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Donald Trump's New America

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EDITOR'S NOTE

Donald Trump's New America

The polls, carried out a year after taking the office of 45th President of the United States of America, showed the extremely low popularity of Donald Trump among the American voters. Trump's support after the first year of the presidency was 39%, which is the worst result in the history of these surveys. Moreover, according to Gallup Institute respondents, America has lost the seat of the world leader for Germany and China. What are the home and foreign policy of "Trump's New America"? Does Donald Trump's presidency really weaken the United States?

The recent volume of "Ante Portas – Security Studies" scientific journal contains five articles concerning the issues of the US home and foreign policy during the presidency of Donald Trump. Authors, affiliated with universities in the United Kingdom, Germany, Turkey, Brazil, and Georgia, share their point of view on contemporary security issues and international relations.

As usual, the second part of our journal contains guest articles respecting actual security problems, inter alia the Russian foreign policy issues, energy and economic affairs, and also very interesting matter of the crisis management.

Enjoy your reading!

Editorial Board
"Ante Portas – Security Studies"

I. THEMATIC ARTICLES

„Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem”
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TRANSATLANTIC TWILIGHT? THE IMPACT OF THE MUELLER INVESTIGATION ON US-EUROPE RELATIONS

Abstract:

The Mueller investigation into Russian interference in the US 2016 Presidential election has dogged the Trump administration, almost from the beginning of its time in office. The impact of the probe is widespread and affecting the United States in myriad ways both domestically and in foreign policy. We contend that, regarding US-European relations, the Mueller investigation is hastening two broad trends. Firstly, the continuing revelations are pushing the traditional US foreign policy establishment closer towards Europe. Secondly, and simultaneously, these revelations, as well as the continued actions of the President himself, are acting as a source of tension in US-European relations that are pushing European elites into awkward policy choices. The Mueller investigation has uncovered an ill-defined Russian strategy of sowing discord during the 2016 election cycle, matching other initiatives in Europe itself. In the rhetoric of prominent American politicians, it has succeeded. Donald Trump has been loath - unlike his verbosity towards the majority of the US's traditional allies - to criticise the Russian state. Meanwhile, the US Congress has tightened sanctions against Russia. While Trump has distanced himself from the European Union on issues such as the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the Iranian Nuclear Deal, other parts of the US polity – from city to mayors to state governors and Congress itself – have sought to reinforce

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relationships with European countries. The forthcoming 2018 midterm Congressional elections are likely to result in an exacerbation of the process, particularly if there are further allegations of Russian cyber-attacks. The impact on European leaders is varied. Whereas the German government wants to push ahead with a new gas pipeline, which would increase reliance on Russian energy supplies, the EU has thus far held firm over sanctions and presented a united front denouncing the alleged Russian state-sponsored use of a nerve agent in Britain. This paper will aim to explore the impact of the Mueller investigation on these two trends and the effect on wider US-European relations.

Keywords:

Donald Trump, Russia, Robert Mueller, European Union, Theresa May, Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron, Transatlantic Partnership

Since his appointment in May 2017 as a Special Prosecutor tasked with investigating potential collusion between the Trump Campaign and the Russian state, as well as broader potential Russian attempts to disrupt the 2016 US presidential election, much has been written about the actions of Robert Mueller. The same can also be said, though perhaps to a lesser extent, of investigations into these matters by other parts of the US government. Understandably, much of what has already been written about the Mueller investigation and the broader Trump-Russia issue has focused on domestic US politics, with the effect on the operations of the White House and the impact the investigations may have on the 2018 midterm elections being particularly prominent themes. Writing prior to Mueller's appointment, for instance, Allan Lichtman argued that, should the most lurid allegations against Trump and his campaign prove correct the US Congress would have a “near-airtight Case” for impeaching him for “treason”³, with John Burke stating that “at the very least”, contacts between the Trump campaign and administration and Russia were “inappropriate”⁴. In the media, *The Guardian's* Luke Harding has documented the attempts of the Trump Campaign to “discredit” Mueller⁵, whereas George W. Bush's former speechwriter and a senior editor of *The Atlantic* David Frum has claimed that the Trump Administration represents a “crisis” for the “work in progress” that is US “[d]emocracy”⁶. Whilst former Democrat staffer and contributor to *The Hill*, Brent Budowsky, positing that the continuous run of “bombshells” emanating from the investigations will have a

³ A. Lichtman, *The Case for Impeachment*, Kindle Edition, London 2017, Loc. 1851.

⁴ J. Burke, *The Trump Transition, Early Presidency, and National Security Organization*, “Presidential Studies Quarterly” 2017, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 574-596, p. 585.

⁵ L. Harding, *Collusion: How Russia Helped Trump Win the White House*, Kindle Edition, London 2017, Loc. 3332.

⁶ D. Frum, *Trumpocracy: The Corruption of the American Republic*, New York 2018, p. IX.

negative effect on the Republicans in the 2018 midterms⁷. Finally, participants involved in the events have also had their say, with James Comey, the former Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) whose firing led to Mueller's appointment, hypothesizing that Mueller is likely to consider whether or not his firing was an attempt to "obstruct Justice"⁸, whereas Hillary Clinton, Trump's opponent in the 2016 election, has labelled Russian actions during the 2016 US election "unprecedented"⁹. Yet, what has been missing from the ink spilled so far has been a sustained consideration of the ways the Mueller investigation, and the broader Trump whirlwind, has impacted and may continue to impact, Europe.

In short, we contend that, regarding US-European relations, the Mueller investigation, and the broader dynamic set of investigations, lawsuits and journalistic inquiries that it arguably spearheads, is hastening two broad trends. Firstly, the continuing revelations are pushing the traditional US foreign policy establishment closer towards Europe. Secondly, and simultaneously, these revelations, as well as the continued actions of the President himself, are acting as a source of tension in US-European relations that are pushing European elites into awkward policy choices. To explore and illustrate these contentions, this article evolves into two sections. To begin with, the current landscape of the US government investigations into the 2016 US elections, the Trump campaign and administration, and Russia is mapped. This occurs to enable readers to ground themselves within a complex and ever-shifting set of interconnected investigations. Next, this piece surveys some of the current and potential future effects for Europe of these investigations and the broader actions of Trump and his administration. Effects explored include the challenge that Trump poses to that rule-based order seen as sacrosanct by many US and European elites that, in theory at least, underpins US-European relations, sustained attempts to work around Trump and the inspiration that deliberately divisive European populists may find in the words and actions of Trump and the emulation this inspiration is likely to engender. All told, the Trump administration's approach is threatening the transatlantic order that has prevailed since the end of the Cold War.

The Current State of US Government Investigations into the 2016 Election

As of the end of May 2018, the four most high-profile US government investigations into attempts by the Russian state and related actors to influence

⁷ B. Budowsky, *GOP Faces Midterm Disaster as Mueller, Rosenstein, Cohen Bombshells Explode*, <<http://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/385861-gop-faces-midterm-disaster-as-mueller-rosenstein-cohen-bombshells-explode>> (28.05.2018).

⁸ J. Comey, *A Higher Loyalty: Truth, Lies and Leadership*, Kindle Edition, London 2018, Loc. 4093.

⁹ H. Clinton, *What Happened*, New York-New York 2018, p. 356.

the elections of 2016, as well as collusion by members of the Trump campaign, have been an FBI investigation that was cut short when Trump dismissed Comey in May 2017, an investigation by the House of Representatives Intelligence Committee that ended in March 2018, an ongoing investigation by the Senate Intelligence Committee and the Mueller investigation.

The FBI probe has its roots in the hacking of emails from the Democratic National Committee. This hack was confirmed on July 25th, 2016 and led to an investigation that began exploring potential links between the Trump campaign and the Russian state¹⁰. A formal investigation was likely triggered by information pertaining to Trump campaign advisor George Papadopoulos¹¹, who told Trump in March 2016 that “he had connections” that could “help arrange a meeting between [...] Trump and President Putin”¹². On March 20th, 2017, then FBI Director Comey confirmed that the FBI was “investigating the nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian government” as well as whether coordination between them occurred¹³. The FBI investigation ended when Trump dismissed Comey on May 9th, 2017¹⁴.

The next investigation to be terminated was run by the House of Representatives Intelligence Committee. From January 2017, the committee's work coalesced around four main themes; Russian “cyber activity and other active measures”, whether such “active measures included links between Russia” and US individuals and “associated political campaigns”, the US response to such active measures and what future responses should be and, finally, whether “leaks of classified information took place related to [a January 6th, 2016] Intelligence Community Assessment of these matters”¹⁵. This assessment found with “high confidence” that Russian President Vladimir Putin had ordered an “influence campaign” to “undermine public faith in the US democratic process” and that “Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump”¹⁶. The house investigation was ended in March 2018 by the committee’s Republican majority. Key outcomes included a finding that

¹⁰ D. Volz, *Democratic Party Email Leak Points to Russia: Cyber Experts, U.S. Officials*, <<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-russia-fbi-idUSKCN1051TD>> (25.05.2018).

¹¹ House Intelligence Committee Majority, *January 20th, 2018 Memo to House Intelligence Committee Minority: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Abuses at the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation*.

¹² R. Mueller, *October 5th, 2017 Statement of Offense of George Papadopoulos*, pp. 4-5.

¹³ House Intelligence Committee, *Testimony, and Questioning of James Comey March 20th, 2017*.

¹⁴ D. Trump, *May 9th, 2017 Letter Dismissing Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation James Comey*.

¹⁵ House Intelligence Committee, *Russia Investigation Parameters Announced in March 2017*.

¹⁶ US Intelligence Community, *January 6th, 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections*, p. ii.

Russia had attempted to influence elections in Europe and the US, but that collusion between the Trump Campaign and the Russian state did not occur¹⁷. Recommendations included the development of better bulwarks in the US and Europe against potential Russian electoral interference and a call for the European States to lessen economic dependence on Russia¹⁸. The closing of the investigation was criticised by the committee's Democrat minority, who unsuccessfully tried to extend it by proposing motions that, amongst other things, called for subpoenas to be issued to, among others, Trump's son and son-in-law, Attorney General Jeff Sessions and the Trump Campaign organisation¹⁹.

The Senate Intelligence Committee investigation also started in January 2017, meanwhile, is ongoing²⁰. It was launched with the aim of reviewing "the intelligence that informed" the January 6th, 2017 US Intelligence Community assessment of Russian activities related to US elections, as well as broader concerns of the Intelligence Community "related to Russia and the 2016' election"²¹. A month after he was dismissed, Comey claimed before the committee that Trump had told him in January 2017 that 'I need loyalty, I expect loyalty" and that in February 2017, referring to the FBI's investigation of Trump's former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn, Trump urged Comey to "let this go" because Flynn "is a good guy". Comey also stated that in March 2017 Trump had denied any links with Russia and asked Comey to publicly confirm that the FBI was not investigating Trump personally²². Thus far, this investigation has avoided the partisan disagreements of its House equivalent.

The fourth, and potentially most consequential, investigation began on May 17th, 2017 when Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed Mueller, a former FBI Director, as a Special Prosecutor²³. Mueller was directed

¹⁷ House Intelligence Committee Majority, *March 22nd, 2018 Report on Russian Active Measures Findings and Recommendations*, pp. 1, 3-4.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

¹⁹ A. Schiff, *March 22nd, 2018 Schiff Statement After Committee Republicans Voted to Release Partisan Report*.

²⁰ Senate Intelligence Committee, *January 13th, 2017 Joint Statement on Committee Inquiry into Russian Intelligence Activities*.

²¹ Senate Intelligence Committee, *March 30th, 2017 Hearing Entitled 'Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns*.

²² J. Comey, *June 8th, 2017 Statement for the Record Delivered to the Senate Intelligence Committee*.

²³ J. Ainsley, *Former FBI Chief Mueller Appointed to Probe Trump-Russia Ties*, <<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump/former-fbi-chief-mueller-appointed-to-probe-trump-russia-ties-idUSKCN18D1XT>> (17.05.2018).

Rosenstein had the authority to appoint Mueller because Sessions had previously refused himself from considering matters pertaining to Russia because he failed to disclose contacts with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak while acting on behalf of the Trump campaign.

to “ensure a full and thorough investigation of the Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election”, was “authorized to conduct” the investigation Comey had confirmed in March 2017 and given latitude “to prosecute federal crimes arising from the investigation of these matters”²⁴. Thus far, Mueller’s investigation appears to have coalesced around three interconnected strands:

1. The extent and significance of contacts, and potential coordination, between members of the Trump campaign and administration and representatives of, or at least those claiming or thought to be representatives of, the Russian state;
2. The evasion of tax and the failure to register work for foreign governments and political parties, mainly in Ukraine, by those linked to the Trump Campaign;
3. Attempts by individuals and organisations with links to the Russian state to disrupt the US elections of 2016.

Thus far, the first strand has seen Papadopoulos, a foreign policy advisor to the Trump campaign, plead guilty to lying to the FBI in January 2017 regarding contact with a Russian academic thought to have connections to “Russian government officials” believed to have “dirt” on Clinton²⁵. Similarly, Flynn pled guilty to lying to the FBI in January 2017 about his discussions with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak whilst Trump was President-Elect²⁶.

On the second strand, in October 2017 Mueller claimed in an indictment that Paul Manafort, one of Trump's campaign managers, and Richard Gates, a campaign aid, had acted as “unregistered agents of the government of Ukraine” and two Ukrainian political parties, had raised millions of dollars for Ukrainian entities, had laundered these funds through “scores” of “corporations, partnerships and bank accounts” and drew on them personally without paying tax required in the US²⁷. In February 2018, Gates pled guilty to aiding Manafort in tax evasion, misleading accountants and deliberately misclassifying payments as loans²⁸. Manafort, meanwhile, is due to stand trial on charges related to “bank fraud, tax evasion” and foreign bank accounts in Virginia in July 2018 and for “making false statements about his foreign lobbying work” and “engaging in a money laundering conspiracy” in a federal trial in

L. Gambino, S. Ackerman, *Jeff Sessions Recuses Himself from Russia Inquiry Amid Calls for Resignation*, <<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/02/jeff-sessions-calls-for-resignation-claims-lies-russia>> (17.05.2018).

²⁴ R. Rosenstein, *May 17th, 2017 Order Appointing Robert Mueller as Special Prosecutor*.

²⁵ R. Mueller, *October 5th, 2017 Statement*, pp. 2, 6-7.

²⁶ Idem, *November 30th, 2017 Statement of Offense of Michael Flynn*.

²⁷ Idem, *October 27th, 2017 Indictment of Paul Manafort and Richard Gates*, pp. 1-3.

²⁸ Idem, *February 23rd, 2018 Statement of Offense of Richard Gates*, pp. 1-3.

September 2018 in Washington D.C.²⁹ On a related note, on February 14th, 2018, Alex van der Zwaan, a Dutch attorney, pled guilty to lying to Mueller about his contacts with Richard Gates and about his role in the dissemination of a report about a Ukrainian trial of Yulia Tymoshenko, a Ukrainian politician “generally regarded as pro-western”³⁰.

On the final strand, on February 12th, Richard Pinedo pled guilty to running a company that “offered [...] services designed to circumvent” the security of “online digital payment companies” that were allegedly exploited by Russian individuals and companies attempting to disrupt the 2016 US election³¹. Four days later, Mueller filed an indictment against 13 Russian individuals who worked for a company named Internet Research Agency LLC. According to the indictment, these individuals engaged in a conspiracy with the aim of interfering with US “political and electoral processes”³².

Beyond these four investigations, there are also a broader set of investigations, legal cases, and sanctions that often overlap in focus. The Senate Judiciary Committee has, for example, pursued evidence related to a meeting involving Trump's son and son-in-law, Manafort and three Russians, including a lawyer named Natalia Veselnitskaya who was thought to have material damaging to Clinton, with particular zeal³³. Whilst the Democratic Party lodged a lawsuit in April 2018 based on the claim that the Trump Campaign was “a willing and active partner” of the Russian state during the 2016 US election³⁴.

²⁹ J. Gerstein, *Federal Judge Rejects Manafort's Bid to Dismiss Mueller Indictment*, <<https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/15/manafort-mueller-indictment-590215>> (25.05.2018); Idem, *Manafort Virginia Trial Delayed Two Weeks*, <<https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/25/paul-manafort-trial-schedule-609041>> (29.05.2018); C. Kelly, K. Polantz, *Manafort Trial Set to Begin July 10*, <<https://edition.cnn.com/2018/03/08/politics/manafort-trial/index.html>> (25.05.2018).

³⁰ M. Crowley, D. Stern, K. Vogel, *Trump tells Ukrainian Politician he Won't lift Russia Sanctions*, <<https://www.politico.eu/article/trump-tells-ukraine-politician-he-wont-lift-russia-sanctions/>> (20.05.2018); R. Mueller, *February 14th, 2018 Statement of Offense of Alex van der Zwaan*.

Interestingly, Taras Kuzio has argued that the image of Tymoshenko as inherently pro-western in her outlook and actions is overplayed, highlighting a persistent failure to stick to verifiable facts and her fostering of animosity towards foreign investment in the Ukrainian economy, regardless of its origin, as evidence. See for instance:

T. Kuzio, *Yulia Tymoshenko's Policies Sit Uneasily with Her Image as a Pro-European Politician*, <<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/05/04/yulia-tymoshenkos-policies-sit-uneasily-with-her-image-as-a-pro-european-politician/>> (30.05.2018).

³¹ R. Mueller, *February 2nd, 2018 Statement of Offense of Richard Pinedo*.

³² Idem, *February 16th, 2018 Indictment of Internet Research Agency LLC and Named Individuals*.

³³ Senate Judiciary Committee, *Materials from Inquiry into Circumstances Surrounding Trump Tower Meeting*, <<https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/releases/materials-from-inquiry-into-circumstances-surrounding-trump-tower-meeting>> (12.05.2018).

³⁴ Democratic Party, *April 20th, 2018 Complaint Filed Against the Russian State, Donald Trump and Others*, p. 5.

On a related note, there is a raft of US sanctions against Russia, some of which are coordinated with the European Union (EU) and others, that relate to events in Ukraine from 2014 onward and the 2016 US election. The most recent raft of US sanctions was imposed in April 2018, whereas a new round of related sanctions have also arisen from the poisoning of Sergey and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury, England, in March 2018, which the British government blames on Russia³⁵. With the breadth, depth and dynamic nature of these investigations, legal cases and sanctions in mind, we will now consider how they, as well as actions of the wider Trump administration, might impact Europe.

Effects on Europe

The Mueller investigation has been widely reported in Europe, acting as a proxy for the conflict between the US establishment – one that supports a multilateral rules-based order anchored in a strong transatlantic relationship – and the forces of populism encapsulated by Donald Trump, disinterested or even openly hostile to these principles³⁶. In essence, the Mueller investigation exacerbates a dynamic between the United States and Europe, that is to say since Trump became President, European leaders have sought to stay as close as possible to the US state broadly defined, whilst simultaneously widening their policy options. The Mueller probe has uncovered the behaviour of a number of individuals, now or at one time close to the levers of power in the Trump White House, who have shown a disregard for the long-standing transatlantic relationship. Similarly, Donald Trump himself has disdained most of his predecessor's foreign policy, including elements forged through negotiation with the EU. Trump, representing as he does the encapsulation of a particular form of populism, threatens the institutional and normative foundations that European leaders have long taken for granted.

European elites, for the most part, have looked on in horror as Trump has torn up the agreements painstakingly crafted by his predecessor, President Barack Obama. These most notably include the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the Iranian nuclear deal. Nevertheless, EU leaders have responded to Trump - and the sentiments of their own citizens to him - in differing ways. President Emmanuel Macron has most clearly sought to engage with Trump. The French leader's visit to Washington in April 2018, in an attempt to prevent the President torpedoing the Iranian agreement, involved the bizarre spectacle of the pair apparently on good terms, while Macron advocated an anti-

³⁵ B. Smith, *April 2018 House of Commons Library Briefing Paper: Sanctions against Russia-In Brief*; US Treasury Department, OFAC FAQs: Other Sanctions Programs: Ukraine-/Russia-related Sanctions, <https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_other.aspx#567> (30.05.2018).

³⁶ B. Bruno, *Trump is Wrong over Iran, but Europe Can't Afford to Divorce the US*, <<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/16/europe-cant-afford-full-divorce-iran-nuclear-deal-trump-europe-antagonism>> (20.05.2018).

Trumpian liberal world order in Congress³⁷. With Trump, for his part, seemingly completely disregarding his fellow President's council³⁸. Macron, although careful not to directly criticise the President, seamlessly ploughed on with his vision of globalization that, accurately or not, promises to benefit all within a "fair system"³⁹.

Theresa May has pursued a similar, if less successful, strategy. An early visit to the White House in 2017, including the offer of a state visit to Britain, met with hostility from the British public⁴⁰. Embroiled by the Brexit process and weakened by the 2017 General Election result, and despite the fact that Trump currently plans to visit the UK in July 2018, May has since kept her distance from Trump, with public animosity, likely feeding into UK policy. Something demonstrated by the fact that Trump will come only for a one day "working visit" rather than the full-state visit originally offered and the mass-protests planned to coincide with his presence⁴¹. On a broader European level, the EU was initially, through the likes of President of the European Council Donald Tusk, relatively emollient towards Trump. This has gradually hardened, however⁴². Recently, for example, Tusk labelled the Trump administration "capricious", thus deliberately shining a light on its inconsistencies⁴³.

Berlin has, perhaps, demonstrated the most restrained attitude towards the Trump administration out of the large EU states. Chancellor Angela Merkel's meetings with the President have been cautious and she has issued carefully calibrated statements on EU-American policy. Perhaps most visibly, Merkel said in a 2017 speech that Germany could no longer "completely rely" on its

³⁷ E. Macron, *April 26th, 2018 Speech to US Congress*.

³⁸ M. Landler, *Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned*, <<https://www.npr.org/2017/10/13/557622096/transcript-trump-s-remarks-on-iran-nuclear-deal>> (28.05.2018).

³⁹ World Economic Forum, *President Macron Unveils Bold, Inclusive Agenda for Globalization*, <<https://www.weforum.org/press/2018/01/president-macron-unveils-bold-inclusive-agenda-for-globalization/>> (28.05.2018).

⁴⁰ L. Hughes, G. Parker, E. White, *Labour scared Trump into scrapping UK visit, says Johnson*, <<https://www.ft.com/content/e9769786-f78c-11e7-88f7-5465a6ce1a00>> (20.05.2018).

⁴¹ J. Elgot, *Donald Trump to Meet Queen on UK Visit in July*, <<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/apr/26/donald-trump-to-visit-uk-on-friday-13-july>> (28.05.2018); J. Watts, *Donald Trump UK Visit Set for July as Mass Protests Planned*, <<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/donald-trump-uk-visit-date-us-july-protests-a8322596.html>> (28.05.2018).

⁴² M. Birnbaum, G. Witte, *As Tensions with Trump Deepen, Europe Wonders if America is Lost for Good*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/as-tensions-with-trump-deepen-europe-wonders-if-america-is-lost-for-good/2018/05/18/6f90c56e-587f-11e8-9889-07bcc1327f4b_story.html?utm_term=.716a394bfa97> (21.05.2018).

⁴³ D. Boffey, *"Capricious": Donald Tusk Condemns Trump Administration*, <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/16/donald-tusk-condemns-donald-trump-transatlantic-trade-war>> (21.05.2018).

allies Britain and the United States⁴⁴. A sentiment subsequently repeated by the Chancellor⁴⁵. Germany, seemingly desperate to uphold both its vital interests and the rule-based system that has helped it prosper economically, has seen its most important relationships sour, with Russia over Crimea and Donbas, with Turkey over President Erdogan's growing authoritarianism, with Britain over its exit from the EU and now with the United States⁴⁶. The 2018 German government's coalition agreement revealed the grains of a new transatlantic strategy⁴⁷. Without mentioning Trump, or the executive, the agreement outlined an approach of increased engagement with other centres of American power – at state level, with the security services and the Congress – and put Canada on a par with the US⁴⁸. As the Mueller investigation reveals how Trump and his inner circle hold the current international order in contempt, Germany has apparently sought to maintain a transatlantic relationship by, at least partially, circumventing the White House. The agreement also put forward a view on US trade policy: “protectionism is not the right way”⁴⁹.

Although the German government has led the sanctions policy against Russia, it also has vital interests at play with its giant neighbour. A proposed gas pipeline, Nord Stream 2, has been one area where Germany has continued to work with Russia⁵⁰. Moreover, after President Trump announced he was pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018, Angela Merkel, as well as her Foreign Minister Heiko Maas, was quick to travel to Moscow to consult Vladimir Putin and Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister⁵¹. As such, the

⁴⁴ J. Henley, *Angela Merkel: EU Cannot Completely Rely on US and Britain Any More*, <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/28/merkel-says-eu-cannot-completely-re-ly-on-us-and-britain-any-more-g7-talks>> (23.05.2018).

⁴⁵ A. Delfs, G. Viscusi, *Merkel Says Europe Can't Count on U.S. Military Umbrella Anymore*, <<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-10/merkel-says-europe-cant-count-on-u-s-military-umbrella-anymore>> (23.05.2018).

⁴⁶ Deutsche Welle, *Germany and Turkey in 2017: A Rollercoaster Relationship*, <<http://www.dw.com/en/germany-and-turkey-in-2017-a-rollercoaster-relationship/a-41897041>> (24.05.2018); C. Schreck, *Tensions Between Russia And West Simmer In Munich*, <<https://www.rferl.org/a/gabriel-ukraine-peacekeepers-could-lead-easing-russia-sanctions/29045157.html>> (24.05.2018)

⁴⁷ CDU, CSU und SPD, *Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa. Eine neue Dynamik für Deutschland. Ein neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land: Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD*. [CDU, CSU and SPD, *A new start for Europe. A new dynamic for Germany. A new solidarity for our country: Coalition agreement between the CDU, CSU and SPD*], p. 147.

⁴⁸ A. Rettman, *The EU and US in the age of Trump*, <<https://euobserver.com/europe-in-review/139870>> (26.05.2018).

⁴⁹ CDU, CSU und SPD, *Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa...*, p. 147.

⁵⁰ A. Rettman, *Germany starts to build Nord Stream 2*, <<https://euobserver.com/foreign/141756>> (25.05.2018).

⁵¹ Deutsche Welle, *Germany's Angela Merkel meets Russia's Vladimir Putin*, <<http://www.dw.com/en/germanys-angela-merkel-meets-russias-vladimir-putin/a-43838039>> (25.05.2018).

instability encapsulated by the withdrawal from the Iran deal, something reflected in the on-off summit between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, as well as the details revealed by the Mueller investigation may have had the perverse result of pushing some EU countries closer to Russia in a search for stability⁵². Seemingly, events in the United States are leading EU leaders to seek “like-minded coalitions” on the range of issues on which Trump has declined responsibility or is seeking to challenge existing norms⁵³.

Ultimately though, perhaps the most acute problem that Trump – and the Mueller investigation – poses for European countries is the rise of racially tinged populism⁵⁴. After much apparent relief when Macron was elected in May 2017, populists have taken power in Austria, have consolidated control in Hungary and, if they are able to overcome the structural pro-EU bias in the country, will also do so in Italy⁵⁵. Together, these populists explicitly seek to undermine key rules, at least in theory based on liberal political ideals, generally seen as sacrosanct by elites on both sides of the Atlantic. In short, one of the greatest challenges to the EU emanating from the US is one of emulation, with praise between Trump and European far-right leaders flowing both ways⁵⁶. Meanwhile, the EU’s response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the destabilising of Eastern Ukraine presents a key dividing line between

⁵² D. Trump, *May 24th, 2018 Letter to Kim Jong Un Withdrawing from Summit*.

⁵³ E. Geranmayeh, *Europe Should Strike a Tough Pose with Trump on the Iran Nuclear Deal*, <https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_europe_should_strike_a_tough_pose_with_trump_on_iran_nuclear> (25.05.2018).

⁵⁴ S. Fröhlich, *Germany Cannot Replace the US, But Europe Can Live with Trump*, <<https://transatlanticrelations.org/publication/germany-cannot-replace-us-europe-can-live-trump-stefan-frohlich/>> (25.05.2018).

⁵⁵ F. D’Emilio, *Italy’s Populists Angered as President Foils Their Bid to Form a Coalition Government*, <<http://time.com/5292873/italys-populist-coalition-president-veto/>> (28.05.2018); M. Eder, Z. Simon, *Orban Zeroes In on Soros-Backed NGOs After Dominating Ballot*, <<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-08/orban-dominates-hungarian-ballot-in-win-for-european-populists>> (25.05.2018); M. Eiermann, *The Austrian Election Showed Populists yet Another Path to Power*, <<https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2017/10/austrian-election-showed-populists-yet-another-path-power>> (28.05.2018); N. Slawson, *Austrian President Approves Far-Right Freedom Party Joining Coalition Government*, <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/16/austrian-president-approves-far-right-freedom-party-role-in-coalition-government>> (28.05.2018); I. Tharoor, *Italy’s Thwarted Populists May Have Their Revenge on Europe*, <https://investigaterussia.org/media/2018-05-29/mueller-team-detains-stone-contact-logan-airport?utm_source=Committee+to+Investigate+Russia&utm_campaign=c8987c36fcEMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_05_30_01_55&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_70adbf3447-c8987c36fc-49092213> (30.05.2018).

⁵⁶ B. Jacobs, *Donald Trump: Marine Le Pen is ‘Strongest Candidate’ in French Election*, <<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/apr/21/donald-trump-marine-le-pen-french-presidential-election>> (20.05.2018); Sky News, *Marine Le Pen Praises Donald Trump: ‘I Only have Reason to Rejoice’*, <<https://news.sky.com/story/marine-le-pen-praises-donald-trump-i-only-have-reason-to-rejoice-10779502>> (20.05.2018).

many European establishment and populist parties⁵⁷. Along similar lines, and circling back to where we began, one of the key outcomes of the Mueller investigation thus far appears to be that Manafort and Gates, at one point key members of the Trump campaign, had previously played a part in promoting Ukrainian political parties that deliberately exploited the east-west split in the Ukrainian body-politic for short-term electoral gain (a classic populist strategy reflected in the divisive narrative of Trump), while conveniently enriching themselves in the process⁵⁸.

Conclusion

The EU and the broader European elite is clearly seeking to wait out the Trump Presidency in the hope that no serious damage is inflicted in the intervening four, or even eight, years. Some analysts believe the implications, however, could be permanent as the old system frays and the US re-orientate its foreign policy⁵⁹. Likewise, Europeans are hardening their attitudes towards the United States. A recent opinion poll showed how German's attitudes on security had shifted from transatlanticism; they now overwhelmingly see their most important security partners as European, and on a wider range of issues specifically France⁶⁰. This fits a historical pattern when less amenable Presidents occupy the White House. European integration, for instance, accelerated in the 1970s when Richard Nixon was in office, and in particular after he closed the so-called “gold window”, jeopardising European monetary stability⁶¹.

As we have seen, Mueller, along with the broader investigative milieu he unofficially heads, has illustrated that those working for Trump have attempted to exploit connections they had with those believed to be close to the Russian state in order to aide his election and have lied to the FBI about their contacts

⁵⁷ L. Pasha-Robinson, *Marine Le Pen Backs Vladimir Putin and Denies Invasion of Crimea*, <<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/marine-le-pen-front-national-russian-kremlin-putin-invasion-annexation-crimea-ukraine-2014-a7566196.html>> (24.05.2018).

⁵⁸ L. Harding, *Collusion: How Russia...* Loc. 1729-2110.

⁵⁹ M. Birnbaum, G. Witte, *As Tensions with Trump...*

For an interesting counterpoint to this, see the writing of Jake Sullivan, a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former Director of Policy Planning the the US State Department, who posits that the current international system is resilient enough to ‘endure’ the attempts of Trump, among others, to undermine it. Although, Sullivan does caveat this line of thought by arguing that, while a single Trump term is manageable, a second could be ‘cataclysmic’.

J. Sullivan, *The World After Trump: How the System Can Endure*, “Foreign Affairs” 2018, Vol. 97, No. 2. pp. 10-19.

⁶⁰ U. Franke, *German Public says ‘Jein’ to European Security*, <https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_german_public_says_jein_to_european_security> (24.05.2018).

⁶¹ L. Nichter, *Richard Nixon, and Europe: The Reshaping of the Postwar Atlantic World*, Cambridge, pp. 68, 155.

with Russian officials. Whereas it appears Trump himself has not been averse to attempting to interfere with investigations into these matters. Yet, as well as being felt domestically, the effects of these investigations, along with the broader actions of Trump and his administration, are being felt in Europe as well. With the EU, its constituent parts and the leaders of individual states attempting, with differing degrees of success, to chart a course through a world disrupted. In the medium term, much hangs on the results of the 2018 midterms with, one presumes, many European elites hoping for a democratic surge that, at the least, could blunt the instincts of the current White House occupant. Further in the future, whoever the next US president may be, Republican or Democrat, will be faced with a transatlantic alliance frayed by a deliberately provocative president and the shifting of other geopolitical fault-lines that, as of Trump's election, can be said to have entered a new, particularly trying and perhaps more transactional, phase.

