit the spread of Russian influence in the region.

So, let’s see, what are the intermediate political and military results of Russian campaign in Syria, which is not over yet.

Political lessons

Moscow wanted to be important for the West, and it did that. Putin meets the leaders of Iran, Turkey, Israel, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan. All of them have very different interests in Syria, but all they are in dialogue with Russia, which thus is in the centre of the Middle East politics, showing its diplomatic and military (especially after the establishment of the permanent naval and air military bases in Syria) potential.

As Jessica Tuchman Mathews from Carnegie Endowment notes: “Since Russian President Putin saved Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime from collapse, he has established working relations with every major power in the Middle East, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iran, and Turkey, though several of them fiercely oppose what he is doing in Syria. (...) In the space of a few years, Putin has ended decades of Russian irrelevance in the Middle East and built a stronger position than the Soviet Union enjoyed 40 years ago”⁵.

So, there is no surprise that the United States ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley actually recognized that America cannot just ignore Kremlin’s actions anymore, because “whether it’s their involvement in Ukraine, whether you look at how they are supporting Maduro in Venezuela, whether you look in Syria and their way of propping up Assad and working

⁴ S. A. Cook, *Russia Is in the Middle East to Stay*, Council of Foreign Affairs, 26.03.2018, <<https://www.cfr.org/blog/russia-middle-east-stay>> (28.05.2018).

⁵ J. T. Mathews, *Russia Replaces America as the Power Player in the Middle East*, Carnegie Endowment, 06.03.2018, <<https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/06/russia-replaces-america-as-power-player-in-middle-east-pub-75726>> (28.05.2018).

with Iran, that continues to be a problem”⁶. It means that from being nothing Russia was able to become a problem for the U.S., and in order to solve this problem America must treat Moscow as a player, what Putin needed.

But playing in the highest geopolitical league is not an easy task, because in the conditions of strategic proximity the level of confrontation and the possibility of big military conflict grows rapidly. For example, information warfare between the West and Russia in case of Syria became extremely sharp, and the fact is that Moscow, even being right about some things, is not able to concur “Western truth”, because its media sources (Russia Today, Sputnik, etc.) are not influential enough. In avoiding local (like in Vietnam or Afghanistan in the 20th century) or a full-scale war with America Russia is much more successful, demonstrating patience and responsibility. Still, it is not the main challenge for it.

The main question: “If Russia has an exit strategy in Syria?”. Moscow develops more or less effectively an inclusive peace process in that country and speaks about restoration of the territorial integrity of Syria⁷. It plays smart, but still, it is unclear, if there is a long-term Middle East strategy in Kremlin. Paradoxically, the final result, in this case, may be less important than the process itself. In other words, if it is possible to bring Syria back to its 2011 situation – good, if not – good enough, because being inside the Syrian conflict means being inside the Middle East politics, what will keep Russia in the high-stakes game with the United States and will further maintain its influence in the region (just like in case of the American presence in Afghanistan, where Washington is not able to destroy Taliban, but saves its political and military position in the strategic geopolitical point).

Of course, there is a question of cost then. Up to now Russia’s campaign in Syria was successful in terms of cost-benefit relations, but its further long-time participation in the conflict will inevitably require more human and financial resources. Is the Russian economy ready for that? Some experts think, it is not. Others say that you will never be fully ready for a fight, but if you do not get in when necessary, you will lose for sure. Russia made a choice to become a “Big State” with global interests again. This status has its price. It seems that Putin is ready to pay that price and believes that this mission is possible for the Russian economy despite Western sanctions. We will see, who is right, but history shows that there was no price for Russia(ns), when they wanted to win.

⁶ T. Hains, *Nikki Haley: Russia Is “Involved With All The Wrong Actors” Around The World*, Realclearpolitics.com, 15.04.2018, <https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2018/04/15/nikki_haley_russia_is_involved_with_all_the_wrong_actors.html> (28.05.2018).

⁷ T. Qiblawi, *All ‘foreign forces’ to leave Syria, Putin tells Assad*, CNN, 18.05.2018, <<https://edition.cnn.com/2018/05/18/middleeast/assad-putin-intl/index.html>> (29.05.2018).

Military lessons

Russian diplomacy did a great job in the Middle East, but the Russian military did even more – for Syria, for Russia and for itself⁸. Syrian conflict proved some traditional military laws, broke some myths and presented some new war approaches.

First of all, the crucial role of the air force in modern warfare was demonstrated once again. When Russian jets and helicopters arrived, the situation changed dramatically in favour of Assad. At the same time, drones showed their importance – first of all as an intelligence tool together with space intelligence instruments. On the other hand, Russia still lacks powerful attack drones, which could make its air attacks cheaper, but works hard to create them⁹.

