

ANTE PORTAS

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Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem

**Kryzys ukraiński i jego znaczenie
dla bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego:
aspekty ekonomiczno-polityczne**

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Kryzys ukraiński i jego znaczenie dla bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego: aspekty ekonomiczno-polityczne

Trwający od 2013 r. kryzys na Ukrainie, wraz z politycznym i militarnym zaangażowaniem się Federacji Rosyjskiej po stronie ukraińskich separatystów, zyskał wymiar międzynarodowy. Zaanektowanie Krymu przez Rosję oraz zainicjowanie „wojny buntowniczej” na wschodniej Ukrainie stanowiły odpowiedź Kremla na reprezentowany przez obóz Euromajdanu okcydentalny kierunek ukraińskiej polityki zagranicznej. Jednocześnie, zdaniem części analityków, rosyjska polityka względem Ukrainy stanowi etap realizacji koncepcji odbudowy rosyjskiej dominacji na obszarze postradzieckim.

Kolejne fazy kryzysu ukraińskiego potwierdzają załamanie się obowiązującego od ponad dwóch dekad systemu bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego na osi Rosja-NATO i – szerzej – Rosja-Zachód. Ekspansywna polityka Kremla i naruszenie integralności terytorialnej Ukrainy nie pozostaje bez wpływu także na systemy bezpieczeństwa narodowego poszczególnych państw NATO, w tym zwłaszcza republik bałtyckich i Polski. Międzynarodowa równowaga sił w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej, ukształtowana po rozpadzie ZSRR, w przeciągu minionych kilku lat przestała obowiązywać.

W piątym numerze półrocznika „Ante Portas” publikujemy artykuły naukowe dotyczące wpływu konfliktu ukraińskiego na system bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego w aspekcie ekonomiczno-politycznym. Opublikowane materiały stanowią próbę spojrzenia na kryzys pod kątem jego wielopłaszczyznowości, wieloaspektowości i oddziaływania na niemal wszystkie sfery życia zarówno na Ukrainie, jak i w krajach ościennych. Znamienne, iż spojrzenia te, prezentowane przez naukowców i specjalistów z Ukrainy, Rosji, Gruzji, Litwy oraz Polski, obrazują niejednokrotnie odmienne perspektywy, poglądy i oczekiwania względem dalszego rozwoju sytuacji na Ukrainie.

Zamieszczone na łamach niniejszego numeru teksty dotyczą m.in. problematyki możliwych scenariuszy dalszego przebiegu kryzysu (dr Vadim Volovoj), działań podejmowanych przez władze ukraińskie w kierunku zreformowania nieefektywnego systemu administracyjnego państwa (prof. dr hab. Siergii Slukhai oraz prof. dr Khatuna Chapichadze) oraz zmian w sektorze bankowo-finansowym (dr Victoria Klymenko, dr Ganna Lozova oraz Mariana Shchhehelska). Wiele uwagi poświęcono problematyce stosunków polsko-ukraińskich w wymiarze ekonomiczno-politycznym (prof. dr hab. Jurij Makar, doc. dr Witalij Makar oraz dr Vadym Zheltovskyy) oraz oddziaływaniu kryzysu ukraińskiego na gospodarkę Ukrainy i Rosji (dr Leonid Gusev, Veronika Mitášová oraz Ján Havko), w tym również kwestii ukraińsko-rosyjskiej wojny ekonomicznej (dr Przemysław Furgacz oraz Olga Jastrzębska). Analizie poddano także kwestię postaw społeczeństwa ukraińskiego względem toczącego się kryzysu (Anna Tishchenko, Ihor Bondarenko) oraz jego wpływu na tożsamość narodową (dr Natalia Spitsa).

Redakcja zdecydowała o wyodrębnieniu nowego działu tematycznego, w którym zamieszczono krótkie analizy prezentujące problematykę wpływu konfliktu na gospodarkę Ukrainy, autorstwa znanych ukraińskich ekonomistów – prof. dr. hab. Petro Nikiforova, prof. dr. hab. Romana Harata, dr Oleny Kuzmak oraz dr. Olega Kuzmaka.

Kolejną nowością wprowadzoną w niniejszym numerze jest dział „GOŚCINNY ARTYKUŁ NUMERU”, gdzie prezentujemy artykuły naukowe z zakresu bezpieczeństwa, stosunków międzynarodowych, wojskowości itp., niezwiązane z tematyką przewodnią wydania. Jako pierwszy z serii publikacji przedstawiamy artykuł autorstwa dr. Sheriffa Folarina, dr. Bankole Olorunyomi oraz Oluwafunke Folarina z Covenant University (Nigeria), dotyczący problematyki zróżnicowania etnicznego krajów Afryki Zachodniej i jego wpływu na proces integracji regionalnej.

Uzupełnieniem numeru jest recenzja książki Jewhena Magdy, *Gibridnaja wojna. Wyżit' i pobiedit'*, autorstwa dr. Leszka Sykulskiego.

Życzymy przyjemnej lektury!

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I. ARTYKUŁY NAUKOWE

„*Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem*”
2015, nr 2(5)

Sergii Slukhaii

Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv

DECENTRALIZATION IN UKRAINE: WHAT IS ON THE AGENDA?

Summary:

After the Revolution of Dignity (2013-2014) in Ukraine, the new government declared an extensive decentralization program as a part of far-reaching economic reforms to be implemented. These efforts are supposed to be supported by reassigning of public functions, shifting down some public revenues, and increasing the local autonomy concerning revenue management. The paper shows the main obstacles on the way to decentralization, to what extent these decentralization plans have been realized within the actual governmental policy in 2014-2015, and how these decentralization efforts would contribute to increasing efficiency in public administration.

Key words:

decentralization, local finance, subnational government.

Introduction

The scale and intensity of fiscal decentralization is preconditioned by peculiarities of the country's intergovernmental fiscal relations, assignment of governmental functions and revenues within the sector of public administration. Thus, it also depends on a variety of institutional, political, and economic factors which shape the specific features of the country's public administration sector. Ukraine as a transition nation that gained independence after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 has inherited some remnants of a socialist past, when there was no place for subnational government (further referred to as SNG) fiscal autonomy and sound fiscal management.

Ukraine, being a unitary state, naturally tended to practise a centralistic model of fiscal federalism; this fact does have an impact on the shape of its intergovernmental fiscal system in general, and the transfer system in particular.

When analyzing the current legal base and actual practice of intergovernmental finance in Ukraine, one will find that actual implementation of many local government functions is mostly vested onto the national government (further referred to as NG) bodies – district and region state administrations that are appointed by and accountable to the President of Ukraine. This means that bodies of self-government in Ukraine enjoy a very limited scale of own competence. The recent Ukrainian revolution (2013-14) triggered the new state's decentralization efforts, which promise to result in a far-reaching reform of public finance aiming to significantly increase SNGs' economic and fiscal weight.

Actually, even after the enactment of the Budget Code (2001), SNGs remained deprived of the ability to manage their finances and assets. In many cases they formally bore responsibility for certain public functions (such as general secondary education or primary health care), but had no possibility to manage the basic factors affecting their expenditures, such as salaries and wages; they also had no discretion to hire and fire managers of subordinated public institutions, or to set standards of service delivery etc. They even could not hold accounts in the financial institutions of their choice – only in the State Treasury.

All the above-mentioned gave us reasons to conclude that since Ukrainian independence there was no explicit decentralization policy adopted and no implicit decentralization measures implemented¹. However, new prospects in this field could be opened due to recent changes in governmental policy and practical steps taken concerning retrenching intergovernmental finance; these efforts may really result in a far-reaching decentralization process.

Decentralization nowadays is a way of securing Ukraine as a nation because, if done properly, it could minimize the dangers of country's disintegration, which would be the goal of Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine. The Russian government dresses the war to its own population as »protection of the Russian population «against fascism» and American expansion«.

The goal of this paper is to show whether ongoing fiscal decentralization endeavors could open a way to getting a decentralized and efficient public administration sector in Ukraine.

Development trends in the Ukrainian public administration sector

In order to understand what kind of developments we have had in the Ukrainian public administration sector, it is worth discussing prevailing trends in subnational government expenditure share, which is conventionally understood as the fiscal decentralization index². The problem is that it does not fully

¹ S. Slukhai, *Ukrainian Public Finance after 20 Years of Independence: Leaping Forward or Going in Circles?*, [in:] *Papers presented at the 20th NISPAcee Conference (May 22-25, 2012, Ohrid, Republic of Macedonia)*, Bratislava 2012 (CD-R).

² D. Bergvall, C. Charbit, D.-J. Kraan, O. Merk, *Intergovernmental Transfers and Decentralized Public Spending*, "OECD Journal on Budgeting", 2006, Vol. 5(4), pp. 111-158.

reflect the real extent of fiscal decentralization because subnational fiscal autonomy with regard to expenditures is not taken into account. In Ukraine, despite quite a high SNG expenditure share, most public expenditures at the subnational level are administered by the NG bodies, not by SNGs themselves. As Wojciech Misiąg, a well-known Polish economist who is now helping Ukraine implement the decentralization reform, put it, “this is an incomplete self-governance” at the local level³.

When omitting this point, one could depict some contradictory developments where the decentralization trend has been substituted for the opposite one and *vice versa*. Prior to 2000, we could observe: (I) an increase in total government GDP share supported by expenditure decentralization (1991-1993); (II) a decrease in total government share supported by expenditure centralization (1995-1997); (III) a decrease in total government share supported by expenditure decentralization (1998-1999); (IV) in 2000-2011, an upward trend in the relative size of the public administration sector generally dominated, supported by a very slight growth of the relative role of the subnational sector within it; (V) since 2012, a diminishing governmental share has been complemented by a clear centralization bias⁴. It looks like Ukrainian experience is fully consistent with Oates’ conclusion drawn about 20 years ago: “there does not exist a strong, systematic relationship between the size of government and the degree of centralization of the public sector”⁵.

Observations of SNG share in public expenditure dynamics could be very misleading, because local fiscal autonomy with regard to revenues is something that really matters here. As concerns Ukrainian public revenues, the trends here are not ambiguous, but quite straightforward. The data in Table 1 demonstrates that SNGs’ role in mobilization of revenues has been permanently diminishing through the years. Starting with about 46 per cent at the moment of gaining independence (1991), the total subnational share in public revenues (transfers excluded) has actually halved – it had dropped to about 22 per cent by 2014. Simultaneously, the NG gained a much bigger role in subsidizing SNGs and making them more dependent on its decisions concerning the fiscal support granted.

³ В. Мисенг, *Провести децентрализацию так, чтобы были довольны все, невозможно. Главное – начать*, „Зеркало недели”, Украина, 11 сентября 2015.

⁴ S. Slukhai, *Fiscal Decentralization efforts in Ukraine: Tax Competition on Agenda?*, [in:] *Insourcing and/or Outsourcing: How Do They Contribute to the Public Administration Reform. Presented Papers from the 23th NISPAcee Annual Conference (May 21-23, 2015, Tbilisi, Georgia)*, Bratislava 2015 (CD-R).

⁵ W.E. Oates, *Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study*, “American Economic Review”, 1985, Vol. 75, p. 756.

Table 1. Distribution of revenues among Ukrainian governmental levels (inter-governmental transfers excluded), per cent

Governmental levels	1991	1995	2000	2005	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
National	54.1	47.6	70.9	77.3	74.4	78.3	77.4	76.2	77.8
Total subnational	45.9	52.4	29.1	22.7	25.6	21.7	22.6	23.8	22.2
Regional	9.8	24.8	12.2	7.3	8.9	7.7	8.6	8.9	8.5
Cities of regional significance	25.6	17.6	10.2	11.3	11.8	9.4	9.2	9.7	8.8
Districts	6.3	7.5	4.8	1.8	2.4	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.2
Total SNGs of subdistrict level	4.2	2.5	1.9	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.8

Source: Own calculations based on MoF data.

An important issue of concern related to fiscal decentralization is direct fiscal transfers. Ukrainian SNGs are heavily subsidized by the NG. As the data in Table 2 demonstrates, intergovernmental finance in Ukraine displays the following trends: (I) a growing dependence of SNGs on fiscal transfers, (II) a substitution of NG's discretionary transfers (mutual settlements and budgetary loans) for formula transfers ("grants"), and (III) a substitution of general transfers ("grants") for earmarked ones ("subventions").

Table 2. Evolution in composition of the fiscal transfer fund in Ukraine, per cent

Year	Transfer share in the SNG total revenues	Out of total transfer mass:			
		Mutual settlements	Grants	Intergovernmental loans	Subventions
1991	14.4	34.8	55.9	9.2	-
1995	4.9	51.7	40.3	8.0	-
2000	22.9	0.2	96.5	1.9	2.4
2005	43.5	-	61.8	-	38.2
2010	48.8	-	56.8	-	43.1
2011	52.3	-	50.7	-	49.3
2012	55.2	-	48.7	-	51.3
2013	52.4	-	52.9	-	47.1
2014	56.4	-	50.7	-	49.3

2015 pro- jections	50	-	7.2	-	92.8
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Source: Own calculations based on MoF data.

The growing transfer dependence of SNGs signals a soaring vertical imbalance and diminishing local fiscal autonomy. The increasing relative importance of earmarked transfers could hardly be judged positively, because earmarking puts additional restrictions on SNGs' fiscal policy and may distort their spending priorities.


Among the different reasons for implementing some kind of intergovernmental transfer policy, bridging the vertical fiscal gap is the less controversial one. A gap between revenue capacity and expenditure liability of governmental levels, "vertical fiscal imbalance" (further referred to here as VFI), is quite big in Ukraine, like in many other transition nations. Conventionally, VFI for different governmental tiers could be measured as a relation of revenue and expenditure shares.

As shown in Figure 1, during 1991-1993 and in 1997, the subnational revenue share exceeded its expenditure share; since 1998, the situation has reversed: a trend towards further VFI increase has dominated. In 1998, VFI was only 2.4 per cent points, but it soared by 2014 by almost 10 times (!), reaching the highest historical level of 21.6 per cent points. The soaring VFI contributes to the growing need for direct fiscal transfers and to SNGs' direct and hidden indebtedness.

Observing a trend in subnational revenue share, we should take into account a specific composition of subnational tax proceeds, most of which belong to ceded national levies. As concerns own revenues, here SNGs in Ukraine don't have rights to set rates, define base, freely spend proceeds, and grant credits. That is why own revenues cannot secure a satisfactory level of local fiscal autonomy.

Firstly, their revenue potential is very limited (in 2010 the local tax share in total SNG revenues was only one percent, in 2014 – 3.2 per cent). Secondly, local governments have no big incentive to collect them because they depend highly on ceded taxes and direct transfers. Thirdly, local governments have no power to administer them (local taxes and duties are collected by the state tax authorities).

Figure 1. Subnational shares in total government revenues and expenditures in Ukraine (direct fiscal transfers excluded), per cent



Source: Own calculations based on MoF data.

That is why there exists a high need to expand the list of truly local revenues by shifting some national levies down and converting the existing ones from quasi-own to true own. In this way, the local share in total public sector tax proceeds could be significantly expanded, up to 20-30 per cent. Of course, increasing local fiscal autonomy will trigger a problem of fiscal inequality of territories, and fiscal competition could also become an issue of special concern.

Decentralization: approaches and obstacles

After the revolutionary events of 2013-2014, a change in top state political powers created a new political environment in Ukraine that could make decentralization a success. As the informal institutions of civil society culminated in helping the nation to hold out against Russian aggression, it became obvious that society in general has ripened to bear more important public responsibilities and to limit NG functions. This created a good soil for real decentralization efforts which were proclaimed by the newly elected President and Parliament.