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THE ROOTS OF TRUMP’S FOREIGN POLICY: OFFENSIVE REALISM OR EYE WASHING TWILIGHT?

Abstract:

Beyond his low popularity and lack of experience in governance, Donald Trump is already one of the most “out of type” presidents of the American history. Despite the fact that he just spent almost one and a half year on the presidency, his domestic and foreign policy approaches dominate the agenda of international public opinion. In particular, his discourses on American foreign policy’s approach towards the international system offer great aggression. In other words, on the basis of discursive, Trump’s foreign policy approach accords with the classic approach of American foreign policy which is mostly based on offensive realism. On the other hand, in the practice, Trump faces various internal and external difficulties to realize his foreign policy approach. Besides these difficulties, Trump’s practical foreign policy implementations dramatically decrease the prestigious of the States and harm the historical “American Exceptionalism” image. This paper aims to produce a comparative approach to Trump’s foreign policy between theory and in practice. According to the findings of this study, Trump considers the American foreign policy as an instrument to consolidate his domestic power and popularity. On the other hand, use of the American foreign policy as a “political card” does not appear as a rational option to maximize the power capacity of the United States.

Keywords:

Donald John Trump, American Foreign Policy, Offensive Realism

Introduction

Despite the fact that many people consider politics as a rational interaction between the political elites and citizens, sometimes politics do not meet the rational expectations of the national and international public opinions. In other

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words, in some cases “expect the unexpected” motto of Murphy Laws may be valid for political elections all around the world. In this context, unexpected results from political elections entail a quite basic but very critical question: *What will happen now?*

In 2016, the presidential election in the USA, which has named Donald John Trump the 45th President of USA perfectly matches with the aforementioned case. In spite of Hillary Clinton's high popularity and previous positions in governance, the majority of the American voters has elected Trump who could be considered as a “closed book” both for American and international politics. Despite the fact that the reasons behind the Trump’s victory worth to be examined carefully; this paper prefers to focus the Trump’s foreign policy approach. Needless to say that likewise the other country’s citizens, Americans also consider Trump’s domestic policy implementations as their (non)satisfactions’ primary indicator; on the other hand, definitely Trump’s foreign policy indicators will be the most decisive constituent of the international system and power politics.

Exactly at this point, another very important question emerges: *How Trump and the international political system counterpoised their each other?* According to this study, the short answer to this question is sceptical. Inasmuch, according to the point of view of an international system, Trump was a “businessman”, on the other hand, due to his financial capacity, Trump was considering himself as the “boss” of the international system. Quite a long time, this mutual obscurity dominated a very sensitive triangle: Trump himself, the traditions of US foreign policy and the international system. In the context of this equation, in fact, the international system and US foreign policy were used to themselves. Since the end of the I World War, US foreign policy can be considered as the great combination of idealism and realism. All the American presidents consider themselves as the global advocate of democratic and liberal values which constructs the soul of idealism. On the other hand, rationality and power maximization in the frame of offensive realism rise to the occasion of American foreign policy in its every single implementation. In the meantime, the international system is mostly shaped by the position of US foreign policy. In other words, relations between the US foreign policy and the international system are based on a relative prediction. On the other hand, Trump’s discourses² distressed both the traditions of US foreign policy and international system based on this question: *Are we experiencing an epoch-making figure in the sense of obscurity?* The following chapter of this paper shall focus on the main arguments of offensive realism and its samples on US foreign policy. Afterward, Trump's foreign policy will be tested on this theory and finally, an explanatory overall evolution will be produced.

² In this study, the author prefers to make a clear distinction between Trump’s discourses and his implementations.

The Footprints of Offensive Realism on US Foreign Policy

John J. Mearsheimer's reinterpretation of classic realism constructs the main arguments of offensive realism in his famous book *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. In this context, Mearsheimer asks a basic question for his theory: *Why states have considerable reason to think and sometimes act aggressively?*³ According to his answers, the following responses emerge respectively:

- Despite the fact that the nature of the international system is chaotic this situation should not be confused with a pure conflict. This chaos stems from the lack of international governance over national governances;
- Militarization should be counted as a primary object which creates the security dilemma and risks for states to be hurt;
- States are sceptical about their each other and can't estimate their behaviours;
- Survival is the primary objective of states and in this context, states have a tendency to maximize their movement area;
- States are rational actors and they are aware of the international dynamics. Finally, states think strategic⁴.

By a spell backward of Mearsheimer's assumptions, it can be argued that if states don't think strategic and rational, they miss the international conjuncture, they might use their military potential wrongly, they minimize their movement area and finally, they can't survive. In the final analyses, for states, Mearsheimer's theory's ultimate goal is the power maximization. On the other hand, naturally, there are many strong criticisms of Mearsheimer's theory. For instance, Peter Toft argues that Mearsheimer is blind to other decisive instruments of foreign policy such as economic warfare⁵, identity, soft power, population, type of the government or in short, other non-military means. In fact, the majority of criticisms against Mearsheimer focus on the fact that Mearsheimer locates his theory into a pure militarized and security-obsessed perspective. On the other hand, this approach shouldn't be considered surprising because Mearsheimer is a "Cold War-oriented academician". In the second place, it is possible to give meaning to International Relations (IR) by using the non-military means but it is impossible to describe the nature of IR without using the militarism. In the same time, it shouldn't be expected from Mearsheimer to contradict with the major arguments of classic realism, because Mearsheimer only adds the *why* question to the main arguments of classic realism. Consequently, despite the fact that solutions to Mearsheimer's quintet findings might seem like the major arguments of idealism; in fact, according to

³ J. J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York 2001, pp. 29.

⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 29-31.

⁵ P. Toft, *John J. Mearsheimer: An Offensive Realist Between Geopolitics and Power*, "Journal of International Relations and Development" 2005, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 384.

many scholars, the accuracy and popularity of classic realism constructs the existence reason of other IR theories⁶. In other words, when classic/offensive realism is taken from the IR literature, the rest of the IR theories fail to claim their arguments. As it is argued in the very beginning of this paper, US foreign policy should be considered as the combination of idealism and classic/offensive realism, in the following part of this study, Mearsheimer's standpoints will be analyzed on different turning points of US foreign policy in a quick look.

During the preparation period of the Great War, according to many scholars, "the lack of governance over the governances" was one of the most important decisive factors of the war. In this context, shortly after the I World War, the IR academy was largely in the favour of idealism⁷. On the other hand, not only the IR scholars but also the US foreign policymakers were in the favour of this trend. In this context, Woodrow Wilson who is considered as one of the most important prime movers of idealism laid the foundation stone of the League of Nations in 1918. In the same way, after the II World War, despite the strong tendency to realism, in 1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt was trying the same attempt due to the failure of the League of Nations by becoming the initiator of the United Nations. Needless to mention that the "international governance" issue was not the "magical solution recipe" of the states' aggressive nature. According to Mearsheimer, security dilemma due to intense militarization tendency of states should be considered as another major factor.

According to Todor Mirkovic, during the Cold War era due to the technological race between the polar leaders, the international system entered into a very sophisticated militarization⁸. In fact, militarization was not an unfamiliar development for the international system; but the profile of the weapons was quite threatening for the states. In this context, it might be argued that during the Cold War era, the rationality of the states was suppressed by a security paranoia. On the other hand, despite this intense nuclear militarization, polar leaders didn't leave the rationality completely. In this respect, SALT 1-2 Treaties (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) were signed between Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev in 1972 and finally, SALT 2 is signed between Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev in 1979. Certainly, these two treaties were the glory of rationality and major steps in favour of mutual understanding between the polar leaders for establishing a more nuclear weapon free world⁹. On the other hand, despite these rare positive developments regarding the limitation of

⁶ E. Özlük, *Gelenekselcilik-Davranışsalılık Tartışmasını Bağlamında Anlamak*, "Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi" 2009, Vol. 64, No. 3, pp. 199.

⁷ A. Bennett, G. J. Ikenberry, *The Review's Evolving Relevance for U.S. Foreign Policy 1906-2006*, "American Political Science Review" 2006, Vol. 100, No. 4, pp. 654.

⁸ T. Mirkovic, *The World's Globalization, and Global Militarization*, "Vojno Delo" 2015, Vol. 6, pp. 7.

⁹ S. Kavuncu, *Nükleer Silahsızlanma Yolunda Start Süreci*, "Bilge Strateji" 2013, Vol. 5, No. 8, pp. 120.

strategic arms still, states' strong tendency to scepticism is one of the most important chronic problems of IR. Without any doubt, even today there is no solution recipe is "invented" for this problem, but it is possible to argue that an advanced dialogue platform between the states might decrease the paranoiac attitude of states to their each other.

In this context, October 1962 was not only the most critical year of the Cold War era but also it was a turning point for the recent world history. A careless "Russian roulette" between John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev was almost transforming the Cold War into a very "hot war". Needless to mention that Cuban Missile Crisis is very much worthing to be analyzed in the sense of decision-making process in IR or for practicing the game theories, but one of the most important consequents of Cuban Missile Crisis is the establishment of "hotline" which allowed the direct communication between the US and Soviet leaders¹⁰. Tough, Cuban Missile Crisis is mostly analyzed in the frame of Soviets' defeat after a "chicken game"; in fact, the crises should also be considered as a *win-win policy* as a result of rationality's glory especially when the potential result of a global nuclear war is counted. Since the finalization of Cuban Missile Crisis is considered as the start of *detente period* in IR, synchronously it can be argued that scepticism between the polar leaders had started to gradually decrease.

Hitherto all these mentioned developments on US foreign policy refer to particular cases which are dominated by the rationalism. On the other hand, there are extremely few cases in American history which forced the USA to deal with survival concerns. In the first place, the American Civil War (1861-1865) might be considered as a matter of life and death for the USA. In the recent times, definitely, 9/11 attacks took a similar effect for the American nation. Despite of the fact that as an independent case, the effects of 9/11 attacks might relatively differ from nation to nation; but without any doubt for the USA it was a totally unexpected development especially when it is taken into account that besides the American Civil War, 9/11 was the only case that the USA exposed to physical attacks within his own territory. In this context, the effects of these unexpected attacks immediately showed themselves on US foreign policy under the name of *Bush Doctrine* or *Preemptive War Doctrine*. George W. Bush's "the best defence is the offense" motto was anticipating military aggression not only to target states but also to non-state actors¹¹ even for reasonable doubt. Thus, after the Cold War era for the first time, USA has embarked on such a wide range of military attempts starting from Iraq and Afghanistan. By the Iraq and Afghanistan operations, US foreign policy was proving that despite involving to the principles of so-called idealism, when needed, US foreign policy never avoids from using the hard power.

¹⁰ J. Swift, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, "History Review" 2007, Vol. 57, pp. 10.

¹¹ S. Clavier, *Contrasting Perspectives and Preemptive Strike: The United States, France The War on Terror*, "Maine Law Review" 2006, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 572.

To sum up, in the light of this information the following conclusions might be counted regarding the traditional roots of US foreign policy:

- Rationality constructs the primary principle of US foreign policy;
- Time to time, in spite of transforming into an idealist perspective, always US foreign policy deals with the main arguments of offensive realism;
- Bluffing is not a primary tool for US foreign policy;
- One of the most visible mottoes of US foreign policy is “action speaks louder than words”;
- Finally, consistency is one of the most important features of US foreign policy.

A Consistent Foreign Policy on Inconsistency

Make American great again – the campaign slogan that was popularized by Trump. It is a general belief that similar to painting, music or chess, the usage of diplomacy is an art. The only matter is, in practice the use of diplomacy might offer a profile in parallel with “fine arts” or it might turn into “martial arts”. Certainly, populism and valour should be considered as the major enemies of well-functioning diplomacies. According to Walter Russel Mead, exclusively in the USA, suburban libertarians, rural fundamentalists, ambitious pundits, unconstructed racists, and finally conservative housewives should be considered as the main target group of populist and heroic discourses¹². Needless to mention that these classes were the key groups which provided Trump's election victory. On the other hand, in spite of not spending many decades on the presidency, the foreign policy approach of Trump gave important signals to the international system. The following table describes the major foreign policy strategies of Trump and these strategies will be tested in different fields of US foreign policy.

Tab. 1. Donald Trump policy strategy.

Aim	Strategy	Outcome
Tour De Force	Threatening	Resistance
Rallying	Retreat	Power Dissipation
Re-Gaining Strength	Reconciliation	Confusion

Source: own work.

After Trump coming to power, USA's relations with North Korea, Russia, and Iran; his approach to European allies and NATO; finally the nature of US

¹² W. R. Mead, *The Tea Party and American Foreign Policy: What Populism Means for Globalism*, “Foreign Affairs” 2011, Vol. 90, No. 2, pp. 29.

foreign policy towards the Syrian Crisis were the most anticipated questions in the sense of US foreign policy. In this context, the North Korea question has become one of the most important political engagements of Trump.

Despite the fact that in the first sight North Korea issue might seem as a non-privileged issue for the USA due to the country was a “half closed book” for the USA for more than a half century; however, Trump decided to practice his *tour de force* on North Korea. In this point, it should be mentioned that Pyongyang’s “huge interest” to nuclear weapons was not a new attempt both for the USA and the international system. After the escalation of tension between two parties, on 3rd January 2018, Trump’s threatening post on Twitter to Kim Jong-Un: “...*My nuclear button is much bigger and more powerful...*” called the Cuban Missile Crisis to international public opinion’s mind. The only difference was on the aforementioned date the international system was not experiencing a Cold War. In other words, the recent development between the USA and North Korea was not a natural growing crisis but it was a Trump oriented artificial crises. In order to support the artificiality of that case, two supportive developments shall be given. On 11th April 2018, Trump threatened Russia on Twitter by the following post: “*Russia vows the shoot down any and all missiles fired at Syria. Get ready Russia because they will be coming nice and new and “smart”*”. Kremlin’s reply to this post was: “*We do not participate in Twitter diplomacy and we support serious approaches*” which was quite harmful to the great image of American diplomacy. Consequently, on 12th June 2018 Trump had become the first American President meeting with a North Korean leader. In spite of this development is counted as a plus for Trump’s foreign policy still the international public opinion couldn’t find the proper answer this question: *What’s changed between the USA and North Korea in six months?* Inasmuch as, North Korea’s nuclear program is developing and North Korean citizens are still indoctrinating by anti-Americanism¹³.

Besides his provocative nuclear Twitter diplomacy, the Jerusalem declaration revolutionized the USA’s relations with different international actors. In the first week of December 2017, Trump recognized the Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. On the other hand, due to the rising protests in various countries and organizations, UN General Assembly refused the proposal of the USA. Surprisingly, many EU countries also opposed the Trump’s Jerusalem declaration. Because of this reason, EU has become the target of the USA. According to Antonio Missiroli, NATO is very necessary for European security, due to still EU couldn’t undertake its own army¹⁴. By knowing this fact during the G-7 Summit in Quebec, Trump called NATO “as bad as NAFTA.” In spite of his threats about quitting from NATO, the mutual

¹³ D. A. Pinkston, *North Korea’s Foreign Policy Towards the United States*, “Strategic Insights” 2006, Vol. 5, No. 7, pp. 4.

¹⁴ A. Missiroli, *EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP*, “Security Dialogue” 2002, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 9.

interests of both parties make Trump's discourses utopian. Likewise EU, Iran also has become the target of the USA due to his certain attitude towards the Jerusalem declaration. In the first week of May 2018, Trump cancelled the nuclear deal with Iran by leaving the "door open" which was signed by intense efforts. In the light of this information the great paradox is the following questions: "Can USA achieve his goals in Syria by himself? If not, how Trump's America will be a trustworthy actor in the eyes of these other great powers?"

Conclusion

State and power are two inseparable twins. Through the development of the IR discipline, all the theoretic approaches try to produce the relation between these two vital notions. Idealists claim the preventability of conflicts and wars while classic realists disagree to the death. Exactly in this point, the offensive realists emerge. Instead of maintaining the vicious cycle between these two theories, offensive realists achieve to give the meaning of IR by asking the why and how questions. Needles to mention, that Mearsheimer's theory turns into practice on US foreign policy in different cases of different US presidents. Inasmuch as the great power of the USA comes from the clearance of the state policy and government policy distinction which most of the failed states suffer from. Yet, during the first years of his presidency, Trump seems decisive to change the "rules" of US foreign policy by using his *sui generis* methods. In this respect, recently US foreign policy has been the "target board" of Trump's too much confidence and the traditions of US foreign policy. The negative matter is the fact that the most critical issues of the international system attract the long-lasting bluffs of Trump. The dominance and the determination of US foreign policy will determine the result of USA's "Russian roulette" with the man who treats everyone.

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TRUMP’S ADMINISTRATION TOUGH APPROACH: USA AT EDGE OF FOREIGN POLICY TRANSFORMATION

Abstract:

After inauguration of new President of the USA Donald Trump have been passed more than three months and some assumptions could be considered how the Administration completes its foreign policy and national security missions. Donald Trump has purported in his first days of his presidency to prepare new version of National Security Strategy. However due to incompleteness for key positions for foreign policy and national defence in the Administration – as President Donald Trump at his initial phase of his presidency in 2016-17, managed to drag on the positions of State Department and Defense Department his personalities – like Rex Tillerson and James Mattis as well as John Kelly as Homeland Security Chief. All these personalities have very decisive influence on formulating goals and missions of national security and foreign policy at global levels. The team is to be labelled “tough hawks” and the hawks have already demonstrated their claws and the Russian “hawks” in name of authoritarian authority of the Kremlin Administration in Moscow have been blundered in declamation pre-emptive delight for having elected Donald Trump against Hillary Clinton. At his first part of the presidency and as soon as he was elected as the president, D. Trump made no secret of his admiration for the military, and former and current brass feature prominently in his national security team: Mattis, and Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly, are both retired Marine generals, and Army Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster is his national security adviser. This was his first team after his fascinated election. Certainly the Kremlin has contributed it’s pare in forwarding anti-Democrat challenger’s to Presidential race and with usage of cyber-warfare capabilities almost has reached its mission. The Syrian tragic event – gas attack in Khan-Sheikhun where more than 78 children died and many injured and the genocide had been done by the Moscow supported Assad regime troops with the Russian jets participation indicated international criminality and cruelty, it was imagination

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that no any power could counter-weight the genocide. It was suspicious story that the chemical attack had been conducted by the Russian military contingent in Syria in order to crack down resistance of anti-Assad rebel forces in Idlib province next to Aleppo in order to reinforce its political-military presence in the Middle East. The Russians caused of feeling full and complete dominance at the regional level and with Iranian engagement were in mind to boost up their presence even beyond the regional scope, notable in Maghreb (in Libya and in Egypt).

Keywords:

Trump, foreign policy making, USA, hawks, National Security Strategy, NAFTA, Neocons, pivotal nations, selective engagement, global engagement

New 45th President of USA: New Challenger in White House

The election of 45th President of the USA Donald Trump, a national tycoon and inexperienced politician, dramatized the situation in the country. First time since Declaration of Independence in 1776 and since election of first President in the country, well-known tycoon or representative from oligarchy, business community person took over the position to the highest political level. The USA is very strong presidential type of governance, where the President has quite strong leverages in domestic and moreover in defence and foreign policy-making provisions. The characteristic points of political system in USA makes from one point this country vulnerable to challenges perceived in nearest future at any level of politics. Certainly Donald Trump was elected by the minority, but with 288 electoral votes enables him to increase his social prestigious. Trump has planned his pre-election campaign quite eligible action and he wittingly opted for middle class and local provincial state population whose economic and social background had been deteriorated drastically. Having faced with \$25 trillion foreign debt and envisaged more than 15 trillion domestic debt (it makes roughly 45% of the GDP rate), due to three massive economic crisis waves (2002, 2008 and 2012) when unemployment reached its most highest point and average income to ordinary American citizen barely made of \$2000 per month, makes the possibility of Trump's victory very high². 6 days before the elections, in one of the Georgian TV political show-program, I have predicted the elections outcome – Trump vs. Clinton and with concrete arguments forwarded explained why it could be happened. From Georgian local perspective, having no idea what and how the American economy is being ruled and governed, it could be difficult to predict the final stage of the elections. D. Trump has achieved victory two times – first when he defeated his

² V. Maisaia, *Donald Trump, 45th President of USA: Who is He?*, “The Georgian Times” No. 11, November 28, 2016, p. 11.

challengers at the Republican Party primary Congress elections and second time when defeated his Democratic Party challenger at national level. His unbelievable and bumper-sticker slogans as “America First”, detailed plan and his very locally oriented political preferences made his campaign very successful. His neo-liberal conceptual approaches and his neo-mercantilist orientation attract America’s population, especially those 30 million citizens who never came to voter poll stations before. Trump unlike rest of politician is a very well-known businessman and he knows the value of promised words and statements. It means that he is going to fulfil and realize what he had put forwarded and by doing so, his policy mostly foreign affairs and security could be contradictory with geopolitical realms of the contemporary world politics. During his pre-election campaign, D. Trump as challenger put emphasis on foreign political problems, which in that time concerned USA (for instance, war in Syria and in Iraq, Russia’s case with Vladimir Putin, Ukraine’s security dilemma, North Korea nuclear gambling, USA-EU strategic cooperation, etc.). He did not pay a great attention to global politics and security affairs in contrary to Hillary Clinton. His international program focus on few basic points: in economy on trade problems with China and Mexico; in security on demanding that allies like Japan and the EU member-states increased their defence budget, diminishing American defence burden on Trans-Atlantic solidarity with downsizing 20% of the national contribution to the NATO defence budget and promote the American business elite interests at international arena (with recalling American industrial mergers to back to the country and produce more goods and merchandizes, like automobiles – so-called “Detroit Crisis” resolution)³. However, Donald Trump as a charismatic leader will formulate its own version of foreign policy and will be very pragmatic in pursuing its on proper manner. Some of his already outlined concrete missions in short-run perspective, which his Administration might execute:

- to renegotiate trade pacts such as NAFTA with Mexico and Canada (and even threatening to leave the organization);
- to suspend future trade agreement in aegis of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) between the USA and 11 other Asia-Pacific countries;
- to renegotiate conditions for Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the EU. Certainly this step could lead toward so-called “Trade War”;
- to change relations with World Trade Organization (WTO) as new Administration would be seeking to pursue protectionist policy at international level;
- to foster trend for pulling out of the Paris climate agreement and abrogate Obama’s deal with China on that matters.

³ *Ibidem.*

- Maintain USA-China relations, which can be worsened due to many reasons, including geopolitical ones;
- to pursue multilateralism foreign policy and accept multipolar world order⁴.

These are only some elements of Donald Trump program, which he has declared officially and want to achieve. In that aspect whether he agrees to a Yalta-style order that would recognize a Russian sphere of influence in its “near abroad” is key question for Post-Soviet space nations, including Georgia.

Trump’s Administration Tough Approach: USA at the edge of Foreign Policy Transformation

After inauguration of new President of the USA some assumptions could be considered how the Administration completes its foreign policy and national security missions. D. Trump has purported in his first days of his presidency to prepare new version of National Security Strategy. However due to incompleteness on key positions in the Administration, the President managed to fill the positions of State Department and Defense Department with his personalities like Rex Tillerson and James Mattis as well as John Kelly as Homeland Security Chief, later all of them get retired due to some circumstances. All these personalities have a decisive role in process of formulating goals and missions of national security and foreign policy at global level⁵.

Trump Administration reaction to brutality which took place in Syria was tough enough with 59 sea-ballistic cruise missile attack on Shairat Air Force Base of the Syrian Armed Forces led by Bashir Assad. By doing so, Trump has reiterated of prevalence of the American supremacy over the Middle East regional security. Also underscored the unipolarity status of the USA in current world order. Russian incumbent authority lost its face whilst Korean crisis when the Trump Administration demonstrated its military power against North Korea last totalitarian Communist regime and the Kremlin sluggish reaction on the American Naval strike grouping from the US 3rd Fleet clearly demonstrated what Russia can do when real true power is against its geopolitical weak ambitions. Having gained support from the Communist China leadership for counter-strike to North Korean ambitions to grip with nuclear weapon holder positions and reiterated with renewed China-USA strategic partnership case from 70s in last century during the Cold War period, Russia has been sweeping

⁴ X. Wickett, *Trump’s Foreign Policy Is Looking Very Predictable*, Chatham House-The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2017, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/trump-s-foreign-policy-looking-very-predictable?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI86H__6Cz3AIV0IeyCh2oMAoiEAAYASAAEgK7c_D_BwE> (17.09.2018).

⁵ A. Bezrukov, O. Rebro, A. Sushentzov, *Donald Trump: Professionalny Profil Novogo Prezidenta SA*, Valдай, International Discussion Club: analytical report, January 2017, p. 3.

off the international political processes and only became outsider in the game. China is also trying demonstrate its approaches in its strategic zone of influence. Notable, Chinese air force land-attack, cruise-missile-capable bombers were put “on high alert” in 2016 as the US sees evidence that the Chinese military is preparing to respond to a potential situation in North Korea. According to CNN, it's estimated that some 85% of North Korea's economic trade is dependent on China. Given those close economic links, US military officials have said that Beijing is critical to solving the North Korean situation. The Trump Administration in Syria and in North Korea actually geopolitically humiliated the Putin's regime and has demonstrated coldness approaches in promoting national survival interests at any place of the globe. Indeed from one point of view position of the Trump Administration at initial stage in tackling foreign policy challenges and military vulnerabilities latently transformed in much more coercive reflection against Russia's bluff geopolitics in the Middle and Far East regions.

The USA current Administration has been rising its stances in Central Asia and is seeking to strengthen its position in Afghanistan. The US military lately dropped a GBU-43B on a tunnel complex used by ISIS in Afghanistan. The strike was the first time the US used its “mother of all bombs” in combat. The Afghan government estimated that the weapon killed more than 90 ISIS militants. No civilians died in the attack, it said. These very tough approaches in Afghanistan has precluded that USA remains strong positions whenever it reaches its possibilities. Trump Administration showed up its teeth even in Arabic peninsula - Yemen's deteriorating security situation has drawn increasing attention from the US military. Last month, US warplanes conducted 20 airstrikes against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, a terrorist group with designs on American and western targets. Late in January, a US special operations raid against the militants resulted in the death of Navy SEAL William “Ryan” Owens. Yemen's geostrategy is aiming at flattering Iranian's ambiguity missions and hegemonic goals in the whole Middle East area and demonstrated who is a real master of the game. It means that the Trump Administration changes its priorities but not principles in its foreign policy-making.

After election of new President of the USA, main key problem for the American policy-makers have become how to formulate current foreign policy. First few months after elections new Administration done nothing in case of formulating foreign policy agenda. Before coming to power, Donald Trump manipulated with controversial priorities in pushing ahead foreign policy, like saying at first that NATO is non-effective security organization and later that NATO is still crucial instrument for strengthening Euro-Atlantic security. By and large, since January 20, 2017 when he gave oath as the President, he outline key elements of his foreign policy priorities. Including few good starting points: making NATO and Europe the centrepiece of global relationships in Eurasia; strengthening relationships with Japan and South

Korea; replacing the defunct Trans-Pacific Partnership with a web of bilateral relationships; working to bring the Sunni Arab world and the Israelis closer together in creating a bulwark against Iran; improving our increasingly fraught relationship with Mexico and building ties with Colombia (an emerging powerhouse in Latin America); focusing on India as a potential long range partner and counterweight to China; and confronting Russian aggression with international pressure. In addition to that Trump Administration is forging and requesting intensively to NATO European allies to increase their defence expenses up to 2% of GDP and share responsibilities for military burden in further promoting Euro-Atlantic security. President Trump has also talked about combating terrorism issue. He introduced new idea how to confront terrorism and what concrete tools should be taken to minimize this global threat. The idea is associated with so-called “disengagement strategy”. The strategy envisages confronting terrorism primarily through non-military means⁶. Internally United States would focus on intelligence and law enforcement. Abroad, it would focus on sharing intelligence with other countries and securing diplomatic cooperation on counterterrorism. Disengagement might involve some limited development assistance to Middle Eastern countries, but US policy is focusing on fundamentally remake them. The logic of disengagement is simple: US military involvement in the Muslim world cannot fix the problem of terrorism; in fact, it exacerbates it by sowing anger at US involvement. Pulling back could therefore minimize the terrorist threat. At least, disengagement would remove a tempting target—the US military — from the terrorists’ backyard and reduce the blowback that occurs when US forces accidentally kill innocent people or act in other heavy-handed ways. It would also deprive extremists of crucial propaganda material: US “occupation” of the Holy Land. More optimistically, it might redirect the anger of Islamists militant away from the United States and toward their own repressive governments and prevent more moderates from radicalizing. Whatever terrorist threat remained, the argument runs, could best be handled by learning to live with occasional small attacks rather than by overreacting to them. Disengagement would mean, its proponents claim, that the United States would save billions of dollars annually by conducting fewer operations and marginally reducing the size of its military. Here is very evident case that the strategy has been already performing – on 24-25 February 2017 jointly Russian-American military forces launched strike to liberate Mosul from ISIS forces and this counter-terrorist operation indicates where the Trump Administration stands for. It is interesting to mention that at the beginning, national security advisor Lt. General H. R. McMaster directly indicated who real enemies of USA were. In one of his comments, he claimed that “geopolitics has returned, as hostile, revisionist powers – Russia, China, North Korea and Iran – annex territory, intimidate our allies, develop nuclear

⁶ *US National Security Strategy*, December 2017, pp.10-12.

weapons, and use proxies⁷”. He also undermined that in the post 11th September era, enemies include terrorists organizations, as well as states that leverage less overt tools, including propaganda, political subversion, and espionage, against America. These are real indications how Trump Administration sees its future perspectives dealing with national security challenges and promoting USA new geopolitical missions at global level. However he reserves his neo-Isolationist rhetoric and slogan: “American interests at first” and still pending on confronting with China for economic expansion to the American economy⁸.

However, the main vulnerable point remains stiff relations between Russia and USA. The recent processes in global politics have been slipped off the Georgian society sphere of interests and all interested daily news are only stuffed with peculiarities of local politics. That is why Georgia is being disappeared from so-called “international radar” or “area-denial” (AD in accord to NATO classification). However, around Georgia and nearby areas that are to be sought as vitally important from national security perspectives, notable in Black Sea geopolitical area is developing new type of geostrategic “tsunami”. Lately ultimately deterioration of relations between Russia and USA are really indicating how stalemate is international relations processes and how it could effect to Georgia’s foreign policy provisions. In accordance to international law perspective and definition: “War is a legal sense, when two or more states officially declare that a condition of hostilities exists between them”⁹. Certainly if one analyses the condition of two great powers at time being, one can easily determine that Russia and USA have already declared a condition with full of hostilities of geopolitical, geoeconomic and even at this stage, geostrategic origin. As for legal sense, the war is a clear indication and explanation of such relations between the Russia and USA. The war was declared as a legal sense what is paradox not in land, navy and even air space dimensions but in virtual, in space. Everything happened when the Kremlin decided to behave in aegis of pre-emptive strike strategy and ordered its cyber-warfare special destination units to attack the official sites and webpages of the USA governmental and political parties. In 2016 the President of Russian Federation Vladimir Putin authorized to newly endorse and create mega-special service – National Guard Service led by Putin’s personal body-guard Colonel-General Victor Zolotov, the most loyal personally to Putin, setting up special cyber-warfare Department to coordinate and execute information warfare against the Western community.

⁷ A. Lockie, *Trump’s new national security adviser is hawkish on Russia – a big reversal from Michel Flynn*, “Business Insider”, 2017, <<http://www.businessinsider.com/mcmaster-reversal-michael-flynn-national-security-council-russia-hawk-2017-2>> (17.09.2018).

⁸ J. Harney, J. Stearns, *Trump Faults China’s Economic Policy as Threat to US Security*, “Bloomberg”, June 20, 2018, <<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-20/trump-faults-china-s-economic-policy-as-threat-to-u-s-security>> (17.09.2018).

⁹ Ch. Greenwood, *The Concept of War in Modern International Law*, “The International and Comparative Law Quarterly” Vol. 36, No. 2 (April, 1987), pp. 283-306.

Hence, the Kremlin, by doing so, decided to create new type of the Armed Forces – Cyberwarfare Army with direct subordination to Zolotov’s National Guard Service. It means that personally V. Putin will assume leadership and command on newly created Armed Forces formation. It seems so that the mission was reached its success as afterward American territories was targeted with highly sophisticated cyber-attacks from “unknown” and “strange” enemy. Nevertheless, as soon as it occurred the official USA governmental special services – CIA, NSA and Cyberwarfare Strategic Command blamed the Russian for this conduit.