In the context of Russian-American competition in the air of Syria, air defence system S-400 together with the systems of radio-electronic warfare became a significant factor of deterrence of Western aviation, and Russian air defence complex “Pantsir” showed its power in a real fight with terrorists’ drones. Finally, modern technological warfare is unimaginable without “smart weaponry”. Russia successfully used in Syria different types of cruise missiles, launched from ships, submarines and jets (for example, “Kalibr” from the Caspian Sea), and it means that now it belongs to the club of states, which can fight last generation war.

It is clear that the latter becomes more and more technological, but man’s role (primarily – of special forces, especially snipers) is still dominant – if you want to win, only man to man fight can guarantee a victory. That is why Russian special operations forces work together with the Russian air force, helping it to detect and destroy its targets, and take part in direct battles with terrorists. Besides, Russia unofficially uses private military companies in Syria (for example, “Wagner group”¹⁰), which are supposed to be controlled by Russian military commanders and do the “dirtiest work” in that war – also because Syrian army is still too weak for the fast large-scale operations. On the other hand, Russia invested a lot in its rebuilding, and it became much more powerful and efficient. It means that Russian military advisers are capable

⁸ W. Baraniec, *Naczalnik Giensztaba Woorużonnych sil Rossii gienieral armii Walerij Gierasimow: „My pierielomili chriebiet udarnym silam tierrorizma”*, „Komsomolskaja prawda”, 27.12.2017, <<https://www.kompravda.eu/daily/26775/3808693/>> (29.05.2018).

⁹ *W Rossii sozdadut bojewyje biespilotniki wiesom do 15 tonn*, „Rossijskaja gazieta”, 14.11.2017, <<https://rg.ru/2017/11/14/v-rossii-sozdadut-boevye-bespilotniki-vesom-do-15-tonn.html>> (29.05.2018).

¹⁰ L. Peter, *Syria war: Who are Russia’s shadowy Wagner mercenaries?* BBC, 23.02.2018, <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43167697>> (29.05.2018).

to teach and motivate even the weakest soldiers, and therefore, there is no surprise that they already appeared in African states.

Next point is that the Syrian war destroyed the popular military myth that tanks and artillery are “dinosaurs” in contemporary military conflicts. An example of the first war in Chechnya (New Year attack of Grozny) is usually used to show that tanks cannot be used in the cities. But this is just an example of how tanks should not be used in the cities. In Syria, they proved their importance, especially T-90 (and it would be interesting to see T-14 “Armata” there). At the same time, it is clear that they need to be supported by troops and support machines. So, in Russia tanks now have two devastating “friends” – tank support machine called “Terminator”¹¹ and small unmanned tank “Uran-9”¹², which will make fights in the cities and other areas even more effective. Artillery (both barrel and rocket one) also is not “dead” in the modern battlefield (especially in the conditions of Syrian deserts). For instance, such Russian systems as “Buratino” and “Solncepiok” became a real nightmare for terrorists in Syria.

The latter on their side create the self-made mechanisms, comparable to big mine-throwers, which use gas balloons with many metal pieces in order to achieve bigger damage. And this is not the only “innovation” of regime opponents: for Syrian army and even for Russian special forces it is very difficult to destroy the so-called jihad-vehicles (simple jeeps or armoured vehicles with suicide fanatic inside), when often there are just several seconds to see it and just one shot to stop it. Besides, jeeps with machine-gun or mine-thrower on their board, which combine mobility and a rather big firepower, became one of the most significant weapons in the Syrian war. Reacting to that, Russia improves its armoured vehicles, such as “Tigr”, “Volk”, “Medved”, “Taifun” and others¹³.

The last but not the least moment, related to Russian military lessons in Syria, is about training. Taking part in the Syrian conflict, Russia tested its logistics capabilities and new weapons (for example, “Kalibr” cruise missiles and SU-34, SU-35 and SU-57 jets), which is useful for their modernization and trade perspectives. Also, it trained in real war its younger soldiers (especially pilots, special operations forces and private military companies) and high-level officers, who could improve their knowledge about fighting in the cities (effective tactics of surrounding some territory, its separation to smaller pieces

¹¹ *Ekspiert o nowom woorużenii armii RF: „Tierminator” probjot lubuju broniu*, „RIA NOWOSTI”, 20.03.2018, <https://ria.ru/radio_brief/20180320/1516810188.html> (29.05.2018).

¹² *Ispytanija robota-zaszczitnika sniali na widieo*, Lenta.ru, 06.05.2018, <<https://lenta.ru/news/2018/05/06/uran9/>> (29.05.2018).

¹³ For example: *Tanki na kolosach. Samyje woorużonnyje bronieawtomobili Rossii*, „RIA NOWOSTI”, 29.05.2018, <https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20180529/1521556363.html> (29.05.2018).

and destruction of that pieces became evident). Finally, the Russian Navy found itself in the Mediterranean Sea and is not going to leave.