In April 2014, the official Decentralization Concept was approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine⁶. According to this document, the government planned to take the following major steps towards decentralization: (I) reallocation and strict delineation of public functions among governmental levels; (II) rearranging the administrative and territorial structure of administration (all local communities should be in position to supply basic public services to its inhabitants); (III) instituting full-range self-governance in regional and district levels and limiting territorial state administration bodies' functions by coordination and supervision over the legal adherence of SNG activities and quality of public service delivery; (IV) increasing SNGs' competence concerning revenue generation up to setting rates for local levies. The heart of this future reform is community empowerment – making the territorial community a key factor of societal life and a decision-maker with regard to public good delivery.

It is worth mentioning that up to now several decentralization concepts have been adopted, but none of them implemented. This time it looks much more serious because of the approval of respective amendments to the Tax Code and the Budget Code in December 2014 – so decentralization started with fiscal decentralization through giving to SNGs additional sources of revenue.

It is expected that amendments to the Tax Code will increase subnational revenues by UAH 25 billion (plus around 25 per cent to the level of year 2013) in 2015 due to introduction of the property tax for commercial property, local excises, luxury car tax, increasing shares in some national levies like EPF (10 per cent), mineral resources extraction rent (25 per cent), environmental tax (80 per cent instead of 35 before), and assigning 100 per cent of fees for public administrative services.

The new non-transfer proceeds will be supplemented by additional UAH 20 billion in the form of intergovernmental transfers due to amendments to the Budget Code (changes in fiscal equalization procedure and introduction of new types of targeted subventions – medical and educational subventions – which will be allocated according to some formulae). Borrowings have been allowed to any city of regional significance and newly established amalgamated communities (only cities of regional significance with a population of above 300,000 had such a right before).

However, new proportions of PIT proceed sharing (NG 25 per cent; regions 15 per cent; districts, cities of regional significance and new amalgamated communities 60 per cent, Kyiv City 40 per cent) would diminish SNG tax revenues by UAH 25 billion. As a result, we would have a situation when local revenues would experience an increase only due to a bigger transfer dependency – the state merely substituted indirect transfers for the direct ones.

⁶ Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, *On Approval of the Concept of Reforming Local Self-Governance and Territorial Power Organization in Ukraine*, Ordinance No. 333 as of April 1, 2014.

Summing up, due to all these policy measures, some increase in subnational fiscal autonomy in Ukraine is to be expected, but it will not affect the share of really independent revenues. Releasing today's strict limits on subnational borrowing policy and administration of accounts (an SNG may independently choose a bank for holding accounts, not only the State Treasury, as until now) is on the agenda, too. It is also worth mentioning that up-to-date decentralization efforts did not affect the functional competence of SNGs, and this could also be a challenge.

All these problematic issues give reason for some domestic experts to claim that nowadays we have something like "decentralization without decentralization"⁷.

The reform has been performed against a very harsh background both politically and economically. It means there are some issues that, despite possible benefits from decentralization as predicted by the so-called "decentralization theorem"⁸, make implementation of the respective policy in Ukraine very problematic. In our opinion, the hurdles to decentralization include several main factors, each of which could be eliminated with varying efforts. To these belong, in the first row, the Russian aggression.

In February 2014, using a moment of temporary weakness of Ukrainian public institutes, Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula; in April 2014, it triggered unrest in Donbas and then occupied parts of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. The undeclared Russian-Ukrainian war started, and it has demanded huge efforts of the national government and society to secure Ukrainian sovereignty and national statehood in view of the overwhelming economic and military power of the attacker.

Firstly, we should point out the indirect losses of the Ukrainian economy due to retrenchment of public expenditures and reallocation of the scarce economic resources because of the war. One should bear in mind that direct defense expenses of Ukraine soared from 2.9 per cent of the total governmental expenditures in 2013 up to 5.2 per cent in 2014. In 2015 only direct war expenses will reach 5 per cent to GDP. The nation also has to allocate resources to support more than one and a half million internally displaced people who moved to Ukrainian regions not affected by the war in the hope of securing their livelihoods.

Secondly, there is a shrinking in total revenue base that has caused direct fiscal losses for the state. In the course of Russia's aggressive policy Ukraine has lost about 20 per cent of its economy. The war caused a direct loss of UAH 23 billion in budget revenues in 2014. It is hard to assess the total material loss so far, but in case of Crimea it is assets of estimated value UAH 1.2 trillion; in Donetsk region – a deterioration of infrastructure of more than UAH one tril-

⁷ И. Лунина, Д. Серебрянская, *Декларации и реалии бюджетной децентрализации*, „Зеркало недели”, Украина, 13 ноября 2015.

⁸ W.E. Oates, *Fiscal Federalism*, New York 1972.

lion worth. Most enterprises in the occupied Donbas have been destroyed, robbed out, or taken out with their personnel to the Russian territory.

Thirdly, there are macroeconomic issues that could be related to the war, too. In 2014, the real GDP of Ukraine decreased by 7 per cent, inflation reached 25 per cent, industrial production experienced a cut by 11 per cent (especially in the war-affected regions: Donetsk by 32 per cent, Luhansk by 41 per cent), loss of foreign investments exceeded USD 6.5 billion. The budget deficit comprised five per cent to GDP in 2014, and is expected to be the same in 2015. External public debt reached USD 33 billion, that is around 2/3 to GDP in 2014.

As is well-known from fiscal federalism literature, decentralization efforts could generate additional macroeconomic risks for the economy. Since the country experiences huge macroeconomic problems, the decentralization policy could weaken the state's ability to stabilize the economy. With a quite significant subnational economy share it would be very important, while giving SNGs more space in performing own fiscal policy, to prevent them from counteracting the NG macroeconomic policy efforts in achieving financial recovery.

Fourthly, there is the external political pressure from Russia and Europe. Russian demands concerning the political order of Ukraine are as follows: Ukraine should be a federal state with regions (especially Donbas) having extensive rights extending to vetoing NG actions in any policy sphere. With regard to this Russia wants Ukraine to change its Constitution granting a "special status" to occupied Donbas. The idea behind is to make Ukraine a weak state on an anchor that would hold it in the Russian sphere of dominance. Russia also demands that Ukraine restore economic relations with the occupied territories, having in mind that our country should bear all the costs related to support of these territories in terms of paying salaries to public servants, pensions and social benefits to population, transfers to local governments, making investments into restoration of the physical infrastructure eroded by Russian troops and separatists, etc. This sounds surreal, because according to international legislation an occupant bears full responsibility for the well-being of the population in the occupied territory. However, Russia tries to shift the fiscal burden of occupation onto Ukraine – a good example could be repeated efforts to make Ukraine pay for gas consumption in the occupied territories (in November 2015, Gasprom issued a next invoice for USD 256.6 million which, of course, Ukraine will not accept).

This fact also creates a specific attitude in society towards decentralization because this "Russian style decentralization" would undermine the national ability to make the right decisions on its political modernization and choosing a path of future development.

Finally, there is the lacking readiness of the Ukrainian administrative elite to loosen control over society. An important issue is its disposition to control society like before – no power should be given away, because this would mean less possibilities. The administrative elite in Ukraine, like in many other transi-

tion (especially post-socialist) nations, has no will to outsource public functions and to give more power to communities. They understand: if power is being shifted to the regions and locations – then regional and local decision-makers will play a more important role. However, real decentralization will occur only when local communities enjoy significant authority in fiscal and administrative sphere, and when communities decide what kind of public services and on what scale they need. Some explicit signs of this fight could be seen in recent endeavors to reassign revenue sources recently granted to SNGs in favor of the upper-level governments (like making local excise a shared tax or even full centralization of its proceeds). However, under the pressure of society this kind of opposition could be gradually fought back with the practical implementation of anti-corruption measures and especially after the local elections (October 2015), which could lead to significant shifts in the cross-national political landscape, since many informal civil society leaders were elected to the representative bodies at the local, district and regional levels.

All these factors should be neutralized or dealt with appropriately in order to pave the nation's path to decentralization.

Fiscal decentralization on the march

In 2015, important acts of legislation have been approved, which represents the subsequent steps toward decentralization. To these belongs draft legislation on extending competence of SNGs (in business registration, construction oversight, forming municipal guard, etc.) which passed the first reading, and draft changes in the Constitution. The latter introduce new shaping of territorial administration (three types of basic territorial units – community, district and region, instead of existing six – Kyiv-City, AR Crimea, Sevastopol and oblasts, districts, cities, urban districts, townships and villages), endowing territorial units with instruments of self-governance like forming the executive, substituting state territorial administrations in districts and regions for prefects.

Now SNG budgets could be approved independently from the state budget, and strict limits of borrowing policy and administration of accounts (an SNG could choose its bank, not only the Treasury) have been released. There are also changes in the revenue side of subnational budgets. To these belong extension of local property taxation to commercial property and cars; assigning proceeds from some excises and other national levies to local budgets.

Since 2015, SNGs have received a part of the profit tax from newly-established private companies in the territory of their jurisdiction for five years; they could set rates for local levies and decide upon tax credits for them. However, it should be mentioned that SNGs' ability to administer local levies still looks quite limited, as the legislation does not grant them full discretion to set rates. So, most local rates have been capped due to the national legislation, e.g.: 1-3 per cent to the normative valuation rate depending on land use type for the land tax; 0.5-1 per cent to tax base (cost of accommodation) for the tourist fee;

no more than 2 per cent of the minimum wage per sq. m (now about UAH 24, or one USD according to current exchange rate) per annum for the property tax; 10 or 20 per cent of the minimum wage depending on turnover for the unified small business tax; excise rates for alcohol and tobacco assigned to the local budgets are fixed. This means that SNGs have no big possibility to expand proceeds concerning local taxation, as they cannot exceed the rates prescribed by the legislation. The only possibility remaining is to set rates below the caps, which could be considered a manifestation of fiscal competition in case these proceeds fund the most important public services delivered by the respective government. But in the case of local levies being applied to a non-mobile tax base, it will lead to diminishing local revenues. From this line, the governmental estimate “to raise local revenues by three times” due to amendments to the Tax Code could be too optimistic, as some experts foresee⁹.

Some decentralization measures could be linked to the expenditure side, such as: extension of the list of expenditures (mostly in the education sphere) and voluntary amalgamation of rural territorial units up to size of 5,000 inhabitants with offering them additional target transfers (foreseen by the respective Law No. 157 as of February 5, 2015). This is undertaken in order to avoid further fragmentation of territorial units and to form more fiscally sustainable communities needing less support from the NG. The current situation in Ukraine is the following: 12,000 territorial units with separate budgets; average community size is less than 500 people. The territorial communities which decide to merge receive a special state subvention for infrastructure development due to such criteria as area and population; newly-established communities will have the status of a city of regional importance (it means also they could attract external borrowings) and enjoy direct relations with MoF. This was the carrot; and now the stick: if not amalgamated till October 2015, rural communities will have no possibility to administer delegated functions – virtually all budget institutions will be beyond control of the rural community since it will receive neither revenues from shared national taxes, nor equalization transfers or targeted subventions, staying at full discretion of the superior (district) authorities.

Generally speaking, amalgamation could be a step in the right direction because Ukraine has too much of a fragmented subnational sector. However, we doubt whether a fiscal incentive in the form of targeted fiscal transfer for developing new territorial unit's objects of physical infrastructure will be sufficient for achieving the aim of having integrated and fiscally viable territorial units; at least the experience of many CEE countries showed that voluntary amalgamation will take time, which Ukraine does not have. It also requires changes to the Constitution and Law on Local Self-Governance.

However, the mere fact of existence of 1,000 territorial communities instead of 12,000 which are fiscally viable means a lot in terms of fiscal decen-

⁹ И. Сикора, *Деньги на места или на место*, „Зеркало недели” Украина, 13 Марта 2015.

tralization and efficiency in public good delivery. Firstly, bigger territorial units could attract much more capital as they could potentially offer better physical infrastructure and fiscal management. Secondly, they could realize economy of scale for many public services and provide them more efficiently. This could make space for yardstick competition amongst jurisdictions: a bundle, quality and price of local public goods will give community members and firms looking for a location for their facility an univocal signal about the quality of SNG management.

An additional point is introduction of a new equalization approach based on fiscal capacity. The previous one was based on expenditure equalization, which led to actual full equalization of *per capita* expenditures¹⁰. The new approach legalized by the recent amendments to the Budget Code includes the following innovations: I) substituting equalization transfers for targeted subventions (see Table 2 above); II) switching from expenditure need equalization to revenue equalization; III) incorporating significant incentive components into the equalization formula. The proposal to change the allocation principle (origin) has not been adopted.

The new equalization procedure is now based not on formulas involving dozens indexes and coefficients, but on the tax capacity measure such as index of actual *per capita* PIT (district and local budgets) and EPT (regions) proceeds to its average nation-wide level. As concerns other incentive components, the new approach foresees only limited revenue equalization: in case the SNG tax capacity measure falls into the 90-110 per cent bracket, there will be no equalization performed; in case it falls short of 90 per cent threshold, the respective budget will be supported by 80 per cent of amount needed to reach 90 per cent level; if tax measure exceeds 110 per cent, half of the amount exceeding threshold of 110 per cent will be extracted from the respective budget to the equalization fund.

We assume that this new approach raises local interest to attract more taxpayers by means of local fiscal policy because the equalization formula does not include local tax proceeds, but only proceeds from the two national ones assigned to the SNGs. It also makes impossible a full equalization for expenditures on delegated functions that are not funded by the targeted subventions; however, more affluent territorial donor units are still experiencing some kind of disincentive in comparison to the beneficiaries. One problematic issue is that this new approach is actually not a revenue potential equalization as it is based on the actual *per capita* tax proceeds of the previous year.

The data on budget execution for the first half year of 2015 demonstrates that the Ukrainian intergovernmental finance reform has started bringing some expected fruits. For the first time in many years, SNGs in total over-executed

¹⁰ S. Slukhai O. Komashko, *Efficacy of Interregional Fiscal Equalization Policy in Ukraine*, [in:] O. Cherniak, P. Zakharchenko (eds), *Modern Problems in Development Forecasting of the Complex Socio-Economic Systems*, Berdiansk 2014, pp. 153-155.

their budgets, and their total budget revenue exceeded that of the previous year by more than 18.8 per cent¹¹. One of the signs of positive development is the fact that the share of equalization fund beneficiaries decreased from 96.3 per cent in 2014 to 74.6 per cent; the number of SNGs making contributions to the equalization fund has increased from 3.7 per cent in 2014 to 15.2 per cent; about 10 per cent of local governments achieved balanced budgets (in 2014 there were none such). However, this does not mean that the final goal of decentralization has been achieved. A long way lies ahead, because too little is done as concerns reaching real subnational fiscal autonomy.

Conclusions

Recent changes in Ukraine concerning intergovernmental finance give hope that this time, the public rhetoric on advantages of fiscal decentralization will be supported by definite steps in this direction. Latest changes in the Tax Code and the Budget Code create a basis, starting from which decentralization efforts will bring results. Hopefully, they won't be undermined by some external factors, e.g. further deterioration of the national economy caused by the war in the first line. The changes in governmental transfer policy due to which fiscal support is granted mostly by means of conditional transfers (subventions) could be considered a temporary measure. It should be relaxed after adjusting the current administrative-territorial composition to modern standards. Despite all this, the grade of fiscal autonomy remains quite low in Ukraine. In order to make it higher, caps for local tax rates should be eliminated or pushed up, and new local levies introduced.

However, it is obvious that the scale of local responsibilities should be extended in order to make local authorities more motivated to generate higher revenues and nurture their revenue base.