Donald Trump between option being Good “Cowboy” or Magic “Enigma”: Neo-Isolationism vs. Global Engagement

It is suffice to say that the elections results were done by the political minority – Electoral College which is keen Constitutional principle guarantee – protection of minority rights. Hence, D. Trump is sought to be minority protection guarantee and it’s elected President. Nevertheless having more clarified in his domestic politics with priorities and his intentions making him more like as neoliberal¹⁰ whose representative first time won the elections, at the same time being very unclear what kind of foreign policy and national security he intends pursuing further on. Having encircled around himself as a team for national security and foreign policy planning and execution of so-called “Neocons” (Neo-conservative trend supporters¹¹). D. Trump’s foreign and national security policy implications are less radical and hawkish than someone could imagine. Therefore, in order to boost up his foreign, security and defence policies and set up new ones, he neatly changed his administration team and reinforced it with more “hawks”, like he has appointed ex-head of the US Diplomatic Mission at the UN, John Bolton as his National Security Advisor replaced McMaster. Regarding reinforcing his internal security conditions at the national level, mostly in conjunction with illegal migration

¹⁰ Like liberalize hard taxation burden for business community, mainly for low and middle business community representatives, change medical insurance and social protection policy, increase wealthy tax rate, keep for stimulation national industry – so-called “protectionalism” strategic line as well as promoting policy toward hard backing with illegal migration and endorsing an idea to expel more than 3 million immigrants came to the country without legal provisions

¹¹ Like Newt Gingrich, ex-Republican leader, former Defense Department inspector general Joe Schmitz, Alabama Sen. Jeff Sessions, energy consultant George Papadopoulos, as Vice-President he opted for Mike Pence, Indiana Governor, Michael Flynn, ex-Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, retired Lt. General (it means that at first time USA military intelligence service would be more influential and dominant rather than CIA).

challenge, he made interesting casting appointed Kirstjen Nielsen, leading expert on national security, as new Secretary of Homeland Security¹².

His presidential campaign was used to be more balanced and milder with intentions for supporting idea of modern type of Neo-Isolationism trend in future country's foreign policy. For instance, in his pre-election campaign Trump told Blitzer that "there has to be at least a change in philosophy and there also has to be a change in the cut up, the money, the spread" of NATO's budget. He added that he didn't want the US to decrease its role, but certainly decrease its spending in NATO, which marks its 67th anniversary in April 2016¹³. As it is known, the US is NATO's main contributor, providing about 22% of the organization's budget. Germany is second, contributing 14.5%, followed by France, which gives 11% of the budget, and then the UK at 10.5%¹⁴. All members agree to spend at least 2% of GDP on their defence budget, but some don't meet that threshold¹⁵.

Hence, his delicate stance on NATO future perspectives really presuppose of such foreign policy inclination provision. In addition to that was interesting to whom elected President Trump called and debated moreover international political and geopolitical affairs – among first two selected "priority" figures were Prime-minister of Great Britain – Theresa May and Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin. Who is to be next after these two leaders is still unknown. It is less probable that D. Trump and his new administration would pay less attention to its closest allies or so-called "pivotal nations" where Georgia is being considered (backed on strategic partnership charter signed up by Georgian and American high-level diplomats in January 2009 in Tbilisi). The trend could be more increased as he as a Presidential challenger promised Israel, but Trump's approach is very pragmatic and well sorted out in retrospect of new foreign policy direction – Multilateralism. By the way, pivots are the states that have valuable political, economic, military cost for Great Actors. They are located in the in the centre of the places that equally attract grate power's interest¹⁶. They connect strategic plans and goals of the great powers. However, let's see and wait whether the scenario is to be real and false.

¹² J. Blitzer, *Why Trump Is So Angry At His Homeland Security Adviser*, "New Yorker", May 17, 2018, <<https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-trump-is-so-angry-at-his-homeland-security-secretary>> (17.09.2018).

¹³ J. Diamond, N. Gaouette, *Donald Trump unveils foreign policy advisers*, "CNN politics", <<https://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/21/politics/donald-trump-foreign-policy-team/index.html>> (17.08.2018).

¹⁴ P. Shelter-Jones, *Does Europe contribute enough to NATO? The truth about defence spending*, "World Economic Forum", <<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/03/nato-defence-spending-europe-america/>> (15.09.2018).


¹⁵ *Trump: NATO states to increase defence funding*, "The Georgian Times", <http://geotimes.ge/index.php?m=5&news_id=57805&cat_id=17&lng=eng> (12.07.2018).

¹⁶ T. Sweijjs, *Why are Pivot States so Pivotal?*, the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), Hague, 2014.

Some Peculiar Aspects of the Foreign-Policy Making Provisions in the Trump Administration: Georgia's Case-Study

However, key issue of the Trump Administration foreign policy has been transformed into different manner as it was before. The so-called “state-centric realism” when the state, rather than any other international actor is regarded as the foreign policy-making unit¹⁷ completely changed into more flexible modality. In case of the “state-centric realism”, a foreign policy decision is reflected and predefined by the following actors as it is depicted in Figure 1.

Fig. 1. Foreign policy.



Source: own work

The above-mentioned scheme is applicable to realm of “extra” puzzles of foreign policy fluctuations, more generally, pattern in domestic structure. One version of this view is to argue that “open” or democratic societies tend to have one kind of foreign policy, while “closed” or authoritarian societies have a different kind of foreign policy¹⁸.


This provision stands with concrete democratic nation, but the global dimension also makes its input in reflecting foreign policy-making even in such nation as the USA. In this respect is interesting underscoring that some scholars imagines of declining of the American hegemony at global level. Respectively,

¹⁷ *New Dimensions in World Politics*, J.S. Nye, G.L. Goodwin, A. Linklater, [ed.], London, Croom Helm, 1975, p. 36.

¹⁸ M. Clarke, B. White, *Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach*, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, England, 1989, p. 88.

Richard Haas believes that the world has entered an era of so-called “non-polarity” or “apolarity” with globalization forcing an era of interdependence, particularly as America experiences chronic fiscal deficits and military overstretch¹⁹. In due process when the USA global domination is being declined and officially President Trump declared of withstanding from the Global Engagement policy of previous Administrations and only pretend on prevailing the America’s primary interests. Unfortunately, the Russian special services meddled in the American elections in 2016 has also contributed in changing preface and background of making foreign policy. It means that homogeneity or “state-centric realism” in the USA political system has been ruined and no any holistic state-centric institution can achieve the decision on that stance. Currently, due to the occasion the American foreign policy-making is varied in and among three actors competition groupings, like in Figure 2.

Fig. 2. Three actors in American foreign policy.



Source: own work

This is real configuration how the current American foreign policy making process is and how many “insider”-political lobbyist groups (having two “layer” approaches: executive and legislative branch group-members). Regarding the Georgian case, it is clear that the “Neocons” are ruling and directing the whole implications of foreign policy making toward the Georgia. Unfortunately the “Ultra-Nationalist” (with their slogan: “American is the first”) - Trump Administration has less interests and implications not only toward Georgia (President Trump’s extraordinary statement on unpreparedness

¹⁹ R. Haas, *The Age of Nonpolarity*, “Foreign Affairs”, vol. 87, no. 3, May/June 2008, pp.44-56.

of Georgia for the NATO membership partially confirmed the hypothesis)²⁰ but also toward the Caucasus-Caspian region in general²¹. “Neo-liberals” Democratic Party wing dissuaded its foreign policy interests since Obama Administration who had imposed on M. Saakashvili authoritarian regime informal sanctions (political and economic) in 2009-2012 period. The only “Neocons” have their leverages and tools to influence on Georgia’s politics via the USA Embassy in Tbilisi. A competition among three wings is directly influenced on nomination and appointment of new USA Ambassador in Tbilisi, yet has to be selected since the previous one – Jan Kelly left Georgia in February of 2018²². Moreover, just recently the rival competition and fierce battling among these groupings, mainly “Neocons” and “Ultra-Nationalists” forced the incumbent Georgian government refrained of sending high-level official delegation and neither the President George Margvelashvili, nor lately elected Prime-minister Mamuka Bakhtadze and even nor the Speaker of the Parliament Irakli Kobakhidze did not go to attend the funeral of passed away of one of the leaders of the “Neocons”, Senator John McCain. General saying, the one of the probable reasons of failure attending the funeral was not to confront with President Donald Trump and his team. The funeral process was attended by the Georgian Parliamentary delegation with two MPs²³, including Vice-Chairman Tamar Chugoshvili who is main lobbyist of the US interests in Georgia. This is a reason why the incumbent USA foreign policy is fluctuated at least at regional levels.

Conclusion

In summary, Trump Administration is seeking to figure out new outlines and drives in the national foreign policy decision making. Recently held NATO Brussels and USA-Russia Helsinki Summits have demonstrated why the policy-making is still plausible game and determines that whilst analyzing the American foreign policy is possible to use one approaches – psychobiography, events data, integrated explanations, leader assessment frameworks, etc.²⁴ The

²⁰ S. Guthrie, *Trump Says “No Right Now” to Georgia’s Aspirations*, “Georgia Today”, <<http://georgiatoday.ge/news/11325/Trump-Says-%E2%80%9CNot-Right-Now%E2%80%9D-to-Georgia%E2%80%99s-NATO-Aspirations>> (25.08.2018).

²¹ *US National Security Strategy*, December 2017: “The Strategy in A Regional Context”, pp.45-52

²² S. Zurabiani, *US Ambassador completes three-year mission in Georgia – Kelly urges ruling party to restraint*, “Rustavi-2 TV”, <<http://rustavi2.ge/en/news/97419>> (22.02.2018).

²³ *John McCain’s funeral will be attended the Georgian delegation*, “IMEDI” TV, <<https://imedinews.ge/ge/saqartvelo/75532/jon-makkeinis-dakrdzalas-qartuli-delegatsia-daestsreba>> (25.08.2018).

²⁴ V. Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations*, “Foreign Policy Analysis” 2005, <<https://edisciplinas.usp.br/>

personality, presumable Donald Trump is more affiliated with those challenges faced up with modern American geopolitics and realization of the national interests. However, his recent dialogue with Vladimir Putin in Helsinki and his quite cautious reference on his political activities at global political level indicates that Donald Trump is seeking to keep respect Russia's global hegemony geopolitical mission temptation and more inclined to have new provision of world order based on Multilateralism modality. However, Donald Trump as highest business community representatives is more independent and is inclined to keep his promises and words that make him different of being professional politician position and he would be opting for pursuing more pragmatic foreign policy missions and backed on principle of so-called "selective engagement" contradicting principle of so-called "global engagement"²⁵. The Georgian Case-Study mentioned above reflects, how different is foreign policy approaches toward the strategic partners. Donald Trump's "No" for the Georgian membership in NATO has demonstrated cardinal shifts toward more pragmatic stance in formulating the foreign policy missions and goals. Probable more alike he will introduce new version of Monroe Doctrine relevant to globalized world politics and will be pending to promote concept "cooperative security" with equal participation of other Great Powers. Hence, Trump Administration is still limbo and how it handles it foreign policy challenges is still puzzle.

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THE US SOUTH CAUCASIAN POLICY UNDER DONALD TRUMP

Abstract:

After providing a brief overview of the US policy in the South Caucasus from the beginning of the 90s of the 20th century as there have emerged three new countries in the region after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the article mainly focuses on relatively less active engagement from the side of the United States into the affairs of the South Caucasus since the presidency of Barack Obama maintained if not untypically deepened even more under Donald Trump currently as well. These trends are explained through the prism of the general standpoints of the latest American administrations promoting the idea of less or non-interference of the superpower in other countries', regions' or continents' notably domestic matters. There are discussed major implications of such, i.e. the less active US foreign policy observed among others, also in the South Caucasus lately, although in the case of this region clearly primarily with less desirable effects as it appears in fact, taking into account on the other hand however quite diverse needs and interests of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. The article critically analyses the consequences the US recent withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, as well as its re-imposition of economic sanctions against Iran might have for the South Caucasian countries, addresses the factor of latest uncertainty over the NATO member Turkey, covers the Russian problem, and raises one of the crucial issues whether the current US President Donald Trump has more actual decisive power than the Congress, also in terms of foreign policy implementation, or not.

Keywords:

The US, the South Caucasus, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Donald Trump, the US foreign policy, Russia, NATO

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Introduction

Democracy and human rights, energy, and security are believed to be the three major pillars of the US South Caucasian policy.

Due to the States' interest in transporting possibilities of the Caspian basin's energy resources to Western markets, energy became the main priority in this regard for the Bill Clinton administration, while on the background of 9/11 and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, i.e. increased security concerns, the latter appeared to be the primary focus point under the leadership of George W. Bush.

During Barack Obama's presidency, America integrated rather liberal-interventionist foreign policy in the region that might seem more in accordance with the Democrats' governing style. Although, noteworthy to underline here as well Obama's distinguishing individual impact as of the highly value-oriented and principled politician in general.

Less Engagement

Despite the fact that the US has clear strategic, although not the vital interests in the South Caucasus region, the latter has become less visible and covered in the US foreign policy agenda after the presidency of George W. Bush who was much more active in this context, as well as his predecessor Bill Clinton.

We can say, Barack Obama's non-active policy much more anticipated as such considering the fact that it is nothing surprising under the leadership of the Democrats, seems to be preserved under the presidency of Donald Trump as well.

However, along with continuation of certain inertia from the Obama period, the non-active policy has been preserved even more under Trump as he is famous for his declarations and practical approaches regarding decreasing the US interference in other countries' especially domestic affairs. Besides this, suggesting to some extent even isolation of the US represents one of the non-typical specificities characteristic to Donald Trump's policy as of individual that is different from Republicans' traditional standpoints - increased interference and more active foreign policy of the US mainly based on expanding its involvement in other states' affairs. Trump as an outsider, is a deviant, exceptional, and due to contradictory approaches not rarely, unpredictable player, however he won the elections based on populist rhetoric and vocalizing the interests of typically abandoned particularly for the last decades, middle-class white American majority so far.

Major Implications of the Less Active US Foreign Policy in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia

When we are discussing such kind of non or at least less interference from the side of the US in the regional or state affairs in the South Caucasus, among the three countries, Georgia seems to suffer more from this policy as much

more depending state on the active Western and especially American support, oriented towards counterbalancing Russia's post-Soviet ambitions for reviving its former power also in the South Caucasus and over the regional countries in its direct neighborhood. The newer grounds for pessimism have emerged especially after the recent Brussels Summit of NATO (July, 2018) where Georgia once again got unclear message regarding when it can be expected for the country to gain MAP and its eventual membership of the Alliance. Although, the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 11-12 July 2018 have reiterated the decision made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Georgia will become a member of the Alliance, with MAP as an integral part of the process; they reaffirmed all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions. They have welcomed the significant progress realized since 2008².

Other countries, for example, Azerbaijan seems to gain less pressure during Trump's presidency as there are having been heard less pretensions over the human rights' violations in the state; it is simply less important and corresponds to Trump's non-interference policy agenda. Although, such less-active policy of the US in the region, to certain extent quite logical if we also consider Trump's careful and more business-oriented relations with Moscow, seems to have less profitable influence not only for Armenia's increased balancing needs and strategies under the changed reality that suggests to at least raise more pro-Western rhetoric during the new – since May, 2018 “revolutionary” leadership of the Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, but also for the Azerbaijani economic interests as well to attract more Western and American partners and investment dealing with its oil and gas, especially in the reality of the decreased Russian contribution considerably caused due to the anti-Russian sanctions.

The Iranian Factor

Another important factor playing its specific role in the South Caucasus region during Trump's presidency is the US recently announced (in May, 2018) withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, which makes the viability of this agreement vulnerable, and re-imposition of the US significant economic sanctions against Iran.

These conditions are believed to bring back the previous picture of Iran's at least increased isolation containing halt of the business relations and projects with the South Caucasian countries and their businessmen as well.

Along with other regional energy and business projects to be under certain threat due to re-imposition of the US important economic sanctions against Iran, there has to be noted also the International North–South Transport

² *Brussels Summit Declaration*, Press Release (2018) 074, Nato.int, 11.07.2018 (Updated: 13.08.2018), <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm> (10.08.2018).

Corridor, which has been designed to connect Northern Europe with South-East Asia involving Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran, and at the same time, emerging vulnerability of this greatly valuable initiative.

Such a negative move will not only have economically detrimental consequences not necessarily only for Iran as it can be clear, but also for the whole regional security.

There is obvious in any event that if the Trump's US does not engage more in the South Caucasus, deterioration of the business or other relations with Iran from the side of the three regional countries is a game where these South Caucasian countries are losing more than they gain or to put it into other words, they unfairly are not gaining anything adequate back from the US on the expense of failing their business projects with Iran and thus losing new significant commercial or energy development opportunities due to the superpower's negative interference in this case as it appears.

Uncertainty over Turkey

Not mentioning the certain proximity of another critical and broadly war-torn region – Middle East, which makes the South Caucasus issue additionally delicate, uncertainty over Turkey occurred remarkably in the last years due to the internal political divides and clashes, increasing autocracy, renewed tensions with Kurds in its southeastern provinces when facing the persistent ethnic conflict since the 70s of the 20th century, and different sorts of external pressure evolving based on diverse grounds, including from Turkey's major NATO ally – the US in the light of controversially acclaimed Turkish contribution into the Syrian campaign³, or other heavily complicated circumstances altogether, Turkey's EU accession talks stopped among others due to the highly criticized from democratic point of view Turkish constitutional referendum of 2017, etc., reflected eventually in complex political, economic, security, diplomatic or other crises, is noteworthy to consider.

The Russian Problem

Despite Trump's primarily business-based and bargaining approach towards Russia as well (not mentioning popular, however still not confirmed allegations in keeping special bonds with the Russian leadership even to the degree of having them the decisive influence on the outcome of the last US presidential elections) another factor is anti-Russian sanctions supported and

³ D. L. Phillips, *Research Paper: ISIS-Turkey Links*, Huffingtonpost.com, 09.11.2014 (Updated: 08.09.2016), <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-l-phillips/research-paper-isis-turke_b_6128950.html> (14.07.2018).

as it has been promoted, even pressured on Trump by the US Congress in further⁴.

One Important Question

An additional principal question arises though, is it about Trump's superiority over the Congress regarding the actual decision-making, including when it comes to the foreign policy, or not? Some analysts detect such a trend, however what about the constitutional restraints and checks and balances then?!

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RUSSIA – USA RELATIONSHIP: R.I.P. COLD WAR?

Abstract:

The focus of the proposal is related to the relationship of Russia and the West after the Cold War, especially concerning the NATO enlargement. It is assumed that at this moment the relationship of these entities have changed to a whole new situation. However if the Cold War was about performance of identity conformation, this proposal claims that this logic still persists In this scenario Russia is trying to find a new role at the international level, as much as NATO is trying to do the same. since their main enemy no longer exists, so the Atlantic Alliance starts a new project of spreading democracy and market economy to the ex-soviet sphere of influence, on the basis of fear of a renewed cycle of Russian nationalist expansionism. Thereby, the rationalism of this debate can be substituted by a new one more inclined to the post-structuralist debate. In this way the main purpose of this paper is to analyze the delimitation of the Russian and West’s identities in this space full of “otherness” constituting the “self”, in this scenario of tension/distension hark back to the Cold War era, with special emphasis on Russian foreign policy.

Keywords:

New Cold War; Russia; USA; NATO; Security

Introduction

This paper proposes the analysis of a specific case study, rather than research for theoretical ends. It is intended to analyze Russian foreign policy at the time following the Cold War, in which the country was under President Yeltsin and later, in a second moment since 2000 when Russia is already under the presidency of Vladimir Putin,.

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The analysis of the proposed two moments will be through a lens focused on the post-positivism theoretical approach. Therefore, one of the focal points of the work will be the Russian foreign policy directed towards the West/NATO and Russia's relationship with other so-called external threats like terror attacks in 2001.

The analysis of foreign policy is a fundamental exercise to access the ramifications of the end of the Cold War to Russia, in particular, its implications for defining Russian identity as well as regional security.

After 1991, the Russia-West/NATO relationship should be treated differently in relation to the one previously maintained, whether from the assumption that identities change, objectives change, and the context in which they operate is no longer the same. Although there are controversies over whether this relationship really changed, including the debate about the possibility of a New Cold War has spread.

Although, the theme of this work raises a range of issues, most will not be answered in this paper. The main question that guides this study is: To what extent Russia, in order to (re)define its role in the international scenario after the end of the Cold War, or in a scenario where there's a New Cold War, this is related to external threats?

Thus, historical events will be crucial for the evaluation and discussion of this issue. Therefore, the use of theoretical assumptions will be essential in order to analyze the relationship from the "self" with the "other" as well as the limitations brought by the issue of sovereignty which brings the dichotomous pairs, the logic of exclusion and therefore, the creation of foreign enemies generating security dilemmas.

Historical Background

By the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) the main western military organization, The Organization of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) suffered with the transformation of the East-West conflict logic. Without its main enemy, and a crisis of what behaviour to adopt in the new international scenario, NATO changed its policy, monitoring and providing security for the expansion of economic and political liberal principles along the new borders².

The expansion of NATO aimed to increase its area of operation and to establish itself as an organization that would promote peace through the ideological proximity of its members, besides being a military security guarantee for new members. This act of expansion had a major impact in the former Soviet republics, the promise of security and participation in an important forum for the West, also presented as a gateway to greater interaction

² D. Reiter, *Why NATO enlargement does not spread democracy?*, "International Security", Vol. 25, No. 4, 2001, pp. 41-67.

with former rivals during the Cold War, this movement took shape with the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council which aimed to maintain the dialogue between NATO and the former members of the defunct Warsaw Pact³.

Security was a factor of great importance for recruiting the ex-Soviet republics to NATO's new course. The countries that emerged at the end of the USSR had great fear of a Russian revanchism, which could try to reoccupy these countries or to directly influence their policies by decreasing their levels of independence⁴ achieved in the end of the Soviet Union.

Although the NATO new focus of security has developed a very important role for the accession of the former USSR countries, Russia did not see the situation the same way. This is made clear in the words of Primakov: "Indeed, the leaders of the Central and East European countries declared their firm desire to join NATO. Indications are that a considerable part of their populations – indeed, the majority – supported that position. Public opinion polls and a referendum in Hungary confirm that impression. What was behind the desire to join NATO? Was it fear that the situation in Russia could pose a threat to their security? I don't think that was a major reason or even a valid one. Besides, many leaders of those countries stated emphatically that their choice was not motivated by fear of Russian aggression"⁵.

The creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council demonstrates the difficulty NATO faced in establishing an identity to face the new international order. Without a clear military enemy, the organization changes its - approach to that of promoting the development of Western liberal ideas, mainly eastwards. This move was made possible by the identity crisis that occurred in Russia post-USSR. Although NATO initiated a new facet of this, being in the post-Cold War while trying to unite its members based on values and standards, the Alliance continues to have a military character. Indeed, NATO continues to be characterized as the chief military alliance in the region⁶.

Russia as the main heir of the USSR, highlighting this heritage by maintaining a permanent seat in the Security Council of the United Nations, the nuclear and conventional arsenal and the fact that it remained with the status as the major regional power. Moscow would continue to be the centre of decision

³ *The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)*, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_69344.htm>, (1.05.2018).

⁴ After the end of the Cold War some countries were "more independent" because of their economic situation, for example. Other regions couldn't be in fact independent, they remained gravitating around Russia, like Chechnya, which stayed in a complicated situation. Other countries like Belarus became independent, but still very dependent on Russian resources. These are a few examples to enlighten the "levels of independence".

⁵ Y. Primakov, F. Rosenthal, *Russian Crossroads: Toward the New Millennium*, New Haven, 2004, p. 130.

⁶ H. Sjursen, *On the Identity of NATO*, "International Affairs", Vol. 80, No. 4, 2004, pp. 687-703.

making in respect to the former Soviet republics within the region, Russia continued following the thought that those states would continue to be its area of influence⁷.

Meanwhile Boris Yeltsin, as the first Russian president in the post-Cold War era faced internal problems that would prevent Russia from exercising a foreign policy like the one made by the USSR. Yeltsin had great challenges as the government to stabilize the chaotic Russian economy and the formation and articulation of domestic politics. internationally, Moscow sought to establish new behaviour in order to get international help, seeking internal stability. This Russian move would transform their foreign policy into one more convergent with the West, including NATO⁸.

Yeltsin's domestic problems led to a discourse of almost zero conflict regarding the West, NATO interpreted this policy as a weakness on the part of the Russian state⁹. A Russia without the ability to influence international security issues in areas considered strategic for national defence was not well regarded by many domestic actors in the country, highlighted by the security agencies and foreign policy planners¹⁰. However, the expansion of NATO to the East would be consolidated into a real threat to Russian security policies¹¹. The appearance of this problem was evident to Moscow, but internal problems, like the economy and the political pressures faced by Yeltsin, would be the principal guide of Russian foreign policy. A conflict, even if a diplomatic one, with NATO could complicate the search for international aid.

With the thought of minimizing a possible threat of conflict with NATO, Yeltsin opted for dialogue beginning with NATO for the establishment of international debates. Russia joins the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in order to increase the dialogue between the actors, prevent any conflict and create bases for a possible entry of Russia into the treaty, an idea that was present in the thoughts of Yeltsin¹².

Yeltsin's Russia behaved much different than expected from the main regional power created by the end of the Cold War. This paradigm shift in the Cold War logic by Moscow did not seem to produce the desired effects regarding the international community and the West in particular. The economic¹³ aid that was expected to come would not be enough to stabilize the

⁷ R. Colin, *Rússia: O Ressurgimento da Grande Potência*, Florianópolis 2007.

⁸ A. Segrillo, *O Fim da URSS e a Nova Rússia: de Gorbachev ao Pós-Yeltsin*, Petrópolis 2000.

⁹ C. Thorun, *Explaining Ideas in Russian Foreign Policy: the role of ideas in the post-Soviet Russia's conduct towards the West*, New York 2009.

¹⁰ R. Colin, *op. cit.*

¹¹ C. Thorun, *op. cit.*

¹² *Ibidem.*

¹³ *G7 Summit: Munique, 6-8 July, 1992*, <<http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1992munich/communique/russia.html>>, (1.05.2018).

Russian economy and support on international security issues would not be reciprocal¹⁴.

The new attitude of Yeltsin's Russia wouldn't last, conflicts in Bosnia in 1994 showed that conflict logic remained a major pillar in Russia-West relations, or Russia-NATO relations. The crisis has put Russia and NATO on different sides, NATO opted for a more belligerent discourse regarding the ceasefire, giving an ultimatum threatening to bomb ex-Yugoslavia. Russia opted for a diplomatic resolution, and in a move that would change his way of acting in the international arena this moment on, started talks for a diplomatic ceasefire, which ended successfully¹⁵.

At this point it is worth noting that at the beginning of the conflict in Bosnia, NATO and Russia worked together to try to solve the problem. One of gestures that demonstrates more clearly the Russian attempt to cooperation was the opening airspace for NATO flights¹⁶. For much of the negotiations the two actors tried to establish a unified policy to deal with the situation, but in decision making, Moscow was removed from the debate and their wills were placed in the background.

The Russian negotiations were ignored by NATO, that kept its ultimatum on 4th February (1994)¹⁷ to all forces fighting to hand off the weapons within 20 km from Sarajevo, something that was extremely criticized by the Russian authorities. The ceasefire occurred within the time stipulated by NATO and the bombing did not happen. It is difficult to determine which side was more important to the ceasefire, Russian or NATO, but the differences between the parties were evident. The differences between the actors remained the same regarding the Cold War logic.

The ceasefire was celebrated as a victory of the Russian independent diplomacy as shows the declaration of Yeltsin and Churkin, Russian diplomatic

¹⁴ A. Segrillo, *op. cit.*

¹⁵ C. Thorun, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ *Ibidem.*

¹⁷ "Excluded from the decision-making process in NATO and understanding that Russia would not be able to convince the Western powers to nullify the February 1994 ultimatum, Moscow decided to initiate an independent mission with regard to the Sarajevo crisis. Russian Special Envoy Vitaliy Churkin delivered to Serb President Milosevic and Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic a proposal from Yeltsin that the Bosnian Serbs withdraw their heavy weapons to positions 20 kilometers from Sarajevo within the time limit set by NATO, while 400 Russian peacekeepers were transferred to Sarajevo. Both leaders accepted this proposal. In the end, the heavy weapons were withdrawn and the February crisis was resolved without the use of force. While it is difficult to assess whether NATO's threat of the use of force was the decisive factor or whether Russia's diplomatic intervention convinced the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw, this event was celebrated in Russia as an example of a successful independent Russian foreign policy. Yeltsin argued in February 1994 that 'unlike the NATO bloc, which gave the Serbs an ultimatum, Russia had asked the Serbs to withdraw their heavy weapons [...], this was in psychological terms a subtly calculated move that worked". C. Thorun, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

envoy to negotiate a ceasefire¹⁸. Yeltsin argued in February 1994 that “unlike the NATO bloc, which gave the Serbs an ultimatum, Russia had asked the Serbs to withdraw their heavy weapons [...], this was in psychological terms a subtly calculated move that worked...”¹⁹. Similarly, Churkin argued that the crisis was solved because firstly, the ‘phrase “a request from Russia, “had a powerful psychological effect [...]. Secondly, the letter was signed by the Russian president”²⁰.

The success of diplomacy, however, did not last long and was not very effective. Months after the ceasefire the war in Bosnia had resumed, NATO conducted a series of airstrikes trying to end the confrontation. Russia went on to criticize the NATO attacks in Bosnia, but was also unable to stop the war with diplomatic attempts²¹.

The conflict took on a new dimension in the summer of 1995 when NATO bombed Sarajevo mostly in response to an attack on installations of the United Nations (UN). The Russian diplomacy was reaching its limit, and with the creation of the NATO Rapid Reaction Force supported by the Security Council, where Russia abstained, and a subsequent shelling of Sarajevo, the Russian diplomatic representatives spared no criticism on NATO policies²². When NATO used air strikes to repel the Bosnian Serbs offensive around Sarajevo, Srebrenica, and Zepa, the Russian foreign ministry characterized them as “senseless”²³, and Defence Minister Grachev condemned them as “madness”. He argued that political methods of influencing the Bosnian Serbs were still “far from exhausted”²⁴.

The difficulty of establishing a new Russian identity continued even after withdrawal during the crisis in Bosnia and the critical approach of Russian representatives regarding the policies adopted by NATO in that episode, Russia remained with the thought of rapprochement with the West and resumed the dialogue with NATO. Proof of this search for a deeper dialogue between the parties was the creation of the Partnership for Peace program (PfP)²⁵, with the

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹ *Yeltsin Criticizes NATO for Seeking to Exclude Moscow from Regional Conflicts*, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 February 1994; refer to: C. Thorun, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

²⁰ *Interview with Churkin on St Petersburg Channel 5 TV*, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 March 1994; refer to: C. Thorun, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

²¹ *Ibidem*.

²² *Ibidem*.

²³ *Foreign Ministry Says NATO Airstrikes in Bosnia “Unjustified”*, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 July 1995.

²⁴ V. Abarinov, *Kogda v posrednikakh soglas'ia net*, “Segodnia”, 25 July 1995.

²⁵ *The Partnership for Peace programme* <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm> (1.05.2018).

goal of reducing instability in the region. Altogether, there were 34 signatories to the PfP, and Russia entered into July 22nd, 1994²⁶.

During most of the 1990s, Russia maintained cooperative behaviour with the West and NATO. A break and a return to Cold War logic was expected in post-conflict Bosnia, however what happened was the continuation of the thought of conducting foreign policy according to internal demands. This move was not well regarded internally, the feeling of those involved in Russian decision making was the need for a leader stronger than Boris Yeltsin was being.

The return of a rapprochement between Moscow and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization gained strength with the Founding Act in 1997²⁷, a document that aims to put clearly that Russia and NATO do not treat each other as enemies. This document establishes principles for the creation of cooperation mechanisms and more solid debate organs highlighting the creation in the near future for a permanent council for the establishment of joint solutions to common problems. Maintaining and ensuring stability in the Euro-Atlantic area was of great importance to the parties.

In 1998, another conflict would undermine the relationship between Russia and NATO, the Kosovo conflict. Kosovo had been battling for independence since the early 1990s and in 1998 the conflict escalated into a civil war. The area was a zone of Russian influence and considered of great strategic value by Moscow. However, Russia was a party in negotiations for a ceasefire, which was conducted by NATO member countries²⁸.

NATO reproduced the policy implemented in Bosnia after failed negotiations opted for an ultimatum threatening to bomb Belgrade. Russia was moved to a secondary role without decision-making power, even being involved in the initial demands of Slobodan Milosevic for a possible ceasefire. The threats and ultimatum had no effect and Belgrade was bombed, something that would be an insult to Russian diplomacy²⁹.