To sum up, in Syria the Russian Army proved that the talks about its revival are true. At the same time, it saw its weaknesses, but only to eliminate them and become even stronger. Good news for the West is that Russians “showed their cards” in many spheres, and now Western military planners know better, how to respond to Russian challenge.

Conclusion

To make a long story short, interference in the Syrian conflict was important for Russia in political and military terms. Politically it helped Moscow to strengthen its position in geopolitical dialogue with the West (not to speak about the influence in the Middle East), which cannot ignore Russia anymore. The final price of that victory is as unclear, as the perspective of the Syrian war, but it seems that Putin and his supporters are ready for a long game. At the same time, the Russian military demonstrated its growing strength in Syria and learned a lot of useful lessons (logistics, a test of new weaponry, training of soldiers and officers, etc.), which will help it to become even more powerful. The task of the United States and Europe is to learn their own lessons of the Russian campaign in Syria in order to make the right political and military decisions on further relations with Moscow.

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„*Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem*”
2019, Nr 1(12)
DOI: 10.33674/2201911

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RUSSIA: LIVING FROM ITS PAST?

Abstract:

Since the end of the Cold War Russia has been treated as a defeated state. Western countries usually perceive Russia not only as a defeated state but also relating it to Soviet Union. Beyond that the West has Orientalized Russia, segregating it from the “western club” of developed states. But Russia’s recovery from the collapse of the 90’s made it more assertive towards the West. It’s proposed here that this assertiveness is due to it’s orientalization, it’s inferior status perceived by the West. The inferior perception by the West has triggered a process of identity’s reconstruction which will be analyzed through a perspective of ontological security. The more Russia has it’s great power status denied, the more aggressive it becomes regarding it’s foreign policy. As the international hierarchy continues to treat Russia as that of “behind” the modern states, and the more it feels marginalized, it will double down on efforts to regain its great power status it will have to dispose power. Russia’s ontological insecurity might lead it to a path of aggressiveness.

Keywords:

Russian Federation; Crimea; Ontological Security.

Introduction

This research proposes to carry out an analysis with the primary intention of trying to raise possible motivations for the assertiveness of the Russian Federation in recent years, especially with regard to the West. The temporal clipping does not have absolute accuracy, since this Russian aggressiveness toward the "West" is not linear, there are times when the Russian government

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tries to conduct more cooperative policies, there are many ups and downs in this relationship.

However, the point that should stand out most in this research is the search for ontological security by the Russian Federation. That is, their ontological insecurity is the most explored hypothesis to try to understand aggressive acts by the Russian government, with more emphasis on Vladimir Putin's policies, and the issue of annexation of the Crimea. Which means that the construction of identity is a nodal point to be observed. However, it is not assumed here that we will find "answers", but indicative and perhaps more questions will be raised.

This research also has the purpose of understanding certain aspects of Russian foreign policy, especially due to the continuous description of it as being schizophrenic, among other adjectives that end up mischaracterizing and even masking what would be behind certain attitudes on the part of the Russian government.

For those analysts who consider Russia inconsistent and unpredictable, with a schizophrenic foreign policy, the justification is in the acts and speeches in Russian government. For these same, makes no sense that in the early 1990s Russia aligned ideologically with the West, and later declared contrary and had reactions very hostile to Western policies. However, what these analysts might not see is the possibility of a Russian identity change, not schizophrenia, and the possibility of an identity that does not fit into certain patterns, but it has been built in a hybrid way. And this is what² suggests when he brings to the analysis of Russian identity "cooperative pragmatism" from V. Putin largely. Furthermore, the question of the annexation of Crimea has been poorly analyzed within the manner prescribed in this research.

The utilization of official texts and speeches of Russian officers, besides the president, are justified by the obvious importance of the same, and, in addition, such texts have very different content of much of diplomatic and presidential speeches. These documents appear to be quite close to the reality of the actions of the Russian Federation, both speeches, such as the documents have content that, in fact, show the Russian motivations quite clearly, so are of great relevance.

The main research question is to try to understand Russian motivations for their actions related to the recent annexation of Crimea. How was the Russian government mobilized to the point of annexing Crimea? Some analysts ensure that such actions are motivated only for strategic reasons, but what is proposed in this research is that the Russian government is acting in accordance not only with material interests, but the ideational factor is very present in their choices

² A. Tsygankov, *Vladimir Putin's last stand: the sources of Russia's Ukraine policy*, "Post-Soviet Affairs", vol. 31, no 4/2015, pp 1-25.

of foreign policy. That is, the hypothesis is that there may be materials /geostrategic interests for the annexation of the Crimea, but also the identity issue has great influence in decision making.

Given the assertion, it's important to understand the Russian relationship with the West and demonstrate how some events can illuminate the present research in order to corroborate the idea that the government of V. Putin seeks identity redefinition of the Russian Federation³. Some moments of clash of Russia under the V. Putin administration include the independence of Kosovo, NATO expansion to the East, the possibility of missile defense installation in Poland and the Czech Republic, the possibility of including Georgia in NATO⁴, the intervention in Libya, considered by Russia as being something out of the limits of the mandate, the various vetoes of the Federation so that there wasn't an intervention in Syria, among other issues.⁵ However, it is not only tension that defines the Russian vs. West/NATO relationship; there have also been moments of cooperation. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks Russia and the United States worked together against a common enemy, terrorism.