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TWO YEARS OF EUROMAIDAN AND STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE OF THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS

Summary:

Question of the future of Ukraine is globally important and requires answer before it is closed in order to be ready for final result. Ukrainian crisis has an internal and external dimension. First part of the article analyzes the consequences of Euromaidan. Two years is a period of time, which makes possible some preliminary conclusions about the development of Ukraine. It can be said that political and economic system of the country is deteriorating. At the same time disappointment of the people about the course of the state is growing. Therefore theory of expectations and reality discrepancy can be applied to predict the future of the today's political regime in Kiev. The conclusion is that next social explosion (revolution) in Ukraine is highly possible in a short term, because unacceptable gap between expectations of Ukrainians and reality they live in has almost reached critical margin. Still situation in the country is strongly dependent on the position of two big external actors – the West (the United States and the European Union) and Russia. On the one hand, they stabilize the conflict – the West helps the government of Petro Poroshenko to survive politically and economically and manages social protest potential in the state; Russia supports separatists of Donbass, but holds them from further military aggression, accentuating implementation of Minsk deal. On the other hand, Ukraine definitely is a hostage of “great geopolitical game” between Washington, Brussels and Moscow and is not a subject, but object in it. Strategic perspective of the Ukrainian crisis will depend on Russia's ability to survive economically and make the West believe it is better to retreat in Ukraine, on the American so called “hawks” perception of this ability and on the damage they and the EU are ready to suffer from the Russian side. Supposed additional value of the article is that it tries to conceptualize (also theoretically) the current national and foreign situation of Ukraine and propose prognostic framework (the main variables) to predict its future.


Key words:

Ukraine; Euromaidan; Donbass separatists; Russia; the United States; “hawks”; “ruled chaos theory”; Europe; Minsk deal.

Introduction

Recently Euromaidan celebrated its second anniversary. In this context Ukrainian experts like to repeat alleged phrase of Deng Xiaoping, who, asked about the impact of the French Revolution, answered it is too early to say. But in reality many of them just do not want to recognize a rather clear fact that the consequences of Euromaidan and the so called “revolution of dignity“ for Ukraine are miserably terrible both internally and externally.

Inside the country new wave of social unrest is coming, because very high expectations of the Ukrainians after removal of the former corrupt president of the state Viktor Ianukovich crashed both in political and economic sphere, not to speak about unsuccessful war in Donbass. In other words the gap between exaggerated hopes of the Ukrainian society and cruel reality it faces is reaching unacceptable margin, and this, according to J-Curve theory (see the picture below) of James C. Davies¹, can result in revolution.



At the same time externally Ukraine actually lost its sovereignty, being totally dependent on the financial support and accordingly on the political will of the West, while Russia controls big part of its territory in Donbass, not to speak about Crimea annexation (or reunification – as you like).

In such situation the country in fact feels double pressure – bottom-up (degradation of the political and economic system) and top-down (destiny of the state is decided by global geopolitical players), what makes its future unpredictable (up to the scenario of disintegration).

¹ J.C. Davies, *The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfaction as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion* [in:] *Violence in America: The History of Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. H.D. Graham, T.R. Gurr, New York 1969, pp. 690-730.

Therefore this article is not going to propose concrete end of the story, only to generalize the political and economic consequences of Euromaidan and provide prognostic framework (the main variables) to predict strategic perspective of the Ukrainian crisis.

Degradation of the political system of Ukraine

Two main expectations of the Ukrainian people on Maidan square could be described as truly democratic government with domination of rule of law – not unrestricted corruption, and economic progress, also in relation to the Association Agreement (free trade zone) with European Union.

The political problems started at once. Several points can be made in this context. First, there is no new elite in today's Ukrainian government, and this is general problem of the revolutions in the post-soviet area (for example, in Kyrgyzstan after two revolutions there are still old generation politics in power).

If you look at the main political leaders of Ukraine, you can easily notice that their unattractive past dominates over their same present. For instance, President Petro Poroshenko is an oligarch, who had close relations with “Party of Regions” and personally with Viktor Ianukovich. Other fact – RFE/RL revealed that over the course of seven years, Petro Poroshenko quietly appropriated a plot of protected land in Kyiv's elite Pechera district and recently quashed an inquiry into the damage of an 18th-century structure caused by construction work on his plot². He also made a lot of electoral promises and continues to make them, but without implementation (in the Internet you can even find a long list of the things he promised to do, but did not). Finally, he hardly controls situation in the country. Many of these problematic aspects became very clear in the interview of Petro Poroshenko to Deutsche Welle Conflict Zone journalist Tim Sebastian³.

Prime Minister of Ukraine Arsenii Iatseniuk is also representative of the political past of Ukraine, once being brother in arms of Iuliia Timoshenko, who had been in prison for non transparent gas deal with Russia, but now is again an active political actor. Perhaps the best story, which characterizes leader of the Ukrainian Government, was told by the former head of the State Financial Inspection Nikolai Gordienko, who said: “Corruption schemes in Ukraine are headed by the government of Yatsenyuk”⁴.

² *Questions Raised Over Poroshenko's Role In Valuable Kyiv Land Deal*, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 13.05.2015, <<http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-poroshenko-land-deal-questions-tsars-village/27013945.html>> (12.12.2015).

³ *Deutsche Welle „Conflict Zone“ interview with President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko made by Tim Sebastian*, YouTube.com, 16.11.2015, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GBLt-B0ya8w>> (12.12.2015).

⁴ *Ukraine's Chief Anti-Corruption Official Fired after Uncovering Millions Stolen*, Russia-Insider.com, 26.03.2015, <<http://russia-insider.com/en/2015/03/26/5028>> (26.03.2015).

Finally, the Vice President of the United States Joe Biden, speaking in the Ukrainian parliament said: “I never tell people from other countries what they should do, but you can’t find a single democracy in the world where the cancer of corruption is so thriving. You cannot find any such a country”⁵.

Other feature of the qualitative democracy is well functioning mechanism of elections. First post-Maidan presidential and parliamentary elections took place in specific conditions and can be excused for some shortcomings. But local ones – two years after Maidan – had to prove that new system of governance in Ukraine had become transparent and fair.

ESCO surprisingly declared that they were democratic. At the same time many experts noticed that the amount of violations was extremely high. Only one example – MP of Mazury board (Poland) Janusz Niedźwiecki, commenting local elections in Dnipropetrovsk, informed: “Generally, the election process was spoiled very much and nowadays it is not be trustworthy. We are going to address in European Parliament with plea to consider elections in Dnipropetrovsk invalid and to organize it again”⁶. And such a type of evidence seems to be rather a rule than an exception.

It means that Euromaidan actually destroyed respect to constitutional order in Ukraine. Now instead of rule of law we witness there rule of uncontrolled violence disparaging to democratic procedures.

Economic crisis and crash of the European economic dream

With such a political system there is no surprise that economy of Ukraine is also in a terrible if not catastrophic condition. If we look at Ukrainian 2010-2014 economic outlook, we can easily conclude that every indicator is down, and some of them dramatically⁷.

Table 1. Ukraine Economy Data

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Population (million)	45.6	45.5	45.4	42.9	42.8
GDP per capita (USD)	2,983	3,586	3,813	4,195	3,016
GDP (USD bn)	136	163	173	180	129

⁵ *No country in the world so rife with corruption in Ukraine, says Biden*, Reporter-ua.ru 08.12.2015, <<http://en.reporter-ua.ru/no-country-in-the-world-so-rife-with-corruption-in-ukraine-says-biden.html>> (08.12.2015).

⁶ International observers will appeal to European Parliament with request to declare elections in Dnipropetrovsk invalid, Most-Dnepr.info, 16.11.2015, <http://most-dnepr.info/news/economics_eng/128339.htm> (16.11.2015).

⁷ *Ukraine Economic Outlook*, Focus-Economics.com, 01.12.2015, <<http://www.focus-economics.com/countries/ukraine>> (01.12.2015).

Economic Growth (GDP, annual variation in %)	4.1	5.5	0.2	0.0	-6.8
Consumption (annual variation in %)	7.1	15.7	8.4	6.9	-9.6
Investment (annual variation in %)	3.9	8.5	5.0	-8.4	-23.0
Industrial Production (annual variation in %)	11.2	8.0	-0.5	-4.3	-10.1
Retail Sales (annual variation in %)	10.1	13.7	13.7	5.6	-9.6
Unemployment Rate	8.1	7.9	7.8	7.4	9.3
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP)	-6.0	-1.8	-3.6	-4.3	-4.6
Public Debt (% of GDP)	40.1	36.4	36.7	39.9	70.3
Stock Market (annual variation in %)	23.1	14.2	13.1	17.5	5.4
Inflation Rate (CPI, annual variation in %, eop)	9.1	4.6	-0.2	0.5	24.9
Inflation Rate (CPI, annual variation in %)	9.4	8.0	0.6	-0.3	12.1
Inflation (PPI, annual variation in %)	20.9	19.0	3.7	-0.1	17.1
Policy Interest Rate (%)	7.75	7.75	7.50	6.50	14.00
Stock Market (annual variation in %)	70.2	-45.2	-38.5	-8.6	28.8
Exchange Rate (vs USD)	7.97	8.01	8.05	8.24	15.82
Exchange Rate (vs USD, aop)	7.97	7.99	8.08	8.15	12.02
Current Account (% of GDP)	-2.2	-6.3	-8.2	-9.2	-4.1
Current Account Balance (USD bn)	-3.0	-10.2	-14.3	-16.5	-5.3
Trade Balance (USD billion)	-9.6	-18.0	-21.9	-22.1	-7.7
Exports (USD billion)	47.3	62.4	64.4	59.1	50.6
Imports (USD billion)	56.9	80.4	86.3	81.2	58.2
Exports (annual variation in %)	27.4	31.9	3.3	-8.3	-14.5
Imports (annual variation in %)	33.9	41.3	7.3	-5.8	-28.4
International Reserves (USD)	34.6	31.8	24.6	20.4	7.5
External Debt (% of GDP)	86.0	77.3	78.0	78.9	97.7

Source: *Ukraine Economic Outlook*, Focus-Economics.com, 01.12.2015, <<http://www.focus-economics.com/countries/ukraine>> (01.12.2015).

In other words, GDP is falling (also because of decrease of industrial production, and it is terrible that such industrial giants as “Iuzhmash“ and “Motor Sich“ actually stopped), national currency devaluating and inflation growing, country’s gross public debt is near 100% of GDP. Year 2015 only worsened the situation. Therefore international rating agencies give very low ratings to Ukraine, which today could not survive without external economic help.

Of course it can be said that Ukraine is a war state. But the problem is that the government of the country only makes the problems bigger. For example, cut of industrial ties with Russia (and even cancellation of air flights to it) is populistically understandable, but economically highly irresponsible – many

people in this case lose their income, what inevitably augments social tension. To say more, total Ukraine's dependence on credits from IMF leads to its required "liberal shock therapy" (radical liberalization of economic system), which only deepens the problem of social impoverishment, because inefficient Soviet-Type Ukrainian economy is not ready for drastic changes.

Particular attention should be given to the question of the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement (already not to speak about visa-free regime for Ukrainians going to Europe, which was promised for Euromaidan and still is not in place). Refusal of Viktor Ianukovich to sign it triggered Euromaidan. Advocates of Agreement were explaining that it will open a window of new possibilities for the Ukrainian economy. But already then it was clear that it is much more useful to the EU than to Ukraine, because Europe gets unrestricted access to the Ukrainian market, and big part of the Ukrainian goods do not match European standards and are uncompetitive in the European market.

Report of the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting (Ukraine) named "Autonomous trade preferences of the EU: Implications for Ukrainian export" confirmed that trade preferences granted by the EU to Ukraine in the end of April 2014 had not brought the expected effect on the export of Ukrainian goods to Europe⁸. In 2014 it grew by only 1,5% and in the first half of 2015 it fell by 35,5%. Exports into the EU peaked in may 2014, when the growth was 36,1%, and trend was positive until the end of August 2014. Since then its dynamics is continuously deteriorating – the further, the faster. And, as report shows, this is not just because of the challenges of the Ukrainian companies from antiterrorist operation zone.

Finally, Russia's message to Kiev was clear from the beginning – in case of implementation of the Free Trade Agreement between Ukraine and the EU it will respond by trade restrictions. Government of Arsenii Iatseniuk estimated potential losses of Russia's food embargo at 600 million dollars in 2016⁹. Thus it would be logical for Ukrainian side to look for some compromise with Moscow. But Petro Poroshenko said in Vilnius: "Neither Ukraine nor the EU will respond to any blackmail, we are resolute in our desire to put into force the agreement on the deep and comprehensive free trade area with the EU on January 1, 2016"¹⁰.

To sum up, two years after Euromaidan victory Ukrainian economy found itself in deep crisis which is caused not so much by war in Donbass, as by populist, irresponsive, ineffective and likely corruptive policy of the state's gov-

⁸ *Ukrainian exports to the EU fell by 35%*, 30.07.2015

<http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=10b_1438291887#GpHz9hCUjPjEeUUUb.99> (30.07.2015).

⁹ *Ukraine estimates potential losses of Russia's food embargo at \$600 mln in 2016*, TASS.ru, 18.11.2015, <<http://tass.ru/en/economy/837543>> (18.11.2015).


¹⁰ *Poroshenko: Ukraine not to yield to Russia's blackmail concerning entry into force of FTA with EU*. Interfax.com.ua, 02.12.2015.

<<http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/308371.html>> (02.12.2015).

ernment. At the same time, European trade preferences did not open for the Ukrainian business expected export window, and implementation of the free trade zone between Ukraine and the EU will bring the former even more costs because of trade restrictions from the Russian side.

All this definitely strengthens dissatisfaction of the Ukrainians with their today's government, which is evident in different public opinion polls. For example, The International Republican Institute in the United States has published the results of polling, which was conducted in the latter two weeks of July 2015 and which shows that majority of people in Ukraine (even without Donbass representatives, who were not included in the poll) thinks that the country is going in the wrong direction¹¹.

Chart 1. Poll results showing Ukrainians deeply dissatisfied with government, economy and war



Source: <https://newcoldwar.org/15039-2/> (26.08.2015).

¹¹ Poll results showing Ukrainians deeply dissatisfied with government, economy and war, NewColdWar.org, 26.08.2015, <<http://newcoldwar.org/15039-2/>> (26.08.2015).

In this way we get formula of new revolution in Ukraine finished: political system degradation complemented by very hard economic situation, what people of that country see as wrong course of its development. In other words, expectations-reality gap is evident, but for the moment practice contradicts theory. Possible explanation, why new revolt still did not happen in Ukraine, is that Ukrainians are tired of instability or their patience has not finished yet. But true answer can be related to the decisive role of external factor in this crisis.

Main players and their interests

Ukrainian conflict is very complicated. It has many participants with different interests and hardly predictable trajectory of development. Still some preliminary conclusions can be proposed and some prognosis made.

First of all, it is necessary to determine who is who in the Ukrainian puzzle. In other words it must be clear which actor(s) is decisive and which one is dependent in his decisions. In this context it is evident enough that Donbass separatists are totally dependent on the Russian financial and military help (so called “Voentorg” or “North Wind”), and on its political will. At the same time Ukrainian regime decisively depends on the West plans, and it should be noted that inside the western camp position of Europe is influenced a lot by the United States.

In other words direct participants of the conflict in Ukraine – Kiev and Donbass – are not its main actors: “Love is all around” – America, Russia and in some way Europe. The following step is to understand their interests in the Ukrainian crisis. To start from Russia we can determine at least three fractions in Kremlin with their own position on Ukraine and call them “liberals”, “peacefully imperialists” and “militarists”.