Negotiations for a cease-fire itself were also a reason for the discontent of Moscow, the Rambouillet meetings, the major international forum of decision making for the Serbia conflict were attended only by NATO members. Thus it was clear that Russia was being relegated to a secondary role, again, in the decision making process of a territory that was considered strategic and was yet, in Russian view, inside their sphere of influence.

Russia responded to the bombing of Belgrade by breaking free of the Partnership for Peace and NATO expelling the NATO representatives from

²⁶ *Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document*, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_82584.htm> (1.05.2018).

²⁷ *NATO-Russia Founding Act, 17th May 1997*, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm> (1.05.2018).

²⁸ C. Thorun, *op. cit.*

²⁹ M. Mccgwire, *Why did we bomb Belgrade?*, "International Affairs", Vol. 76, No. 1, 2000, p. 1-23.

Russian territory. The NATO investees in Kosovo were considered by the Russian government an attempt to destabilize the zone of Russian influence and made Yeltsin maintain its support for Milosevic³⁰.

The deepening of friction between Moscow and NATO would gain new faces with NATO enlargement process to the East. In the late 1990s, the policy of NATO to include countries such as Hungary and the Czech Republic to the treaty was perceived as an unfriendly step by the Russians. Moreover, the Russian intention to join the treaty was not reciprocal, which incited the thought that NATO continued to perform actions similar to those made during the Cold War³¹.

The eastward expansion of NATO had begun with the end of the USSR, the attempt to co-opt the former members of the Warsaw Pact was seen by Moscow as an attempt to re-establish a Cold War logic. Yeltsin ruled the hard way with respect to the policy of NATO in 1994: “ideological confrontation has been replaced by a struggle for spheres of influence in geopolitics”³².

Boris Yeltsin's words reflected the events in 1994 and responded to the first wave of NATO expansion to the East in the post USSR. The second wave of expansion occurred in the late 1990s and has resulted in more concrete terms of membership for countries from former members of the Warsaw Pact. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia and Slovenia were invited to begin accession talks at the Alliance's Prague Summit in 2002. On 29th March 2004, they officially became members of the Alliance, making this the largest wave of enlargement in NATO history³³.

Even before an international scenario unreceptive to Yeltsin changing posture, Russia was still open to dialogue with the West and NATO. Before being elected Vladimir Putin told the Star News journal from USA that Moscow would be willing to participate Treaty Organization since the Russian terms are respected: “I don't see why not. I wouldn't rule out such a possibility. But I repeat, if and when Russia's views are taken into account as an equal partner”³⁴.

However, the milder words of Putin faded, shortly after his election Russia remodelled its foreign policy. Putin brought back the logic of rivalry with West/NATO, which is presented in a clear New Security Concept of the Russian Federation of January 10th, 2000, where Moscow returned to call the Treaty Organization as an external threat. “The second tendency manifests itself in attempts to create an international relations structure based on domination by developed Western countries in the international community,

³⁰ C. Thorun, *op. cit.*

³¹ R. J. Art, *Creating a Disaster: NATO's open door policy*, “Political Science Quarterly”, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1998, pp. 383-403.

³² C. Thorun, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

³³ *Member countries*, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52044.htm> (1.05.2018).

³⁴ *Star News, 6th March 2018*, <<http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1454&dat=20000306&id=O1hIAAAIBAJ&sjid=ah8EAAAIBAJ&pg=5738,2522991>> (1.05.2018).

under US leadership and designed for unilateral solutions (primarily by the use of military force) to key issues in world politics in circumvention of the fundamental rules of international law. [...]The main threats in the international sphere are due to the following factors: the striving of particular states and intergovernmental associations to belittle the role of existing mechanisms for ensuring international security, above all the United Nations and the OSCE; the danger of a weakening of Russia's political, economic and military influence in the world; the strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, above all NATO's eastward expansion; [...]"³⁵.

The greatest hostility displayed by Putin to NATO was an act with the aim of raising awareness of Treaty Organization policies of expansion to the East, implemented at the end of the previous decade, would not be seen so complacent in the Putin administration. However, the harsh speech rhetoric of the New Security Concept of the Russian Federation has not determined the end of attempt of rapprochement between the parts.

The next important step, regarding the rapprochement between the actors, occurred in the post September 11th, 2001 context. Putin, who had used the speech of combating terrorism to justify the invasion of Chechnya in 1999, aligned his speech to NATO in fighting terrorism. This approach demonstrates the difficulty of dialogue between the actors, because in 1999 the initiative of Moscow to invade Chechnya in order to fight terrorism did not receive support from NATO or USA, despite claims that Al-Qaeda was operating in the region and the fact that Osama Bin-Laden was already one of the most wanted men³⁶ in the world due to his participation in the terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania³⁷.

The attacks of September 11th brought to the table discussions between Russia and NATO needed to develop joint policies to combat this new threat. The identity conflicts between the actors, which proved a hindrance to the support of the Organization towards Russian policies against terrorism, would evolve to joint action.

The moment of cooperation between Russia and NATO continued with the creation of the NATO-Russia Council (NATO-Russia Council/NRC) in 2002. The assumptions for the formation of a permanent body of debate between the two actors was established in 1997 and with the creation of this new mechanism, where Russia would have the same weight as all other 28 members

³⁵ *National Security Concept of the Russian Federation 10/01/2000*, <<http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/36aba64ac09f737fc32575d9002bbf31!OpenDocument>> (1.05.2018).

³⁶ *Attacks on US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania*, <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/98emb.htm>> (1.05.2018).

³⁷ *Wanted by the FBI: Osama Bin Laden*, <<http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/topten/usama-bin-laden/>> (1.05.2018); D. V. Trenin, *The Forgotten War: Chechnya and Russia's Future*, Policy Brief: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 2003.

of the treaty, the expectation was a continued approximation and deeper relations by the time³⁸.

The history in the post-Cold War and especially after the USSR dissolution shows that the Russia-NATO/West relationship had to be rebuilt. The changing external enemy always present, and the idea of a threat without end, which the USSR represented to Western states, and its main military organization had been disbanded.

With that, NATO had to find a new way of acting in the early 1990s. However, the policies used by the organization of the treaty were based on the existence of an external threat. Russia had been the great heiress of the USSR, which also inherited the status of foreign enemy.

The construction of the identity of NATO as an actor on the international scene depended on an external enemy and defining a new enemy would be the simplest way to maintain their policies. Confrontation with Russia, was used to as the centre of power and the decisions that defined the direction of the USSR region and Russia would not give up that status.

“Self” + “Other” = “We” the Russians

At the end of the Cold War, Russia was in a delicate and complicated situation at many levels. Then-President Boris Yeltsin had to face domestic economic problems, disputes between the presidency and the legislature, and even external issues like civil wars in Moldova, Georgia, among others, and the conflict in Chechnya³⁹. The problems affecting Russia contributed to the responsible entities remaining in a situation of uncertainty regarding the conformation of guidelines that lead to both foreign policies as its national security policy. The first document of national security began in 1992 but only in 1994 a permanent commission was established for which the document was completed. The Russian Federation has passed the time immediately after the end of the East-West conflict, with great instability and uncertainty. Even on matters that would be of national interest, there was an ideological vacuum left by the defeat of Communism⁴⁰.

For a long period, Russia remained stuck in a kind of “identity crisis”, characterized by a lack of consistency, especially in their guidelines for foreign and security policies. With the end of the Cold War, Russia is in this context of great indecision and confusion in political, social and economic terms, not only due to the legacy left by the USSR, but also by the administration exercised by then President Boris Yeltsin that culminated in worsening Russian problems. Facing this scenario, which lasted for two terms of Yeltsin, Russia, collectivity,

³⁸ NATO-Russia Council, <<http://www.nato-russia-council.info/en/about/>> (1.05.2018).

³⁹ A. Segrillo, op. cit.

⁴⁰ M. de Haas, *The Development of Russian Security Policy: 1992-2002*, BASEES Annual Conferences, 2003.

demanded more than ever the internal unity of its people. Russia lacked redefinition of its identity, and in a moment of crisis of such gravity, the Russian identity redefinition needed an “other” sufficiently compelling as to generate a new direction for this country. In previous decades the US and NATO, as well as Western Europe, were Russians enemies, your source of self-perception, so this “other” could be re-definition of its source, through its foreign policy⁴¹.

According Kassianova⁴², policy issues in Russia are largely influenced by internal demands, which ultimately generates something like an internal dispute for the definition of national interests. That is, the definition of identity, at least regarding the contribution of this author, puts it, internally, there is a big debate on the issues of ideational Russian identity, and this is not defined only in relation to a State, as “black box”, with another State, but also by domestic ideational motivations. However, for Kassianova, the State will not assume only the mediating role of internal and external voices, this will also assume a posture a bit more dynamic and independent, through its political elites and organizations like intelligence. Therefore, Kassianova brings to the debate the diversity of some of the groups of thought that coexist within Russia. There are liberals who believe that Russia should modernize and liberalize; the nationalists, who believe in the inherent relationship enmity with the West and do not want the situation to change, prescribing the maintenance of independent values of his country and the restoration of Russian power in the territory comprising the former Soviet Union. There are also groups skewed more toward the centre as the liberal nationalists; statesmen, they who are a little more realistic and the more moderate as liberal patriots.

Usually, the Russians blame the West for failing to end the relationship with Russia based on Cold War logic⁴³, whereas the United States similarity to Russia also remained without its main external enemy and remained without their main “source” of identity constitution, and therefore needed another external enemy⁴⁴. Therefore, the West gives continuation to the policies considered hostile by Russia, for example, the expansion of NATO to Eastern Europe throughout the 90s, with the purpose of promoting democratic principles, and the former countries of the region to become members even knowing they were already democratic⁴⁵.

In the early 90s, Russia seemed to have foreign and security policies formed, so trying to maintain ties with the West, given that the country was

⁴¹ A. Kassianova, *Russia: Still Open to the West? Evolution of State Identity in the Foreign Policy and Security Discourse*, “Europe-Asia Studies”, Vol. 53, No. 6, 2001, pp. 821-839.

⁴² *Ibidem*.

⁴³ R. Colin, *op. cit.*

⁴⁴ D. Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Minneapolis 1992.

⁴⁵ D. Reiter, *op. cit.*

under the rule of a leader a bit more focused on liberal democratic aspects. As soon as issues arose that required the attention of the West and Russia, disagreements also arose between the two parts. One example was the conflict in Bosnia, where Russia praised a resolution based on multilateralism, but the United States eventually took a more unilateral position, especially in the case of Serbia, which displeased Russia. Following this direction, in 1994, unilaterally, NATO gives an ultimatum to Serbia to give an order not to attack Bosnia. At that moment, Russia is placed next to all Slavs, saying an attack on Serbia is also an attack on Russia. This moment is very crucial for the entering of Russia in the international arena, as Russia once again puts the West in its role of enemy and rebuilds ties with the Slavs, inserting themselves as protectors of these people. Likewise, Russia, to some extent, is to reconstruct their identity in the extreme of creating an enemy, the West as a potential danger, and initiates a redefinition to their policies⁴⁶.

One of the biggest problems between Russia and the West was the issue of NATO expansion to the East. For much of Russian public opinion, the open door policy of the Alliance was directed at countering Russia, other views on the subject also put enlargement as a recreation of the division between the West and Russia, Russia is placed on the underground as in the Cold War times, as part of a second world⁴⁷. Anyway, the Russian population was opposed to this attitude. In 1994, NATO had made some concessions to Russia and the Russians to the Alliance, and established the Partnership for Peace, a consultative body between the two parts. However, in 1996 the United States placed priority on NATO expansion to the East, and once more problems arose⁴⁸. Here, Russia takes advantage by declaring its frustration, and starts threatening Western capitals of NATO member countries with missiles, and so definitively determines its major external enemy, and his dialogue with this extreme build their identity in the post-Cold War with vehemence⁴⁹. This enemy will follow Russia in defining its identity, hence their interests and actions for many more years.

The next moment of relative changes in Russian foreign policy and its security policy was marked by the terrorist attacks of 09/11, now under President Vladimir Putin. As previously mentioned, the Russian leader was the first to provide solidarity to the United States at the time of the terrorist attack

⁴⁶ P. Kubicek, *Russian Foreign Policy and the West*, "Political Science Quarterly", Vol. 114, No. 4 (Winter 1999-2000), pp. 547-568.

⁴⁷ M. Light, *A Redivisão da Europa*, "Contexto Internacional", Vol. 17, No. 2/1995, pp. 295-312.

⁴⁸ P. Kubicek, *op. cit.*

⁴⁹ R. K. Ashley, *Untying the Sovereign State: a Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique*, "Millenium: Journal of International Studies", Vol. 17, No. 2, 1988, pp. 227-262.

of 09/11⁵⁰. This was another turning point for the construction of the Russian position in the international scenario. Until then Russia had not determined what would be its foreign policy for the Caucasus region, with special attention to Chechnya and Georgia. Russia needed to define its national interest and how it would be directed to this region because it remained in a kind of political limbo. When the terrorist attacks happened on the United States, Russia found itself in an important moment of decision, after the US remained the major world power allied to another major partner, the European Union, while the Russians were in a semi-isolation. Thus, Russia instrumentalizes this period in its favour, as a way to remove the West from external enemy position, because there was a necessity to relate in a better way with these poles, considering that Russia lacked foreign investments, for example, and still would find a way to deal with the regions where its foreign policy was still without conformation⁵¹.

The terrorist attacks resulted in a change in Russian policy. Its support to the United States in combating global terrorism gave Russia a kind of “*carte blanche*” to join this war on terror. The Russian enemy would shift from NATO and its members, to global terrorism and its perpetrators, Islamic radicals. The Russian rhetoric changes, and potential threat becomes imminent danger and the tone changes to a matter of urgency in combating this threat⁵². While the discourse changes, accompanying practices, and Russia becomes more assertive in respect to Georgia, as a place with the possibility of harbouring terrorists and Chechnya, for its history of conflict with the Russians and, reportedly large Islamic population. In this way, Russia joins the West, redefines itself, defines its role in the Caucasus region, and in this scenario arises as a regional power, considering the use of lots of resources to deal with the problems of your surroundings even with occasional use of violence to achieve their goals⁵³.

However, the good moments between Russia and the West would not last forever. Although much of the Russian population were more concerned with issues related to the economy, drugs, health, etc, this population was also concerned about the status of their country in the international scenario, and wanted Russia to become a great power again. Putin, in his first term proved to be a strong leader who managed to answer most of the expectations of the Russian population. So, he was elected to a second term with a large majority of votes. With the endorsement of Russian people, Putin could accomplish its foreign and security policies with more assertiveness aside from this, Russia was no longer in the difficult economic and social situations as it was before.

⁵⁰ S. Markov et al., *Rússia. In: II Conferência Nacional de Política Externa e Política Internacional*, Brasília 2008.

⁵¹ J. Hedenskog et al. (ed.), *Russia as a great power: dimensions of security under Putin*, London 2005.

⁵² K. M. Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*, Cambridge 2007.

⁵³ J. Hedenskog et al., *op. cit.*

Putin, while a nationalist leader would promote once more the aspirations of its people to make Russia a great power again⁵⁴.

During the 1990s, Russia manages to maintain, in a large extent, a good relationship with NATO, after all those were domestic threats, and were used to restrain its population. Threats need to convince the population of a state⁵⁵. Thus, while the Russian Federation kept its *raison d'être* fighting the socio-economic problems there was no a need for another “enemy”. Thus is explained the calm relationship between Russia and NATO. However, domestic threats would not be sufficient to maintain the legitimacy of the Russian State, and proceeds to settle a foreign policy less aligned with the West and with the Atlantic Alliance, while the latter, in particular, gives continuity to Cold War logic.

In 2007, Russia-West relationship became bitter again. This year, the acting US would be considered hostile by Russia and lead to new tensions. The United States made a proposal to deploy a missile shield which would be situated in Poland and the Czech Republic, on the grounds that it would be directed to Iran and North Korea. However, Russia felt threatened and said that national security was at stake, so would confront the United States and Europe by declaring that it would point its missiles at European capitals. At that moment, having put European security at stake, the United States declined, and decided to discuss the implementation of the artefact at another time, and that Russia would be included in the debate⁵⁶. That is, Russia once again succeeded in establishing its external enemy, who would be the West again, given the domestic conditions and external interaction, and even more Russia would manage to establish a position of major player in the international scenario, meeting internal political aspirations.

The construction of a new Russian identity is, in this sense, situated so as to destabilize the security of the region. The new Russian enemy would again be NATO because of its ability to maintain, after all, had been one of his main threats for decades. Moreover, the construction of the meanings around NATO within the Federation during the Cold War may not yet have dissipated, and thus currents are easy instrumentalized.

In 2001, Russia and NATO/West found a common enemy, terrorism, which leads to an end of relations as enemies. However, the terrorist threat, though still existing, dissipates gradually but does not end and ceases to be so convincing to the Russian population in subsequent years. This leads to more confrontation between the Federation and the Alliance, as in 2007 when Russia declares moratorium on the CFE Treaty, later there is another turning point with the possibility of the entry of Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, with others to come.

⁵⁴ R. Service, *Russia: From Tsarism to the Twenty-First Century*, London 2008.

⁵⁵ D. Campbell, *op. cit.*

⁵⁶ R. Service, *op. cit.*

Why are we still talking about ghosts?

Since 2008, the relationship between Russia and USA/West holds a lot of tension. In 2008 there was the so called “Five Days War” between Russia and Georgia, the invasion of Libya, then the crisis in Syria, followed by one of the most dramatic events, the annexation of Crimea by Russia. The annexation of Crimea was a crucial point to return to the question: is there a New Cold War?

This question about a New Cold War, or Cold War 2.0, has been debated for a long time by analysts. Some academics disagree and assert Cold War is in the past under the argument that since there is no longer an iron curtain, or an ideological conflict, which was the main point of the Cold War, i.e., without these components it shouldn't be called a Cold War.

On the other hand these same tension points (Libya, Syria, and Crimea, among others) also say something about this relationship, they remain the old proxies from the Cold War. That's just one example, but some analysts who assert “there's a New Cold War”, are highlighting that even the lack of the ideology component, this so called New Cold War has a hybrid characteristic adapted to contemporary forms of war and the “old” forms of war. For example, information war, the problems related to fake news, intertwined with the “old” issues like NATO expansion, proxies, Russian government taking a piece of Ukraine, and spies.

There aren't just two options. Maybe both sides represented here are right, the Cold War might have died and now is hunting this relationship again, because Russia and USA couldn't find another way to relate to each other. Maybe the Cold War has never gone, and it's being reshaped. It seems difficult for Russia and USA to find a common agenda to work together. At some moments they have worked together, but these have been brief.

The Relationship After Trump's Election

As stated previously, the lack of cooperation between these actors shows that maybe they can't find a “new” way to relate to each other after the end of the Cold War. When Donald Trump was elected as American president, even with suspicions that Russia could have meddled in the election, there has been dialogue. Although, there have been no significant changes compared to the previous administration, especially given the latest acts from Russia's side. The annexation of Crimea was an act of showing power, showing that Russia can also act unilaterally, as Russian government is trying to be recognized as a great power again. Russia's search for this recognition and this identity of being a great power can be seen as an increasing threat, and that's why the “New Cold War” can be just a narrative. But the West acquiring force as Russia pursues its greatness in an attempt to stop this kind of behaviour with sanctions, and words, but few acts, sounds like the Cold War we know.

Donald Trump seems to be a small variable in this equation. Russia is going after it's greatness, and he doesn't have enough power, alone, to stop Putin at this moment. As they said after their summit this year, nor Putin or Trump believe in improvements in their relationship⁵⁷.

For now...

Given the moment faced by Russia, the country tried to approach the West, what did not work completely. Western attitudes gave reason to Russian claims that they were a country disrespected, and that their opinions were not heard. The semi-isolation in which Russia was led to a sense of nationalism among its people and then the country was going to act and not just remain reactive. Created again a "second world".

Given the situations exposed as the expansion of NATO to Eastern Europe, the terrorist attacks of 09/11 and the issue of missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, Libya and other factors Russia has used these situations to establish itself in the international scenario. Through its foreign policy, Russia is defining its new identity as a great power again and instrumentalizing it to achieve their interests, from the creation of external threats, as was the case analyzed through the three stages mentioned above.

However, as already placed, the identity is in a constant process of transformation, as well as Russia itself. This newborn state seems to be in a constant state of transformation since 1991, which is latent when analyzing its relationship with the West, for example. In this theme, Russia has demonstrated quite pragmatically under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, seeking to adapt to the international scenario for his own constant reinvention. The question that arises is that constant search for an identity, looking through a lense of enemies in order to establish itself as a state, and even more, while a state representative internationally to not endanger the safety of all in the region. After all, according to the theoretical contributions of Ashley⁵⁸, both the "issue of sovereignty", as the "heroic practices", put the State as the great protector of the population, and that this same state invariably needs to rebuild. In this sense, it seems that Russia is doomed to seek enemies, and thus will be caught in a trap to feel threatened and therefore end up threatening others with the use of violence in the name of an inescapable identity.

It seems that the (re)construction of the parts leads them to meet halfway with certain constancy, destabilizing regional security ties that can be observed through some threats, but as in the Cold War, there are more in rhetoric than in practice.

⁵⁷ *Trump and Putin Will Call Their Summit a Success. But Don't Expect U.S.-Russia Relations to Improve*, "Time", July 6, 2018, <<http://time.com/5331253/trump-putin-summit-russia-united-states-relations/>> (1.08.2018).

⁵⁸ R. K. Ashley, *op. cit.*

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II. GUEST ARTICLES

„Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem”

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ELEMENTS OF RUSSIAN HYBRID WAR IN THE EAST-EUROPEAN SPACE AND CAUCASUS

Abstract:

As a result of the geopolitical metamorphoses of the 1990s, the Russian Federation is trying to regain its lost positions. One of the most debated topics was undoubtedly the issue of Russia's new role on the international arena. Within a decade since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the former USSR, the Russian Federation is trying to restore its status as a great power, re-launching a policy of restoring the zone of influence in the post-Soviet space. This paper analyzes the strategies of the Russian Federation to maintain in its sphere of influence the East-European and South-Caucasian space.

Keywords:

Russian Federation, geopolitical interest, strategy, power, influence zone, space

As a result of the geopolitical metamorphoses of the 1990s, the Russian Federation is trying to regain its lost positions. One of the most debated topics was undoubtedly the issue of Russia's new role on the international arena. In the early 1990s, the dominant idea was the one that started from the existence of a single superpower, but did not realistically assess the multiple consequences of promoting the new order based on this indisputable political

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reality. In a much more complicated situation, there is the Russian Federation, which claims that the US assured that after the collapse of the USSR, the former Soviet republics as well as the former USSR states would remain in its sphere of influence or at most adopt the status of neutrality. It is known that the states that were part of the Warsaw Treaty joined NATO and/or the EU. Even the three Baltic States - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, former union republics, did the same. Russia perceived NATO membership of these states in 2004 as a great loss and a direct threat to its integrity and security³.

Geopolitically, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) space is not a monolith. It is the factor of Russia that determines the geopolitical division of mentioned region. Analyzing from a geopolitical point of view the position of the CIS states, in relation to the Russian Federation, they can be divided into two categories - 1) states oriented in their foreign policy to a great extent towards cooperation with Russia - Belarus, Armenia and the states of Central Asia, and 2) states which tend towards autonomy in their foreign policy and independence from the Russian Federation - Georgia (until 2008 when it was part of CIS), Ukraine, Azerbaijan and the Republic of Moldova. The first category of states created, at the initiative of Russia, various organizations within the CIS - the Euro-Asian Economic Community, the Union of Central Asian States, the European Economic Area, the Collective Security Treaty Organization or the Shanghai Collaboration Organization. The states of the second category were organized in GUAM⁴.

A decade after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the former USSR, the Russian Federation has been trying to re-establish its status as a great power, re-launching a policy of restoring the zone of influence in the post-Soviet space. In relations with the neighbouring countries in order to secure a future and the international arena, Russia has its own *modus operandi*⁵.

Analyzing Russia's main foreign policy objectives and directions set out in the Russian Federation's Security Strategy by 2020, approved by Presidential Decree 12th May 2009, we can conclude that Russia's long-term strategic interest is to turn the Russian Federation in a global power, and the international system - in a multi-polar one. The nearby neighbourhood (*blijnee zarubejje*), which in fact is the post-Soviet space, is seen by Moscow as an exclusive influence zone, in which the Russian Federation manifests geostrategic interests⁶.

³ M. Atanasiu, M. Calopăreanu, *Capacitatea combativă a forțelor militare ale Federației Ruse. Mit sau realitate. Revista de Științe Militare*. Secția de Științe Militare a Academiei Oamenilor de Știință din România, nr. 2 (43), anul XVI, 2016, pp.68-80.

⁴ I. Tăbîrță, V. Berbeca, *Proiectul CSI: anatomia unui eșec*. Politici Publice, Institutul pentru Dezvoltare și Inițiative Sociale (IDIS) „Viitorul”. nr.7, 2009, p.13.

⁵ K. E. Sorokin, *Geopolitika sovremennosti i geostrategiya Rossii*, Moskva 2009, p.170.

⁶ J. Nye, R. Kagan, *Le Smart power américain au XXI^e siècle* <<http://lebulletindamerique.com/2011/03/14/joseph-nye-et-robert-kagan-le-smart-power-americain-au-xxie-siecle-i/>> (22.03.2018).

For a better understanding of the foreign policy and the geostrategic interest of the Russian Federation, it is necessary to analyze these phenomena through the use of *hard power* or the so-called hard policy, exercised through military or economic, but also through *soft power* or loyal policy pursued through non-military means - media, television in order to exert pressure⁷. Thus, in order to achieve its objectives, the Russian Federation uses a series of traditional or *hard power* measures, such as military actions, just like in Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008 or economic sanctions (Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus).

Vladimir Putin, who became president of the Russian Federation in 2000, through his actions, demonstrates that he wants to reconstruct as much territory as possible from the former Soviet Union. Obviously, a step in this direction was the reintegration of Ukraine into the area of influence of the Russian Federation. So, through his policies, the President of Russia is trying to rebuild the Russian influence in the geopolitical space, the former Soviet space, to bring Russia back to the status of a great global power, and to promote this newly recreated Russian civilized identity on the international agenda. To this end, President V. Putin uses all the political, economic, diplomatic, imagistic and military instruments available to him, in order to achieve the goal that many specialists call “imperialist”. Thus, Russia has resumed to actively promoting its interests in worldwide, which has led to direct confrontations with international influential powers. In this context, Russia's economic revitalization, political and economic elites have begun to support President Putin's expansive policy. Russia has shown that it does not hesitate to use the armed force if it believes its interests are at stake⁸.

Thus, on August 8th, 2008, Russian armed forces entered South Ossetia using tanks and a mechanized infantry supported by aviation. South Ossetia was unofficially allied with Russia, which acted to prevent Georgia from absorbing the region. The counterattack was rigorously planned and executed competently, and within only 48 hours the Russians managed to defeat the Georgian main force. On August 10th, the Russians strengthened their position in South Ossetia and on August 11th they expanded their offensive to Georgia, attacking two directions. One direction was south from South Ossetia to the Georgian town Gori. Another direction came from Abkhazia, second secessionist region allied with Russian Federation. This attack was designed to cut the road between the capital Tbilisi and the Georgian ports. At this time, the Russians bombed the military airports of Marmeuil and Vaziani and apparently shut down the radar at the international airport in Tbilisi. These movements

⁷ G. Friedman, *Războiul ruso-georgian și echilibrul puterii*, <<http://inlinedreapta.net/razboiul-ruso-georgian-si-echilibrul-puterii/>> (08.03.2018).

⁸ N. Afanas, *Consecințele confruntării geostrategice Rusia-NATO pentru securitatea Republicii Moldova*, <<http://realismpolitik.wordpress.com/2014/02/13/consecintele-confruntarii-geostrategice-nato-rusia-pentru-securitatea-republicii-moldova/>> (20.03.2018).

brought Russian forces only 40 miles from the capital of Georgia, making it difficult to supply material and provide Georgian reserve forces.

In order to understand the Russian way of thinking, we must appeal to two events. The first is the Orange Revolution of Ukraine. From the point of view of the United States (US) and Europeans, the Orange Revolution represented a triumph of Western democracy and influence. From the point of view of the Russian Federation, the Orange Revolution was a CIA-funded domestic affair of Ukraine, which was meant to attract Ukraine into NATO and add it to Russia's encirclement. US Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton have promised Russia that NATO will not expand into the former Soviet empire. This promise has already been violated in 1998 through NATO expansion in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, and in 2004, by expanding not only the rest of the former Soviet allies in what is now Central and Eastern Europe but also in the three Baltic States, which were part of the Soviet Union⁹.

Although the Russian Federation has tolerated the waves of NATO's expansion to the East, talks on the inclusion of Ukraine in NATO have been a fundamental threat to Russia's national security, which would have made Russia undependable and would have even provoked a destabilization of the Russian Federation. The US intention was to suggest that Georgia can become a member, which would have brought NATO to the middle of the Caucasus, prompted the Russian conclusion, which was that United States in particular intends to encircle and defeat Russia. The second, no less important event was the decision of the European Union (EU) and the United States to support the separation of Kosovo from Serbia. The Russians are the friends of Serbia, but Russia's firm intention was the following: since World War II, the principle of Europe was that, in order to prevent conflicts, national borders must not be changed. If this principle was violated in Kosovo, other border movements – including demands from separatist regions in Russia – could follow. The Russians have asked, both publicly and in private talks, not to grant Kosovo independence, but continue with its autonomy, which was almost the same in practical terms. But Russia's demands were ignored.

The Russian Federation was convinced that the United States engaged in a strategic encirclement plan of Russia. With Kosovo's experience, the Russians have come to the conclusion that the US and the EU were not prepared to take into account the wishes of the Russian Federation, even in the smallest aspects, which can be considered as the turning point in the Russian-Western relations. When the West fails to take account the interests of the Russian Federation, even in minor situations, the confrontation between them was obvious. Getting no response in the case of Kosovo, Russia has decided to attack where it has all the strengths - in South Ossetia. Based on this context, Moscow can justify its actions for two reasons, the least important being to make it equal to the West

⁹ G. Friedman, *Războiul ruso-georgian și echilibrul puterii*, <<http://inlinedreapta.net/razboiul-ruso-georgian-si-echilibrul-puterii/>> (08.03.2018).

after the Kosovo episode. If Kosovo's independence was declared under the sphere of Western interest, then South Ossetia and Abkhazia, may be declared independent under the protection of the Russian Federation¹⁰.

Analyzing the actions of president Putin, one can observe not the intention of restoring the Soviet Union, but the desire to restore the sphere of influence of Russia in the post-Soviet space. In order to achieve this goal, Russia responded based on two arguments: first, the restoration of the credibility of the Russian Armed Forces as a fighting force, at least at the regional level and secondly, to ensure that the US guarantees, including the NATO membership, is nothing in the face of the Russian Federation power. Also, the Russian president, by avoiding a direct confrontation with NATO forces, through another Georgia-aligned geopolitical actor, has tried to confront these two power centres. In this context, Georgia was the perfect choice.

Thus, by invading Georgia in August 2008, as it was done (in a competent, if not exemplary way), V. Putin restored the credibility of the Russian army. That is why the war in Georgia can be considered as return of Russia to the status of great power. The events in Georgia are the exemplification of whole process that had developed since the moment when Putin had come to power. Russia's goal is to use *hard power* tools to assert its geostrategic interests in the new reality in the South Caucasus¹¹.

The occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014 proved to be the most dangerous geopolitical event in the post-cold war period and perhaps even after the Cuban missile crisis. Fighting Crimea could trigger two types of actions, both of them were detrimental to Europe's long-term stability. The first option was Russia's regaining the influence on region; the right to withdraw borders and to exercise its veto power over the governments of the neighbouring states. The second possibility was to provoke the Ukrainian government to a backlash, supported by Westerners. This reaction could lead to a Yugoslav-style civil war, basically demonstrated by events in the eastern area of Ukraine - Donetsk and Lugansk. An "anti-terrorist" operation was launched by officials in Kiev in April 2014 in order to stifle pro-Russian armed insurrection in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions. Petro Poroşenko, the president of Ukraine, said in a speech that he would refuse any "compromise" with Russia on his country's European orientation and Crimean membership of Ukraine. NATO officials said they "are concerned that Russian troops at the border with Ukraine may pose a threat to the southeast of Ukraine". Moreover, after massive Russian troops concentrated on the border with Ukraine, V. Putin said that "Russia is now counting on equal relations with Western states, after defending its geopolitical interests in the Ukrainian crisis, and will continue to defend the interests ethnic Russians from other states". This statement by the

¹⁰ *Ibidem.*

¹¹ J. Nye, R. Kagan, *op. cit.*

Russian President only confirms the plan to regain Russian influence in the former Soviet states¹².