It is conceived that the Russian Federation under the administration of President V. Putin, since the late 1990s acts in accordance with the objective of (re) building the Russian identity in order to make this state a great power again, and this occurs shortly after what many analysts call the "identity crisis"⁶. Although one of Russia's way of justifying the interference in Ukraine is based on "saving people".

Since its intervention in the Crimea that had begun in March 2014, Russian President V. Putin spoke of R2P to justify their interference in Ukrainian territory. Putin made it clear that he had a duty to protect the population of Crimea, but there were no signs of any of the four crimes under ICISS report – Responsibility to protect. Moreover, humanitarian intervention, according to Responsibility to Protect criteria should be the last resort, and / or the state, if Ukraine had no ability to protect its citizens.

Of course, since the crisis began, there was division among the population; those that were pro-Russian and those who were pro-EU along with dropping

³ E. Kropatcheva, *NATO-Russia relations and the Chinese factor: an ignored variable*, "Politics", v. 34, no. 2/2013, pp. 149-160.

⁴ A. Tsygankov, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-25.

⁵ M. Barabanov, *Russian Interests in Syria: myths and reality. Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST)*, Moscow defense brief, 30.04.2012, <<http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/42012/item1/article1/>> (30.05.2019).

⁶ B. Lo, *Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking*, New York 2002.

a discriminatory law regarding the Russian language⁷. In order to try to justify their actions, the Russian president made use of many rhetorical devices. One of his reasons for intervening in Crimea was by pointing to the Western mistakes in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, as if that made their righteous deeds. As V. Putin likes to quote the case of Kosovo and make comparisons with the case of Crimea. Indeed, Kosovar independence set an important precedent in the international arena, but it seems that the cases are different. We will not go into detail about the cases of Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. The use of the word "error" is removed from V. Putin rhetoric to describe the activities already mentioned. In the case of Afghanistan, the Russian President had forgotten to mention that he assisted the West in some of its measures such as providing intelligence to the location of terrorists. In Iraq despite knowing of complaints from Russia, his government has done nothing about it. In fact, regarding the intervention in Iraq the Russian government had made mention of international law.

Regarding resolution 1973 that decided an intervention in Libya and mentioned the R2P it should be remembered that Russia abstained. In Libya, the constant complaint of the Russian leadership is that those involved in the intervention exceeded its mandate. Having been an intervention that had caused divisions in opinions, in fact, in Libya, there was a humanitarian emergency, and while it is not the purpose here to discuss the background of the same⁸. Interestingly, during many of his last speeches, Vladimir Putin mentioned the issue of Syria. After all, since the beginning of the crisis in Syria, the Russian government was ranting contrary to any kind of intervention in the country, because according to the government's position of V. Putin, an intervention in Syria would be contrary to international law and standards, would run counter the principle of nonintervention and sovereignty of Syria, so vetoed all attempts to pass resolutions in the UN Security Council with regard to this case. However, it is quite clear that in Syria, exceptions are made to the complexity of the situation, there is a humanitarian emergency taking place⁹.

According to the Russian government, intervention in Ukraine was held under the auspices of international law. However, despite clashes between Tatars civilians, pro-EU Ukrainians and the share of pro-Russian population,

⁷ J. O'Sullivan, The difference between real journalism and Russia Today, "The Spectator", 6.12.2014, <<http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/9390782/the-truth-about-russia-today-is-that-it-is-putins-mouthpiece/>> (30.05.2019).

⁸ V. Pacer, *Vladimir Putin's justification for Russian action in Crimea undermines his previous arguments over Syria, Libya and Iraq*, European Politics and Policy, 2014. <<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/03/11/vladimir-putins-justification-for-russian-action-in-crimea-undermines-his-previous-arguments-over-syria-libya-and-iraq/>>, (30.05.2019).

⁹ *Ibidem*.

there is in fact no evidence to support a humanitarian emergency in the region. According to the principles and criteria of R2P at least, Russian justifications for their interference in Ukrainian issues do not hold up. Another controversial point Russia shares outside with respect to the Budapest Memorandum signed with the United States, United Kingdom and the Russian Federation in 1994 recognizing the independence, sovereignty and borders of Ukraine, Russia would give up using force against the integrity and Ukrainian sovereignty. Regarding the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 in order to be justified again, the Russian government said that if what happened in Ukraine was a revolution, so now it is another country and not even mentioned in the memorandum in question¹⁰. This attempt at justification is not convincing, Ukraine, under any circumstances, became another State.