First camp was initially disappointed by the decision on Crimea, which resulted in fierce confrontation – also economic – with the West. As close to ruling regime political expert Viacheslav Nikonov said, some liberals accuse militarists of creating problems, which they – not army – have to solve now¹². But this line is not dominant. Further we can speak about peaceful and aggressive Russian imperialists. Former seek to concur and control Ukraine through political game or – to put it simply – through full-fledged implementation of Minsk deal. It is said that leader of this camp is Vladislav Surkov, being adviser of Vladimir Putin. Finally, there are “militarists” (representatives of army and special services, like GRU), who allegedly would prefer to solve all problems in Ukraine by changing Kiev regime with the help of the Russian military.

Vladimir Putin is supposed to have two scenarios on his table: Minsk deal and military option. And he is completely ready for both of them.

¹² *Voskresnyi vecher s Vladimirom Solov'evym [Sunday evening with Vladimir Solovyov]*, YouTube.com, 21.06.2015, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FSw6SSYvxIM&feature=youtu.be>> (21.06.2015).

For the moment implementation of Minsk requirements seems to be priority for Kremlin, because it has at least two big advantages. First and the most important – real fulfilment of the deal (as a result of Kiev compromise with Donbass) means that Russia will get its agent inside Ukraine, which will be blocking all western initiatives of Kiev. Second, Minsk process helps Moscow to bring back friendship of Berlin and Paris and expect the end of the European sanctions. At the same time, if Ukraine decides to restart military action against Donbass (so called “Croatian scenario”), “North Wind“ will blow again, and as a result it may lose more territories (if not Kiev). And this time Europe may not support Petro Poroshenko.

Now about the interests of the western side. Today already many experts say that America lost its strategic orientation. To be more precise, it looks like there is no consensus in American elite on grand strategy and main adversary. For example, well-known and well-informed Russian expert Sergei Karaganov said: “It is necessary to understand that our partners failed and went too far afield. Especially partners in America. They lost strategic guidelines, lost everything, they are in a fluster and they do not know what to do. This is absolutely evident. There is open quarrel between different elite groups”¹³. Therefore simplistically it is possible to speak about two American camps – supporters of the so called “ruled chaos theory“, which they apply both in the “Big Middle East“ and in Ukraine, and traditionalists, thinking in the categories of spheres of influence in relations with Russia, China or Iran.

To make it more or less clear in faces, Barack Obama and John Kerry prefer not to create unpredictable situations, and Pentagon is more destructively aggressive. Actually, today’s president of the United States is the biggest ally of Russia. For example, he supported Putin’s idea on the Sirian chemical weapon when American attack seemed almost inevitable, he reached the deal with Iran and he blocks official military help to Ukraine under huge pressure of his opponents. Real traditionalist in terms of geopolitical philosophy, if listen to his speeches, is Henry Kissinger, whom Vladimir Putin likes to meet with so much. Europe is divided in its preferences on Ukrainian crisis in the same way – partly supports American “hawks“ (mainly, so called “younger Europeans“ – Baltic states, Poland etc.), partly is tired of anti-Russian policy and wants to restore previous level of relations (primarily, “Old Europe“, but not Angela Merkel as a chancellor of Germany). The former, for instance, vote for sanctions against Russia, the latter agree to build “Nord Stream 2“.

So, for now we have two big geopolitical teams, which determine the destiny of Ukraine. First consists of Russia, American traditionalists, who are ready to recognize the whole post-soviet area as a Russian sphere of influence, and their supporters in Europe. The second is represented by American “hawks“ and “Young Europe“. In this way the future of the Ukrainian conflict

¹³ *Pravo znat' [Right to know]*, YouTube.com, 03.10.2015, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=45puyE7x2AY>> (03.10.2015).

depends on the relations between these two camps, to be more concrete – on the change of their positions.

When perception matters

The position of Russia is not going to change – either Ukraine accepts Minsk rules how Kremlin sees them or, if Kiev restarts military action, “Voentorg” will be open again. Europe because of economic costs is looking for opportunity to reconcile with Russia. But still it is strongly influenced by the American point of view. So, actually the main variable is the position of the United States, and it is hardly predictable.

The fact is that Russia must be in a hurry until Barack Obama is in Washington, but it has little chance to finish Ukrainian story as it wants before new person comes to White House. Then there is a question, who will be this person? Hillary Clinton is a strong candidate, but extraordinary Donald Trump can make a surprise. Anyway, strategic indetermination of America does not seem to finish after presidential elections, whoever becomes the next leader of the USA.

At the same time Russia apparently finds itself in a win-win situation. It will definitely win from full scale implementation of the Minsk deal, and it will win military campaign, if Kiev restarts war, feeling the support of American “hawks”.

In this context “ruled chaos approach” followers in the USA have several options. First, understanding that in the long run there is no chance to win against Moscow in its “close abroad”, retreat with maximal gain (initiate final Ukrainian military attack in Donbass to make as much problems for Russia as possible or get something from Kremlin for leaving Ukraine in the Russian sphere of interest, what traditionalists are already ready for). Second, protract the crisis as long as possible with all its aspects, such as European sanctions against Russia, expecting that Vladimir Putin will pull back.

Post-positivist theories of international relations accentuate understanding how non-material structures condition actors’ actions. In other words, their perception of reality sometimes is more important than reality itself. So the choice of American “hawks” in case of Ukraine is supposed to depend on three things: real Russia’s ability to survive economically, its real ability to create for America (and broader for the West) unacceptable political, economic or even (indirectly) military damage, and on the western perception of Russia’s abilities.

Is Russia strong enough to win a long term game? It seems that Vladimir Putin believes that it can, because majority of Russian people supports him and is ready to suffer for great victory against the “evil” West. Besides, the more conflict in Ukraine continues, the more the EU will wish to finish it, accepting Russian conditions, also because in historical civilizational sense Europe ends on the border of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine.

It means that for American “hawks” it is better to start preparing final deal on Ukraine with Moscow today in order to get at least something tomorrow. But they still seem to believe that protraction of the Ukrainian crisis is in their favour, because the damage Russia creates for the West is not critical for the moment and because Moscow is not ready (mainly in economic sense) for a long fight. And maybe they are right.

To sum up, determinant factor in the Ukrainian crisis is external, not internal, and its strategic perspective depends on Russia’s ability to survive economically and make the West believe it is better to pull back; on the American “hawks” estimation of this ability and on the damage they and Europe are ready to suffer. In other words, we witness simple “chicken game”, and if nobody turns to the side, believing in his final success, Russia has better chances to win. Mainly, it is because Ukraine is a matter of geopolitical future for it (as it is seen in Kremlin). And Vladimir Putin will do everything to succeed, having the support of Russian people for whom sense of greatness of their state has always been more important than economic prosperity. For America and the EU it is not, and especially patience of Europeans (primarily of “Old Europe”, which determines the policy of the EU) is almost over. Of course there is a possibility that Russian economy will collapse, not being able to feed its imperialistic beast, but it seems unlikely. Therefore, perhaps there is no question, whether Russia wins in Ukraine, but only when it does.

Conclusion

American writer, historian and philosopher William James Durant once said: “A great civilization is not conquered from without until it has destroyed itself from within”. For more than twenty years after getting independence Ukraine had been destroying itself from within like Russia had in the “wild 90s” (licence of oligarchs, deep economic crisis and finally – civil war). Euro-maidan became the epic final of this process and let external forces (Russia and the West) to “conquer” the country, to make it the hostage of their geopolitical ambitions.

In other words, Ukraine is under the huge pressure – both bottom-up and top-down, and actually for now cannot decide anything about its future. At the same time, perhaps, there is no question, whether Kremlin wins in Ukraine, but only when it does, because it is a matter of geopolitical future for Russia. It means that for American “hawks” it is better to start preparing final deal on Ukraine with Moscow today in order to get at least something tomorrow. But they still seem to believe that protraction of the Ukrainian crisis is in their favour, because the damage Russia creates for the West is not critical for the moment and because Moscow is not ready (mainly in economic sense) for a long fight. And maybe they are right.

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POST-REVOLUTIONARY NEOLIBERAL REFORMS IN UKRAINE (SECURITY CONTEXT)

Summary:

The main question to be addressed while discussing post-revolutionary and in particular, post-EuroMaidan Revolution reforms being implemented in Ukraine is – how significant can be essentially neoliberal reforms being conducted in Ukraine in terms of overcoming first of all military-political, but also economic crisis and providing peace in the country, which could positively impact international security as well? Why can we assess post-EuroMaidan reforms as in fact neoliberal? Not only Georgian, but also other foreign libertarians' direct active participation in the Ukrainian Government makes these reforms neoliberal, but first of all Ukrainian President – Petro Poroshenko's broadly announced “4-Ds Program”. However, it is noteworthy to mention that there is still an important gap and internal controversy within the current Ukrainian leadership when it comes to the implementation of this program. There is also a meaningful controversy in addition to attempt assuming generally that neoliberal, and specifically, neoliberal economic policy in Ukraine as well, is an efficient strategy for internal or external conflict resolution and/or has conflict preventive function if we take into consideration much specific in many regards Georgian-Russian War of 2008 and current factual Russian-Ukrainian War, both conflicts taking place in parallel with the neoliberalization of Georgia and Ukraine.

Key words:

Post-revolutionary reforms, post-EuroMaidan Revolution reforms, Ukraine, neoliberal, neoliberal economic policy, neoliberalization, conflict resolution, conflict prevention

Table 1. *Graphic Overview of Post-Revolutionary – Post-EuroMaidan Reforms in Ukraine*

	What has been done	What has not been done
Firing law enforcement	In February, 2014 the Berkut riot police unit was dissolved.	No comprehensive lustration so far. Despite the lustration

personnel and government officials, lustration	<p>A lustration law for judges was passed in April, 2014. The first reading of the lustration bill for government officials was passed earlier this month.</p> <p>In July, 2014 585 police officers were fired in the Donetsk oblast for supporting separatists.</p>	<p>law, very few judges have been lustrated.</p> <p>Law enforcement agencies are still mostly staffed with old personnel.</p>
Deregulation of the economy	Energy prices have been brought closer to market levels.	Deregulation has been very limited. Ukraine is still one of the most economically unfree countries in the world.
Reducing the tax burden	Earlier in August, 2014 Prime Minister Arseny Yatsenyuk presented a reform package that will cut the number of taxes to eight from 22 and tweak the value added tax, corporate tax and payroll tax.	Though tax reform plans have been announced, no major tax cuts have been implemented so far.
Privatization	In August, 2014 Yatsenyuk announced plans to privatize all state companies, except for strategic ones.	No comprehensive privatization has been implemented so far.

Source: O. Sukhov, *Georgian architect of Saakashvili's reforms warns of mounting costs for Ukraine*, <<http://www.kyivpost.com/content/kyiv-post-plus/georgian-architect-of-saakashvilis-reforms-warns-of-mounting-costs-for-ukraine-362231.html?flavour=mobile>>, (30.11.2015).

How could post-EuroMaidan reforms influence on overcoming military-political, but also economic crisis and providing peace in Ukraine, and how would it all impact international security in addition?

The response to the question especially in terms of providing peace and/or increasing the level of security in Ukraine can be shaped through Ukrainian leadership's attempt of strengthening the army of the country, developing its

technical standards and equipment, as well as through increasing the US assistance¹.

Regarding political crisis and the possibilities to overcome it through the reforms being implemented currently in Ukraine, we can discuss two versions of such a crisis; if we consider internal tension within the Ukraine leadership, for instance between the President and Prime Minister over strategic and tactic approaches towards reaching the desirable goals for stabilization and development of Ukraine, even regarding foreign, including former Georgian administration members' active participation in the Ukrainian politics and concerning radical neoliberalization of the country, apparently the above mentioned reforms elaborated on the basis of classical American neoliberal standards, do not seem to be agreed first of all within the Ukrainian administration and thus be helpful in solving such internal political tensions.

As for the external political crisis, clearly the most important part of Ukraine's external political crisis is its crisis of the relations with the Russian Federation and due to the radical negativism of the Russian administration towards the new – westernized vector of Ukraine's development in each sphere, first of all geopolitical and in general political, economic, cultural or else, definitely Ukraine's reforms are essentially contradictory to Russia's conservative development path predominantly influenced by the mainstream idea of some kind of revival of the Soviet strength. This contradiction, first of all mental, of determining values apparently does not help to the solving of the external political crisis of the Ukrainian-Russian relations.

In economic regards, as it is commonly well known, neoliberal economic reforms increase the effectiveness of economic performance of a country and its economic growth rates. Another issue is how the economic success of a country is correspondingly reflected on the life of ordinary citizens and average population. Quite recent example in this whole context is definitely Georgia². Regarding international security, current events on the international arena show that the most severe problem in the whole world now is terrorism and it shifted one of the most significant hot spots from Ukraine to Syria. However, it is clear in general that Russia's post-Soviet strengthening, as well as the increase of the threats to the sovereignty of post-Soviet states and thus to international security, coincide with the factual war between Ukraine and the Russian Federation currently, firstly after the Georgian-Russian war of 2008.

¹ A. Siddons, *U.S. Expands Aid to Train Regular Army Troops*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/25/world/europe/ukraine-us-expands-aid-to-train-regular-army-troops.html?_r=0> (30.11.2015); *US expands training mission in Ukraine as part of long-term military partnership*, <<https://www.rt.com/news/310714-us-training-ukraine-military/>>; D. Alexander, B. Trott, B. Orr, *U.S. troops to train regular Ukrainian military troops*, <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/25/us-ukraine-crisis-usa-idUSKCN0PY28A20150725#qjeBmqp9shfvv8iO.97>> (30.11.2015).

² <<http://geostat.ge/index.php?action=0&lang=eng>> (30.11.2015).

Why can we assess post-EuroMaidan reforms as in fact neoliberal?

Not only Georgian, but also other foreign libertarians' direct active participation in the Ukrainian Government makes the above mentioned reforms neoliberal; Mikheil Saakashvili, former President of Georgia between 2004 and 2013, is the recently appointed Governor of Odessa in Ukraine; Alexander Kvitchashvili is Minister of Healthcare of Ukraine, also Georgian, used to be Minister of Health of Georgia from 2008 to 2010 and Rector of Tbilisi State University (TSU) from 2010 to 2013; First Deputy Interior Minister of Ukraine Eka Zguladze had served as Georgia's First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs from 2006 to 2012 and Acting Minister of Internal Affairs in 2012; Natalie Jaresko is an American-born Ukrainian investment banker who has served as Ukraine's Minister of Finance since 2014; Aivaras Abromavičius is a Lithuanian-born Ukrainian investment banker and politician. He became Ukraine's Minister of Economy and Trade in December 2014.

Despite all the above-mentioned, first of all Ukrainian President – Petro Poroshenko's broadly announced “4-Ds Program”³ makes current Ukrainian reforms – neoliberal as “4-Ds” stand for: de-regulation, de-oligarchization, de-bureaucratization and de-centralization.

However, it is noteworthy to underline that there is still an important gap and internal controversy within the current Ukrainian leadership when it comes to the implementation of the “4-Ds Program”.

There is also a meaningful controversy in addition to attempt assuming generally that neoliberal, and specifically, neoliberal economic policy (including radical privatization, deregulation, etc.) in Ukraine as well, is an efficient strategy for internal or external conflict resolution and/or has conflict preventive function if we take into consideration much specific in many regards Georgian-Russian War of 2008 and current factual Russian-Ukrainian War, both conflicts taking place in parallel with the neoliberalization of Georgia and Ukraine. Although, we have to distinguish the short term and long term perspectives.