In analyze of the events in Ukraine, three interrelated levels can be identified in the Russian Federation's military strategy:

Level 1 - doctrinal unilateralism. Russia has relied on the principle that successful use of force generates legitimation of action. The weak US and EU reaction has validated this principle.

Level 2 - strong (apparent) adherence to legalism. Beyond the real aspects of the legality of the actions of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, they have been permanently supported on some valid legal acts, creating the appearance of legality, thus:

- President Putin has asked the Russian Council, the upper house of the Russian parliament, to "authorize" the use, if necessary, of military power in Ukraine. On 1st March 2014, the use of the Russian army in Ukraine was authorized. Subsequently, for reasons of promoting a legalistic-pacifist image, at the request of V. Putin, the Council of the Russian Federation revoked the resolution authorizing the use of the Russian army in Ukraine. The decision was taken with 153 possible votes out of 154 and entered into force on the date of approval;
- the non-use of military power in the Crimea, along with the authorization given by the Council of the Russian Federation, is used by V. Putin as a sign of his pacifist intentions;
- the fact that the Russian troops in the Crimea did not exceed the limits set by the agreement to station the Russian Federation's fleet in the Black Sea in the Crimea, even if their number increased, is presented by the Russian Federation as an argument on the assertion that it did not occupy the Crimea by military force.

Level 3 - supporting the referendum promoted by the pro-Russian political forces in the Crimea. The Russian Federation supports its intervention, arguing for the right to self-determination of the Crimean population, similar to the case in Kosovo. The recent campaign of Russia in the Crimea was an impressive demonstration of strategic communication, one that, despite having many similarities to those in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, nevertheless presents a number of specific features, reflecting the operationalization of the new military directives of Russia that are hoped to be implemented by 2020. The success of this campaign is due to the fact that in just three weeks the morale of the Ukrainian military was so badly affected that all 190 units capitulated. Instead of relying on the massive deployment of tanks and artillery, Russia used assault forces worth less than 10.000 soldiers - already stationed in Crimea, mostly marine infantry, supported by several battalions of airborne troops and Special Forces Commands - Spetsnaz. In addition, the heaviest vehicles used

¹² N. Afanas, *op.cit.*, p. 128.

the TAB-80 Armoured Conveyors (Armoured Carriers). They fought a force of about 16.000 Ukrainian soldiers¹³.

In the newly created geopolitical context, it is possible that a new type of war - the hybrid war - will somehow satisfy Moscow's aspirations, in view of the fact that a potential tension in the relationship with the West is believed to bring Russia back to political importance and the lost superpower status after the dismantling of the USSR, also giving it the opportunity to talk on a par with the US. All these confrontations will take time to establish a new balance of power on the international arena.

The Russian Federation will not surrender Ukraine to the West and will not be willing to leave Crimea and Sevastopol. Ukraine, in its current territorial format, has no chance of joining the EU or NATO, regardless of the enthusiasm of the new leaders in Kiev or even the will of the majority of the Western population. Georgia with Abkhazia and South Ossetia is in the same situation, where the prospect of joining the Euro-Atlantic structures of the states that hold them formally is limited. The restoration of the sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia in former Soviet states is the overriding objective of Russia's policy, an objective that can be achieved through the support of ethnic Russians inhabiting those territories¹⁴.

Another Russian *hard power* tool is the economy, very often used by the Russian Federation to achieve geostrategic interests in Eastern Europe. Oil and gas are the most valuable resources of Russia. After his inauguration, president Putin used the energy dependence of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and many European states to bargaining and blackmail. Thus, in 2006 and in the winter of 2008-2009, as a result of some misunderstandings, the Russian Federation stopped Ukraine's gas supply for a while. The decision to take over Crimea is considered to be the result of a cumulus of factors, one of which is that in September 2013 Ukraine signed concession agreements for the exploration and exploitation of the Black Sea gas fields, a step that would reduce energy dependence on Russia. The agreements concerned the "exploitation of a North-western gas perimeter, a gas field estimated at almost 8-10 billion cubic meters".

At the same time, Russia started the economic project of building Eurasian Economic Union that would include as many of the former USSR satellites as possible. At present, in the union prefigured to launch in 2015, only Belarus and Kazakhstan were attracted by Russia. Bringing Ukraine into this Eurasian economic circle would have followed President V. Putin's plan to bring Russia back to the stage as an essential actor on international scene¹⁵.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 133.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 159.

¹⁵ I. W. Andronova, *Vneshneekonomicheskiye aspekty natsionalnykh interesov Rossii na postsovetском prostranstve*, Moskva 2010, p. 383

Economy is one of the tool in international relations and one of the main strengths of Russia. Rich in raw materials Russian Federation is an energetic power primarily (with more than 18% of world gas reserves, ranked second in the world, and 5% of world oil reserves). Russia's strategy is articulated over a project aimed at maintaining the influence over former Soviet states that it was in conflict with (Moldova, Georgia, 2014 Ukraine, which have a Euro-Atlantic orientation)¹⁶. Analyzing the energy aspect, it is noteworthy that Gazprom's tough behaviour towards Ukraine has a (geo) political and (geo) economic connotation, in line with the pro-Soviet orientation of official authorities in Kiev. At the level of official statements and actions, Moscow makes it clear in an explicit manner that it will never accept the proximity of pro-Western military structures in the closest neighbourhood. Thus, the energy blackmail against Kiev and Chisinau is only a pressure tool to ensure Russian national security. On the one hand, it is a signal for the West to extend its influence to the East (especially political and military), which undermines Russia's geostrategic interest in the region. On the other hand, these actions are permanent warnings for Ukraine and including the Republic of Moldova, prompting them to review their own position on accession to Western structures. Moscow's intent is to influence the domestic political situation in Ukraine, but also in the South Caucasian states, which is unstable due to differences in positions and disagreements between different political forces¹⁷.

The geographic position of Ukraine and the pipeline network built during the Soviet Union have determined that this state plays a rather important role in the continental energy sector. Consequently, Ukraine is now positioned as an important actor in European energy security, so Russian-Ukrainian energy disputes are not only a Ukrainian or Russian problem, but they get a geopolitical character. It was mentioned that through the Ukrainian territory about 80% of the natural gas resources imported from Russia by the EU is transited, which represents 25% of the total volume imported by the community states. Similarly, the Ukrainian region transits the West-East corridor, constituting an axis of connection between mainland Europe and Central Asia and the Caspian region. At the same time, this space forms the North-South corridor, a demonstration in this respect being the Blue Stream gas pipeline connecting Russia and Turkey. Obviously, there is a competition between these two axes, characterized not only by geopolitical but also technical aspects.

There is now a diplomatic struggle between the West and Russia for this region, given that Ukraine provides access to a rich area with energy resources. Moreover, if we take into account the Turkish route, then we note that it does

¹⁶ *La stratégie russe dans l'espace post-soviétique: entre soft et hard power. Le cas de l'Ukraine*, <<http://www.justicepaix.be/?article591>> (22.02.2018).

¹⁷ A. Tinguy, *Russie: le syndrome de la puissance*, <<http://ceriscope.sciences-po.fr/puissance/content/part4/russie-le-syndrome-de-la-puissance?page=3>> (22.02.2018).

not reduce Ukraine's importance in terms of hydrocarbon transit. The Ukrainian card could serve as an alternative to possible negative developments in the Turkish region, for example escalating the conflict around the Kurdish minority.

Gazprom's tough policy, which has had a negative impact on both Kiev and Brussels, explicitly expresses political and geopolitical connotations on the basis of Russia's geopolitical interests in its immediate neighbourhood. Moscow has repeatedly made clear that it will never accept the proximity of pan-Western military structures in the immediate vicinity, and to prevent such a situation, Russia is able to act in the most drastic way. Thus, the energy blackmail to Kiev is only a first step of Russia to ensure national security. Also to signal the US and NATO to disengage from the policies that go against Russia's interest, which in Ukraine's case is a vital one. At the same time, it is also a warning to Ukraine, causing it to revise its own position regarding its accession to Western structures. Obviously, the Kremlin also pursues certain trade and energy interests. In this context, it would be better to draw attention to a nuance. The official cause of the gas conflict between Ukraine and Russia was not the failure of Kiev to pay the gas debt. However, it cannot be forgotten that the debt of Transnistria is much higher, it clearly show that the real reason for the conflict between Kiev and Moscow had no financial connotation, but geopolitical and geo-energetic¹⁸.

Republic of Belarus like the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine is dependent on the energy resources of the Russian Federation. Gazprom acquired 50% of Belarus's shares in Beltransgaz. In response to this step, Minsk demands the observance of two conditions: the first is that the pipelines used for Russian gas transit are always full and the second condition is that the gas price for Belarus is the same as for Russia. Belarus paid 150 dollars for 1000 cubic meters of Russian gas (the price for the Russian region near the border, Smolensk, is much lower). Since 2011, Minsk has been buying gas at the European average, minus the transit and export taxes. With regard to oil, President Lukashenko is ready to sell assets held at oil refineries to buy fuel without charging taxes. At present, only 6.3 million tons of Russian oil imported by Belarus is exempt from customs duties, with the Russian authorities periodically threatening to cancel all fiscal facilities. Also, the Russian authorities frequently interrupted the oil supply of the main refineries in Belarus as a result of the repeated refusal of the Minsk regime to accept the conditions imposed by Moscow on the taxation of the delivered oil and the sale of the main Belarusian refineries to the Russian companies. According to the

¹⁸ A. Baltag, *Arma energetică a Rusiei ca instrument de presiune și de influență în spațiul ex-sovietic* (cazul Republicii Moldova și al Ucrainei), Asociația pentru Politică Externă, <<http://www.ape.md/doc.php?l=ro&idc=156&id=1139>> (02.02.2018).

“Karadeniz Press” press agency, the energy conflict was triggered by Lukoil and the oil giant’s intention to purchase the Naftan refinery in Belarus¹⁹.

The Russia-Belarus relations can be examined in the light of the latest events in eastern Ukraine and the reaction of the international community to the actions and policy of the Russian Federation regarding the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula, it is worth mentioning that these have recently become contradictory. In the context of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, Belarusian president A. Lukashenko pursues a policy of supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity, a policy that does not suit the Kremlin. Russia’s response to Lukashenko’s statements does not remain unnoticed, Russia again appealing to the use of the *hard power* strategy towards Belarus - imposing embargoes on Belarusian products. Taking into account the situation created by the imposition of embargoes on the Russian Federation by the US and European countries, Belarus could have served as a connecting link between the Russian Federation and the EU. Belarus is willing to buy products from other states, then to expose them to Russia’s markets. This scheme of action is not in contradiction with the sanctions imposed by the US and the EU on the Russian Federation or the international agreements, these transactions would only be beneficial to Belarus²⁰.

The Minsk Summit with the participation of Western Leaders Angela Merkel - Chancellor of Germany, Francois Hollande - ex-President of France, Barack Obama ex-US President, P. Poroshenko - President of Ukraine, respectively V. Putin - President of the Russian Federation, brings Belarus to the international community’s attention. In the context of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, Belarus serves as the pacifist side between the conflicting parties - the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The Minsk Forum became the arena of East-West confrontations between the Russian Federation and the West, and the Belarusian authorities are trying to take advantage of the situation created to intensify their relations with the West, which, after the Minsk Summit, has become more open towards Belarus. In the European space, Belarus’s pacifist image in Russian-Ukrainian relations is rising. NATO forces on the Belarusian border pose a threat to Russia’s security, and this situation will lead to increased Russian presence in the region, and without the support of Belarus, this plan is harder to achieve²¹.

Another tool of Russia’s *hard power* to achieve geostrategic interests through the use of the economic weapon is to impose embargoes on different products. Since March 2006, Russia has introduced various sanctions against

¹⁹ V. Goncharov, *Președintele belarus Lukașenko, înșenuncheat de Gazprom*, <<http://karadeniz-press.ro/kara/belarus-sclava-gazprom/>> (02.02.2018).

²⁰ W. Li, *Teoriya mezhdunarodnogo prognozirovaniya: Nauchnaya kniga*, <http://www.globalaffairs.ru/book/n_1596> (20.02.2018).

²¹ W. Odinochenko, *Sovremennaya Belarus mezhdru Vostokom i Zapadom: politicheskiy aspekt problemy*, <<http://www.geopolitika.lt/?artc=7212>> (01.03.2018).

exporters in Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus and Republic of Moldova. The analyze of these sanctions factors, brings only one result, that the reason in every case was the disobedience or intent of the former Soviet states to leave the sphere of influence of the Russian Federation. Thus, the embargo imposed by Russia on 1.000 Belarusian dairy products in 2008 would have been caused by the Minsk authorities' failure to recognize the independence of the two separatist regions of Georgia - Abkhazia and South Ossetia²².

Similar sanctions were imposed on a large number of post-Soviet countries. In 2004, when Mikheil Saakashvili came to power, Georgia refocused its foreign policy vector to a pro-European and pro-Atlanticist course. In this context, Russia began to use its infallible instruments. In 2004, South Ossetia's forces, the separatist region of Georgia, arrested several Georgian soldiers. In 2005, the main pipeline transiting Russian gas to Georgia exploded in the middle of winter in the North Caucasus region. Another instrument used by the Russian Federation was the expulsion in 2006 of tens of thousands of Georgian emigrants working in Russia, and in the same year, Russia forbids the import of Georgian products²³. The ban on Russian imports of Georgian and Moldovan wines started at the end of March 2006 and created a major diplomatic conflict between the Republic of Moldova and Georgia on one hand and Russia on the other. The wine trade with Russia at that time occupied 80-90% of all wine exports between the two countries. Russia's chief health inspector Gennady Onishchenko said that heavy metals and pesticides were found in Georgian wines and that they falsified alcoholic products labelled as wines. The Russian consumer protection agency argued that it had examined 21 Georgian wine varieties sold in Moscow and concluded that 85.7% did not meet the sanitary requirements. The ban on wine imports has come at a time of worsening diplomatic relations between states in the context of the changes brought by the Revolution of the Roses and the transition to pro-NATO and pro-EU direction in Georgia²⁴.

In the same context can be consider the embargoes of the Russian Federation in the fall of 2013 imposed on Ukraine's chocolate products. By making a careful analysis of the conditions in which these sanctions were imposed by Russia, it is obvious that all these actions had a geopolitical and geostrategic character. The Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, 28-29 November 2013, where ex-soviet states Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia were

²² V. Goncharov, *Embargo comercial extins al Rusiei asupra unor produse lactate din Belarus*, <<http://www.europalibera.org/archive/news/20090610/445/445.html?id=1750739>> (02.03.2018).

²³ *Embargoul rusesc sau un șut în fund este întotdeauna un pas înainte*, <<http://bloguvern.md/2013/09/12/embargoul-rusesc-sau-un-sut-in-fund-este-intotdeauna-un-pas-inainte/>> (02.03.2018).

²⁴ *Embargoul rus asupra vinurilor din Republica Moldova și Georgia*, <<http://www.culiuc.com/archives/2008/03/agriculture4.phtml>> (22.02.2018).

expected to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union, precipitates the geopolitics of the post-Soviet space. Russia resorted to all the instruments available to obstruct the European course assumed by these states. Russia's pressures have grown with the intensification of the relations of these states with the European Union and the finalization of the negotiations on the Association Agreement, implicitly the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement.

By analyzing the *hard power* strategies, it is worth mentioning that the Russian Federation does not have enough levers to achieve its interests in the Eastern European member states of the EU, as opposed to the former Soviet republics. Relations of the Russian Federation with the former member states of the Warsaw Treaty, some *hard power* of Russia can be revealed. In this context, can also analyzed the imposition of the embargo by the Russian Federation on meat products of Polish origin in 2005. According to the Polish Agriculture Minister Andrzej Lepper, the Russian-Polish relations were more of a political nature, Russia's actions being conditioned by the location of the US missile shield in Poland. According to N. Volcikova, the chief economist at the Centre for Economic and Financial Studies, the Russian Federation does not want to cool relations with Poland, its actions are dictated by the fact that the imported meat of Indian origin is imported through Poland. N. Volcikova also believes Russia's reaction to Polish products is conditioned by the location of the anti-missile shield in Poland. In this context, the Russian Federation's decision of 1 January 2007 to impose an embargo on meat products from the EU states, especially those from Bulgaria and Romania, fell under the pretext that the animals are bred in unsanitary conditions. However, the prime cause of the embargo was more a political decision, since Romania and Bulgaria become EU members²⁵.

Aware of the risk of Russia's marginalization around the world, the state leadership is looking for ways to bring the Russian Federation back, to impose influence on the international arena. Lately, Russia has noticed that the use of traditional means is not enough to achieve geostrategic interests. Thus, in addition to the *hard power*, characterized by the use of military and economic resources, the Russian Federation, in order to maintain the former Soviet states in its sphere of influence, also calls on the ability to influence others through *soft power*. The *soft* concept is the antonym of the *hard* one, which is the coercive, military and economic force. *Sensu stricto* the *soft power* in the opinion of Joseph Nye, is the ability of a state to get what it wants from another state. Thus, a state, through *soft power*, develops without using its military defence capability²⁶. Russia's *soft power* focuses on a mix of means including nationalist ideology, symbol manipulation, and nostalgia for the past, an

²⁵ V. Goncharov, *op.cit.*

²⁶ *Soft power, hard power et smart power: le pouvoir selon Joseph Nye*, <<http://www.slate.fr/story/88487/soft-power-hard-power-smart-power-pouvoir-joseph-nye>> (22.11.2017).

economically and politically attractive genre for emigrants in former Soviet states²⁷. If *hard power* is an actor's ability to achieve its goals by military means, *soft power* can be defined as the ability to achieve goals through attraction, persuasion or seduction²⁸. *Soft power* focuses on attracting cultural, ideological, foreign policy values of the state²⁹.

The wars in Georgia and Ukraine launched the issue of Russia's position on the international arena, using, besides *hard power*, new *soft power* tools such as electronic warfare, intimidation, bribery, Internet propaganda, the media, seeking to undermine Ukraine's resistance and avoid the use of military power³⁰. The result was a clear military victory, through the operationalization of a well-organized strategic communication campaign, using political, psychological and information tools - what the military writers call "the war of the new generation". To avoid inducing the erroneous impression that we are discussing about new generation of wars that would have been inaugurated by Russia on the occasion of the Crimean actions, should be pointed out that the military actions included in this category are in fact known as the generic category of the "fourth generation war". In American documents it is known as "irregular warfare", which covers but is not limited to, terrorist/anti-terrorist actions and insurgency/counterinsurgency. Therefore, Russia's vision of modern war is based on the idea that the main space of struggle is the human mind. As a result, the war of the new generation will be dominated by confrontations in the information and psychological field. Superiority to the enemy's troops and weapon systems will be accomplished by affecting the psyche and morale of the armed forces and its civilian population, the primary objective being to minimize the need to displace hard power by determining the military and the opponent's civilian population to support the attacker's actions, to the detriment of their own governments and countries. In this context, it is interesting to observe the notion of "permanent war", as it implies a "permanent adversary". In the current geopolitical structure, the clear enemy of the Russian Federation is the *Western civilization* - values, culture, political system and Western ideology³¹.

For the specific case of Crimea, at the centre of the operational planning, the Russians placed the idea of influencing. To exploit this idea, they used all

²⁷ G. Friedman, Războiul ruso-georgian și echilibrul puterii, <<http://inlinedreapta.net/razboiul-ruso-georgian-si-echilibrul-puterii/>> (08.09.2017).

²⁸ *Sur le Soft (et Hard) Power: les deux faces de la médaille*, <<http://terrealalune.blogspot.com/2011/07/sur-le-soft-et-hard-power-les-deux.html>> (22.11.2017).

²⁹ *Logiques et ressources élémentaires du «soft power»*, <<http://www.inaglobal.fr/idees/note-de-lecture/joseph-s-nye-jr/soft-power/culture-et-soft-power>> (22.11.2017).

³⁰ *Putin y el "soft power"*, <<http://ar.bastiondigital.com/notas/putin-y-el-%E2%80%9Csoft-power%E2%80%9D>> (22.11.2017).

³¹ M. Atanasiu, *Rolul Ucrainei în politica expansionistă a Federației Ruse*, „Gândirea militară românească. Revista de teorie și știință militară editată de Statul Major General al Armatei Române”, București, nr. iulie-august, 2014, p. 132

the tools they had in mind: ingenious internal communication methods, misleading operations, psychological operations, well-built external communication. Misleading operations were carried out on the territory of the Russian Federation in the form of military exercises, including in the Kaliningrad region, to increase the degree of insecurity of the former Soviet republics, Poland and in the Baltic States. In terms of strategic communication, the Ukrainian media became inaccessible, and the Russian channels strongly promoted the Russian Federation's version, building a parallel reality that, in public perception, legitimized Russia's actions. Of crucial importance was the inborn understanding of three target audiences, particularly their likely behaviour: the Crimean-speaking Russian *majority population*, the Ukrainian *government leadership* and the *international community* - specifically NATO and the EU. Armed with these means, the Russian Federation has thus demonstrated that the old Soviet art of *reflexive control* is present. By *reflexive control* can be understand the control over the opponent by influencing the relationship he has with himself: determining that he voluntarily takes the predetermined and desired decisions of the initiator of the action³².

For this purpose, since 2003-2004, Russia has been looking for new means of action that have the objective of influencing and gaining access to its ideas and theses: to restructure RIA Novosti, the main Russian information agency, to modernize external audiovisuals, creating a network of programs such as Russia Today (RT), with a 24-hour broadcast (broadcasting in English since 2005, in Arabic – since 2007, in Spanish – since 2009), create the Valdai Discussion Club, NGO's and foundations that have the mission to strengthen Russia's presence on the international arena. Of a significant importance is also Runet – the Russian Internet. In order to strengthen its presence in the field of innovation, it initiates a branding policy through the Skolkovo project³³.

In order to achieve its goals in foreign policy, Russia needs to improve its perception on the international arena. V. Putin uses in his game a new tactics, that of *smart power*, which includes in the nearby neighbouring countries influence through popular means controlled by the Russian Federation, including Russian-language television channels broadcast abroad, which are much more famous than the local ones³⁴.

By developing *soft power*, Russia faces a number of problems. The transition from the ubiquitous propaganda from the time of the former USSR to the information on the aspects concerning the image of the Russian Federation is monopolized by the image of President V. Putin³⁵. Partnerships in the cultural

³² *Ibidem*, p. 133.

³³ *Quand la Russie montre sa puissance... douce*, <<http://fortune.fdesouche.com/296173-quand-la-russie-montre-sa-puissance-douce>> (22.03.2018).

³⁴ *La stratégie russe dans l'espace post-soviétique: entre soft et hard power. Le cas de l'Ukraine*, <<http://www.justicepaix.be/?article591>> (22.02.2018).

³⁵ A. Tinguay, *Russie: le syndrome de la puissance*, <<http://ceriscope.sciences-po.fr/puissance/content/part4/russie-le-syndrome-de-la-puissance?page=3>> (22.11.2017).

and scientific field are another aspect of the humanitarian direction and its main purpose is to stop the process of changing history in the post-Soviet space. Thus, with the creation of “Ruskii Mir” Foundation Centres, Russian literature, history books and other materials meant to prevent any other interpretation.

Mass media is also one of the main sources of information for most of the CIS population. The Russian press is used as one of the tools by which the Russian Federation promotes its policy in the region. A proof of this is also the case for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus where over the years several Russian media attitudes have been observed, which took place at the same time as the Russian official speech to these countries. In addition to traditional propaganda tools, through news bulletins, analytical broadcasts and talk shows, indirect instruments such as films, concerts, sports and other non-political broadcasts popular outside the Russian Federation are often used. These are often more effective than those with a political character.

Events caused by the Russian Federation in Ukraine, resulting in the annexation of Crimea and the city of special status Sevastopol, as well as the serious destabilization of the security situation in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, had a special impact on the states in the vicinity of Russia³⁶.

Almost 25 years after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation is trying to re-establish its status as a major power. Since the second half of the 2000s, Russia has re-launched its policy of restoring the superpower status. The main objective of Russia is to have influence in the post-Soviet space, which remains an area in which the Russian Federation has geostrategic interests. In order to achieve geopolitical and geostrategic interests, the Russian Federation resorts to a wide range of power: from *hard* to *soft* power.

Taking under consideration the use of soft power, the city of Sochi as the arena of the Olympic Games can serve as an example. By organizing the Winter Olympic Games, the Russian Federation again tried to manifest itself as an important geopolitical actor on the international arena. The costs of preparations for 2014 winter competitions exceeded \$ 53 billion, being the most impressive in the history of the Olympic Games. For the first time in the history of the Olympic Games a unique Olympic park was created, with the capacity to host 75.000 guests. At the same time, participants were provided service by 25.000 volunteers trained in 26 educational institutions. During the competitions 2.800 media representatives were accredited; 3 billion viewers

³⁶ W. Usloviyakh, *Kogda Rossiyskaya Federatsiya sozdayot Respublike Moldova ekonomicheskije problemy, Yevropeyskiy soyuz otkryvayet svoi granitsy dlya moldavskoy produktsii*, <<http://point.md/ru/novosti/politika/kogda-rossiya-sozdayot-moldove-problemi-es-otkrivaet-svoi-granici>> (01.03.2018).

across the world have been able to watch the broadcast of the Olympic Games, which have been the most innovative in the history of Olympic competitions³⁷.

Currently, Russia is trying to regain its international prestige and influence, which it lost in the years after the collapse of the USSR through its policies in the relations with the West. As an objective of the Russian strategy, it is the ambition to conquer, not just through the economic and political influence, the close proximity and part of Eastern Europe, but also through the social-cultural aspect. The Olympic Games have become not only the most important social event of the last decades, but also a good way of displaying Russia on the international arena.

In addition to preparing competitions, it was also important to ensure the security of the Games and preserve the public order. For the successful unfolding of the event, the security of Sochi borders has also entered remote control - televisions, modern control points at the airport, ports, entry permit on the territory of the city, especially the control of the crossing point on Mzimta river, the control of the crossing points of the Soci-Abhazia railway³⁸.

More than 20.000 rescuers³⁹, including the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, were involved in the Olympics. Also, the armed forces were involved in operations to maintain public order and ensure security for the preparation and running of the Sochi Winter Olympics held in February 2014. Thus, according to the commander of the Russian Land Forces, General Vladimir Cirkin, as reported by Mediafax, "The security Guarantee for Preparing and Running the Olympic Games (7-23 February 2014) and Soil Paralympics" (7-16 March 2014) was part of the army's missions in operations aimed at "new threats to internal security".

While analyzing the geostrategic interests of the Russian Federation in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus, it is worth mentioning that they remain present. Given the presence and manifestation of the US and NATO interests towards the Eastern European area, the Russian Federation is making efforts to maintain the former Soviet republics in its sphere of influence. The events in Kiev that resulted in the escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis and the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula, a geostrategic point by which the Russian Federation expanded its presence in the Black Sea Basin, represent Russia's tendencies to maintain in its sphere of influence the Eastern European and South Caucasian regions. Russia's use of the *hard* and *soft power* strategies in order to maintain the Eastern European area in its sphere of influence shows us the tendency of Russia to diminish the impact of the US, NATO and the EU in the area, considering it as threat to national security. The interest of the Russian

³⁷ *Minoborony RF budet obespechivat bezoposnost zimnikh Olimpiyskikh igr v Sochi*, <<http://www.versia.am/minoborony-rf-budet-obespechivat-bezoposnost-zimnix-olimpijskix-igr-v-sochi/>> (20.02.2018).

³⁸ *Jocurile Olimpice de Iarnă 2014 de la Soci, amenințate deschis cu atentate teroriste*, <http://stiri.tvr.ro/jocurile-olimpice-de-iarna-2014-de-la-soci-amenintate-deschis-cu-atentate-teroriste_32413.html> (14.03.2018).

³⁹ *Bezopastmost Olimpiyskikh igr Sochi - 2014*, <<http://sochi2013.com/zimnie-olimpijskie-igr-y-sochi-2014/organizaciya-igr-v-sochi/bezopasnost-olimpijskix-igr-sochi-2014/>> (21. 07.03.18).

Federation towards the Eastern European and South Caucasian states, especially the former Soviet republics, is to create a buffer zone at its borders in order not to admit the neighbouring direction with the EU and NATO.

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ANALYSIS OF THE HYBRID WAR EFFECTS ON THE SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA IN THE PRESENT SECURITY CONTEXT

Abstract:

In this work, there were described some facts of hybrid war effects on the security of the Republic of Moldova in the present security context. The subject of the work was unveiled by describing the main parts judging from the results of the analysis, elucidate and outline the effects of the multidimensional wars and why not, the hybrid warfare. An important role in this report is the focus on the hybrid war and its parts in a geopolitical context. The work carries also aspects of the levels based on new security threats from the perspective of hybrid war or new hidden conflicts. Currently, in the context of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, taking into account the complex situations arising out of hybrid military actions, guarding objectives of strategic importance require a more practical approach in planning and carrying out the mentioned actions.

Keywords:

Strategy, power, conflicts, international relations, hybrid war, Russian Federation, Ukraine.

We live in a transcendent and dynamic period in which the issue of crises and conflicts is one of the primordial themes in the work of many analysts and researchers in political sciences, but also in international relations. However, it is worth mentioning that at this stage the field of research is not exhausted, and a number of scientific investigations can be carried out in this direction to better elucidate and outline the effects of the multidimensional wars and why not the hybrid warfare.

Currently, the term “hybrid war” is used by Western experts to designate the war between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Thus, through the “hybrid” component, which has the etymon in the “hybrida”, which means

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mixing, joining. Also hybrid is the organism or cell that, as a result of genetic metamorphoses, has obtained a new form. For the current characterization of the contradictions between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, the term “unconventional warfare”, “irregular warfare”, “compound warfare”, or war sponsored by the state, virtually all forms of war that refer to the presence of military conflict, the involvement of non-military means, which often have nothing common with classical military confrontations².

The means used by the Russian Federation against Ukraine have not been completely conceptualized either by native researchers or by Westerners. The genesis of the formation of the concept of “hybrid war”, the stages of development, the components, as well as the main directions remain the focus, and will be finalized³.

In a geopolitical context, “hybrid war” is a new concept, used especially in the field of Special Forces operations, which combines the practice of the tough resilience of threats to international security with the lessons learned from the struggle against extremism of state or non-state subjects. “Hybrid war” is driven both by forces that tend to weaken or overthrow a government, act both within the state or area, and by outside forces.

The actions of the outside forces consist in supporting and converting the followers to the preparation of operative support, the impact on the economy and the social sphere, the coordination of diplomatic efforts, and certain protest actions.

For this purpose, Special Forces, research forces, criminal groups, information and psychological influence on the masses, the use of the whole range of technological innovations are involved. On a general level today, the term “hybrid war” means the relationship between the belligerent parties, referring to the incidence on international, regional security in general, and on the national oversight of a particular state.

Polemology try to include this into more or less theorized categories. Thus, for the action in the Crimea and in the South-East of Ukraine, they launched the concept of “hybrid war”.

In this paper, we analyze the effects of the hybrid war on the security of the Republic of Moldova in the current security context, given the degree of influence of the great powers on the phenomenon. There are also various instruments and mechanisms that make it possible to achieve the hybrid war phenomenon.

Starting from the broadest definitions of hybrid warfare accepted by academic communities, “hybrid war” is that war fought by one of the

² H. Bucur-Marcu, *Războiul hibrid – prolegomene (pentru publicul larg – și nu doar!)*, <www.powerpolitics.ro/razboiul-hibrid-prolegomene-pentru-publicul-larg-si-nu-doar>, (4.10.2017).

³ S. Cebotari, „Războiul Hibrid”. *Unele Considerațiuni*, “Revista Militară”, No. 1(13)/2015, p. 4.

belligerent parties by both conventional military means and non-conventional or non-military means simultaneously.

Lately, state security is increasingly confronted with a new type of threats - hybrid threats. In the opinion of the specialists, the hybrid character of the new security threats must be seen on two levels:

- organizational level - both state and non-state actors use hybrid threats when the situation and conditions impose it;
- level of methods and means - the actors involved use both conventional and unconventional means combined with the requirements of success.

In the opinion of specialists, the concept of “hybrid warfare threats” is a sophisticated combination of unrestricted activities, characterized by decentralized leadership, simultaneous military and non-military activities, combining traditional and asymmetric, terrorist actions and criminal methods, of the complex operational environment conditions⁴.

Hybrid threats highlight the organization and means of the actor that appeals to them, successfully combining strategic influence with decentralized execution⁵.

Thus, in 2011 “NATO's BiSCCC” concept, “hybrid threats” are determined as threats created by the adversary that have the capacity to use and adapt traditional and non-traditional means at the same time to achieve their own goals and interests⁶.