With regard to legal matters dealing with interventions, the United Nations Charter also unlikely, the Russian government can convince the international community, despite its rhetorical turns. Starting from Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, the Russian government no longer has legitimacy because this stretch, as previously stated, prohibits the use of force against the integrity and sovereignty of another State. As laid earlier, the Charter itself already brings itself loopholes for intervention and the use of force contained in Chapter VII thereof, which are in self defense, or the use of force should be sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council. The issue of Crimea does not pass the test of these two gaps. One of the justifications most frequently used by the government of V. Putin to intervene in the Crimea is to protect its citizens. There seems to be consensus regarding how the protection of citizens who are outside their country of nationality should occur. Typically, the extraterritorial protection of citizens is carried out only by consular means and not by sending troops without the state's consent¹¹. Another justification widely used by the Russian government is that the Ukrainian president had given consent to an intervention in the Crimea. However, the letter of consent in the hands of the Russian government is deposed President Viktor Yanukovich, who no longer has presidential powers. However, V. Putin's government insists that Yanukovich as the deposition process was done illegally, the Russian Federation still recognizes him as president of Ukraine. Among many attempts to justify its unilateral intervention in the Crimea, one of them also used is that the population of Crimea has the right to self-determination as described in the United Nation's Charter, citing the following excerpt from the article 1 (2): *To Develop friendly relations Among nations based on respect for the principle*

¹⁰ *Ibidem.*

¹¹ J. Lenarz, (et al), *Ukraine: A Regional Crisis with Global Impact. Humanitarian Intervention Centre*, Humanitarian Intervention Centre Policy, 2014.

of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and to take other Appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

Thus, the process of self-determination should be used when a population is being oppressed by their government or suffering serious human rights violations, which was not the case in Ukraine. In addition, the use of this United Nations Charter device must be in accordance with the rules, and must come from the people who are suffering, as occurred in the case of Kosovo, which is independent with the help of the United Nations, and Kosovar population, in fact, was suffering from the oppression of their rights by Serbia. Furthermore, when a population decides to become independent, and opts for self-determination device, it does not confer the right of other nations intervene in the process, as was done in the Crimea by Russia. The decision of a people for self-determination should be unilateral, Russia illegally interfered throughout the Crimean independence process and then attacked that territory¹². So far the intervention of the Russian Federation in Crimea has not experienced any legality or legitimacy test according to their justifications for such military action on Ukrainian territory.

Historically

Historically, what is the place of the Russian Federation in the International scene? What is your role in it? Is the Russian Federation an insider or outsider? Over the centuries, Russia had been a Western allied, enemy, neither, friend, with a pragmatic cooperative relationship, but to a large extent it seems to be an enigma. What sounds right is that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, no matter how many Russian efforts have been made to "take part," the West's treatment of the Federation has not changed. Russia has since remained stigmatized as a defeated power, relegated to the background of the international scenario.

Especially since the annexation of the Crimea in 2014 many analysis that arise about Russia, it's role and it's place in the international scene. The issues raised about Putin's Russia vary. In a scenario of prevalence of certain political and economic systems, in which certain imperatives of international law and its derivatives are in force, the Russian Federation does not appear to integrate or even integrate and "fulfill" its oscillating what was explicit when annexing part of Ukrainian territory, and yet the government garnered broad support from its population. Following the annexation of the Crimea to the Federation, it became subject to economic sanctions and political pressures, but it does not yield to the pressure, and still makes it appear that this type of attitude is perfectly natural. Perhaps this is normal in a Russia that seems to be living in

¹² *Ibidem.*

another century, but for much of the international community its acts are inadmissible and alien to the current order.

In the midst of the crisis with Ukraine, the debate over the Russian search for paper and space on the international scene has been exacerbated, especially as Russia has not yielded to international pressures. Despite criticism especially from the West, the withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the G8, sanctions, in addition to political pressures, appear to have had no effect. The act may be illegal, in addition to the possibility of disruption of order and security in Europe, which for a major power belonging to the UN Security Council symbolizes still more strongly the paradox of Russian government behavior¹³. In this sense, there are analysts who believe in the possibility that Russia under President Putin is in the process of returning to Soviet practices and that the West must then return to treating Russia as a Soviet Union and continuing the containment of Russia¹⁴.

The annexation of the Crimea to Russia in 2014 has been analyzed in various ways, often by purely material means, but they do not account for the provision of a broader understanding of the overall picture. Therefore, the present research will use postcolonial perspectives and some of its concepts in order to try to understand what the annexation of the Crimea has to say about the role of Russia in the contemporary international scenario considered here as an injunction, periphery. In this way, it is proposed to think about the possibility of a "colonized" dimension of Russian thought that unfolded as acts of resistance from a hybrid identity¹⁵. This means that as an act of resistance because it is "colonized" by the thought of Western modernity, the Russian Federation once again changes its foreign policy paradigm, becoming more and more assertive about this idea of domination, and thus "colonizes" its surroundings in order to "civilize" the Self, considering that Russia considers itself, despite being a great power with great relevance for international politics, left aside by the West¹⁶.