Conclusions

Based on the analysis made during working on the article, we can arrive at several following conclusions:

- Taking into consideration recent and current developments inside and outside of Ukraine, neoliberal reforms being conducted in the country

³ *Poroshenko gives Ukraine '4 Ds' in annual address*, <<http://www.intellinews.com/poroshenko-gives-ukraine-4-ds-in-annual-address-500446700/?archive=bne>> (30.11.2015); M. Saakashvili, *Poroshenko's First Year Has Set Ukraine On The Road to Reform*, <<http://www.newsweek.com/poroshenkos-first-year-has-set-ukraine-road-reform-340061>> (30.11.2015).

cannot predict decrease especially of the military and political tensions taking place in or out of Ukraine, at least for the nearest future.

- We can argue although about the positive outcomes expected to gain sooner or later from neoliberal economic policy discourse for the country's better economic performance. There is a quite reasonable controversy about increasing the quality of life for ordinary citizens in parallel with the increasing indices of economic activity for a country however.
- Concerning international security, current global events illustrate that the most severe problem in the whole world nowadays is terrorism and struggle against it, and this problem has shifted one of the most significant hot spots from Ukraine to Syria. Though, it is generally obvious that Russia's post-Soviet strengthening, as well as the increase of the threats to the sovereignty of post-Soviet states and thus to international security, coincide with the current de facto war between Ukraine and Russia, firstly after the Georgian-Russian war of 2008.
- Another conclusion we came up with is that not only Georgian, but also other foreign libertarians' direct active participation in the Ukrainian administration makes these reforms neoliberal, but first of all Ukrainian President – Petro Poroshenko's broadly announced "4-Ds Program". It is worth to mention though that there is still an important gap and internal controversy within the current Ukrainian leadership when it comes to the realization of this program.
- Reasonable controversy exists also when attempting to assume generally that neoliberal, and specifically, neoliberal economic policy (including radical privatization, deregulation, etc.) in Ukraine as well, is an effective mechanism for internal or external conflict resolution and/or has conflict preventive function if we take into account quite unique in many aspects Georgian-Russian War of August, 2008 and current de facto Russian-Ukrainian War, both conflicts taking place in parallel with the neoliberalization of Georgia and Ukraine. However, it is clear that we have to analyze differently the short term and long term consequences.

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NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESENT-DAY CRISIS IN UKRAINE

Summary:

With the rise of Maidan phenomenon and unfolding the deep crisis in all spheres of life in Ukraine the problem of national identity and upbringing of the new Ukrainian civil society became the real challenge. On the one hand, Ukrainian people are striving for conservation of their national identity which somebody just finds in time when Maidan detonated their patriotism. On the contrary, the surge of our national pride mustn't become arrogant like an obstacle on our way to organic confluence with European community. Correct favourable decision about national identity will guarantee Ukraine forming as economically and politically strong European state. National identity problem in the context of the upbringing of new elite and controlling the aggression in society is investigated in the article.

Key words:

national identity, aggression, “hostile” (“hot”) aggression, “instrumental” (“cold”) aggression, self-organization, globalization.

Political events which have been taking place over the last two years in Europe absorbed scientists' attention all over the world. In order to make an adequate prognosis and to determine ways for solving imminent problems, many people are trying to understand what is happening. Conferences, “round tables” and TV-debates with politicians, political scientists, sociologists, and economists have become constant companions of Europeans – hard to stay apart and be indifferent and impartial in conditions of maturing real threat of the world military conflict which has not been fading in Ukraine for about two years. Politicians and scientists specializing in studying of variety of socio-political processes are actively criticizing the current situation, with one accord they are speaking about crisis and catastrophic situation in Ukraine economy and politics. They appeal to save Ukraine immediately but only few are able to offer high-quality treatment of the disease, even after making a detailed diagnosis. As a rule, modern researchers of the Ukrainian problem are limited to speculative references to humanitarian issues, calling to revive the high level of spirit-

uality and patriotism, desperately criticizing the present corrupted political elite which got stuck in the meshes of the proper insatiable greed. At this level our scholars are played out typically. This situation is similar to such when patient, visiting doctor at last receives as much as possible full picture of his diagnosis which is flavoured with the most disappointing details, but the doctor is so interested in description of the diagnosis that he does not have the strength, resources and time for the employment of treatment.

Forming the national identity is a root-question lying in the base of many problems. On the one hand, preservation and enhancement of national peculiarities is the state-forming factor, without which it would not take a “revolution of dignity”. Contrariwise, radical forces that do not accept the globalization processes and are ready to hopple good international relations with others, often gather under the flags of the national idea. That is to say national identity could play radically opposite roles. How to solve the question of the correct measures of national identity in Ukrainian state for making only constructive effect?

Socio-cultural environment which carries responsibility for the integrity of Ukraine and security of its citizens will be the subject of our research and object can be represented as national identity as an aggression phenomenon. Indeed, aggression is a factor that is the cause and consequence of the situation in the country, in all its socio-political possible forms we would like to explore. We propose to take the self-organization concept studies in psychology (David G. Myers)¹, and ethologic sphere (Konrad Lorenz)² as primary basis of the methodology, which will be able to shed light on human behaviour in modern society and in particular situation.

The crux of the matter lies in fact that Ukraine is facing an acute problem about which society it will build, to which kind of society it will transform – subduing the global process brought from outside or preserving and multiplying national characteristics by isolating. Evidently, we have to study how to balance between these two extremes: being flowing in to European world to save face. With the help of self-organizing methodology we can examine outward influence as entropy forces to which we have counteract for keeping system in homeostasis balance.

D. Myers marks out two types of aggression: “hostile” (“hot”) and “instrumental” (“cold”)³. The main difference between them is the aim: in case of hostile aggression the main goal will be to harm another, it acts as a source of anger. The purpose of instrumental aggression differs from hostile and is not related to an injury, but it may be a source of aggression indirectly and harmful acts may be used as a means to an end unintentionally. Succeeding many prominent scientists and philosophers (Hobbes, Spencer, Freud, Karl Lorenz and others) we will focus on the belief that aggression is a feature of all biological

¹ Д. Майерс, *Социальная психология*, Питер 1997, с. 688.

² К. Лоренц, *Оборотная сторона зеркала*, 1998, с. 393.

³ Д. Майерс, *op. cit.*, с. 486.

organisms including man and it mustn't be ignored. K. Lorenz asserts the aggression in biological species is a mechanism that retains the hierarchy and order inside species. So we can refute that the main role of aggression is an annihilation because aggression is mainly responsible for the maintaining and continuity of the life of the species. In particular, the behaviour of animals, to which we can attribute ourselves, builds mechanisms to restrict, redirect aggression – it punishes, indicates the place in the hierarchy, organizing, but not aiming at killing their own kind. If we compare the results of D. Myers' and K. Lorenz's investigations, normal aggression, constructive, designed to keep the kind of a person would be called "instrumental" or "cold" and is a mandatory attribute of any human community. On the other side is a destructive, killing aggression – "hostile" or "hot". Exactly this kind of human aggression causes murders, violence, war and bloodshed, with which 20th and the beginning of 21st centuries are filled. Myers leads surprisingly precise quote by Lewis Thomas (1981) that "in nature nothing is more dangerous to mankind than humanity itself"⁴.

According to K. Lorenz, constructive aggression in case of not finding opportunities to pour out into the outside world is used for the benefit of species (fighting with a rival, for example) able to amass. Whereupon it changes its main distinctive quality and becomes a destructive force – splashes out on relatives, impairs the life of the system. Lorenz and Myers cited examples of frustration as the cause of generating anger and evoking a hostile aggression: in the animal world it is an inability to accomplish any instinctive action, in the human world – inability to achieve delivered goal. In both situations, frustration and aggression which follows it, is stronger as closer we are to the goal. Only one difference is present: a person is able to endure with the aid of its ability to be strong-willed on the basis of the generated motivation. It is not that simple "Unavoidable misfortunes can be endured with patience, but can become unbearable in case they seem able they might evade"⁵.

To be precise, according to the concept of self-organization, constructive aggression (cold) is a compulsory unit of society's homeostasis because without it, it is impossible to realize normal life. Aggression makes us motivated, gives us the ability to achieve goals, becomes more successful and stronger, which generally contributes to the development of the whole society. It does not kill and destroy, but only builds a hierarchy of society, making it a viable and resilient to external influences. The variety of human society's rituals serve as limiting mechanisms. Ritualization of our lives up to the good manners and an easy smile relieves stress and suppresses aggression excess, gives no possibilities to form anger – the source of "hot" aggression. People transmit the accumulated knowledge about rituals to the next generations, fixing them as he-

⁴ *Ibidem*, c. 488.

⁵ *Ibidem*, c. 494.

redity important to preserve society. Not in vain Confucius places high emphasis on ceremonial and paternalism.

Unfortunately, human history is filled with violence and aggression of a destructive nature that can be directly attributed to the lack of phylogenetic human persistent prohibitions on the destruction of their own kind, because physically it is really difficult for us to do this without sharp canine teeth and long claws. But people learned to make weapons and began to apply it against their own kind. This is due to the lack of those mechanisms for the referral and removal of aggression. When rituals, designed to maintain the optimal amount of cold aggression, are not enough, when population density is increasing, and the area is growing, new requirements to improve the life, rises the amount of hot aggression that begins to destroy society appears. Hostile aggression serves as the entropy of society, it disturbs homeostasis and, as a result, society gets into a zone of increased turbulence – fluctuations grow and can destroy or severely harm the existing order. One of the most important factors in maintaining the vitality of society as a self-organizing complex system is the accumulation of the order that can prevent an increase of hostile aggression. K. Lorenz argues that only an emotion, a sense of the value of life gives meaning to our whole behaviour that endows us by humaneness⁶. Myers actively explores the role of television and other mass media in modern society, arguing that humanity from high-developed countries simply loses sensitivity, falling into a mental stupor. Thanks to the Internet and TV programs violence has become the norm of life and is programming population for new violence and aggression. People get accustomed to the cruelty and inhuman behaviours simply because from childhood our only opportunity to become human is to repeat, learn from others. If examples, standing right in front of us are associated with violence and aggression, normally we ought to expect in response is violence and not humane behaviour. Ensuring the viability of the system, in this case, for the normal development of society, needs to maintain an optimal balance of instrumental aggression, which is the compulsory condition for the existence of a man as a biological (and as a social) being with non-aggressive behaviour. On the contrary, hostile, destructive aggression must be constantly monitored by society and the state, as it is not part of homeostasis, and its rise in any case, shall entail destructive actions. As the mechanisms, controlling the situation, we can offer the compulsory popularization of non-aggressive behaviour, reduce the amount of cruelty and violence on TV and in other media, which suggests the idea of implementation of social mechanisms of censorship and its provision.

It should be clear that globalization is a kind of constant process which is impossible to avoid. In that case the question remains “how to optimize integration of the state into the global society and at the same time to preserve its identity in such conditions”. It is important not to forget the features of our national

⁶ К. Лоренц, *op. cit.*, с. 229.

mentality expressed in ideas of cosmism in Ukrainian philosophy. As stated above, we need to accumulate the order by compiling the order information which helps us to keep system in balance between chaos and order, balance of hot and cold aggression. Cold aggression prevents state destruction; a sort of this aggression can be our national identity, realization of national originality.

Recalling to D. Dontsov's article "Youth and Politics" where he argues that "in the life of the nation should be a certain number of axioms, irrefutable truths and no doubt to be present in them, as for the believer – commandments or »I believe«. For each member of the nation these axioms are: God, Motherland, proper pride and honour. They must be steadfast concepts... We must and can learn different ideologies, political programs and so on. But these three axioms must remain an unshakable foundation for young people. These basic concepts must be indissoluble by any effect"⁷. The concept allocated by Dontsov as axioms acquires purely philosophical sense, the understanding of which will provide the possibility of forming new elite. God axiom cannot be found through church attendance and religious ceremonies celebration, it can be realized by transcendent comprehension of the divine nature, which can be reached only through a philosophical outlook. That is shown in concepts of cosmism – ideas of individuals' unity with the general principles of space through the sophia prism. According to Berdyaev's concept of individual freedom, the universe can be included in man and be cognized because man contains its entire stuff, all its strength and properties. He wrote that "in cognitive meaning the person enters the universe as a huge man; yield its creative efforts as a small universe, as a microcosm. Man and Space are coping by forces as equals"⁸. As a Microcosm person includes the entire Cosmos. Consequently, it cannot be a part of something, it is always a wholeness. This central person's place in space is determined exclusively by its spirit. All of the above could mean the importance of the organization of national educational space on the basis of theoretical and philosophical level. Neither the knowledge of Christian ethics at the school through the study of the Bible nor permanent educational events dedicated to various national heroes and historical events of the last countries will give such a complete and comprehensive desired result as philosophy.

In the modern world it is difficult to use empirical examples taken from world and national history. Very often young people criticize and do not trust historical facts, because for a short time (last 20-25 years) they have been watching an examples of the constant rewriting of history, adjusting it under the status quo in politics. That understanding of the world through axiomatic, a priori knowledge of God as Absolute gives meaning for the knowledge about Good. Only the awareness of the general and objective, which are put into effect as the result of a philosophical deduction, is able to bring to mind the idea

⁷ <http://dontsov.info/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=207:ddoncov-qmolod-i-politykaq&catid=31:tvorcha-spadshchyna&Itemid=46> (10.10.2015)

⁸ Н.А. Бердяев, *Философия свободы. Смысл творчества*, Москва 1989, p.295.

of God, which is not “view”, “public opinion” but firm conviction of high-educated and highly spiritual person. On the same basis of philosophical education should be “the formation of his character, a man of noble, with highly developed sense of honour, loyal, firm in defence of his beliefs and his country – “gentleman”, as they say in England, “Cossack” as saying in Ukraine, a man of much higher moral species, with clean “blood”, with “precious bones”⁹. Modern world is increasingly implementing illusion of infinite possibilities of human change. In the judgment of majority – people are so free that can be converted permanently. But such confidence creates a big problem – lost sense of sanctity of man, it gets full autonomy and independence. Such faith according to the outstanding thinker of the 20th century Leszek Kolakowski, becomes destructive. He argues that the utopia of absolute autonomy of man and the hope of unlimited perfection can be the most effective instruments of self-destruction ever invented by human culture. Denial from everything it is a rejection of our own limits. This is a rejection from the idea of evil. In the rapidly globalizing world it is difficult to live with confidence about the sanctity of our state autonomy, independence, economy and politics from external influences. But the belief in indissoluble value of the “noble man” who understands the true meaning of the concepts “God”, “holiness” and cares not only about his personal remains. As we follow the Dontsov’s advice, formation of the new elite gets a new meaning. This creative elite can be formed not on the basis of certain political forces, but on the highly intellectual education, has its own dignity and sense of duty to people and to the universe.

Hence, national identity is a kind of social factor, which makes the state viable by accumulating constructive, “cold” aggression. To the same extent national identity has destructive influence being as the source of “hot” aggression. All in all, modern Ukrainian society must keep in balance both spheres of aggression, because both of them are necessary. For such purpose can be recommended: 1) active engagement in the promotion of non-violent, non-aggressive behaviour among the population of all ages, starting from kindergarten and continuing quality programs and movies on TV for seniors. Even news programs, taking into account the war events taking place in the East of the country, must give sufficient time for sharing with the audience not only negative, but also positive events and emotions, showing what good is happening in the country and abroad; 2) to give auspicious conditions for the future elite education must have maximum philosophical grounds, because only philosophy can show the deepest sides of the problem and gives us weapon to withstand the threat of aggression. Philosophy is the main tool to accumulate necessary sort of information to keep system in balance, to resist destructive (hot) aggression by forming tolerant nation with own national interests at the same time; 3) absolutely do not permit the spread of weapons in the country legally and illegal-

⁹ <http://dontsov.info/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=207:ddoncov-qmolod-i-politykaq&catid=31:tvorchy-spadshchyna&Itemid=46> (10.10.2015).

ly, to familiarize the public with statistical data, giving an exact picture of interference between the prevalence of firearms and the consequent rapid growth of aggression and violence in these areas, as it has been reported in detail in Myer's work; 4) it is important for the political and economic elite of the country to realize that the suggestion of public expectations and the refusal in consequence of the implementation of the promise is a direct path to a catastrophic increase of the hostile aggression that translate into uncontrollable riots, leads to destabilization and sometimes even to the death of the system, in which entropy overcomes.