In actions that would destabilize the situation, the aggressive state undertakes the following actions:

- The search for sources of sponsorship of the protesters, and later of the military formations both from the outside and inside forces;
- Determination of protesters capable of participating in protest actions and actions that are peaceful, non-violent, which then become larger, turning into actions of force, which can evolve into civil wars;
- Determining slogans, as close as possible to the real demands of protesters and social groups, whose actions can be used to overthrow the leadership;
- Determining political groups and preparing leaders able to lead the protesters;
- Prepare in special camps for fighters for force actions, organize mobilization centers abroad and ways of introducing mercenaries;
- Ensure opposition support and expansion in the area, primarily from the sources of mass information both within the country and abroad. An

⁴ N. Albu, *Influența procesului de globalizare asupra securității naționale a Republicii Moldova*, Doctors Thesis, Chișinău 2007, Biblioteca Națională a Republicii Moldova, p. 14.

⁵ A. Gurău, *Terorismul de sorginte fundamentalist islamic-risc asimetric la securitate*, Universitatea „Babeș Bolyai”, Cluj Napoca 2015, p. 122.

⁶ J. D. Lewis, *The Islamic State: A Counter-Strategy for a Counter-State*, Washington 2014, p.78.

important role is a support from international organizations and the international community;

- Organizing network management structures, monitoring the situation in the area.

In the Republic of Moldova, the preoccupation with the phenomenon of hybrid war is a real one, since its negative implications, due to the presence of the Transnistrian conflict, corruption, unstable political situation, money laundering, drug trafficking, human and weapons trafficking play a significant role in the development of international terrorism.

I consider it extremely important to study in depth the phenomenon of hybrid war for the simple reason that being close to Ukraine, which is bounded by this scourge at the time, we have a real platform to study and research current events.

A hybrid war is very difficult to avoid as far as counteraction is concerned, it is possible through effective policy, transparency, effective communication with the population, and the demonstration that power is able not only to reform but actually to explain all parts of this phenomenon.

Hybrid war rises, whether we want or not, questions about hiring rules, war laws, and the rights of combatants on the battlefield. Of course, they are not upgraded to the new form of war, on the contrary, the use of unregistered, unassembled soldiers and the intervention of the so-called "green men" have introduced the tools to use gaps in international law, a position that also facilitates the avoidance of responsibilities.

This is the new type of war, lawfare which involves speculating international law in order to take advantage of the capabilities and dominant position held for its own national advantages.

Still speaking about the Republic of Moldova and the hybrid war, we can mention a number of risk factors, which allow for the development and comfortable metamorphosis of the "tension scourge" in the region.

Our state, Republic of Moldova, is a neutral, independent and sovereign state, on the one hand, and on the other hand a state buffer, a gray area, a state in which a frozen conflict, actively supported by the Russian Federation, the presence of the state army foreign to our territory, we are neighbors with Ukraine, all favor tension and conditions favorable to the development of the hybrid war in the region.

The implications of the hybrid war for Eastern Europe are not limited to Ukraine, and Russia is already looking towards the Republic of Moldova, the West has no reason to believe that the Russian Federation limits its plans for Eastern Europe to Ukraine, and the Republic of Moldova is the next point on Moscow's list, more frequently warns more officials from the Pentagon and NATO⁷.

The lack of free press is another major problem in the Republic of Moldova that favors the emergence of a hybrid war. This highlights the danger

⁷ S. Medar, *Hybrid warfare in Ukraine*, <<http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com>> (01.03.2018).

brought by the media controlled by a small group of politicians and businesspeople, and the state needs strong and independent journalists with one goal: to provide objective and rigorous accounts of current events.

It is well known that only the independent press can educate the population and fulfill its duty of "the fourth power in the state". The monopoly-controlled and controlled regime of an oligarchic regime, or even more specifically owned by one person, leads us to the idea of deliberately creating an artificial field favorable for speculation and bringing the state into the conception of a maïdan and subsequently to concrete actions for offensive hybrid actions.

Also, following the problems faced by the Republic of Moldova, there is also the risk of the 4GW scourge, which refers strictly to the confrontation of societies within states rather than to their armies, the fight in PsyOps - psychological operations, including terrorist tactics and tough insurgency, through the extensive use of terror against the civilian of that society, and certainly by using the enemy's strengths against himself, such as making use of the inertia of the state's decision-making systems, or the reduced ability to move on the ground, difficulties in deploying troops and handling in urban areas and populated environments, low levels of flexibility and adaptation to irregular warfare and tactics involving the use of human shields⁸.

In the opinion of the analysts, the succession of a pro-Kremlin president to the leadership of the Republic of Moldova opens new horizons of Russian influence in this country, including through foreign policy options, creating the perception of a bicephalic power, to which various "power" loyal to Russia: access to the Russian market, the status of migrants, the expanded role of the Russian church, the hybrid power, etc. Although they can no longer fund the separatist regime as it did a few years ago, Russian officials would like to solve the viability of this militarized enclave by attracting political forces from the Republic of Moldova into the federalist project, forcing the Republic of Moldova to accept the reintegration price the separatist region by giving up the EU, denouncing the agreements signed in 2014, and securing a veto power status for the separatist regime. Moscow could also camouflage its intentions by adopting transitional laws that would recognize the elements of sovereignty for the separatist regime⁹.

Another weak point of the Republic of Moldova, which can lead directly to the emergence of a hybrid war, is the phenomenon of corruption, political

⁸ I. Chifu, *Război hibrid, "lawfare", război informațional. Războaiele viitorului*, <https://adevarul.ro/international/in-lume/razboi-hibrid-lawfare-razboi-informatiional-razboaiele-viitorului-1_56f281ab5ab6550cb8246783/index.html> (1.10.2017).

⁹ R. Turcan, *Războiul hibrid al Rusiei împotriva Republicii Moldova. Pregătirea de către Federația Rusă a unor acțiuni care urmăresc discreditarea forțelor pro-europene din Ucraina și Republica Moldova*, <<https://cersipamantromanesc.wordpress.com/2017/02/27/razboiul-hibrid-al-rusiei-impotriva-republicii-moldova-pregatirea-de-catre-federatia-rusa-a-unor-actiuni-care-urmasesc-discreditarea-fortelor-pro-europene-din-ucraina-si-republica-moldova/>> (15.09.2017).

instability, economic difficulties, human trafficking, smuggling, and illicit weapons trafficking.

Conclusion

Based on the analysis of the information and sources studied, referring to the hybrid war term, the hybrid phenomenon and its implications on the security of the Republic of Moldova, we managed to identify the specificity of the hybrid war at the present stage by formulating the following general conclusions:

1. Hybrid war has a multidimensional, relevant, complex and highly dynamic character and, depending on the purposes of the power it uses, it finds its targets in favorable territories and areas, from which it can obtain profits and colossal resources;
2. The hybrid war influences considerably, but also encourages in a hidden manner terrorism and separatism, which is an extremely profitable business;
3. Propaganda, economic measures, uncertainties in Transnistria and the presence of Russian troops remain a constant source of concern;
4. In the age of the hybrid war, in which the boundaries between covered agents and non-undercover agents as well as those between war and peace are very difficult to delimit, gangsters will remain a useful weapon in the dispute over Russia and the US, geopolitical Moldova is situated in the midst of these dispositions;
5. In the Republic of Moldova there is a sufficient arsenal of instruments as political parties and Moldovan citizens who have participated and still participate actively in the struggles of Eastern Ukraine, which are a perceptible risk factor in the design of the hybrid war in the territory;
6. The use of Religion and Religious Representatives to promote hidden interests are elements that can lead to the emergence of rigid tensions;
7. The status of neutrality of the Republic of Moldova;
8. An old military doctrine which is not adapted to the requirements of the current security environment;
9. Russian Federation's policy on the near neighbor states and the protection of its citizens in these territories.

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CLIMATE CHANGE - A THREAT MULTIPLIER IN THE FUTURE CONFLICTS

Abstract:

Climate change generates great controversies in public opinion. Political debacles, scientific feuds and NGOs activities sometimes overshadow objectively defined challenges created by global ecosystem transformation. Nevertheless, discussion about the genesis of climate change is increasingly concentrated on security issues. The author of the presented articles explores the notion of climate change being a threat multiplier in the conflicts of the future. The purpose of the article is to outline a rudimentary prognose of climate change impact on existing and potential conflicts. Several case studies are used in the analysis.

Keywords:

Climate change, security environment, conflicts, threat multiplier

Introduction

Climate change² is an indisputable fact. It is one of the most controversial global problems. As an object of scientific and political feuds,

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² *Climate change 2014. Synthesis Report*, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva 2014, p. 120. “Climate change refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g., by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. Climate change may be due to natural internal processes or external forcings such as modulations of the solar cycles, volcanic eruptions and persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or in land use. Note that the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in its Article 1, defines climate change as: ‘a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability

it is surrounded by emotions. The core question is focused around the responsibility for changes. In general, parties involved in the discussion are divided between those, who argue that climate change is man-made, anthropogenic and those who understand them as a natural element of climate super cycles.

NGOs, politicians, environmentalists, and industrial circles are trying to invent the universal formula to stop or even reverse this process. Large parts of international community aim, under the auspices of the United Nations, to reduce carbon dioxide emission. In 2015, during the so-called COP21 conference in Paris (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 21st Conference of the Parties), the agreement on CO₂ reduction was reached. Measured, long-term aim of the COP21 treaty is to cut greenhouse gas emission and stabilize global warming below 2 degrees Celsius³. Temperatures have risen globally by approximately 1 degree since the Industrial Revolution. The COP21 strategic target constitutes a compromise between scientific necessity and achievability, perceived by signatory countries. However, the accord is not equipped with enforcement mechanisms.

Slowing the pace of the temperature rise, apart from an ecologic dimension, has political meaning. Consequently, it is an object of political struggle – both on state and international level. Probably the most meaningful recent example of politically driven decision on climate change is United States president, Donald Trump move to withdraw from the Paris Agreement and cease its implementation⁴. His decision was met with harsh critic in European capitals, NGOs and many others⁵.

Climate change becomes an element of ideological disputes. There are voices decrying a new “religion of climate change” or “climate change industry”. Rational arguments collide with emotionally loaded discourse and extreme world views. This grave issue and perspective of devastating effects of sea level rise, ice cap melting is, in some way, a hostage of the political balance of power and functions only as a dependent variable in this complicated equation. Political pushing and shoving with the energetic sector and traditional industry in the background is not the only field, in which the climate change is the “centre of gravity”.

observed over comparable time periods’. The UNFCCC thus makes a distinction between climate change attributable to human activities altering the atmospheric composition and climate variability attributable to natural causes”.

³ *Framework Convention on Climate Change. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1*, UN Climate Change, 12.12.2015, <<https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf>> (25.05.2018).

⁴ P. Barker, *Rejecting Popular Deal, The President Bets Big On His Core Supporters*, “*The New York Times*” 02.06.2017, Vol. 166 Issue 57616, p. A13.

⁵ M. D. Shaer, A. Smale, M. Rich, J. Kanter, C. Buckley, *Foreign Leaders Lament U.S. Withdrawal, but Say It Won’t Stop Climate Effort*, “*The New York Times*” 03.06.2017, Vol. 166 Issue 57617, p. A9.

Securitization of climate change

According to proponents of the constructivist Copenhagen School of International Relations Theory, security is a social construction, an act of speech. This act moves a certain question or process away from the sphere of “ordinary” politics and places it in “special”, security-related realm. Thus, it requires a special type of activities. This process is called *securitization*⁶.

The abovementioned discussions and controversies, especially political, are blocking broad international consensus about security threats originating in changing the climate. Anthropogenic climate change *versus* natural climate change discussion beclouds the level of security impact of this complex process. However, there is an institution, for which the climate change is not about saving whales but prepare for the wars of the future.

There is no doubt, that the armed forces and intelligence agencies are not expected to be concerned about the natural environment. But there is a clear need for strategic thinking about the security of the future and factors, which will define the security environment, within which these institutions will perform their work. The example of the American security establishment can be taken as a frame of reference.

Climate anomalies were placed in the *National Security Strategy in 2006*: “Environmental destruction, whether caused by human behaviour or cataclysmic mega-disasters such as floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, or tsunamis. Problems of this scope may overwhelm the capacity of local authorities to respond, and may even overtax national militaries, requiring a larger international response”⁷

It was a harbinger of gradual *securitization* of the climate change. The discussions about the possible impact of climate change on American national security and armed forces readiness were broadly present in the security debate. The Department of Defense, National Intelligence Council, and think-tanks presented arguments supporting the strong push for investment in an adaptation of infrastructure and the whole security apparatus to forthcoming global changes. Several branches of US military directly enunciated the need of taking climate into considerations, when it comes to creating future operations profile (especially with respect to the opening of Arctic sea routes)⁸.

The 2014 edition of *Quadrennial Defense Review* has been a turning point. Climate change was described as a *threat multiplier*: “Climate change poses another significant challenge for the United States and the world at large. As

⁶ B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. de Wilde, *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder, CO 1998, p. 23.

⁷ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington D.C. 2006, p. 47.

⁸ C. E. Werrel, F. Femia, *A Responsibility to Prepare: Why the U.S. National Security Community Takes Climate Risks Seriously*, “The Center for Climate and Security Briefer” 2017, no. 35, p. 1.

greenhouse gas emissions increase, sea levels are rising, average global temperatures are increasing, and severe weather patterns are accelerating. These changes, coupled with other global dynamics, including growing, urbanizing, more affluent populations, and substantial economic growth in India, China, Brazil, and other nations, will devastate homes, land, and infrastructure. Climate change may exacerbate water scarcity and lead to sharp increases in food costs. The pressures caused by climate change will influence resource competition while placing additional burdens on economies, societies, and governance institutions around the world. These effects are threat multipliers that will aggravate stressors abroad such as poverty, environmental degradation, political instability, and social tensions – conditions that can enable terrorist activity and other forms of violence”⁹.

Despite the President Donald Trump decision to withdraw from COP21, the US security establishment retained its views on the relation of climate change and security. The most important example of this consistency can be identified in general James Mattis’, the then Secretary of Defense nominee in Trump Administration testimony before Senate Armed Forces Committee, during which he stressed: “Climate change is impacting stability in areas of the world where our troops are operating today. It is appropriate for the Combatant Commands to incorporate drivers of instability that impact the security environment in their areas into their planning”¹⁰. US House of Representatives went further. Republican-controlled House maintained an amendment to military expenditures project, where climate change was defined as a *direct threat* to US national security¹¹. The authorization act was later signed by president Trump¹². However, the National Security Strategy does not contain reference to climate change as a threat, but rather assumptions that the US will pursue energetic policy (a section of the document dealing with the climate change), that is "expanding economy"¹³. Soon after, the Department of Defense followed suite – the climate was omitted in its strategic document¹⁴. This ambivalence in doctrinal documents does not represent the stance of the whole

⁹ *Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington, D.C. 2014, p. 8.

¹⁰ D. Henry, *Trump’s Defense secretary calls climate change a national security risk*, The Hill, 14.03.2017, <<http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/323959-trumps-defense-secretary-calls-climate-change-a-national-security>>, (26.05.2018).

¹¹ G. Price, *Climate Change A ‘National Security Threat’, Republican-Led House Declares in Defense Bill Vote*, Newsweek.com, 14.07.2017, <<http://www.newsweek.com/climate-change-national-security-republicans-637174>> (25.05.2018).

¹² *Trump Signs Fiscal Year 2018 Defense Authorization*, U.S. Department of Defense, 12.12.2017, <<https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1394990/trump-signs-fiscal-year-2018-defense-authorization/>> (26.05.2018).

¹³ *National Security Strategy of the United States*, Washington D.C. 2017, p. 22.

¹⁴ S. Pereira, *Pentagon Scraps Climate Change as Security Risk in New Strategy – Even Though Defense Secretary Has Said It’s a Clear Threat*, Newsweek.com, 19.01.2018, <<http://www.newsweek.com/pentagon-scraps-climate-change-security-risk-new-strategy-even-though-defense-785615>> (26.05.2018).

security establishment. There is, at least, one clear example of the climate change-related threat – a security of the US installations across the world. According to report presented by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, nearly 50% of US military facilities face increased risk¹⁵. This is evidence of the overall US security apparatus approach to climate change. The language of doctrinal documents, strategies can be recognized as political. As reality and *securitization* theory suggests, this question can be a function of current political moods. The society is an object of political communication, while the security is an object of militaries and intelligence services activity. As it can be seen, climate change is put on the American security agenda, despite and against the line of incumbent US president. The security establishment must remain focused on projecting and preparing forces to the security environment of the future, and there should be no doubt, that climate change, which effects are visible in increasing level, will be taken into consideration.

As the leader of the Western world, the United States sets the tone of important security enterprises. It is worth to mention, that NATO, the most powerful military alliance in the world, also declares climate change as an important factor, defining security environment now and in the future. The Alliance gave a clear view of its stance in 2014 Wales Summit Declaration¹⁶. NATO is engaging in actions, described as “revolutionary” by Amar Causevic from Royal Swedish Science Academy, to “integrate climate change to the organization’s *modus operandi*”¹⁷.

The second powerful arm of security institutions around the world – the intelligence services - also directs their sights to climate threats. Once again, the vast US constellation of them can be taken as a frame of reference. One of the most reliable strategic prognoses, the US National Intelligence Council *Global Trends*, explicitly puts climate change in a broad security context, stressing that: "Changes in the climate will produce more extreme weather events and put greater stress on humans and critical systems, including oceans, freshwater, and biodiversity. These changes, in turn, will have direct and indirect social, economic, political, and security effects. Extreme weather can trigger crop failures, wildfires, energy blackouts, infrastructure breakdown, supply chain breakdowns, migration, and infectious disease outbreaks. Such events will be

¹⁵ *Climate-Related Risk to DoD Infrastructure Initial Vulnerability Assessment Survey (SLVAS) Report*, Washington D.C. 2018, pp. 1-11.

¹⁶ *Wales Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales*, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 05.09.2014, <https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm> (26.05.2018).

¹⁷ A. Causevic, *Facing an Unpredictable Threat: Is NATO Ideally Placed to Manage Climate Change as a Non-Traditional Threat Multiplier?*, “Connections” 2017, Vol. 16 Issue 2, pp. 73-74.

more pronounced as people concentrate in climate vulnerable locations, such as cities, coastal areas, and water-stressed regions"¹⁸.

UN and NATO are not the only international institution, which takes climate change into consideration. World Economic Forum *Global Risk Assessment* put climate change in several interlocking contexts: "Structural economic changes in affected countries and regions could also stoke societal and geopolitical risks. There is no scope for complacency about the sufficiency of global efforts to deal with climate change and the continued degradation of the global environmental commons"¹⁹.

Climate change is securitized as a threat (or risk) multiplier. It is not a complete process, but the security establishments are responsible for putting this problem in strategic prognoses and expenditures plans. There is an understanding, that climate events will define, at least in part, the situation in the world and will affect the threat structure, escalation processes and the situation in the conflict zones (or even create new ones). The complexity of this process makes virtually impossible to measure the exact scope of this impact, but as professor Ulrich Beck suggested, there is a need to unlock the "dangers fantasy" and try to "take control" over future threats and risks, by modelling, description, and preparation²⁰.

Climate change is most often projected as a future threat to international security. Nevertheless, certain manifestations of the climate-conflict link, although highly contested, can be observed today.

Multiplying today's threats

Climate events had an influence on conflicts in history. It is enough to mention the famous *kamikaze*, the *divine wind*, how Japanese named two typhoons, that destroyed Mongolian invasion fleets in the 13th century or severe winters in Russia, which had turned the faith of two wars.

Climate change has the potential to generate or multiply threats, fuel conflicts directly or indirectly. Today, scientific circles debate the linkage between drought in Fertile Crescent and the prolonged civil war in Syria. The drought was the worst in recorded history²¹. Some think that human-induced climate change contributed to catastrophic drought and produced masses of internally displaced families (some estimates reach 1,5 million people)²². The drought was met by poor infrastructure, lack of funds and bad overall policy of

¹⁸ *Global Trends. Paradox of Progress*, Washington, D.C. 2017, p. 21.

¹⁹ *The Global Risks Report 2018*, Geneva 2018, p. 14.

²⁰ U. Beck, *Spółeczeństwo światowego ryzyka. W poszukiwaniu utraconego bezpieczeństwa*, Warszawa 2012, s. 23.

²¹ R. F. Worth, H. Saad, *Parched Earth Where Syrian Farms Thrived*, "The New York Times", 14.10.2010, Vol. 160, Issue 55193, p. 1.

²² P. H. Gleick, *Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria*, "Water, Climate, and Society" 2014, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 334-337.

Bashar al-Assad government. Displaced families sought refuge in the outskirts of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs or Hama - pockets of radicalization expanded.

On the other hand, there are claims, that linking anthropogenic climate change with drought and civil war in Syria is far-reaching simplification²³. Gathered evidence, research, and modeling do not give clear-cut evidence of the direct link. Internally displaced Syrians might have not tip the point of fragile balance and in fact, not ignited a civil war. It is just to stress, that causes of the Syrian conflict are extremely complicated. The drought was not the gravest among them, but it can be assumed, that it was one of them.

Authors of the paper published in the “Proceedings of National Academy of Sciences” quote a displaced Syrian farmer, talking about the drought: “Of course, the drought and unemployment were important in pushing people toward revolution. When the drought happened, we could handle it for two years, and then we said, it’s enough”²⁴.

Climate change, regardless of being human-induced or natural, is one of the factors defining spaces of ongoing conflicts and should be counted among the causes of potential internal and interstate strife.

Security establishments are well aware of this threat and its rank is increasing. Prognoses containing reflections of possible trajectories of future conflicts under pressure of transforming global ecosystem are common, especially in the United States.

Abrupt climate change

All these prognoses are concurrent in one important feature: they assume, that the process of climate change is gradual. This assumption is rarely challenged. All the more, that 2 degrees Celsius increase will probably cause the collapse of the Earth's ecosystem. Notwithstanding, the history knows cases when climate had dramatically turned - an abrupt climate change. Such a climate event, which lasted a century, occurred 8,200 years ago (Younger Dryas). After an extended period of warming, the sudden cooling arrived. The average temperature in Greenland (records from ice core there were a basis of the research) dropped by ferocious 15 degrees Celsius. During this century-long event, a decrease of temperature in the North Atlantic region caused severe winters in Europe. In many places glaciers advanced, rivers frost, and agriculture lands suffered turmoil. One of the hypotheses states, that it was

²³ J. Selby, O. S. Dahi, C. Frohlich, M. Hulme, *Climate change and the Syrian civil war revisited*, “Political Geography” 2017, Vol. 50, p. 241.

²⁴ C. P. Kelley, S. Mohtadi, M. A. Cane, R. Seager, Y. Kushnir, *Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought*, “Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the United States of America” 2015, Vol. 112, No. 11, p. 3245.

caused by a collapse of the ocean's conveyor, the Gulf Stream, after the period of gradual warming²⁵.

US Department of Defense analytical unit, Office of Net Assessment, has commissioned a holistic analysis of this question. The work has been performed by the Global Business Network. The result – report titled “An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security”, where Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall outlined a *low probability – high impact scenario*, astonished public opinion in US and Europe. As a prognosis placed on the edge of threat horizon, the report has not been marked as an official document of Pentagon.

Nonetheless, the question of an abrupt climate change influence on security environment and the character of conflicts in the future remained the part of the debate. P. Schwartz and D. Randall modelled a scenario, where changes in the north hemisphere generate cascading effects in the entire world. The report contains a catastrophic vision of severe winters in Europe, droughts in agriculture regions, intensified monsoon periods in South Asia, causing a dramatic reduction in carrying capacity with broad security consequences.

Tab. 1.

	Europe	Asia	United States
2020 – 2030	2020: Increasing: skirmishes over water and immigration	2020: Persistent conflict in South East Asia; Burma, Laos, Vietnam, India, China	2020: Oil prices increase as the security of supply is threatened by conflicts in Persian Gulf and Caspian
	2022: Skirmish between France and Germany over commercial access to Rhine	2025: Internal conditions in China deteriorate dramatically leading to civil war and border wars	2025: Internal struggle in Saudi Arabia brings Chinese and US naval forces to Gulf, in direct confrontation
	2025: EU nears Collapse		
	2027: Increasing migration to Mediterranean countries such as	2030: Tension growing between China and Japan over Russian	

²⁵ W. Dansgaard, J. W. C. White, S. J. Johansen, *The abrupt termination of the Younger Dryas climate event*, “Nature” 1989, no. 339, pp. 532-534.

	Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, and Israel 2030: Nearly 10% of European population moves to a different country	energy	
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Source: P. Schwartz, D. Randall, *An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security*, Washington, D.C. 2003, p. 17.

The authors of the abovementioned report forecast: “As famine, disease, and weather-related disasters strike due to the abrupt climate change, many countries' needs will exceed their carrying capacity. This will create a sense of desperation, which is likely to lead to offensive aggression in order to reclaim balance. Imagine eastern European countries, struggling to feed their populations with a falling supply of food, water, and energy, eyeing Russia, whose population is already in decline, for access to its grain, minerals, and energy supply. Or, picture Japan, suffering from flooding along its coastal cities and contamination of its fresh water supply, eyeing Russia's Sakhalin Island oil and gas reserves as an energy source to power desalination plants and energy-intensive agricultural processes. Envision Pakistan, India, and China – all armed with nuclear weapons – skirmishing at their borders over refugees, access to shared rivers, and arable land. Spanish and Portuguese fishermen might fight over fishing rights – leading to conflicts at sea. And, countries including the United States would be likely to better secure their borders. With over 200 river basins touching multiple nations, we can expect conflict over access to water for drinking, irrigation, and transportation. The Danube touches twelve nations, the Nile runs through nine, and the Amazon runs through seven”²⁶.

As it was stated, this is a low probability scenario. However, the debate over a possibility of an abrupt climate change event is not pointless. The Gulf Stream is slowing. “Scientific American” cites results of the research of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), ascertaining: “That northward flow is a key part of the larger circulation of water, heat, and nutrients around the world's oceans. Climate scientists have been concerned since the 1980s that rising global temperatures could throw a wrench in the conveyor belt-like system, with possibly stark climatic consequences. Sea

²⁶ P. Schwartz, D. Randall, *An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security*, Washington D.C. 2003, p. 18.

levels could ratchet upward along the US east coast, key fisheries could be devastated by spiking water temperatures and weather patterns over Europe could be altered”²⁷.

Of course, there is no sense of urgency on this matter, but there is evidence preoccupation. For example, the European Commission funded a research project INTERCLIMA (Inter-hemispheric coupling of abrupt climate change project), where, as the brief results communiqué stated: “Abrupt changes to the Earth’s climate in the past have been studied by EU-funded scientists to gain a better understanding of possible future risks due to global warming”²⁸.

If such a scenario will find fulfilment, there will be significant changes in the security environment. Climate change will evolve from *threat multiplier* to a grave threat, generating complex crises. Such a climate event would be surely translated to geopolitical tremors. Abrupt climate change would have push humane and physical domain of life to the critical point²⁹. This point, if reached would have ignited cascading crises around the world.

Harbingers of this relatively slow but consistent process can be identified already. Even if the indications are not clearly visible, the security institutions must undertake steps to be prepared.

Black swan

Climate change is extremely complex, multidimensional, in some part not properly understood phenomenon, with many intercurrent streams. In some of them, *weak signals*, which can influence conflicts of the future, can be identified. There should also be aware, that there are *black swans* among them, waiting to materialize.

Weak signals are “the first important indications of a change. These may be understood as advanced, somewhat noisy and generally socially situated indicators of change in trends and systems that constitute raw informational material for enabling anticipatory action. The benefits of weak signals can be seen when assessing their significance in an organization or a field concerned and analyzing how the phenomena reflected by the weak signals should be reacted on. (...) They represent the first signs of paradigm shifts, or future trends, drivers or discontinuities”³⁰. Some visible processes, events and

²⁷ A. Thompson, *Slow-Motion Ocean: Atlantic’s Circulation Is Weakest in 1,600 Years*, Scientific American, 11.04.2018, <<https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/slow-motion-ocean-atlantics-circulation-is-weakest-in-1-600-years/>>, (27.05.2018).

²⁸ *Abrupt climate change reveals future risks. INTERCLIMA – result in brief*, European Commission, 21.12.2016, <https://cordis.europa.eu/result/rcn/190777_en.html>, (27.05.2018).

²⁹ N. Arnell, E. Tompkins, N. Adger, K. Delaney, *Vulnerability to abrupt climate change in Europe*, Tyndall Centre for Climate Research, Technical Report 34, November 2004, p. 50.

³⁰ O. Saritas, J. E. Smith, *The Big Picture – trends, drivers, wild cards, discontinuities, and weak signals*, “Futures” 2011, vol. 43, issue 3, p. 297.

accessible scientific evidence, clearly state, that acceleration of climate change, which allegedly is on the horizon, is the *weak signal* of future fundamental transformations of the security environment, threat structure and battle-spaces of conflicts parameters.

Severe weather events, such as hurricane season in Atlantic, according to some research are stronger due to climate change. Higher water temperature contributes to the increased destructive power of hurricanes³¹. Their overall strength has raised since early 80's³². Highly exposed and unstable Central America is one of the most important region, where climate events can define asymmetric conflicts of the future. Unstable monsoon seasons in South Asia³³, are extremely dangerous from political, social and economic stability. Like the Middle East drought, dramatic weather event, possibly tied to climate change can aggravate these issues.

Climate change effects can be described as *a black swan*, unexpected, dramatic event, which in common knowledge is marked as "unthinkable". Nassim Nicholas Taleb, who developed this notion, states that "what we do not know becomes more important than what we know"³⁴.

However, as it was mentioned, history knows cases of weather events generating turmoil. It can be assumed, that cyclone Bhola, which struck East Pakistan in 1970, is a relevant example. The storm has killed approximately 500.000 people and contributed to the Indo-Pakistani war and secession of the province, now an independent country, Bangladesh³⁵. This disaster was a catalyst, but security communities should consider similar events in the future. South Asia is particularly vulnerable. If to unlock, just how U. Beck suggested, the "dangers fantasy" - geopolitical clinch between India and Pakistan, with Kashmir and Afghanistan as variables in the strategic equation and "long shadow" of China, generates tensions. If sudden, unexpected natural disaster would overlap with these problems, a "perfect storm" will occur. Suffice it to say, the massive flood in Pakistan or another disastrous cyclone in the region could contribute to the mass movement of refugees. This threat is distinctively serious, due to the high level of exposure and vulnerability (high population

³¹ A. Sneed, *Was the Extreme 2017 Hurricane Season Driven by Climate Change?*, Scientific American, 26.10.2017, <<https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/was-the-extreme-2017-hurricane-season-driven-by-climate-change/>>, (28.05.2018).

³² J. B. Elsner, J. P. Kossin, T. H. Jagger, *The increasing intensity of the strongest tropical cyclones*, "Nature" 2008, vol. 454, p. 92.

³³ S. P. Ogburn, *Indian Monsoons Are Becoming More Extreme*, Scientific American, 29.04.2014, <<https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/indian-monsoons-are-becoming-more-extreme/>>, (28.05.2018).

³⁴ N. N. Taleb, *Czarny Łabędź. O skutkach nieprzewidywalnych zdarzeń*, Kurhaus Publishing, Warszawa 2017, s. 20.

³⁵ N. Hossain, *The 1970 Bhola cyclone, nationalist politics, and the subsistence crisis contract in Bangladesh*, "Disasters" 2018, vol. 42, no. 1, p. 187.

density, neglected infrastructure) of states and societies of the region³⁶. Sudden disaster, an effect of climate change, can add another layer of conflict between nuclear-armed powers. Such an event will tip the fragile balance in the region and could lead to an uncontrolled escalation of the multidimensional conflict.

As it was signalled, more frequent droughts in volatile regions will influence the security environment. Presented, while controversial, Syrian example, can be treated as one, but not only, the pattern of climate change impact. Middle East region is a distinctive example of water scarcity and possible wars over this crucial resource (e.g. Israel and Lebanon³⁷). More than forty percent of the world's population, according to some prognoses, will suffer from leaving under climate change driven severe water stress by 2050³⁸.

Large parts of Africa will have to challenge similar threat. In 2012 study, Ole Magnus Theisen, Helge Holtermann and Halvard Buhaug stated: "Although a drought is unlikely to directly cause civil war, climate change will affect human security in a broader sense. Drought and other climatic shocks frequently cause dismay and poverty, and more extreme weather in the years to come suggests more human suffering"³⁹. This assumption fits the broad definition of *threat multiplier*. Existing problems will become bigger if environmental parameters change – through the sudden event or gradual process. The case of Darfur, which suffered more than a 40-year long period of rainfall drop and one of the most violent conflicts in recorded history, does not need explanation. Potential manifestations of climate change effects in African conflict zones are prolific. Questions of, *inter alia* food supply and agricultural production, the risks of inundation in low-lying settled areas risks to human health from vector-borne diseases are likely⁴⁰.