It is said that the annexation of Crimea to Russian territory should not be considered as an obvious policy, but that it was constructed from meanings that are part of its own context and are tied to this decision-making. Therefore, in order to give body to how the answers will arrive the methodology will

¹³ I. Mannteufel, *Opinion: Crimea reflects Russia's fate*, 2015, <<http://www.dw.com/en/opinion-crimea-reflects-russias-fate/a-18316771>>, (30.05.2019).

¹⁴ J. Goldgeir, *To Contain Russia the U.S. Should Return to Cold War Policies*, (2014), New Republic, <<http://www.newrepublic.com/authors/james-goldgeier>>, (30.05.2019).

¹⁵ A. Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism*, Delhi-Oxford 1983.

¹⁶ D. Trenin, *Ukraine Crisis Causes Strategic, Mental Shift in Global Order*, Carnegie Moscow Center, (2015), <<http://carnegie.ru/2015/05/17/ukraine-crisis-causes-strategic-mental-shift-inglobalorder/i8q4>>, (30.05.2019).

be composed by the discursive analysis in conjunction with concepts of the studies of semiotics. To do so, Bakhtin¹⁷ posits that language is practical, influencing how subjects perceive themselves and perceive others. This understanding is reflected in the language, the subject, then through his pronouncement demonstrates his understanding of what is being said. Language has a cognitive component that relates to specific relationships. According to this logic brought by Bakhtin we have that the foreign policy of a State, here, the Russian Federation is exposed according to its own system of meanings.

“For Russians a strong state is not an anomaly, it is not something against which one should fight. On the contrary, a strong state is a source and guarantor of order, initiator and main moving force of any changes”¹⁸. “Sustainable development of society is impossible without a functioning state”¹⁹. “Russia’s role is important as the role of the state, which defends its values”²⁰.

In the system of signs²¹ of Russia, a great state, as demonstrated in the previous passage, is not an anomaly, which brings the signicity (system of signs of social life) itself, opening a breach within monology. Even when the Russian government puts itself as a great power it ends up placing itself in a position of inferiority when, in a certain way, it asks to be recognized as equal. The orientation of the Russian government to place itself on the international scene as a great power is not recent, so some of its acts can be understood from a notion of resistance (Bhabha), and from approaching the West, actions of a State with a hybrid identity and may appear contradictory.

Russia's national interests in the international sphere lie in upholding its sovereignty and strengthening its positions as a great power and as one of the influential centers of a multipolar world, in development of equal and mutually advantageous relations with all countries and integrative associations and primarily with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States [...]”²² (National Security Concept of Russian Federation, 2000).

The excerpt of the official document of the Russian Federation demonstrates this ambiguous movement of this State, which denounces the

¹⁷ M. Bakhtin, *Marxismo e filosofia da linguagem: problemas fundamentais do método sociológico na ciência da linguagem*, São Paulo 1986.

¹⁸ V. Putin, *Address to the Federal*, <<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17118>> (30.05.2019).

¹⁹ V. Putin, *Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club*, <<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243>> (30.05.2019).

²⁰ V. Putin, *New Year Address by Acting President Vladimir Putin*, <<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22280>> (30.05.2019).

²¹ M. Bakhtin, *op. cit.*

²² *National Security Concept of Russian Federation*, 2000, <<https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/gazeta012400.htm>> (30.05.2019).

West as a source of threats with "unipolarity", while at the same time placing the relevance of integrating in that same West, and calls for an international multipolar scenario. In addition, on many occasions, it is clear that Russia is a great power, evidencing the need for such predication frequently, that is, perhaps for the reason that many do not agree with this position of Russia in the hierarchy of international politics.

V. Putin's speech in 2014 shortly after the formal annexation of the Crimea into Russian territory is quite elucidative in relation to the ambiguous and liminal propensities of the Federation. The Russian president justifies his actions on the basis of Western values and norms, "according to the Charter of the United Nations" that is, it is a Western-minded state, but still trying to demonstrate resistance to it. Putin tends to show that Russia follows an alternative path to Western modernity, and ends up in the liminal between the modern and the traditional in rescuing the glorious past of imperial Russia, so the appearance of being in a limbo may be, in fact, the presentation of an alternative modernity. He still demonstrates the attempt to be superior to the West by manifesting his ability to do the same as the West when Putin compares the annexation of Crimea to Kosovo's independence. And in making this comparison he places himself in the same position as his Western counterparts.

Vladimir Putin underlines the need to re-establish Russian identity based on the traditional and the modern at the same time, with its foreign policy being "independent", ie with the creation of "Russian World" according to Zevelev²³. In this sense, focusing on the annexation of the Crimea brings a range of questions since, in fact, Russia did not gain much from annexation, on the contrary, it lost in several aspects, especially in the political sphere and with the sanctions it had suffered. So, ideational issues need to be taken into account. It is understood here that the possibility exists that Russia does not seem to fit the standard of behavior expected by modernity in force.