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STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF UKRAINIAN POPULATION

Summary:

There is no other way to build a democratic society but with inevitable interaction between the government and overall population of the country. With regard to this the objective of the current research is to determine changes in political views of the Ukrainian population on Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO and to define changes in the level of public trust to social institutions after the Revolution of Dignity by comparing the results of sample surveys opinion poll in July 2013 and March 2015. The results of the study showed that views of Ukraine's population on their country's European integration changed. Public support for Ukraine's joining NATO has reached the highest level in recent years. Tangible changes also have taken place in the regional perspective, which might be caused by internal migration of Donbass region population. The level of confidence in the newly elected president and in the Armed Forces of Ukraine has increased.

Key words:

public trust, European integration, accession, internal migration, EU-Ukraine relationship, NATO-Ukraine relationship, Euro integration of Ukraine, joining the NATO, population opinion, Ukrainian government.

Introduction

There is no other way to build a democratic society but with inevitable interaction between the government and overall population of the country. With regard to this the objective of the current research is to determine changes in political views of the Ukrainian population on Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO and to define changes in the level of public trust to social institutions after the Revolution of Dignity by comparing the results of sample surveys opinion poll in July 2013 and March 2015. The data base of two conducted polls differed in the character of the formed selection. In case of temporal occupation of Crimea and intensifying situation in Donbas the quotas distribution was changed.

Main part

The main body of sample consisted of the population of Ukraine aged from 18 excluding the population of Crimea and temporally occupied Eastern territories of Ukraine¹. However, people living in Donetsk and Luhansk area were polled only partly: a poll was conducted just on the territory, which is controlled by Ukraine while the data was extended to the whole region. This incompatibility was partly removed in a further analysis by taking into account the amount and structure of migrants in Ukraine with subsequent respondents' redistribution proportionally to the quota. Few versions of sample had been examined before the optimal sample size was determined. The percentage of people supporting Ukraine's integration to EU was taken as the main parameter for determining the optimal sample size. For the explored period (July 2013-March 2015) this percentage increased from 56% to 64%. It indicates a change in population's attitudes.

Table 1. Parameters of sample size

2013			2015		
Version	Parameters	Sample size	Version	Parameters	Sample size
1	p=0,56 t=1,96 F(t)=0,95 $\Delta=0,023$	n=1789	1	p=0,64 t=1,96 F(t)=0,95 $\Delta=0,023$	n=1673
2	p=0,5 t=1,96 F(t)=0,95 $\Delta=0,023$	n=1816	2	p=0,64 t=2 F(t)=0,954 $V\Delta=0,023$	n=4253
3	p=0,56 t=2 F(t)=0,954 $V\Delta=0,023$	n=5941	3	p=0,64 t=1,96 F(t)=0,95 $V\Delta=0,03$	n=2401
4	p=0,56 t=1,96 F(t)=0,95 $V\Delta=0,035$	n=2464	4	p=0,64 t=1,96 F(t)=0,95 $V\Delta=0,035$	n=1764
5	p=0,56 t=1,96 F(t)=0,95 $V\Delta=0,05$	n=1207	5	p=0,64 t=1,96 F(t)=0,95 $V\Delta=0,05$	n=864

¹ The program of social poll prepared by the Centre of Economic and Political Studies named after Alexandr Razumkov, Kyiv 2012.

Source: Table developed by authors based on the methodology of carrying out the social poll in the Centre of Economic and political studies named after Alexandr Razumkov, Kyiv 2012 and 2015.

The most suitable sample size in 2013 consisted of 2,464 persons (the level of accuracy accounts for 3.5%). In the year of 2015 the sample error definition was complicated by the lack of information from the occupied territory of Donbas. To increase the accuracy of the study the sample error was reduced from 3.5% to 3% and the final sample size accounted for 2,401 persons.

The division into districts based on geopolitical factors was used to identify the regional differences in the population's opinion. Therefore, six regions were singled out: Central (Vinnitsa, Kirovograd, Poltava region), Northern (Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Sumy region), Southern (Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kherson region), Western (Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv Volyn, Ternopil, Khmelnytsky, Rivne and Chernivtsi regions), Eastern (Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Luhansk, Kharkiv region) and Kyiv city area, as a separate region due to significant characteristics. Due to the lack of information about the situation on the occupied territories, the decision was made to allocate the number of respondents based on population structure of 2013. While doing this, regional quotas of internally displaced Ukrainian population were taken into account. (Table 2)

Table 2. The distribution of the sample by age, type and region of settlement in 2013 and 2015

Region	Age	2013		Total	2015		Total
		City	Village		City	Village	
Central	18-34	52	33	85	52	34	85
	35-59	73	51	124	75	53	128
	60 & more	41	41	82	44	41	85
Northern	18-34	56	28	84	56	29	85
	35-59	79	42	121	82	44	125
	60 & more	42	36	78	45	36	80
Southern	18-34	80	39	119	53	27	80
	35-59	109	54	163	74	37	111
	60 & more	65	31	96	45	22	67

Western	18-34	96	87	183	97	89	186
	35-59	122	117	239	128	123	251
	60 & more	59	74	133	64	75	139
Eastern	18-34	207	34	241	203	34	238
	35-59	294	51	345	302	52	353
	60 & more	180	36	216	191	37	228
City of Kyiv	18-34	53	0	53	53	0	53
	35-59	66	0	66	69	0	69
	60 & more	35	0	35	38	0	38
Total		1709	754	2463	1670	731	2401

Source: Table developed by authors based on the Ukrainian Governmental Statistics Database of region's population [Electronic source]: <http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/> (10.11.2015).

The table represents the proportion in which respondents should be included to the sample according to their region, age and place of residence characteristics. For instance, in the year of 2015 the Southern region should have included 53 respondents from cities in the 18-34 age group. The number of such respondents in 2013 accounted for 80 persons.

The final sample ensures proper representation of each region considering sex and age distribution. Therefore, this sample could be taken for further analysis as it provides adequate interpretation of Ukrainian population's opinion.

The results of the poll state (Table 3) that in the years of 2013 and 2015 younger respondents support Ukraine's integration to the EU far more than older ones. In general, most of the respondents support the idea of integration in both years. For the year of 2013 the percentage of people that support Ukraine's integration accounts for 56%, in the year of 2015 this indicator is at the level of 64%. Nevertheless, some fundamental changes in the age structure of supporting respondents were indicated. For instance, the percentage of young people supporting EU integration decreased from 38.10% in 2013 to 34.03% in 2015. Thus, the percentage of older people supporting the idea of integration increased accordingly from 26.42% up to 29.49%

Table 3. The opinions of the population of Ukraine regarding the expediency of joining the EU, depending on the age in 2013 and 2015, %

Age group	Ukraine's integration to EU			
	For		Against	
	2013	2015	2013	2015
Young (18-34)	38,10	34,03	24,27	23,49
Middle (35-54)	35,48	36,48	33,33	36,24
Old (55 and more)	26,42	29,49	42,40	40,27
Total	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00

Source: Table developed by authors according to sociological research of the Centre of Economic and Political Studies named after Alexandr Razumkov, Kyiv 2012 and 2015.

The measured value of χ^2 in 2013 accounted for 6.61 and in 2015 it accounted for 27.28, a critical value for the number of degrees of freedom is $df = n - 1 = 3 - 1 = 2$ and materiality level 0, 05 : $\chi^2_{0,05}(2) = 5,99$. The measured value is higher than the critical one; therefore the connection is estimated as not accidental.

Supporters and opponents of European integration show significant regional differences (Table 4). The results of research *illustrate the polarization of opinions based on the principle "West-East"*.

Table 4. Distribution of the Ukrainian population's thoughts of the expediency of joining the EU, depending on the region of residence in 2013 and 2015, %

Region	Ukraine's integration to EU					
	2013			2015		
	For	Against	Total	For	Against	Total
Central	56,35	43,65	100,00	72,58	27,42	100,00
Northern	47,70	52,30	100,00	66,15	33,85	100,00
Southern	43,81	56,19	100,00	46,45	53,55	100,00
Western	80,93	19,07	100,00	90,40	9,60	100,00
Eastern	36,50	63,50	100,00	42,00	58,00	100,00
City of Kyiv	74,77	25,23	100,00	83,78	16,22	100,00
Overall	56,09	43,91	100,00	63,99	36,01	100,00

Source: Table developed by authors according to sociological research of the Centre of Economic and Political Studies named after Alexandr Razumkov, Kyiv 2012 and 2015.

The vast majority of people living in the Western region support Ukraine's joining the EU in both years. Moreover, the percentage of those people increased from 80.9% in 2013 up to 90.4% in 2015, which is understandable because people living in this region are connected with neighboring states not only by geographical proximity but also by historical and ethnical traditions, family ties and employment. In spite of significant changes in the political environment of the country, the vast majority of respondents from the Eastern region are against the association with the EU in 2015, mostly, because they believe in the best economic and political partnership with neighboring Russia. However, the percentage of people against the integration in Eastern region reduced from 65.5% in 2013 to 58% in 2015.

Three quarters of the residents of Kyiv show support to the European Association of Ukraine, as evidenced by the mass action of the national vote. These actions were the very beginning of the Revolution of Dignity. For last 3 years the percentage of people supporting EU integration increased by 10% in Kyiv and in the Western region. This percentage goes up in all regions, mostly in the Northern – by 18.5% and in the Central – by 16%. The most stable were the political preferences of the Southern region: the percentage of people supporting the integration increased only by 2.6%.

In the context of last three years events the question about Ukrainian non-block status becomes more popular. The perspective of Ukraine's joining the NATO was observed during the Orange Revolution, in 2004. However, after the further changing of political authorities this idea was declined. Nowadays, because of aggression in the East and Crimea occupation, more and more people refuse the idea of Ukraine's being a non-block country. Considering this, in the year of 2015 the poll included few more questions about NATO-Ukraine relationship.

Table 5. The opinions of the population of Ukraine regarding the expediency of joining the NATO, depending on the age in 2015, %

Age group	Ukraine's joining the NATO		Total
	For	Against	
Young (18-34)	63,08	36,92	100,00
Middle (35-54)	58,44	41,56	100,00
Old (55-70)	57,96	42,04	100,00
The oldest (70+)	34,43	65,57	100,00
Total	57,78	42,22	100,00

Source: Table developed by authors according to sociological research of the Centre of Economic and Political Studies named after Alexandr Razumkov, Kyiv 2012 and 2015.

The differentiation of opinions based on age appeared to be very distinctive. For example, the population of Ukraine in the age from 18 to 34 mostly supports Ukrainian cooperation with the NATO (63.08%). The population in the age after 70 feels rather critical about Ukraine's joining the NATO, the percentage of people, supporting this idea is twice less than those who are against it.

Overall, the vast majority of people in Ukraine have changed their attitude to the NATO since 2004 when the level of supporting cooperation with this organization was not more than 30-35%. The measured value of χ^2 is 62.31, a critical value for the number of degrees of freedom is $df = n - 1 = 4 - 1 = 3$ and materiality level 0, 05: $\chi^2_{0,05}(3) = 7,3$. The measured value is higher than the critical one; therefore the connection is estimated as not accidental.

The regional differentiation of population's attitudes to joining the NATO (Table 6) appears to be more distinctive than in the situation with EU integration.

Table 6. Distribution of the Ukrainian population's thoughts of the expediency of joining the NATO, depending on the region of residence in 2015, %

Region	Ukraine's integration to the NATO		Total
	For	Against	
Central	56,35	43,65	100,00
Northern	47,70	52,30	100,00
Southern	43,81	56,19	100,00
Western	80,93	19,07	100,00
Eastern	36,50	63,50	100,00
City of Kyiv	74,77	25,23	100,00
Overall	56,09	43,91	100,00

Source: Table developed by authors according to sociological research of the Centre of Economic and Political Studies named after Alexandr Razumkov, Kyiv 2015.

The regional differentiation of population's opinion about the Ukraine's joining the NATO is close to the same differentiation as of the idea of integration to the EU. The biggest support is typical for the Western region: it accounts for 80.9%. The lowest level of support was indicated in the Eastern (36.5%) and the Southern (43.81%) regions. It must be also emphasized that there are some differences in the attitudes of the Northern region population. In the year of 2015 most people of this region support integration to the EU while only half of them support joining the NATO. Nevertheless, in other regions the attitudes of population to the EU and the NATO are quite similar.

The trust of population to the governmental institutions changed dramatically in last two years. The research showed that the only institution that still has trust of population is the church: the level of trust in both years is higher than 70%. People in Ukraine are quite confident in the Media of Ukraine. However, the percentage of population that trusts them decreased from 65.5% in 2013 to 56.4% in 2015. The most significant change in the level of trust was towards the Media of Russia. The level of trust to this institution in 2013 accounted for 50.99% while in 2015 this percentage declined to 7.7%. Overall the result of the research demonstrate negative attitudes towards governmental institutions (the President of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Government of Ukraine, local authorities, the Constitutional Court), law enforcement agencies (Armed Forces of Ukraine, Police, Security Courts, Prosecutors) and banks.

Table 7. The level of public confidence in different institutions of Ukraine in 2013 and 2015, %

Institution	2013			2015		
	Do not trust	Trust	Total	Do not trust	Trust	Total
The President of Ukraine	69,07	30,93	100,00	56,4	43,6	100,0
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	79,07	20,93	100,00	72,8	27,2	100,0
Ukraine's Armed Forces	51,27	48,73	100,00	31,9	68,1	100,0
Police	79,93	20,07	100,00	75,4	24,6	100,0
Security Courts	63,52	36,48	100,00	65,9	34,1	100,0
National Guard	-	-	-	32,4	67,6	100,0
Local authorities	54,33	45,67	100,00	59,4	40,6	100,0
Laws	80,53	19,47	100,00	89,4	10,6	100,0
Church	25,95	74,05	100,00	22,6	77,4	100,0
Media of Ukraine	34,48	65,52	100,00	43,6	56,4	100,0
Media of Russia	49,01	50,99	100,00	92,3	7,7	100,0
Public Organizations	46,56	53,44	100,00	40,3	59,7	100,0
Political parties	79,14	20,86	100,00	87,3	12,7	100,0
Banks	71,45	28,55	100,00	91,7	8,3	100,0

Source: Table developed by authors according to sociological research of the Centre of Economic and Political Studies named after Alexandr Razumkov, Kyiv 2015.

Ratio of trust structures coordination accounts for 0.19 that means a significant difference in the structure of population trust of Ukraine in 2013 and 2015.

Conclusion

While studying the process of opinion formation of the population on the issue of Ukraine's joining the EU it was defined that people of different age groups have different opinions on the matter. Young people expressed a decisive consent with this decision. People of middle age have shown different opinions but mostly agreed on Ukraine's joining the EU. The percentage of people supporting Ukraine integration to the EU increased by 8% while the level of supporting the idea of joining the NATO has reached the highest point since 2004.