Of course, Asia and Africa are not the only continents where climate change impact on threats structure will be visible. Europe, even if the "nightmare scenario" of Abrupt Climate Change will not materialize, will be hit. The Arctic is the region, where climate change is downright tangible. The debate over the next "Great Game"⁴¹ is now a permanent element of global security debate. Ice melting opens new opportunities and, at the same time, creates new dangers. Broader latitude of movement for conflicted state and

³⁶ C. Webersik, *Climate Change, and Security. A Gathering Storm of Global Challenges*, Oxford 2010, pp. 84-85.

³⁷ H. A. Amery, *Water Wars in the Middle East: A Looming Threat*, "The Geographic Journal" 2002, vol. 168, no. 4, pp. 321-322.

³⁸ V. Ramanathan, J. Seddon, D. G. Victor, *The Next Front on Climate Change. How to Avoid a Dimmer, Drier World*, "Foreign Affairs" March/April 2016, vol. 92, no. 2, p. 139.

³⁹ O. M. Theisen, H. Holtermann, H. Buhaug, *Climate Wars? Assessing the Claim That Drought Breeds Conflict*, "International Security" Winter 2011/12, vol. 36, no. 3, p. 106.

⁴⁰ O. Brown, A. Hammill, R. Mcleman, *Climate change as the 'new' security threat: implications for Africa*, „International Affairs" 2007, vol 83, no. 5, p. 1145.

⁴¹ R. Tamnes, K. Offerdal, *Introduction, Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic: Regional dynamics in a global world*, ed. R. Tamnes, K. Offerdal, New York 2014, pp. 2-3.

non-state actors will generate geopolitical tremors or even military confrontations. The Arctic is on the path to becoming covered by fault lines of global powers tensions in emerging multi-polar world (even China, while geographically distant, establishes her own position in the disputed region). Climate change process has the potential to aggravate threats in the region. This overlapping can be translated to open, hard to contain conflict.

Conclusion

The ongoing discussion about climate change is increasingly loaded with security, references. There is no doubt, that climate change is a factor, that will determine large sectors of the security environment. Visible, gradual transformations of the global ecosystem will be accompanied by sudden, dramatic events like hurricanes, cyclones or massive floods, which will modify or multiply existing threats, create new lines of conflicts. They will drive to a fast escalation of grievances, "living" just beneath the social tissue in poorly developed states.

According to chaos theory, the *strange attractor* has the capacity to modify the "course of situation" from one trajectory to another⁴². Climate change effects should be treated as the potential attractor of this type. It can suddenly generate new parameters of a situation in areas struck by natural disaster. Climate change will play a broadening role in defining conflict situation in the increasingly dense populated world, vulnerable, overpopulated cities (especially in coastal areas) with obsolete infrastructure and helpless governments. What is more, lack of resilience of growing infrastructure will generate more risks to security. This very complex perspective can be encapsulated in one sentence: a disaster waiting to happen.

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INFLUENCE OF AN ENERGY FACTOR ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN AZERBAIJAN AND RUSSIA²

Abstract:

The relations between Azerbaijan and Russia have deep historical roots. For about two centuries they have been part of common state – Russian empire and the Soviet Union. Such cohabitation in the frames of one state had led to emergence of common features in development of two societies. One of these features is an important role of oil and gas production in economy.

But despite of this similarity the Azerbaijani-Russian relations were not always benevolent. First of all, Azerbaijan for almost two centuries had been under Russian occupation. Even after dissolution of the USSR the relations of the former center – Moscow with the former Soviet republic which restored the independence – Azerbaijan, remained difficult. Practically from the first years of independence energy factor in the Azerbaijani-Russian relations has had the negative impact on already tense relations between two countries.

During the modern period, after the beginning of gas production on new fields in Azerbaijan and after completion of the Southern gas corridor' construction on delivery of the Azerbaijani gas to Europe, the Azerbaijani-Russian relations will expect hard times again.

Keywords:

Azerbaijan, Russia, the EU, energy factor, oil, gas

Introduction

As it is well known from history, Azerbaijan was the alone oil-prone province in the Russian empire in the 19th century. The industrial oil

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production in Baku began in 1870. Already in 1901 Azerbaijan produced 11 million tonnes of oil, that was more than 50% of world oil production and 95% of the whole Russian empire's oil production³.

In the Soviet period Azerbaijan continued to be one of the largest oil suppliers of the whole USSR. For example, in 1941 the oil production in Azerbaijan reached 23.6 million tonnes (76% of the all oil produced in the USSR)⁴. But later the volumes of produced oil in Azerbaijan began to decrease. The falling of oil production was connected with exhaustion of the old oilfields and with detection of new oilfields in other regions of the USSR. As a result, the share of Azerbaijani oil in total soviet oil production decreased (in 1950 – 39.1%, in 1960 – 12%, in 1970 – 5.7%, in 1980 – 2.4%)⁵. After the dissolution of the USSR when Azerbaijan and Russia became independent states, they have kept some features of the development inherited from the former USSR. Firstly, in both countries the energy factor (I mean oil and gas) has still played the crucial role in the economy development (share of GDP, budget revenues and export). In the table 1 you can see the comparative figures.

Tab. 1. Oil and gas importance in the Russian and Azerbaijani economies in 2016

Indicators	Azerbaijan	Russia
<i>Share of oil and gas in GDP (%):</i>	34,3	12
<i>Share of oil and gas in budget revenues (%):</i>	52,7	35,9
<i>Share of oil and gas in export (%):</i>	86,24	67,8

Source: *State Committee of Statistics of Azerbaijan*, <www.stat.gov.az> and *Russian Federal Service of State Statistics* <www.gks.ru>.

Second common feature between Azerbaijan and Russia is the fact that the sphere of oil and gas production and export is mostly controlled by state. For instance, there is only one state-owned company in Azerbaijan (SOCAR – State Oil Company of Azerbaijani Republic) that has a right to produce oil and gas in the onshore and offshore fields⁶. The situation in Russia is more complicated, because there are private oil and gas producing and exporting companies, like LUKOIL⁷. Nevertheless, the lion share of gas (77.3%) and almost half of oil

³ M. Mir-Babayev, *Kratkaya istoriya azerbaydzhanskoy nefi*, Baku 2009, pp. 41, 200.

⁴ Ch. Sultanov, *Neft*, Baku, 2004, p. 190.

⁵ Neftyanyye kamni - gorod v otkrytom more, *Great.az*, 04.02.2018, <<http://great.az/azerbaycan/10955-neftyanyye-kamni-gorod-v-otkrytom-more-baku.html>> (20.04.18).

⁶ For more information concerning SOCAR see: www.socar.az.

⁷ Dobycha nefi v Rossii, *TAdviser.ru*, 23.03.2018, <http://www.tadviser.ru/index.php/%D0%A1%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%8F:%D0%94%D0%BE%D0%B1%D1%8B%D1%87%D0%B0_%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%84%D1%82%D0%B8_%D0%B2_%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B8> (22.04.18).

(47.6%) produce the state-owned companies, like GAZPROM and ROSNEFT⁸. But what is more important, even the private oil and gas producing companies in Russia try to pursue the state policy in their export operations. The Russian officials, in their turn, try to lobby the interests of the national oil and gas producing companies in the world markets. And we can often see the representatives of Russian oil and gas producing companies in the official delegations during the visits to other countries.

So, energy factor plays a crucial role not only in economy, but also in foreign policy of both countries, because Azerbaijan and Russia try to increase their oil and gas export possibilities and expand the geographical borders of the export.

Literature review

The state and development of the Russian-Azerbaijani relations in the sphere of energy security is one of hot topics in research literature, which causes heated debates and contradictory estimates in journalism. All sources on this subject can be divided into two groups conditionally. The first group (mostly Western and Azerbaijani sources) can be characterized as totally supporting the Azerbaijani position in its rivalry with Russia over the routes for delivering gas from Caspian basin to Europe and encouraging Azerbaijani attempts to make a contribution into the European energy security. The following sources belong to that group.

First of all, *“Azerbaijan and the New Energy Geopolitics of Southeastern Europe”* edited by Margarita Assenova and Zaur Shiriyeu. In this book the authors describe the relations between Azerbaijan and the states of Southeastern Europe as well as other European regions, prospects of mutual investments, gas delivery to the Southeastern states via Southern Gas Corridor from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, and the Russian energy strategy towards the same region. In the second book – *“The South Caucasus – Security, Energy and Europeanization”* edited by Meliha B. Altunisik and Oktay F. Tanrisever, the authors describe the Azerbaijani foreign policy postures and priorities, Southern Gas Corridor and European energy security as well as challenges to this project from Russian side. Other books, like *“Sovremennyye mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya i vneshnyaya politika Azerbaydzhana”* (*“The Modern International Relations and Foreign Policy of Azerbaijan”*), *“Politika natsionalnogo razvitiya i bezopasnosti Azerbaydzhanskoy Respubliki”* (*“The National Development and Security Policies of Azerbaijan Republic”*) by Ali Hasanov are totally devoted to the different aspects of the Azerbaijani foreign policy, its energy policy, relations

⁸ "Gazprom" v 2017 godu uvelichil dobychu gaza na 12,4%, TASS.ru, 03.01.2018, <<http://tass.ru/ekonomika/4856164>> (23.04.18) and *Добыча газа в РФ в 2017 г. выросла до 690,5 млрд куб м.*, UAEnergy.com.ua, 04.01.2018, <<http://uaenergy.com.ua/post/30385>> (23.04.18).

with other states, including Russia, Azerbaijani-Russian rivalry for the gas markets of Georgia, Turkey and Southeastern Europe.

The second group of sources (mostly Russian) is characterized as totally supporting the Russian position as dominating state in the Post-Soviet space and especially in the Caspian basin, also justify attempts of Moscow to keep control over sources and especially routes of transportation of oil and gas from the Caspian region to Europe. The authors of such sources support Russian policy despite it uses political and economical tools for pressure on the independent governments in the Caspian basin. One of such tools was the absence of legal status of the Caspian Sea. Among these sources I can point at “*Politika Rossii v Kaspiyskom regione*” (“*Russian Policy in the Caspian Region*”) by Sergey Zhiltsov, “*Kaspiyskiy region. Politika, ekonomika, sotrudnichestvo*” (“*The Caspian Region. Politics, Economics Cooperation*”) by Sergey Zhiltsov and Igor Zonn, “*Rol energeticheskoy diplomatii v formirovanii vneshney politiki Rossii na sovremennom etape*” (“*Role of Energy Diplomacy in Formation of Russian Foreign Policy at the Present Stage*”) by Sofia Chernitsyna and “*Neft i gaz Kaspiyskogo morya: mezhdru Yevropoy i Aziyey*” (“*Oil and Gas of the Caspian Sea: Between Europe and Asia*”) by Victor Katona.

Predicting further development of the Russian-Azerbaijani relations, the above-mentioned authors believe that Azerbaijan will adhere further to multivector foreign policy, balancing between the West and Russia. On the other hand Russian analysts do not assume deterioration in the Russian-Azerbaijani relations as a result of rivalry for sales markets of gas in Europe, because they do not see threat in the Southern gas corridor, being sure that Azerbaijan has not enough gas to become the strong contender of Russia in the gas market of Europe. But they are mistaken as they do not take into consideration the possibilities of Azerbaijan to produce more gas in the nearest future and gas from Turkmenistan which will go to Europe by means of the Transcaspian gas pipeline. In my opinion, I am sure that the independent power policy pursued by Baku will lead to aggravation of the Russian-Azerbaijani relations in the medium term. I will explain my statement further in the main next.

Theory

I have chosen the theory of realism for my research, because I am studying mainly political aspects of the bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Russia. Despite the fact that my research is aimed at the investigating the energy factor influence on the bilateral relations, but taking into consideration the fact that both states (first of all Russia) use its oil and gas resources mostly as a political tool for strengthening their international positions, I have decided to concentrate mainly on the political aspects of Azerbaijani-Russian relations.

As it is well known Russia has been a predominant state in the post-Soviet space for centuries. That is why the Moscow's foreign policy in this space obviously became the most influential for the states existing here. Russia was and is a realist, revanchist and revisionist great power, quick to redraw blunders based on perceived national interest, what were demonstrated on the recent example of Crimean annexation. Actually, Russia after small period of liberalism at the beginning of 1990s returned to its historical trend in foreign policy – realism, used by tsarist and Soviet governments⁹.

That is why I have decided to choose realism as a main theory for this research, because the events which has taken place in the post-Soviet space since 2008 underlined that in this area the realism has still ruled. I mean the Russian attempts to subdue Georgia, Ukraine and other states from its near abroad. There is no place for liberalism, constructivism and the other theories of international relations.

But, neither realism in its pure variant, nor neorealism does suit my research thesis perfectly. In my research I have taken a decision to use another model of international system, differing from realist's view, which first was suggested in 1958 by Abramo F. K. Organski – power transition model. This model rejected three fundamental aspects of the realist view of world politics.

First, the realists insist, that international system is anarchical, but from power transition point of view, the international system is hierarchical and the states accept relations between them based on differences in the power distribution among them.

Second, the power transition theory means, that the rules governing the domestic and international political system are very similar.

Third, the power transition theory understands the international competition as a struggle for net gains which can be extracted from conflict or cooperation.

The hierarchical structure suggested by power transition model consists of the most powerful nation in the international order at the top. Beneath the great powers are disposed, below them are the middle powers, then – small powers and at the bottom of this pyramid are small states¹⁰. From this point of view, Russia is one of the great powers dominating in the post-Soviet space and in considerable part of Eurasian continent, and Azerbaijan is a small power, dominating only in the South Caucasus region.

Hierarchies are characterized by divisions of labor, specialization, and authority structures. Anarchies show the opposite characteristics: there is no division of labor, and no evidence of any obedience. War is the ultimate arbiter of conflicts of interest, and self-help is the only reliable strategy for survival or

⁹ S. Maintra, *Realism in Russian Foreign Policy: Crimean Case*, "CLAWS Journal", summer 2014.

¹⁰ J. Kugler, A. F. K. Organski, *The Power Transition: a Retrospective and – Prospective Evaluation* [in:] *Handbook of War Studies*, Boston 1989, pp. 172-173.

defense of national interest¹¹. Under hierarchy David C. Kang means “a system of international relations organized around a central, dominant power that involves shared expectations of rights and responsibilities for both the dominant and secondary powers. Nations in this system have a shared set of expectations about state behaviour based on continually updated information about state preferences and intentions, shared experiences, as well as deep history. This set of shared expectations reduces the security dilemma”.¹²

Moreover, hierarchy is more stable than anarchy because anarchy is based on a balance of power or equality of the states. But two approximately equal states can lure for a war to know out which state is dominant.

Hierarchy can save the stability by using a combination of benefits and sanctions that the dominant power provides to the lesser powers. So, in contrast to the realist views about state behaviour, according to which the subordinate states should fear the dominant state and balance against that state, in hierarchy the subordinate states can try to develop the good relations with the dominant state in order to gain benefits. Thus, good relations with the dominant state provide not only the survival but even the prosperity of the subordinate states through a flow of goods, trade, and technology. And on the contrary, rejection of the hierarchy leads to a conflict, because the dominant power has to intervene in order to reestablish the hierarchical system¹³.

But, despite such clear evidence in favor of hierarchical international system, in reality in every regional hierarchy on lower level we can find states which are dissatisfied with the dominant power. These states feel threatened by the dominant power and its coalition and that is why they continue to behave as if the system is anarchic. These states try to develop alternative diplomatic or military strategies as non-alignment or development of nuclear weapon, support for insurgencies or terrorism in order to oppose the status quo in existing hierarchy, despite they do not have the resources to directly challenge the preponderant power¹⁴.

And what is important, the theory of “subaltern realism” also claims that political elites of developing countries, including post-communist and post-Soviet states, perceive the international system as hierarchy with the great powers on the top. But the internal situation in their states in their view is a battlefield with different anarchic forces, often supported from abroad, for the

¹¹ J. C. Hsiung, *Anarchy, Hierarchy, and Actio Popularis: An International Governance Perspective*, paper for delivery on the Panel on “Hegemony, Hierarchy and International Order”, the International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Meeting, Montreal, Canada, 19.04.2004, p. 5.

¹² D. C. Kang, *The theoretical roots of hierarchy in international relations*, “Australian Journal of International Affairs”, September 2004, Vol. 58, No. 3, p. 339.

¹³ *Ibidem*, pp. 344-347.

¹⁴ J. E. Strakes, *Situating the ‘Balanced Foreign Policy’: The Role of System Structure in Azerbaijan’s Multivector Diplomacy*, “Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies”, 2013, Vol. 15, No. 1, p. 44.

control over states¹⁵. That is why, after the dissolution of the USSR, Azerbaijan faced the problems of state security (civil wars, interstate conflicts, ethnic separatism, coups). In such situations the political elites of small states have to think more about preservation of their power and pursue very careful foreign policy, directed for balancing between the strong states in seeking support against the threats from the internal political forces¹⁶.

That is why, on the one hand, Azerbaijan has provided the balanced foreign policy since 1993, manoeuvring between aforementioned axes, and not tying itself toughly with any of powerful centres. The continuation of this policy became the joining of Azerbaijan in the non-alignment movement in 2011. So, from this point of view Azerbaijan is a dissatisfied state, but on the other hand, trying to pursue the independent foreign policy, official Baku makes the great efforts to maintain the good relations with Moscow. The Azerbaijani authorities understand the enormous superiority of Russia in military and economic power over Azerbaijan and recognize the hierarchical order on the post-Soviet space with Russia at the top.

As unsatisfied state Azerbaijan tries to pursue the independent on regional hierarchy (Russia) policy. Examples of these are: refusal to join the entities led by Russia – CSTO and EEU, refusal to support the Moscow's intention to create the Caspian Sea economic cooperation organization, support for the territorial integrity of Georgia and Ukraine, and refusal to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as annexation of Crimea. Also, Baku develops relations with the USA and the EU, takes part in NATO programmes and EU's Eastern Partnership, proceeds independent energy and transport policies. The results are – Baku-Supsa and BTC oil pipelines, BTE, TANAP and TAP gas pipelines, BTK railroad, Transcaspian international transport route – all bypassing Russian territory. Besides, despite the negative Russian position, Azerbaijan provides Georgia with gas and oil, and Ukraine with oil.

On other hand, Baku does not make attempts for decisive military resolution in its conflict with Armenia over Nagorny-Karabagh despite the military and economic preponderance over Armenia because of the Russian position. As it is known Moscow and Erevan are military allies in the frames of CSTO and Russia will not permit to Azerbaijan to break the existent status-quo in Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. As well, Baku refused the sheer political support for the governments in Tbilisi and Kyiv during their open military opposition to Russia and tries to conduct careful energy policy. For example Azerbaijan refused the Nabucco and Nabucco-West gas pipelines having faced

¹⁵ M. Ayoob, *Inequality and theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism*, "International Studies Review", Fall 2002, No. 4, pp. 27-48.

¹⁶ D. Streyks, *Iyerarkhicheskiye globalnyye struktury i ikh vozdeystviya na vneshnepoliticheskiye predstavleniya Azerbaydzhana*, "Kavkaz i globalizatsiya", 2009, Vol. 3, p. 60.

the rigid resistance of Russia. The destination of these pipelines was Central and Western Europe – the old Russian gas market. Using pressure Moscow avoided this threat to its plans. Azerbaijan in its turn has chosen other pipelines – TANAP and TAP. They are not so ambitious, directed to the Southeastern Europe and not so dangerous for Russian gas delivery plans.

Such behaviour of official Baku means that it has not only recognized the existent hierarchical order with Russia on the top, but also realized that its chances to challenge Russia openly in the scramble for power are equal to zero. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan, as unsatisfied state, not always happy with Russian policy in the Caucasus and in the Caspian region, tries to challenge Russian power implicitly where it can relying on support of Western states. A sheer example of such attempt is the construction of TANAP and TAP pipelines for delivering Azerbaijani and later the gas from Central Asian states to Southeastern Europe, Italy and further to Central Europe.

Previous crises in relations

The Azerbaijani attempts to defend its sovereign right for independent oil and gas production and also for supply of energy resources along independently chosen route in any point of the world already led to collision of interests with Russia several times. Initially this factor consisted in a choice of a route for export of Azerbaijani oil. From Soviet period there was an oil pipeline on which the Azerbaijani oil had been transported to Russian Black Sea port – Novorossiysk, and further by tankers to the global markets. But in the first half of 90s there were some problems which had indirect (war in Chechnya, problems concerning passing of the Russian tankers through the Turkish straits Bosphorus and Dardanelles to the Mediterranean Sea), and direct (personal hostility of the then Russian president Boris Yeltsin to the then president of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev, the pro-Armenian position of Moscow in the Karabakh conflict and, in general, the policy of pressure rendered by the Kremlin on Azerbaijani authorities with the purpose to force Azerbaijan to enter the CIS and the CSTO and to pursue the pro-Russian policy) negative influence on bilateral relations¹⁷.

As a result, all above-mentioned factors forced the authorities of Azerbaijan of that time to pursue the balanced foreign policy. On the one hand, Baku, being under the large pressure of Moscow, made a concession and started transporting some quantity of oil using the *northern (Russian) pipeline Baku-Novorossiysk*. On the other hand, the authorities of Azerbaijan signed on September 20, 1994 the *Contract of the century* with the large oil-extracting

¹⁷ A. Gasanov, *Sovremennyye mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya i vneshnyaya politika Azerbaydzhana*, Baku 2013, pp. 905-42.

companies of the West on development of the Azerbaijani oil fields on the shelf of the Caspian Sea¹⁸.

Then Azerbaijan began to export the most part of the extracted oil to the world markets bypassing the Russian territory to the Georgian coast of the Black Sea using the new oil pipeline Baku-Supsa. Later it began to work the main export oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) by which the Azerbaijani oil through Georgia and Turkey, bypassing straits comes to the Turkish coast of the Mediterranean Sea¹⁹. It should be noted that all this time the Northern route have been working for maintenance of the normal relations with Russia. But this pipeline has never been loaded at full capacity – 5 million tonnes of oil per year, at best only at 50%. For example, in 2017 SOCAR transported via Russian pipeline only 1.5 million tonnes of oil and the same quantity is planned for 2018²⁰.

Certainly, it could not satisfy Moscow and periodically Kremlin tried to show vulnerability of BTC and Baku-Supsa oil pipelines. For example, during the Georgian-Russian conflict of 2008 Russian military planes repeatedly dropped bombs in dangerous proximity from the oil pipeline²¹. Now the Russian military bases are deployed in self-proclaimed and recognized only by Moscow the Republic of South Ossetia. The Russian soldiers in South Ossetia provide the policy of creeping occupation, gradually moving border deeper into Georgian territory, coming nearer to Baku-Supsa oil pipeline and once even controlled a small piece of pipeline²².

Over time, the gas factor was added to an oil factor in the Russian-Azerbaijani relations. It occurred after completion of construction of the gas pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Erzrum (BTE) when the Azerbaijani gas also went to Europe bypassing the Russian territory through Georgia and Turkey²³. As a result, Azerbaijan not only found sales markets for its own gas, but also pressed Russia – the traditional supplier of gas for both European, and neighboring countries – a bit in these markets. In particular, Baku began to provide more than 95% of Georgia's needs for gas, having relieved it of gas dependence on

¹⁸ P. Ipek, *Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy and Challenges for Energy Security*, "Middle East Journal", 2009, Vol. 63, No. 2.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

²⁰ M. Tsurkov, *SOCAR i «Transneft'» soglasovali prokachku nefi cherez Rossiyu v 2018 godu*, Trend.az, <<https://www.trend.az/business/energy/2845098.html>> (23.04.18).

²¹ T. Blyumgardt, *Khronologiya avgustovskoy voyny 2008 goda mezhdou Rosiyey i Gruziiyey*, Kavkazia.net, 07.08.2011, <<http://kavkazia.net/Georgia/article/1312767626.php>> (25.04.18).

²² *Russia Quietly Encroaches on Georgia*, Stratfor.com, 28.07.2015, <<https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russia-quietly-encroaches-georgia>> (25.04.18).

²³ E. Mekhdiyev, *Energeticheskiy faktor vo vneshney politike Azerbaydzhana*, "Problemy postsovetского prostranstva", 2016, No. 1.

Russia²⁴. Thereby, Azerbaijan deprived Moscow of the important tool of pressure concerning Tbilisi. In addition, Baku for the first time started delivering gas to Turkey²⁵, thereby creating the future threat to energy, and, therefore, to political interests of Moscow in Turkey, and continues to supply some of the European states with its oil. Hence, the competition between two states in energy sphere is still going on.

Current situation

Azerbaijan of course loses competition for volumes of oil and gas export just because of the smaller volumes of oil and gas production, what is related to its limited natural resources. You can see it more detailed in the tables 2, 3 and 4.

Tab. 2. Oil and gas reserves in Azerbaijan and Russia in 2017 according to different sources

Indicators	Azerbaijan	Russia
<i>Crude oil – proved reserves:</i>	1bln.t (CIA) 1bln.t (BP) 1,5bln.t (SOCAR) ²⁶	11bln.t (CIA) 15bln.t (BP) 30bln.t (Ministry of natural resources and environment of Russian Federation)
<i>Natural gas – proved reserves:</i>	1tcm. (CIA) 1,1tcm. (BP) 2,55tcm. (SOCAR)	47,8tcm. (CIA) 32,3tcm. (BP) 73,2tcm. (Ministry)

Source: *CIA World Factbook*, <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>>; *BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017*; Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation, <<http://www.mnr.gov.ru>>.

As you can see, in the form of table 2, I used three sources in which data differ much from each other. These sources have strong and weak sides. For example, the *CIA World Factbook* and *BP Statistical Review of World Energy* are more credible sources, but they operate with outdated data (end of 2016 in the case of BP and the beginning of 2017 in the case of CIA). The data from

²⁴ *SOCAR namerena uvelichit' postavki azerbaydzhanskogo gaza v Gruziiyu*, EADaily.com, 31.01.2018, <<https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2018/01/31/>> (25.04.18).

²⁵ N. Abbasova, *Azerbaydzhan v 2017 g. uvelichil postavki gaza v Turtsiyu na 1%*, *Interfax.az*, 22.02.2018, <<http://interfax.az/view/726641>> (25.04.18).

²⁶ *Eksperty podschitali zapasy nefi i gaza v Azerbaydzhane*, Capost.media, <<https://capost.media/news/economy>> (26.04.18).

SOCAR and Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation are less credible because of the natural desire of authorities in both countries to exaggerate data on reserves of hydrocarbons. But, on the other hand, these institutions have more modern data (end of 2017 in the case of Russian ministry and the beginning of 2018 in the case of SOCAR).

Table 3. Volumes of oil and gas production and export in Azerbaijan

Years	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Oil product. (mln.t)	44,5	50,4	50,8	45,6	43,4	43,5	42,1	41,6	41
Oil export (mln.t)	36,9	44,3	44,5	39	36,8	36,7	35,2	35,1	35
Gas product. (bcm.)	16,3	16,3	16,7	16,4	17,2	17,9	18,8	19,2	29,4
Gas export (bcm.)	5,2	5,9	6,2	6,8	6,6	7,3	8,1	8,1	8,3

Source: State Committee of Statistics of Azerbaijan, <www.stat.gov.az>.

Tab. 4. Volumes of oil and gas production and export in Russia.

Years	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Oil product (mln.t.)	488,5	494,2	505	511,4	518	523,3	526,7	534	547,6
Oil export (mln.t.)	243,1	247,5	250,7	244,5	240	236,6	223,4	245	254,8
Gas product (bcm.)	665	582	650	670	654	668	640	635,3	640
Gas export (bcm.)	195,4	168,4	177,8	189,7	178,7	196,4	174	185,5	208,6

Source: Russian Federal Service of State Statistics, <www.gks.ru>.

Nevertheless even such small volumes of oil and gas, like Azerbaijan has, can be very useful for some states. As a matter of fact, consumers would like to deal with several more or less stable and reliable sources at once, in order to avoid the strong dependency on one source of energy resources and to have affordable prices for oil and gas. But these conditions are possible only if there is a competition in the market between several producers and consumers have the possibilities to choose the best one. This situation is especially important for European gas and oil markets. Azerbaijan, delivering its small volumes of oil and gas to the world markets, including Europe, of course cannot replace Russia, but can help to decrease their dependency, at least a little bit.

In the tables 5 and 6 you can see the main directions of Russian and Azerbaijani oil export.

Tab. 5. Ten states which were the main consumers of Azerbaijani oil in 2016 (million tonnes)

Italy	4,92
Taiwan	2,46
Israel	2,07
Germany	1,91
France	1,72
India	1,3
Portugal	0,82
Czech Republic	0,75
Croatia	0,69
China	0,67

Source: State Customs Committee of Azerbaijan, <www.customs.gov.az>.

Tab. 6. Ten states which were the main consumers of Russian oil in 2016 (million tonnes)

Netherlands	49,8
China	47,8
Germany	23,6
Belorussia	19,4
Poland	19,3
Italy	15,6
South Korea	12,4
Japan	10
Finland	9,7
Slovakia	5,7

Source: Russian Federal Customs Service, <www.customs.ru>.

Comparing these two tables we can see that despite the enormous difference in the volumes of oil exporting to the world markets, both states are similar in their attempts to export more oil to the European countries.

Unfortunately, we cannot observe the similar picture comparing the gas export of both states to Europe. Azerbaijan has still exported very small volumes of gas and they have not reached Europe yet. In the table 7 you can see this comparison.

Tab. 7. Main consumers of Russian and Azerbaijani gas in 2016 (bcm) and plans for nearest future

States	Russia	Azerbaijan
<i>Germany</i>	49,83	-
<i>Turkey</i>	24,76 (it's planned to deliver 15,75 bcm. more via Turkish Stream after 2019)	6,3 (it's planned to deliver 6 bcm. more from 2018 via TANAP)
<i>Italy</i>	24,69	it's planned to deliver about 8 bcm. annually after 2020 via TAP
<i>The UK</i>	17,9	-
<i>France</i>	11,47	-
<i>Poland</i>	11,07	-
<i>Austria</i>	6,08	-
<i>Hungary</i>	5,54	-
<i>Czech Republic</i>	4,54	-
<i>Netherlands</i>	4,22	-
<i>Slovakia</i>	3,69	-
<i>Bulgaria</i>	3,18	1 bcm after 2020 via TAP
<i>Greece</i>	2,68	1 bcm after 2020 via TAP
<i>Finland</i>	2,5	-
<i>Serbia</i>	1,75 (from 2018 – will be more 2)	-
<i>Denmark</i>	1,75	-
<i>Romania</i>	1,48	-
<i>Slovenia</i>	0,52	-
<i>Bosnia-Herzegovina</i>	0,22	-
<i>Georgia</i>	0,1	2 (in 2018 will be 2,7)
<i>Macedonia</i>	0,07	-

Source: State Customs Committee of Azerbaijan, <www.customs.gov.az> and Gazprom Export, <www.gazpromexport.ru>.

Plans for future

But in the nearest future the overall picture can change. Now Azerbaijan is working over the development of new gas fields on the Azerbaijani shelf of the Caspian Sea. Industrial gas production in the new fields has already begun²⁷.

²⁷ Na Sangachalskom terminale sostoyalas tseremoniya ofitsialnogo otkrytiya Yuzhnogo gazovogo koridora, Azertag.ru, 29.05.2018, <https://azertag.az/ru/xeber/Prezident_Ilham_

The construction of the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP)²⁸ on delivery of the Azerbaijani gas through Georgia and Turkey to Europe has been recently completed²⁹ and Azerbaijan has already begun to deliver its gas using the new pipeline³⁰. Using TANAP and the new capacities of gas, Azerbaijan is going to double the volumes of its gas exported to Turkey³¹. As it is well known, TANAP is intended from 16 bcm annually, as planned for 2020, to 23 bcm for 2023 and 31 bcm for 2026. There is also discussion about more ambitious capacities beyond 31 bcm. Some experts and officials are speaking about up to 50 bcm, depending on the availability of Caspian gas volumes from Turkmenistan transiting Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey towards Europe³².

Moreover, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP³³) by which the Azerbaijani gas will spread across all Southeastern and the Central Europe has to become the European continuation of TANAP³⁴. For example, the governments of Bulgaria and Greece have signed recently the agreement for construction of the gas interconnector between the two countries (IGB)³⁵. The aim of this interconnector is to serve for delivering of Azerbaijani gas to Bulgaria. Using aforementioned projects Azerbaijan will make a contribution to the ensuring energy security of Europe.

At the same time, implementation of the above-mentioned projects can endanger the Russian gas monopoly in Turkey and Europe. Especially by that time gas from Turkmenistan, and further from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, where the capacity of gas exceeds the corresponding capacity of Azerbaijan can be connected to TANAP via the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline³⁶. For example,

Aliev_prinyal_uchastie_v_ceremonii_oficialnogo_otkrytiya_YUzhnogo_gazovogo_koridor_a_OBNOVLENO_VIDEO-1167221> (30.05.2018).