Russian identity is one of the most sensitive issues for this research, after all, it is an interesting starting point when it comes to trying to identify some of its motivations in foreign policy, whereas during the last Russian government it took years for some attitudes to be considered controversial such as international action locks in the face of the Syrian crisis and annexation of the Crimea, just to name a few of them. These attitudes may be hiding more than strategic and material concerns. Among the hypothesis is that the Russian involvement with the annexation of Crimea is that this event can be read as a proxy, issues not necessarily related to Ukraine, but with the West, especially to the construction of its identity. In this sense, such actions should send

²³ I. Zevelev, *The Russian World Boundaries. Russia in Global Affairs*, 7.06.2014, <<http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-Russian-WorldBoundaries-16707>> (30.06.2019).

a message to the West, in this relationship that seems ambivalent within their statements of a Russian feeling for example. This may mean that the Russian government, supported by its national identity, has the West at its core, its actions are guided in the centrality of the West.

The Russian Federation believes that with the collapse of the USSR it is promoted to the First World. However, although it is quite associated with a certain greatness, as can be seen in works such as Thompson *Russia and the Soviet Union* or even the work of Kalb *Imperial Gamble*, works that relate contemporary Russia to the Soviet Union and / or imperialism. In addition, the Russian government strives to perform performances worthy of a major Western power, such as emphasizing its war power, intervening in complex issues such as the crisis in Syria or even annexing part of Ukrainian territory.

However, this same "great" Russia that possesses material capabilities, has the ability to make interventions and confront the West to defend what is of its will, is also the same Russia that continues to complain of being neglected by the West, and constantly recalls the moments when it was left out of important decisions of the international scenario, which can be seen in the speech delivered by Vladimir Putin in 2014 when the Crimea is formally annexed. That is, there is a certain incongruity between the lines. For one does not see itself while a state suffering from postcolonial symptoms does not, "provincialize" the West, and continues to perpetuate masked mimetic behavior.

Emotions here matter as the sense of insecurity about the modern illusion of a unified identity leads States to a quest for ontological security. That is, ontological (in) security literature in connection with emotions is a bridge between explanatory possibilities and how this can fill analytical needs in certain scenarios, and how these approaches to some extent provide the shortcomings of some mainstream analyzes of International Relations about the Russian Federation.

As Koschut²⁴ puts it, emotions are analytical categories, but they are also within the spectrum of transformations, normative resistances, identity construction, among others. For Koschut²⁵ the analysis of emotions cannot be separated from the social context, identity and language. For the discursive expression carries within itself several meanings, it does not express only what is being directly discourse, as it carries between the lines the most intuitive emotions and meanings²⁶.

²⁴ S. Koschut, *The Power of (Emotion) Words: on the Importance of Emotions for Social Constructivist Discourse Analysis in IR*, "Journal of International Relations and Development, 21(2) 2017.

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁶ T. Solomon, *Attachment, tautology, and ontological security*, "Critical Studies on Security", Vol. 1, No. 1/2013.

Ontological Security

Here it's important to have in mind what holds together what has been written in the previous pages, which is Russia's ontological insecurity. Meaning that, Russia's government lost more than it gained annexing Crimea. The motivations to annex a part of Ukraine's territory were justified on legal, moral, humanitarian, among many others by Russian government. The problem is that with this action Russia lost material capabilities and "soft power" seeming just an irrational government. As said Russia and Crimea does share a historical past, Crimea was once part of Russia, and still these possible explanations alone miss the ideological component. Russia wants to be great again.

In order to be a great power again it needs recognition, sustainability of the biographical self, the identity of a Great Russia. But, as put, since the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia's been left aside in many important decisions regarding the international scenario. Besides if it doesn't belong among the Great Powers Russia doesn't see itself belonging anywhere else. So if Russia is being left aside, or feels like this, unheard, it will creating aggressive atmosphere to act as a "hero", to act as a great power. Russian identity insecurity created the opportunity to become an actual agent, motivated some sort of creativity for Russia's foreign policy decision makers to go back to a familiar routine of aggressiveness towards the West.

As it feels like it's being "othered" by the West, the search for its nemesis was the "best" approach to bring some certainty to the Russian public about it's identity. Crimea's annexation created the opportunity of ontological security and physical security since the government is drawing a red line, again, to the West, especially to warn NATO. In order to stablish a "modern" identity and be recognized as such, Russia's way of showing off that it can be a great "modern" power was acting aggressively.

Being treated as a stigmatized defeated country helped to build a structure of insecurity about Russia's identity, and this sense of insecurity can be a trigger to an aggressive agency.