It is clear that in order to stabilize the tense political situation in the new government the mistakes of their predecessors must not be repeated and public opinion must be taken into account when making crucial decisions for the country. It is important for preventing new conflicts which can later bring negative consequences for the entire state and destabilize political and, consequently, economic situation in the country. The changes that happened in last two years proved that the new governmental authority has more trust of population. Moreover, the reforms directed towards carrying out agreements with the EU are justified as the population of Ukraine has consciously chosen the way towards European Integration

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ORGANIZATION OF ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION POLICY IN UKRAINE IN MODERN CONDITIONS

Summary:

Existing barriers to the development of competitive relations in Ukraine are the factors that cause low efficiency of the Ukrainian economy, which prevents its European Integration. The article represents the analysis of the state of competition in Ukraine and the results of the activity of Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine. The article deals with the main forms of competition advocacy in Ukraine, the influence of modern AMC's tools on target groups and the measurement of the competition advocacy effectiveness. The priority areas of competition policy in order to implement Eurointegration strategy in Ukraine are determined.

Keywords:

competition policy, antitrust policy, Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine, competition advocacy, competition advocacy effectiveness, competitive culture.

Introduction

"Dignity revolution" in Ukraine actualized the necessity of reformatting state regulation system, including competition field. Existing barriers to development of competitive relations are one of the factors that causes low efficiency of Ukrainian economy, impedes its European integration.

Now the main goals of competition policy in Ukraine are enhancing the functioning of the competitive environment, improving of its regulation mechanism in global changes, increasing of competition, particularly in the markets of socially important goods and services to ensure economic growth in the medium and long term.

Therefore, in conditions of acute economic and political crisis in the country, there is an urgent need to review the priorities and measures of antimonopoly and competition policy in order to stabilize and improvement of the economic situation, the transition to new forms and tools. Competition advoca-

cy is one of the components of competition policy and important aspects of the competition agency activity, a necessary condition for European integration of Ukraine.

On the one hand, the situation that emerged today in Ukraine is characterized with the increasing transparency of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine (AMCU), strengthening antimonopoly regulation of individual markets and industries. However, on the other hand, many entrepreneurs recognize that their level of knowledge in the field of competition and antitrust regulation is rather low, resulting in violation of applicable laws and other adverse effects. The population also has little knowledge about the benefits of competition policy and competition for every single citizen. So, to solve this problem in Ukraine, as in other European countries, the new direction of competition policy, called competition advocacy, is becoming increasingly common in recent years.

Problems of competition advocacy are investigated primarily in publications of International Competition Network Advocacy Working Group¹, works published by Ukrainian and foreign scientists, such as: S. Avdasheva, O. Shastitko², H. Filyuk³, I. Knyazeva, O. Lukashenko⁴, O. Voznyuk⁵. Purpose of the article is to analyze the state of competition in Ukraine and the activity of AMCU; to identify the main forms of competition advocacy in Ukraine, study the influence of modern AMC's tools on target groups and evaluate the competition advocacy effectiveness; to determine the priority areas of competition policy in order to implement Eurointegration strategy.

¹ *Advocacy and Competition policy*. ICN's Conference, Naples, Italy, 2002. <http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc358.pdf> (20.09.2015); *Advocacy Toolkit*. Part I: Advocacy process and tools. Prepared by ICN Advocacy Working Group. Presented at the 10th Annual Conference of the ICN, The Hague, May 2011 (online), <<http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc745.pdf>> (20.09.2015); *ICN Advocacy Working Group: Long-Term Strategic Plan 2011–2016*, 2011, <http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc760.pdf>. (20.09.2015); *ICN Advocacy Working Group: Work Plan for 2011–2012* ICN, 2011, <<http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc759.pdf>> (20.09.2015).

² S. Avdasheva, A. Shastitko, *Competition Advocacy: Subject Field of Problem and courses of action*, Moscow 2006, p. 42.

³ G. Filyuk, *Advocacy Competition as Part of the Competition Policy*, "Competition. Proceedings of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine", 2011, no. 1, pp. 45–52.

⁴ I. Knyazeva, A. Lukashenko, *Transformation Antimonopoly Policy in the Competition Advocacy Policy under Current Economic Conditions*, Novosibirsk 2011, p. 302.

⁵ O. Voznyuk, *Instrument that Provides Efficiency in a Long Time Dimension*, "Competition. Proceedings of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine", 2011, no. 3, pp. 45–52.

Main Thesis

The collapse of the Soviet Union and Ukraine's independence, fundamental changes in the economy set a complex task before Ukrainian government – to develop its own system of regulation of competitive relations and antitrust policy, create Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine.

The main purpose of contemporary institutional changes in the competitive environment in Ukraine is the elimination of contradictions between formal and informal institutions through the embedding of new market standards in the public consciousness, the elimination of institutional vacuum through the growth of complementary institutions to stimulate development of competitive relations in the country.

It should be mentioned, that distorted reproduction of basic standards of competition prevents the development of competitive relations in Ukrainian society, has the so-called "cumulative" effect, when organizations established on the basis of ineffective norms strengthen chosen way of institutional reforms, and the consistent strengthening of unproductive changes occurs. There are two main directions of institutional changes in the competitive environment:

- reforming and improving the state-legal mechanism that should ensure effective regulation and protection of competition;
- implementing radical changes in the consciousness of society, forming elements of its self-regulating in the development and maintenance of an appropriate institutional structure of the economy.

The idea of a "strong" state, which is able to withstand the interests of monopolies and limited number of members of economic clans and groups, is very popular today in the Ukrainian society.

Now let us analyze the state of competition in Ukraine and the activity of AMCU. Table 1 represents the changes in indicators of structural preconditions for competition in Ukraine in 2013-2014.

Table 1. Changes in indicators of structural preconditions for competition in Ukraine

Types of markets	The share of companies operating in the market of a certain type in total amount of production (sales), %		
	2013	2014	Deviation in indicator
Competitive markets	45,7	47,5	1,8
Oligopolistic markets	16,9	15,4	-1,5
Markets characterized by dominance	29,9	25,4	-4,5
Monopolistic markets	7,5	11,8	4,3

Source: Annual Reports of Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine,
<http://www.amc.gov.ua> (15.09.2015).

The increase in monopolization was observed in 34 industries, including mining operations, production of beverages, wood processing and furniture production, production of rubber and plastic products, manufacture of computer and optical products, repair and installation of equipment, land transport, warehousing and supporting activities in transport, hotels and restaurant business, activity of travel agencies and security services and others.

Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine combines measures of strengthening antimonopoly regulation of individual markets and industries (enforcement policy) with measures of competition advocacy. During the analysis, we found the low level of enforcement policy effectiveness. Budget financing of Committee was UAN 50.16 million last year, but the amount of fines and penalties to the state budget paid by violators of the legislation on economic competition protection was only UAH 29.8 million (while AMCU imposed UAH 99.3 million of fines on violators of the legislation). On the other hand, the amount of warnings by AMCU wrongful losses and expenses of economic agents was UAN 753.5 million. Table 2 represents comparison of the results of AMCU's activity in 2011, 2012 and 2014.

Table 2. Comparison of the results of AMCU's activity in 2011, 2012 and 2014

Indicators	2011	2012	2014
Budget financing	64.8	62.7	50.16
Number of workers	788	790	649
Considered statements for 1 worker	6.4	8.1	6.97
Revealed violations for 1 worker	5.69	7.36	8.23
Recommendations, made to stop violations, for 1 worker	1.6	2.7	4.5
Fines paid for 1 worker, thousand UAH	27.9	50.6	40.1

Source: Annual Reports of Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine,
<http://www.amc.gov.ua> (15.09.2015).

During 2014-2015 AMCU held following inquiries:

- Inquiries concerning the concerted actions of the agents in the form of higher prices for medicines. It refers to the validity of higher prices for foreign medicines, the number of which is 80% of the market of medicines in Ukraine.
- Inquiry concerning the creation of a cartel in the furniture industry. The court overturned the penalties (419 mln. UAH), imposed by AMCU because the fine was not fair.

- Inquiry concerning the determination of the fair price on oil and the assessment of actions of economic entities operating on the retail markets of oil products for compliance with the legislation on protection of economic competition as importers of gasoline and diesel fuel, as also to operators that realize petroleum products including liquefied natural gas produced in Ukraine. Today prices set on the Ukrainian fuel stations do not meet international trends of lower prices for oil and oil products. Accordingly, the territorial offices of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine considered over 75 cases about abuse of monopoly (dominant) position on the retail market of petroleum products in 2014. If the violation is proven, the penalty for violators of competition law will be 10% of the turnover of the previous year.

It should be mentioned, that Ukraine is at the crossroads of Europe, in a complex international system of coordinates, is a part of both Central Eastern and South Eastern Europe, and therefore should develop close relations with all countries in these regions. Ukraine recognizes the necessity of harmonization of Ukrainian and European competition law. There are close connections between the AMCU and similar public authorities in the EU. The one way of harmonization of Ukrainian competition policy with European practice is to develop new form of competition policy – competition advocacy.

Competition advocacy refers to “those activities conducted by the competition authority related to the promotion of a competitive environment for economic activities by means of non-enforcement mechanisms, mainly through its relationships with other governmental entities and by increasing public awareness of the benefits of competition”⁶. Competition advocacy involves organization of communication to pursue the interests not only through government, but through other market structures: political parties, NGOs, business, famous personalities etc⁷.

Competition advocacy refers to those activities of competitive agencies that promote competition. Generally, it is the development of collaboration with other government agencies, as well as raising public awareness about the benefits of competition. In practice competition advocacy complements the function of antimonopoly enforcement in the implementation of competition policy.

The main objectives of the AMC Ukraine in competition advocacy are:

1. improving consumer protection;
2. maintaining a healthy economic competition;
3. strengthening international cooperation in competition.

To do this AMC uses certain tools that are represented in Table 3.

⁶ *Advocacy and Competition policy*. ICN’s Conference, Naples, Italy, 2002.

<http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc358.pdf>(15.09.2015).

⁷ A. Belov, *Theory and practice of public relations*, Rostov-on-Don 2005, p. 9.

Table 3. Main Tools of Competition Advocacy

№	Objectives of competition policy	Tools of Competition Advocacy
1	Improving consumer protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – organizing educational company for market participants with low level of knowledge about competition law; – publishing annual reports on the competition agency activities; – conducting research on the most important markets development and publishing reports; – cooperation with authorities on the development, coordination and harmonization of legal and regulatory acts; – advising the authorities on the harmonization of regulatory policy with competition policy.
2	Maintaining a healthy economic competition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – legislative activity; – taking action against anticompetitive mergers and practices that may cause significant competition environment injury; – challenging decisions, restricting competition, in court; – encouraging the development of various industries; – organization of public forums for discussion on competition for specialized and non-specialized audiences.
3	Strengthening international cooperation in competition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation between national competition authorities, including Poland; – learning and knowledge sharing staff competition authorities, technical assistance; – participation in international forums, conferences, committees, commissions and organizations that provide a platform for interaction between national competition authorities; – development and implementation of international projects in competition; – receiving information on best competitive practice from International organizations; – participation in international debates and discussions on issues that may have an impact on competition policy and enforcement;

		– harmonization of Ukrainian competition legislation and business rules with international practice.
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Moreover, a set of competition advocacy tools may vary depending on the primary target group for the purpose of improving the efficiency of these measures. Let's consider the competition advocacy tools that AMC uses for the main target groups.

Cooperation of Antimonopoly Committee with all government agencies and local government is the key to successful implementation of competition policy and the development of an effective competitive environment in Ukraine. According to Article 20 of the Law of Ukraine "On the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine» Committee interacts with the government, local government, bodies of administrative and economic management and control in the development of competition, both at national and regional levels, using either instruments of persuasion and explanation, or instruments of enforcement. At the state level, Committee collaborates with various government ministries and agencies, in particular with the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, the National Commission for State Regulation of Financial Services Markets, State Fiscal Service of Ukraine, and so on.

The main forms of cooperation of Antimonopoly Committee with all government agencies and local government are developing joint plans and programs concerning measures of control over observance of legislation and competition; preparation of joint regulations; participation in working groups; conducting joint meetings, conferences and seminars; exchange of information, mutual consultation, mutual engagement specialists to perform certain tasks. Measures to improving competition policy that AMCU applies mainly to the authorities, are made in form of analysis of normative legal acts of the government in terms of their compliance with antitrust laws, harmonization Bills drafted by the government, development of proposals and comments (Table 4).

Table 4. Interaction of Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine with the Government and Local Authorities in 2014

Indicators	2014
Number of processed decisions and draft decisions:	1598
Number of failures in agreeing decisions and draft regulations:	344
Number of submitted comments and proposals to bring the draft legal acts in compliance with the requirements of legislation on protection of economic competition:	461

Source: Annual Reports of Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine,
<http://www.amc.gov.ua> (17.09.2015).

The traditional form of coordination of activities of the Committee with state and local authorities is participating experts of the Committee in the inter-agency bodies whose competence includes various issues of economic reform. During the 2014, Committee coordinated its activity with 1582 government and local government agencies, and agencies of administrative management and control. The bodies of the Committee held 6958 measures to the exchange of information with government agencies, prepared seven joint decrees and realized 1495 other events. Experts of the Committee participated in 94 inter-departmental commissions and held 1736 measures to coordinate their activities with law enforcement. Committee conducted 25 joint inspections of monopolies with other public authorities, local government, and agencies of administrative management and control, in the results of which 66 violations of legislation on protection of economic competition were found. An important aspect of competition advocacy is the interaction of representatives of the Committee at Courts.

Practice shows, that the active promotion of the principles of fair competition and competitive behavior in business is an effective tool for the development of competitive relations in the country. As a result, increased knowledge of business on competition enhances understanding and support of concepts for the protection of competition in society.

The Committee holds system of advocate measures in competition among individual entrepreneurs and with their unions and associations. Such activities can reach a wider audience while minimizing the costs you per one economic agent. An example of this successful experience is cooperation of the Committee with the Ukrainian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. The plan of joint measures in the field of competition policy, which involved joint work in improving the legal framework of competition policy, improving its procedural mechanisms, publishing, learning and explanation of the law for entrepreneurs, was designed.

While working with entrepreneurs Committee introduced a permanent monitoring of the situation on the commodity markets, which have a significant impact on the socio-economic situation in the country, particularly in the markets of bread and bakery products, markets of petroleum products, etc. Based on the research Antimonopoly Committee regularly publishes analytical reports on the situation in food markets that are sent to the President of Ukraine and the government.

The general trend is an increase in level of confidence in the Antimonopoly Committee of market participants (entrepreneurs). In 2014, the Committee received and reviewed the 4525 statements and representations concerning violations of the law on protection of economic competition from businesses and individuals. After reviewing these statements, Committee commenced 196 cases of violations.

According to the results of these checks AMC starts review of cases of violation of the legislation on protection of economic competition and provides

recommendations for preventing action (or inaction) that contain features such as offenses. In order to prevent violations of the law on protection of economic competition Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine widely uses such tool of competition advocacy as providing recommendations to market participants.

A popular tool of competition advocacy is the organization roundtables and seminars by the Committee. Most often they are held for staff of the Committee with the participation of stakeholders, target groups of competition advocacy to review and discuss issues in the field of competition policy. They also bring together representatives of authorities and business entities of commodity markets to provide explanations for the legislation on protection of economic competition, and recommendations for its implementation and establish of feedback.

Two departments of AMC organized work of telephone "hot line", which was available once or twice a month. However, the effectiveness of this tool of competition advocacy is low because appeals from citizens are virtually absent. However, during direct telephone lines in newspapers and on radio, video- and Internet-conferences Committee makes two-way dialogue with the public and provide answers to the key questions from citizens about its activities.

For competition advocacy among citizens and public Committee uses such tools as publishing articles in the print media and organizing interviews to the electronic media (radio, TV, online edition). Through publication in the media Committee has an opportunity to clarify the legislation and explain how companies should behave in a market, where and how to get help if citizens' rights are violated. In addition, publications in mass media often became the pretext for the start of antitrust investigations.