²⁸ Why TANAP?, TANAP.com, <<http://www.tanap.com/tanap-project/why-tanap>> (28.04.18).

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³⁰ L. Zeynalova, *Azerbaydzhan nachal pervyye kommercheskiye postavki gaza v Turtsiyu*, Trend.az, 30.06.2018, <<https://www.trend.az/business/energy/2923233.html>> (04.08.2018).

³¹ I. Shafiyev, *Azerbaydzhan i Turtsiya tvoryat istoriyu*, Trend.az, 13.06.2018, <<https://www.trend.az/business/energy/2916538.html>> (04.08.2018).

³² M. Assenova, Z. Shiriyev (ed.), *Azerbaijan and the New Energy Geopolitics of Southeastern Europe*, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington 2015, p. 41.

³³ <<https://www.tap-ag.com>> (28.04.2018).

³⁴ *Pervyye kommercheskiye postavki gaza po TAP v Yevropu nachnutsya v marte 2020*, <[Oil-gas-energy.com.ua](http://oil-gas-energy.com.ua)>, <<http://oil-gas-energy.com.ua>> (28.04.2018).

³⁵ *Bulgaria and Greece sign agreement on construction of gas interconnector*, Bnr.bg, 29.06.2018, <<http://bnr.bg/en/post/100989959/bulgaria-and-greece-sign-agreement-on-construction-of-gas-interconnector>> (04.08.2018).

³⁶ B. Pannier, *Trans-Caspian Pipeline: Technically Possible, Politically Difficult*, RFERL.org, 24.05.2015, <<https://www.rferl.org/a/turkmenistan-natural-gas-europe-pipeline-tcp/27033746.html>> (28.04.2018).

only Turkmenistan can offer up to 40 bcm per year. But agreeing to participate in this project, Ashgabad would not risk to harm its relations with Russia adding just a few bcm to the Southern Gas Corridor. Only large volumes would make such a risk profitable enough³⁷.

Also Iran³⁸ can play an important role in supplying Europe with its gas, using the existing system of pipelines in Caucasus. “The combination of Iran resources and Caucasus as a corridor of energy supply could be a proper solution for enhancement of energy security in Europe³⁹”.

In the table 8 you can see comparison of the natural gas capacities with the volumes of its production and export in the states mentioned above.

Tab. 8. Gas capacities, production and export of some states from Caspian basin

States	Natural gas – proved reserves (tcm.)	Natural gas – production (bcm.)	Natural gas – export (bcm.)
Turkmenistan	7,5 (CIA-2017) 17,5 (BP-2016)	83,7 (CIA-2015) 66,8 (BP-2016)	40,3 (CIA-2015)
Uzbekistan	1,84 (CIA-2017) 1,1 (BP-2016)	55,7 (CIA-2015) 62,8 (BP-2016)	14,7 (CIA-2014)
Kazakhstan	2,4 (CIA-2017) 1 (BP-2016)	21,38 (CIA-2016) 19,9 (BP-2016)	13,7 (CIA-2016)
Iran	33,5 (CIA and BP)	184,8 (CIA-2015) 202,4 (BP-2016)	8,38 (CIA-2015)

Source: *CIA World Factbook*, < <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>>; *BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017*.

Moscow understands the threats to its gas monopoly in Southeastern Europe and tries to fend off these threats. Now the Russian Gazprom is proceeding apace the building of Turkish Stream gas pipeline⁴⁰. Turkish Stream project competes with the Azerbaijani-led TANAP as the mainstay of the EU-backed Southern Gas Corridor concept and creates some problems. First, by delivering large quantities of Russian gas to Europe via Turkey, Gazprom could preempt Turkmenistani gas volumes and even Azerbaijani post-Shah Deniz

³⁷ M. Assenova, Z. Shiriyev (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 45.

³⁸ A. Mustafayev, *Iran mozhet naladit eksport gaza cherez TANAP*, Trend.az, 24.04.2018, <<https://www.trend.az/business/energy/2892605.html>> (28.04.2018).

³⁹ *Energy security and competition over energy resources in Iran and Caucasus region*, “AIMS Energy”, 2017, No. 5 (2), p. 236.

⁴⁰ *Zaversheno stroitelstvo pervoy nitki „Turetskogo potoka”*, Gazprom.ru, 30.04.2018, <<http://www.gazprom.ru/press/news/2018/april/article425722>> (30.04.2018).

volumes from entering TANAP en route to the European market. Such a move would undercut the Southern Corridor's strategic position as a non-Russian transit route for non-Russian gas supplies.

Second, the Turkish Stream, directed to the gas supplying of Turkey and Southeastern European states, like Greece and Bulgaria, would lead to the further increasing the region's overall dependence on Russian energy.

Third, the stated purpose of Turkish Stream – just as South Stream's before it – is to shift Russian gas exports away from transiting through Ukraine and maintain pressure on government in Kyiv⁴¹.

Conclusion

All above-mentioned facts show fragility and instability of the Russian-Azerbaijani relations (despite how close partners they may seem now) by the example of only one, but very important factor – energy. Moreover, Azerbaijan has had already a negative experience of clash of interests with Russia in energy sector in previous years. Moreover, despite good relations between Russia and Azerbaijan in the present the energy factor has still cluttered the bilateral relations. That is why Moscow, protecting its own interests, can apply many tools only for the sake of weakening the position of Baku and prevention of implementation the projects, so dangerous to Russia. The tool kit in hands of the Kremlin is wide. Firstly, even if Baku and Ashgabat will continue constructing the TCG, Moscow can force both states to stop construction of the gas pipeline, using its Caspian military fleet. Moreover, the main part of Azerbaijani infrastructure on oil and gas production is located on the Caspian seashore, as well as the capital of Azerbaijan that make them very vulnerable to the attacks from the sea⁴². Secondly, Moscow can put pressure upon Azerbaijani civilians, working and living in Russia and compelling them to return to Azerbaijan. That will lead to difficulties in Azerbaijani economy and to growth in the number of Azeris dissatisfied with the authorities of the country. Russia has used this tool already in previous years.

Till 12 August 2018, Russia could use a factor of lack of regulation of the Caspian Sea legal status that could prevent construction of the Trans-Caspian gas (TCG) pipeline⁴³. Without the Turkmen gas the Southern gas corridor loses the meaning because Azerbaijan per se has no necessary volumes of gas for filling the pipeline. However “Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan have signed a convention regulating the legal status of the Caspian Sea. The document states that the Caspian littoral countries have the

⁴¹ M. Assenova, Z. Shiriyev (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 35.

⁴² A. Gasanov, *Politika natsional'nogo razvitiya i bezopasnosti Azerbaydzhanskoj Respubliki*, Baku 2014, p.128.

⁴³ M. B. Altunışık, O. F. Tanrisever, *The South Caucasus – Security, Energy and Europeanization*, Routledge, 2018, p. 189.

right to lay underwater cables and pipelines. This could lead to energy projects, including a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline that would be important for the EU. At the same time, Russia is blocking access for all other states, guaranteeing its dominance in the region”⁴⁴.

At last, Moscow can initiate the outbreak of war in a zone of the Karabakh conflict by means of the Armenian ally that will interrupt operation of pipelines because they would appear in a zone of military operations.

Here I can suggest some recommendations how to avoid possible confrontation between Azerbaijan and Russia as followed:

1. In these conditions Baku has to continue to adhere to the balanced foreign policy. That is, Azerbaijan must do all the best not to deteriorate its relations with the Western countries, in particular with the European Union and the USA. Because such a deterioration would narrow a field for a political manoeuvre of Baku between force poles.
2. It is vital to Azerbaijan to work out and sign an agreement with the EU on strategic and equal partnership as soon as possible. In my opinion it would boost the political support of Azerbaijan from the side of the EU and the USA. It would become an important trump in hands of Baku for carrying out independent of Russia policy.
3. At the same time Baku should continue its previous policy directed to maintenance the positive relations with Moscow.

And at the end I would like to recommend to other researches to study the economical aspects of the energy factor’s influence on Russian-Azerbaijani relations, because I have studied only political aspects of bilateral relations in this case. Also it would be useful to study the influence of the oil and gas factor on the inner policy of both states as well as how this factor strengthen the ruling regimes in Russia and Azerbaijan.

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III. REVIEWS

„*Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem*”
 2018, No 1(10)
 DOI: 10.33674/1201810

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**AGNIESZKA BIEŃCZYK-MISSALA, ZAPOBIEGANIE MASOWYM
 NARUSZENIOM PRAW CZŁOWIEKA. MIĘDZYNARODOWE
 INSTYTUCJE I INSTRUMENTY, WYDAWNICTWO NAUKOWE
 SCHOLAR, WARSZAWA 2018, SS. 242**

A monograph of Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala titled *Preventing massive violations of human rights. International institutions and instruments* were issued at the beginning of 2018. The publication, despite the relatively small volume, has a chance to claim one of the few (if not the only) items on the Polish publishing market that describe instruments of various nature to prevent violations of human rights. It is worth noting that so far neither Polish nor foreign researchers, the issue of prevention of mass violations of human rights has been frequently discussed. Therefore, it is worth noting both the content of the publication and the authoress herself.

Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala is a respected political scientist at the Department of Strategic Studies at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Warsaw. In addition, she is the authoress of many publications and conference speeches on the protection of human rights, prevention of violations of human rights and humanitarian law. She also gave guest lectures on the aforementioned scope, among others at the *School for Human Rights* of the *Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights* or the *Menachem Begin Heritage Center Museum*. She is a participant in cooperation with the European Network NOHA - Network on Humanitarian Studies, she also acted as an expert in the European TUNING Programme. Therefore, she has comprehensive experience in the field of the reviewed publication.

In 2013-2017, Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala was the manager of the project *Prevention of mass violations of human rights*. It was financed from the resources of the National Science Center, and the reviewed publication is the aftermath of the implemented project.

The reviewed publication consists of an introduction, 10 chapters, a summary, and bibliography. The substantive part of the monograph is divided

into two minor parts – the first part analyzes the competences and instruments of states and international organizations to prevent human rights violations, and the second part contains case studies. The structure of the reviewed monograph shows a deep rethink of the methodological assumptions of the publication by the authoress. The findings and the adopted methodology are presented in the preliminary issues. Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala presents the most important concepts, assumptions and research hypotheses, research methods and techniques as well as the current state of research on the issue. Conceptualization of the concepts used in the publication - especially of prevention and mass violations of human rights - is so valuable that the authoress referred to the categories, which defining can be problematic.

By adopting such an introduction structure, even the recipient who is not fluent in the subject taken in the book is introduced into the author's reflections on the methodological layer of work. Thus, the recipient broadening his knowledge even before moving on to the substantive part of the considerations on the subject of preventing violations of human rights.

The main subject of the publication is the involvement of states and international institutions to prevent massive violations of human rights. The authoress, as the goal of the monograph, set herself to systematize the involvement of the above entities in this matter.

In the first chapter, Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala discusses the role of the United Nations Organization and its bodies and institutions in the field of preventing violations of human rights. This chapter, given the importance of the UN in the world and its role in maintaining international peace and security, is the longest of all those in the publication; it also has the most extensive structure.

In the second chapter under the name *Competences of regional European institutions in the field of preventing mass violations of human rights*, Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala undertakes deliberations on the role and instruments of the European Union, the OSCE and the Council of Europe.

Chapter 3. presents the problem of preventing massive violations of human rights in non-European institutions. In this chapter, the authoress chose for analysis institutions such as the African Union, Economic Community of West African States, International Conference of the Great Lakes Region, Organization of American States as well as institutions and organizations in Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.

The next chapters concern the prevention of massive violations of human rights in states foreign policy and state cooperation in this field (chapter 4.), forms of involvement of non-governmental organizations in this field (chapter 5.) and international instruments to prevent mass violations of human rights (chapter 6.). All issues described so far from the first part of the monograph.

The second part (chapters 7-10) deals with case studies. The analysis made in this part is based on the following pattern – first, the authoress draws up the context of a given conflict in which she familiarizes the recipient with its causes and consequences, secondly, she describes the institutions involved and

the instruments used, and then makes the results of actions aimed at preventing mass violation of rights human and assessing the effectiveness of these.

In this way, the authoress acquaints the recipient with the actions taken to protect human rights as part of the conflict in Chechnya, Rwanda, Ivory Coast, and Libya. The adopted uniform structure and synthetic description allow to quickly find interesting content. It also creates an ideal material for comparative analysis of instruments and tools as well as their effectiveness (or lack of efficiency).

When analyzing the publication as a whole, one should highlight the transparent structure of the monograph and the widely described methodological layer. For this reason, and because of the transparent, accessible - and at the same time very precise language - it is a position that can be used by both recipients with a large knowledge, as well as those interested in the subject, who want to broaden their knowledge in the presented topics. The culmination of the publication is a very detailed scientific bibliography. Noteworthy are also two comprehensive indexes: names and factual, which facilitate navigation after publication. Thus, the recipient has a chance to quickly find interesting issues.

The publication, however, creates a certain insufficiency for the recipient. The surprise is a short - almost five-page description of the European Union's significance in the field of human rights violation prevention and an eight-page analysis on the role of non-governmental organizations. Considering the methodological value of the work, it should be presumed that the descriptions are a reflection of the importance of individual organizations and institutions for world peace, but after an extensive first chapter (concerning the UN), the authoress awakens the reader's appetite, which may be disappointed with the description, which is in fact limited. This, however, compensates for the reference to the rich literature of the subject.

Also, the second part of the monograph (case studies) causes a dissatisfaction in the recipient. The conflicts described do not exhaust the broad spectrum of events in which the global public was faced with the observation of human rights violations on a mass scale. The analysis does not include such conflicts as the war in the former Yugoslavia or the 1st Gulf War. It can, however, become an impulse for Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala to undertake further research on the subject matter, which remains to be counted on.

These deficiencies, however, do not include publications; as indicated by the accessible language, high precision in the analysis of phenomena and instruments to prevent violations of human rights and comprehensive reference to literature, the publication is highly recommendable to recipients only exploring the subject matter, as well as those who want to deepen their already existing knowledge. The value of the monograph also becomes an interdisciplinary approach to the analyzed issue: the authoress discusses issues relevant to international relations, international law, economics or military. It is also one of the few publications dealing with the issue, which is its undisputed value.

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**MARY KALDOR, *GLOBAL SECURITY CULTURES*, POLITY PRESS,
CAMBRIDGE 2018, SS. 224**

Mary Kaldor's recent book titled *Global Security Cultures* is an important contribution to the field of human security. The author of the book is a professor of Global Governance and director of the Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit in the Department of International Development at London School of Economics and Political Science. Professor Kaldor is an established and highly regarded scholar, best known for her work on concepts of new war, global security and democratisation. In 2003 she has received a Commander of the British Empire (CBE) for 'services to democracy and global governance'.

In her new book Professor Kaldor intends to make sense of the different and often competing approaches to the security in the post-Cold War reality. In the recent decades we have observed evolution of different security pathways. New phenomena closely tied with technological advancements often blur rather than increase general understanding on how the nations become more defensive and secure. The book provides essential analysis on the current state of international security describing patterns of behaviour within the global security paradigm. At the same time, the book presents a slightly different approach to security by looking at the issue across a variety of different factors and actors instead of the tradition military forces *versus* enemy. The changing nature of international relations after the dissolution of the bipolar world exposed the lack of appropriate theoretical framework for our understanding of global security.

The book is a result of a long-term research project entitled *Security in Transition: An Interdisciplinary Investigation into the Security Gap*. The research was concerned with the transition between the Cold War security paradigm and the different security models that emerged after 1989. The security gap refers to the profound global lack of security that has been affecting millions of people worldwide. Influenced by the research outcomes, the author developed the concept of security cultures as an analytical tool in order to make sense of the contemporary approaches of security. The book explores the complex layers and complicated nets of connections between security cultures in modern post-Cold War conflicts, particularly in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Syria as prime examples. Identifying security cultures is about

finding similarities in doing security worldwide in terms of its objectives (safety) and recipients (whose security?). Security in this context does not necessarily mean military defence, as the use of military force has changed as a consequence of information technology advancements.

The first chapter, after the introduction, focuses on explaining what security cultures are. Using the term 'culture' suggest social rather than spatial relations. In addition, by definition culture is something that is repetitive, reproduced and specific to a certain groups. Indeed, Mary Kaldor emphasise that security cultures are reproduced continually and socially constructed. Four main types of security cultures have been distinguished in the book, geopolitics, liberal peace, new war and war on terror, and described in the subsequent four chapters. Security cultures, as described by Mary Kaldor, constantly influence each other and cannot exist in isolation. They consist of different sets of actors and have different characteristics but interact and penetrate each other.

Geopolitics, the first security culture, is also the oldest and most dominant one. The chapter examines the history and evolution of geopolitics to what it is today. Indeed, we have witnessed a recent come back of geopolitics in the annexation of Crimea. However, the traditional practice of geopolitics is changing from territorial to communicative in a sense that the military power is used against people and not to seize territory. The geopolitical tactics have adapted to the contemporary nature of the conflict and the ever advancing technology. The role of the military forces has been changing profoundly. Wars are no longer declared and carried out as they were decades ago. The increasing number of private military and security companies also plays an important role in the rise of this security culture. In addition, geopolitics security culture encompasses hybrid war, a state where local conflicts are manipulated for the purpose of political gain. All these factors combined seem to suggest that geopolitics revival is long lasting. However, the author proposes that it might be soon taken over by the competing alternatives.

Next chapter deals with the new wars security culture. Professor Kaldor begins by presenting the evolution of new wars after the end of Cold War and explaining what is new in new wars. The most prominent characteristic of this security culture is that the conceptual framework of wars, and of conflicts for that matter, has irreversibly changed. It must be understood as much more than a mere expansion of political conflict between two irreconcilable positions. Rather, the new wars security culture is a form of long lasting social state where violence is used to allocate resources. The actors are, according to Mary Kaldor, creating a security culture by being programmed to repeat a certain sets of behaviour. New wars are not the same as guerrilla wars or 'low intensity wars'. They involve a large number of non state actors, whose focus is on controlling population and resources - the main source of money. The sad point is that the new wars are often more profitable than peace to internal and external actors. Therefore, it is within their interest to increase the violence,

chaos and attacks on the civilians. Deep structural changes on local and global level are needed in order to stop the spread of new wars.

Third chapter describes the liberal peace security culture as the one that offers the most opportunities to improve the general global security. Liberal peace, as Professor Kaldor argues, is a product of humanitarian assistance and growth of international institutions, such as the United Nations. Therefore, the theory is rooted in the old wars. Although the objective of liberal peace, namely to end conflict, is promising, the culture of liberal peace is adjusting too slowly to the changing nature of contemporary conflicts. Peace agreements are often drafted between warring parties that make financial and political gains from the conflict. Negotiations ought to be more inclusive and supported by deep understanding of the parties involved and their power relations. Any peace agreement that fails to recognize the power relations inside and outside the conflict zone has little chance to be successful and long-lasting. Liberal peace needs serious adjustment and evaluation. Recognizing the flaws of liberal peace culture helps to identify areas where change is possible as new ways of ending conflicts are needed.

Final security culture described by Mary Kaldor is the war on terror that specifically aims at humans instead of territories and states. The culture was born out of response to the 9/11 attack, that had been treated as a classic attack of a foreign state rather than a non-state actor. Professor Kaldor argues that the events after the terrorist attack on US led to the creation of a separate security culture that uses spy technology, surveillance, cyber-attacks, drones and intelligence to deliberately target individuals. This security cultures is also characterized by the decline of norms regarding torture, detention, privacy and confidentiality. The society is able to accept practices that were considered impermissible before. There is no more inside or outside. The enemy can hide anywhere, home or abroad. Unfortunately, as we have learned in the last 15 years or so, the war on terror has undoubtedly failed to stop terrorism.

Mary Kaldor ends the book by providing a number of examples where her distinction between different security cultures is shown in practice. The book is focused on analysis of the current state of global security, but not without trying to give possible solutions to the problems. We are left with conclusions and final recommendation that a new peace culture, born out of a restructured and readjusted liberal peace, is needed to counter both new wars and war on terror. Liberal peace that was created to contain 'old wars' in new security paradigm is creating an unstable situation called 'hybrid peace', that often allows for the further exploitation of populations. Justice and adequate economic policy is needed in order to stop those who make profit from wars.

The main recommendation suggested in that book is that a new humanitarian approach is necessary to accurately respond to the contemporary security demands. But how can we adjust liberal peace? Do humanitarian principles even apply to the current conflicts? Is it possible for the states to implement the 'principles of humanity', as Mary Kaldor calls them?

Unfortunately, the answer to these questions remains unclear. Security cultures and responses to the threats change slower than the nature of the threat itself. Therefore, the reactions and solutions come after a threat is recognised. International consensus and approach change even slower. That is perhaps the reason why it takes time to agree on appropriate approach to the security problems and take action. Perhaps, as the civilization continues to evolve our humanitarian attitude will evolve as well.

Although the book makes a number of highly compelling and engaging arguments, there are a few that deserve a special attention. Firstly, Professor Kaldor makes a very interesting and important point regarding the contemporary conflicts around the world. The days of territorial disputes are gone. The new wars and terrorism lost their geopolitical focus. The conflicts of the 21st century have become bio-political. Rather than controlling territories the objective of the insurgency is the control of population. All four security cultures, including geopolitics supported by the technological revolution, are predominantly focused on controlling groups of people. Indeed, bio-politics can be observed all over the world. This is precisely why the approach to peacemaking and peacekeeping has to change.

Secondly, as Professor Kaldor argues, there is an increasing blurring between the seemingly opposite notions of global and local as well as inside and outside. In times of deep globalisation no place can stay isolated. The world of interconnectedness brings global to the local and *vice versa*. In addition, the number of international actors is growing. The enemy is rarely as simple as another state. Many scholars seem to be stuck on the local/global division without realising that this division is often no longer valid.

Lastly, Mary Kaldor highlights the role and importance of the civil society in local and global conflict resolution. Without an independent civil society there can be no meaningful negotiations or peace agreements. In new wars and war on terror the sides of the conflict are much more concerned with making profits and controlling the resources than with ceasefire and peace. The objective is to keep the conflict going as it generates financial gains and power. Civil society has a crucial role in establishing the legitimacy of the government at all levels. However, what is missing from the book is the explanation of what exactly is meant by civil society. Is civil society always unified and in agreement? Who and on what level (local, state or international) can give legitimacy to political authority?

Although the general statements in the book are supported by convincing evidence regarding the emerging security cultures, it is surprising that cyber attacks or cyber security have received so little attention in *Global Security Cultures*. Examining the current state of international affairs, it is justify wondering if cyber security is becoming one of the cultures that professor Kaldor defines in her book. Perhaps at the moment the exact pattern, characteristics or even possibilities of cyber warfare are not fully recognised as it is still blurred into other security cultures. As the information technology

revolution gains speed all aspects of our lives become more and more digitised and also more vulnerable. Nations, communities, businesses and individuals will require increasing levels of cyber security. Cyber security is a fast growing global business that is predicted to reach billions of dollars in spending costs in the next few years.

The cyber threat is very specific as it does not cross any country borders. It does not operate within any physical frontiers but rather lingers in digital space, which is virtually a no man's land. In addition, it is fully bio-political. The objective of cyber warfare is predominantly to control the population. Although cyber attack is not considered a breach of sovereignty, its consequences can be devastating, including chaos, misinformation, spread of fake news, influenced public opinion, even interference in elections. We can only expect for the cyber attacks to become more sophisticated. If that is the scenario for the future and cyber attack will develop its own security culture, how can we adjust the concept of liberal peace and the principle of humanity to it?

IV. WSBiP's DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

REPORT FROM THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS CONFERENCE "ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS AND HYBRID WARS IN THE 21TH CENTURY" IN THE COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN OSTROWIEC ŚWIĘTOKRZYSKI

On 23-25 May 2018 Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski third time become the host of national and international experts in field of security, international relations, political science and many other disciplines. More than 100 experts and participants from Poland, Ukraine, Russia, Romania, Georgia, Lithuania, Hungary, Czech Republic, Great Britain, Mauretania, Slovakia or Moldova have the opportunity to discuss about topics which especially in Central and Eastern Europe are more than current. The main aim of the Conference was to give the platform for exchange experience and knowledge, share the reflections and thoughts of guest.

At opening ceremony participates were greeted by the rector Izabela Zaborowska. She expressed the satisfaction that the Colleague of Business and Entrepreneurship again become the host of such important event on international scale. During opening ceremony we have the opportunity to listen the speech of Polish parliament deputy Jarosław Rusiecki, who is the chairman of national security parliamentary commission and also was the Head of Conference Programme Council. Guest were also welcomed by general Mieczysław Cieniuch.

After official part, the experts from Poland, Romania and Ukraine present to participants their research results. As first the general Anatol Wojtan speak about the genesis and strategic aspects of asymmetric conflicts and hybrid wars in XXI century. General Józef Flis with general Andrzej Pietrzyk raised the aspects of discussion about hybrid war as new or old phenomenon. General Virgil Balaceanu, responsible for integration of Romanian army with NATO structures, represented the Reserve Officers Association of Romania present the topic "The economical war in Europe. ROU National Defence Industry". At the end of this panel the voice took professor Jurij Makar from Chernivtsi National University, who together with PhD Ludmyła Nowoskolcewa spoke about Russian invasion in Ukraine as the exemplification of hybrid war.

After lunch break the proceedings were resumed in two parallel panels. First session were devoted in general to information about the asymmetric conflicts and hybrid wars. This however give the possibilities to listeners to complete their knowledge and discuss about disagreements. Session was open by the presentation of Marzena Żakowska from Poland, with presentation about

“Determinants of armed conflicts”. Later participants have the opportunity to listen presentation of Alike Guchua “Asymmetrical Threats and the Impact of Hybrid War on Global Security and Role of NATO in Ensuring Peace”, and Eka Beraia with “Asymmetric Challenges and Their Impact on Contemporary International Relations” both from Georgia. Also during this session guest from Ukraine and Russia present their result of research. Professor Władysław Strutyński present the topic “Political Component of Hybrid Wars: History and The Modern Realities”, Vira Burdiak present “Conflict in The East of Ukraine and its psychological features”, and the Igor Seleznev A Quarter of the Century is on the Guard of Collective Security against the Asymmetric Conflicts and Hybrid Wars”. The panel was closed with the speech concerns “Geostrategic Aspects of International Tensions and Conflicts” of Marzena Araźna.

Second parallel session in the same time was devoted mostly to war in Syria. During this panel we had the opportunity to listen experts from Lithuania, Ukraine and Poland, among them Vadim Volovoj with presentation “Political and Military Lessons of the Russian Campaign in Syria”, colonel Dariusz Braźkiewicz “Intervention of the Russian Federation in Syria - a Case Study of the Russian Policy in the Middle East”, Przemysław Furgacz “Iranian Military Intervention in Syrian War: Causes, Hallmarks and Ramifications for Iran’s Relations with Israel and Other Middle-Eastern Powers”, Šarūnas Rinkevičius “Non-Muslim Militias and Their Role in the Conflict in Syria and Iraq” and Natalia Tomaszewska “Russian Experience From War in Syria. Different Battlefields in Modern War”. The panel was ended by Andriy Butyrski from Ukraine with topic “Protection of the Rights of Internally Displaced Person in the Conditions of the Conflict on the Donbas”.

After every session the organizers leave the possibility to discuss with and between experts. Participants could share their remarks, questions and opinions about heard information’s on every presented topic.

Second day 24th May the proceedings start with two parallel sessions. First one was devoted mostly to Russia and connected with topics, like place of military actions in her doctrine or did the hybrid war was a tool use against countries like Ukraine, Moldova or Georgia. Among others, experts present the results of research about propaganda, information warfare or economic elements of hybrid war. Colonel Crăișor Ioniță present the topic “Russia: From Cold War via "Peace Dividend" to Hybrid War in Europe. How to reconcile Europe's strategic interests with Russia's legitimate interests?”, Beata Gostomczyk spoke about “Russian Hybrid Warfare and its Place in the Russian Geopolitical Doctrine”, Wojciech Szczepański give the answer for question “Does Russia Engage in Hybrid Warfare in the Balkans?”, Anna Bałdyga, spoke about “Manipulation of Raw Material Prices on Global Markets as a Key Element of Economic War – the Case of Russia after the Annexation of Crimea”. Łukasz Gałczyński present the elements of economic war on example of Kremlin Internal Recolonisation of the South Caucasus, Marina Gorbatuic “Transnistrian Conflict as a Phenomenon of Hybrid War”. Worth to mention

are also the presentations of Maia Urushadze “Foreign Propaganda Projection in Georgian Politics”, professor Khatuna Chapichadze “Has Georgia Won the Information War against Russia in the Context of the Russian-Georgian Conflict of 2008?” and the professor Jarosław Tomasiewicz “Nation-party Against Nation-state. The Kurdish Nationalist Movement From Terrorism to Quasi-statehood”.

Parallel session was generally devoted to medical aspects of modern war, which refers to lecture of colonel Zoltan Toth from NATO Centre of Excellence for Military Medicine Interoperability Branch in Hungary. During this panel, participants have the opportunity to listen expert from TACMED Michał Czerwiński, the known author and recognize authority in case of medical services, who present topic “Modern threats for Emergency Medical Services in Context of Asymmetric Warfare”. Among other author’s presentation we can distinguish John Quinn and Patrick Chellew from Czech Republic, Lt. Maciej Paszyn, Paweł Kawalerski and Damian G. Dzierżyński from Poland. In this panel beside medicine topics, were present also aspects of territorial defence and local governments issues, cyber war, fourth generation wars.

PhD Alba Popescy from Romania with topic “Muslim Brotherhood and the Global Caliphate” get a lot of attention from listeners. What should be emphasize that this topic was one of the most popular during the discussion among participants. Captain Dariusz Loranty presentation conneced topics of medicine and territorial defence in “Polish Territorial Self-government - Tasks in the Field of Medical Logistics in the Aspect of Asymmetric Conflict. Current Status, Advantages and Disadvantages”

After lunch break participants returned do Assembly Hols for last two parallel panels.

First one was devoted in whole to Ukraine. Participants mainly from Poland but also from Great Britain spoke about hybrid war in Ukraine and its consequences, like migration, asylum seekers or information aspects of war. Piotr Kułakowski rise the topic about the possibility of separatist actions in Zakarpatia region. In fourth panel we could see the domination of media issues, like: “Facebook and Twitter in the Hands of the Terrorists” Lena Kuzka, “The Control and Regulation of Fake News and Hate Speech Online” Ruth Barber, “The Role of Local Media in Shaping Awareness in the Field of Security: on the Example of the Interaction of the Reformed Newspapers and the Armed Forces of Ukraine” by Agata Woźniak-Krakowian.

Second day of proceedings end with mentioned lecture of colonel Zlaton Toth. Information’s about help on battle field and medial process during conflicts gathered many listeners, also nurses from Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski.

During the last day 25th May, we had the occasion to hear among other professor Vahtang Maisaia from Caucasus International University, who speak about Jihadist hybrid war as a asymmetric military strategy for aggressive non-state religious actors – main characteristics and doctrinal implications (Daesh, Taliban and “Caucasus Islamic Emirate” Cases). Staying in topic of Islam,

Aleksandra Cieślak from King's Collage of London spoke about fighting for ISIS - the case of Great Britain. In this panel were also discussed issues connected with migrations, terrorism and climate change.

In second and last panel at that day and general in conference listeners have the occasion to continuing discussions about the asymmetric conflicts in case of terrorism. Leonid Gusev from Russia present the topic of fights in post-soviet area against asymmetric conflicts. Latter Jakub Žak present how and what weapons are used during asymmetric conflicts. Roman Temnikov spoke about the case of Azerbaijan and it's winning fight against terrorism. The panel end with presentation of colonel Grzegorz Motrycz with topics "Terrorist Attacks as an Example of Asymmetrical Actions During the ISAF Mission, and Piotr Lewandowski "Twitter Revolutions - Geopolitical Consequences for International Security".

After panels were conduct two parallel open lectures, first about "Safety at Work of Public Officials – Communication in Crisis Situations" led by captain Dariusz Loranty, known polish police officer, negotiator and specialist in internal affairs and second lecture of professor Vakhtang Maisaia, NATO expert and participant of NATO summit in Warsaw from Georgia who speak about "Caucasus-Caspian Region in the post-Cold War".

Apart from conference, during breaks in proceedings participants have the opportunity to get acquainted with the latest press and book publications concerning asymmetric conflict and hybrid wars. After lectures conference were closed with speech of Rector Izabela Zaborowska and Dean Paweł Gotowiecki.

The conference was broadly commented in national and local media, also abroad. Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski once again become the significant place, where number of experts from 18 countries, different science environment and disciplines, have the possibility to factual and uninhibited discussion on topics which are crucial not only for Central or East Europe, but for the whole Europe, Asia and North America.





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