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„*Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem*”
2019, Nr 1(12)
DOI: 10.33674/2201912

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SEAN BURGES, *BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR*, UNIVERSITY PRESS OF FLORIDA, GAINESVILLE 2009, PP. 248

In this work, the author Sean Burges analyzes the main achievements of Brazilian foreign policy between 1992 and 2002. The choice of such a decade to be analyzed, according to the author, refers to the ten years (hitherto) of greatest achievements in Brazil.

This decade in question is also called “The Decade of Fernando Henrique Cardoso”. He was a foreign minister from 1992-1993, finance minister from 1993-1994, and president of Brazil from 1995-2002. The Canadian scholar tries to understand “how” and “why” Brazil carving its space into the international scenario as a consensual hegemony. Burges does that examining official documents and from several interviews with Brazilian diplomats. And this method can be understood as his first mistake, since diplomats and official documents only disclosure what the Brazilian government wants to show. Meaning: not necessarily the “reality”.

After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union Burges, the international scenario was going through a complicated phase of fast pace changings and growing in internationalization. Facing new challenges Burges claims the Brazilian government embarked on a Foreign Policy in a “quiet style of leadership on South America”. Still, Brazilian diplomacy was seeking to keep the country’s autonomy in the international sphere without foreign interference.

According to this author, during Fernando Henrique Cardoso's “decade” Brazilian foreign policy was seeking this so-called “quiet leadership” in South America because being explicit would incur costs. Here is one more problem in his analysis, Brazil is very important to regional stability. However, during the two mandates of Cardoso, the main goal of the country’s foreign policy wasn’t to have leadership in the region. It’s important, but it was clear that at that moment Brazilian foreign policy was directed towards carving a niche among the great powers, not among other countries of the Global South.

At the beginning of the 1990s, Brazil was suffering from a huge economic crisis. Said that the country couldn’t afford any kind of leadership in the

subcontinent. Although Burges puts clearly the difference between a classic type of hegemony and a consensual type of hegemony, only after an economic plan the country started to get on its feet again. There are no doubts that Brazil needed a stable region to grow and to pursue its own interests, but it sounds an exaggeration to assert that the country was pursuing any kind of hegemony in this hemisphere. At that moment Brazil needed more support than it could offer, that's why the then-president was seeking to be among the most developed countries. Back in the 1990s, Brazil was carving its space in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and BRIC.

The most interesting part of this book is the way Burges takes into account historical elements to build up his argument. But one of the problems, as mentioned here before is that the author relies heavily on 58 interviews, especially with diplomats and on some documents released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although he was not very successful. After all, the Ministry claims the importance of regional affairs for example. However, it's clear that regional affairs are important, which is another interesting aspect of the book because during the two terms of Cardoso economic security can be pinpointed as the ultimate goal of the then-president.

When Burges points that the main goals of Itamaraty are the preservation of Brazilian autonomy and to keep foreign interference far from the country it simply seems redundant because that's basically the "mantra" of Brazilian foreign policy for decades. The author makes another mistake in his analysis, he leans too much on what Fernando Henrique Cardoso did as a sociology scholar. Cardoso is a great scholar in the area of dependency theory, but as a leader of Brazil, he acted in a very liberal way in economic terms. That's a simple mistake to commit when trying to understand this period of Brazilian foreign policy it can seem contradictory but Cardoso focused on taking the country out of economics problems mainly.

The book is permeated by the notion of consensual hegemony and structural power. Then one more problem comes to the surface. Although Brazil tries to be a leader in the subcontinent, even claiming it's made in a consensual way he forgets, according to Burges based on the history of the region. He forgets that in South America Brazilian consensual hegemony and/or leadership is far from being easy to achieve especially because of our history. Brazil not always played like a good neighbour, the country was a "bully" in the past. In this sense to reach this position, the country would have problems with other neighbours who also consider themselves as "natural" leaders in the region like Argentina and Venezuela. Burges is unsuccessful in exploring and recognizing deeply these issues. This question deserved more attention.

Another aspect regarding regionalism in South America is that Burges put that it began with the leadership of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. However, during

his two terms, this *quasi* regionalism is carried out mainly by the private sector. Because as asserted before at that time the state still didn't have the will either the resources to be truly present in the region. So it was a very modestly regionalism with some increase in exchanges between Brazil, Argentina, and Bolivia.

At last Burges treats the first term of the former Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. According to Burges one aspect linking Cardoso and Lula administrations is the idea of "South America". In fact, during Lula's administration, South America had an important role for his foreign policy. However, for Fernando Henrique Cardoso it doesn't seem to had been so prominently the way Burges asserts. For Lula, regionalism was more important, but not only to South America but also to the so-called Global South. Lula *de facto* sought this consensual hegemony in the South, investing more in the region, and also in political terms.

It's also important to highlight that during Lula's terms the Brazilian economic situation was different from the previous years. Lula was able to collect what Fernando Henrique Cardoso planted. That's why regionalism could be incremented for example, so the social programs.

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