One of the key instruments of competition advocacy is the official website of AMC and websites AMC's territorial divisions. The Committee regularly publishes decision on granting permission for concerted actions and concentration of undertakings and decisions on infringement of the competition on the official site to ensure transparency of the AMC's activity. AMC also began to publish the decision, which he takes as the appeal body for public procurement.

A positive step in the field of competition is increase of transparency of the Antimonopoly Committee in 2014-2015 by providing access to public information. During 2014 there were granted 728 requests for such information is received by the central office and regional offices of the Committee. 728 requests for such information received by the central office and regional offices of the Committee were satisfied during the 2014. The Public Council of Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine has been working since 2011. Its membership includes representatives of 50 civil society institutions operating in the relevant working bodies – committees, like regulatory, legal, on financial markets, on industry, on the non-production sphere, on natural monopolies and on unfair competition.

In 2014, there were prepared and published 2,000 news reports about the decisions and activities of the Committee on the official website of the Committee.

The Committee actively interacts with international competitive organizations and competition authorities of other countries in competition advocacy. On the one hand, the Antimonopoly Committee interacts with the specialized international organizations, such as: the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), International Competition Network (ICN), and, on the other hand, cooperates with competition agencies of other countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic). Implementation of these agreements is by exchange of research findings and information on the development of legislation, experience of interaction with industry regulators, the results of investigations on socially important markets.

It is necessary to stress here the importance of AMC's participation in conferences, seminars and workshops, which are usually devoted to the fight against infringements of competition law and competition advocacy. During such events AMC presents the experience of Ukraine in the conduct of competition policy and operations for the protection of competition in product markets. As a result, the exchange of experiences and adopting best practices in the competition policy, including effective search of solving common problems, are realized. Unfortunately, in Ukraine such events are rare, which reduces the possibility of introduction of foreign colleagues and the public on progress and achievements of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine.

Like any other direction of competition policy, competition advocacy requires appropriate evaluation to determine the effectiveness of various measures and further develop tools and strategies. Providing competition advocacy evaluation can be useful to estimate competition advocacy activities in order to assist the prioritization of future advocacy activities and improve how competition advocacy is conducted within the agency; demonstrate that the agency has met its objectives cost-effectively; and highlight the value of competition advocacy interventions.

As mentioned above, the results of the competition advocacy are to neutralize losses from monopoly and receive additional prizes from competition. To ensure competition advocacy effectiveness, competition agency should first identify fields that need intervention. These fields must be socially important and meaningful. Competition authority must carry out those actions for which it has a reasonable assurance of success.

AMC provides evaluation of the effectiveness of competition advocacy by the qualitative quantitative methods. Qualitative methods include surveys and interviews, statements or estimates of independent experts, binary evaluating the success of competition advocacy measures ("useful"/"useless"), evaluation of the achievement of a competition agency goals.

The quantitative indicators for measuring the competition advocacy effectiveness include: the percentage of the population (or legislature or judiciary) who are aware of the role of the competition authority, its outreach activities, and whether they find that the competition authority's "message" compelling; the percentage of respondents who recognized measures competition advocacy "useful"; the percentage of legislative regulations that have approval with competition agencies; the number of initiatives taken in competition advocacy (seminars, conferences, public hearings etc.); the percentage of all cases filed by the competition agency that were successfully resolved through litigation, a settlement, or issuance of a default judgment; customer satisfaction rate with an competition agency consumer education website or microsite; the percentage of proposed administrative Procedure act rulemakings, conducted solely by the competition agency, completed within nine months of receipt of final comments in the final notice of Proposed Rulemaking; the percentage of redress cases in which the competition agency distributes redress money designated for distribution to consumers within six months; the percentage of the competition agency's consumer protection law enforcement actions that target the subject of consumer complaints to the competition agency; frequency of competition advocacy measures coverage in the media and the internet.

Conclusion

Ukraine has chosen integration into European economic, political and legal space as a strategic direction of development. Association with the European Union (EU) is defined as the main priority and strategic goal of Ukraine at the highest state level. This course involves a series of reforms, including competition. Ukraine recognizes the necessity of harmonization of Ukrainian and European competition law. There are close connections between the AMCU and similar public authorities in the EU.

Under conditions of socio-economic instability weighed competition policy allows effectively manage the economy; react quickly and solve acute social and economic contradictions and problems in the market; assess implemented competition policy measures in terms of economic efficiency and expedience; achieve transparency in the work of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine.

Analysis of the Antimonopoly Committee allows to determine the priority areas of competition policy in order to implement Eurointegration strategy:

- deep structural changes in the competitive sector are necessary to ensure sustainable economic growth in Ukraine;
- democratization of public relations and development of civil society require the introduction of competition advocacy;
- harmonization of the national legal framework in competition with European standards;
- improving organizational management component;

- strengthening of bilateral contacts with the competition agencies of the EU, particularly from Poland, Germany;
- deepening cooperation, coordination of the fight with violators of competition law, organized crime and money laundering.

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THE LEVEL OF OFFSHORIZATION OF BANK CAPITAL OF UKRAINE

Summary:

This research examines the offshorization level of the bank capital of Ukraine. We consider the offshorization level of the bank capital as the weight of the share capital, formed in/through states that are considered to be offshore centers according to the Ukrainian legislation or to the data of OECD. The results indicate that 12,10% of the bank capital of Ukraine is formed not transparently, but through offshores; the most popular places to form their capital by banks are BVI and Cyprus; some typical schemes of the ownership structure are described; the indicator of the offshorization level of the bank capital calculated according to the Ukrainian legislation is much lower than according to the OECD report and reaches only 3,00% that shows that substantial changes to the Ukrainian legislation that regulates the transparency standards are needed.

Key words:

offshorization, bank capital, banking, offshore, transparency, ownership structure

Introduction

The problem of increasing the transparency of the ownership structure of commercial banks in Ukraine is becoming increasingly important today, due to the necessity of rehabilitation of the national banking system, approximation of the rules of banking and banking law to international standards, Ukraine's commitments under the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies with IMF including¹.

The banks are forming so complicated ownership structures that add complexity to identify the real owners (beneficiaries) of these banks. This situation has such negative consequences as the following:

¹ National bank of Ukraine, *Ukraine – Memorandum On Economic and Financial Politics*, 27.02.2015, <<http://www.bank.gov.ua/doccatalog/document?id=10315035>> (10.08.2015).

- excessive amounts of crediting the persons which are affiliated with this bank and capital withdrawal from the banks as a result of such transactions;
- banks take higher risks which consist of the normal banking risks and the risks of the business of bank owner (beneficiary);
- inefficiency and instability of banking, leading to the insolvency and bankruptcy of the bank institutions;
- low level of confidence in the banking system of Ukraine².

In our opinion, one of the challenges in improving the transparency of the banking system of Ukraine is the offshore use in the ownership structures of the commercial banks. In addition, global capital flows, increasing requirements for the minimum regulatory capital of commercial banks, the need for additional capitalization of banks according to stress tests conducted by National bank of Ukraine (NBU), requirement for a gradual increase in the bank share capital to 500 mln UAH to 2024³ – all these factors increase the risk of raising capital in the banking system of Ukraine through offshore jurisdictions.

On the one hand the use of offshore schemes has negative consequences for the economy (eg, capital outflow from Ukraine, taxation "minimization", the shortfall of budget revenues and strengthening unfair competition⁴). On the other hand, the use of offshore companies may have sufficient reasons (eg, protection from political persecution, raiding, distrust of the local judicial system).

The problem of deoffshorization is complicated by the fact that there is no universal, single list of offshore jurisdictions. Every State, every international organization forms its own list of offshore zones, which number is increasing nowadays: 30% of countries all over the world have some offshore features⁵. Some countries are not considered to be offshore, nevertheless some areas (zones) with the offshore features may be under their jurisdiction.

Main thesis

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has made its list of offshore zones on the basis of the jurisdictions' assessment according to the international standards of transparency and exchange of information on request (EOIR). Evaluation was carried out in two stages: the first

² National bank of Ukraine, *New Requirements For Banks' Ownership Structure And The Consequences Of Their Non-transparency*, May, 2015

<<http://www.bank.gov.ua/doccatalog/document?id=17998289>> (10.08.2015).

³ National bank of Ukraine, *Resolution On Bringing The Authorized Capital Of Operating Banks In Compliance With The Requirements Of Minimum Amount*,

<<http://www.bank.gov.ua/doccatalog/document?id=10315035>> (06.08.2015).

⁴ M. Karlin, M. Shchehelska, *The Problem Of Offshorization Of Banking Business In Ukraine*, "Banking" Vol.4-5 (136), pp. 21-31.

⁵ V. Katasonov, "Black Holes" *Of The World Financial System*, <http://www.ufin.com.ua/analit_mat/gkr/204.htm> (10.08.2015).

stage - a study of the legal and regulatory framework of jurisdiction, the second phase - the practical operation of that framework. These reviews are based on the Terms of Reference, which break the international standard down into 10 essential elements⁶.

A. AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION

A.1. Jurisdictions should ensure that ownership and identity information for all relevant entities and arrangements is available to their competent authorities.

A.2. Jurisdictions should ensure that reliable accounting records are kept for all relevant entities and arrangements.

A.3. Banking information should be available for all account-holders.

B. ACCESS TO INFORMATION

B.1. Competent authorities should have the power to obtain and provide information that is the subject of a request under an EOI agreement from any person within their territorial jurisdiction who is in possession or control of such information.

B.2. The rights and safeguards that apply to persons in the requested jurisdiction should be compatible with effective exchange of information.

C. EXCHANGING INFORMATION

C.1. EOI mechanisms should provide for effective exchange of information.

C.2. The jurisdictions' network of information exchange mechanisms should cover all relevant partners.

C.3. The jurisdictions' mechanisms for exchange of information should have adequate provisions to ensure the confidentiality of information received.

C.4. The exchange of information mechanisms should respect the rights and safeguards of taxpayers and third parties.

C.5. The jurisdiction should provide information under its network of agreements in a timely manner.

Jurisdictions are following-up on the Global Forum recommendations. A significant number of jurisdictions have improved their legislation to ensure the availability of accounting and ownership information, including abolishing or immobilising bearer shares. Jurisdictions have also acted on improving access powers to the information under domestic laws, for example by improving their access to bank information for EOIR purposes, and have improved EOIR procedures or strengthened EOI units for timely EOIR. Overall, out of the 968

⁶ Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, *Tax Transparency. 2014. Report On Progress*, <<http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/GFannualreport2014.pdf>>, p. 25, 54, (06.08.2015).

recommendations made, 92 jurisdictions have already introduced or proposed changes to their laws and practices to implement around 500 recommendations⁷.

As a result of this assessment every jurisdiction was rated and the jurisdictions were divided into groups (Table 1).

Table 1. Rating of jurisdictions according to the OECD assessment

1. Compliant:
Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, India, Ireland, Isle of Man, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden.
2. Largely compliant:
Argentina, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Belize, Bermuda, Brazil, Cayman Islands, Chile, Estonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Germany, Ghana, Gibraltar, Greece, Grenada, Guernsey, Hong Kong (China), Italy, Jamaica, Jersey, Macao (China), Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Montserrat, Netherlands, Philippines, Qatar, Russia, San Marino, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Turks and Caicos Islands, United Kingdom, United States.
3. Partially compliant:
Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Barbados, Indonesia, Israel, Saint Lucia, Turkey
4. Non-compliant:
British Virgin Islands, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Seychelles
5. Jurisdictions that cannot be rated because they cannot move to Phase 2:
Brunei Darussalam, Marshall Islands, Dominica, Federated States of Micronesia, Guatemala, Lebanon, Liberia, Panama, Nauru, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Vanuatu ⁸

The last three groups, shown in Table 1, will be considered as offshore in the further analysis, with the exception of Austria, which falls now into the group of jurisdictions that are partially compliant. This is because the evaluation of the country was carried out in the first half of 2011, and now the OECD notes in its report that Austria has made some changes in its legislation and this country is undergoing a Supplementary review to improve its ratings. British Virgin Islands and Switzerland are undergoing this additional assessment too, but since these countries are much lower in the rankings - in the group of jurisdictions that are non-compliant and jurisdictions that cannot be classified because their analysis cannot move to the second stage - we consider them as offshore.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 29

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 28.

We can conclude that the OECD has a clear and defined system of evaluation according to which certain countries are considered to be offshore jurisdictions. In addition, if the country improves its legislation on transparency and exchange of financial information, evaluation can be carried out again. In our opinion, it provides the high relevance and objectivity of the offshore list, formed by OECD.

The current Resolution of Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "On the list of offshore zones"⁹ from 23.02.2011 includes the following jurisdictions: Guernsey, Isle of Jersey, Isle of Man, Isle of Alderney, Bahrain, Belize, Andorra, Gibraltar, Monaco, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas Islands, Barbados, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Virgin Islands (US), Grenada, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, the Commonwealth of Dominica, Turks and Caicos Islands, Liberia, Seychelles, Vanuatu, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, the Cook Islands, Samoa, Maldives.

When comparing this offshore list and the one of OECD we see that only a small amount of jurisdictions are on both lists (table 2). However, the selection criteria of the jurisdictions that are considered to be offshores remain unclear and need the periodical revision of the list.

Table 2. List of offshore according to Ukrainian list and list of OECD

Jurisdictions that are considered to be offshores only according to the list of Ukraine	Jurisdictions that are considered to be offshores according to the Ukrainian list and the list of OECD	Jurisdictions that are considered to be offshores only according to the list of OECD
Guernsey, Jersey, Men Alderney, Bahrain, Belize, Gibraltar, Monaco, Aruba, Bahamas, Montserrat, Bermuda, Puerto Rico, Netherlands Antilles, St. Vincent, Niue, Grenadines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, Dominica, Turks and Caicos, Maldives	Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Liberia, Saint Lucia, Seychelles, Vanuatu, Marshall Islands	Indonesia, Israel, Turkey, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Brunei Darussalam, Dominica, Micronesia, Guatemala, Lebanon, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Switzerland

We consider the offshorization level of the bank capital as the weight of the share capital, formed in/through states that are considered to be offshore centers. As there is no universal, single list of offshore zones, we are using two of such lists: 1) list of Ukraine; 2) list of OECD.

⁹ Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, *Resolution On The List Of Offshore Zones*, 23.02.2011 <<http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/143-2011-%D1%80>> (10.08.2015).

The study was conducted by analyzing data concerning ownership structure of commercial banks in Ukraine, posted on the official websites of relevant banks and the NBU¹⁰. The analysis was conducted in the context of groups (according to the classification of NBU according to the assets of banks) (table 3).

Table 3. Amount of Ukrainian bank share capital formed in offshore (list of Ukraine and list of OECD) as of 01.01.2015.

	Bank	Share capital, *1000 UAH	Share capital, formed in off- shore zones (Ukrainian list), *1000 UAH	Share capital, formed in offshore zones (list of OECD), *1000 UAH
	Group I			
1.	Privatbank	18100740,00	2938347,43	2938347,43
2.	Oschadbank	18302480,00	0,00	0,00
...
	Group I Total	108058351,90	3288347,44	11327849,98
	Group II			
17.	Credit Agricole Bank	1222928,76	0,00	0,00
18.	Bank "Financial Initiative"	2000000,00	0,00	2000000,00
...
	Group II Total	31265264,41	585000,00	6077915,93
	Group III
36.	Ukrainian Development Bank	722000,00	0,00	0,00
37.	Bank "Clearing House"	439692,50	0,00	219835,70
...
68.	City Commercial Bank	400000,00	0,00	0,00
	Group III Total	17525774,64	1167584,40	2561598,23
	Group IV
69.	Bank Mykhailivskyi	500000,00	0,00	0,00
70.	Ekspres-bank	248767,76	0,00	196128,50

¹⁰ National bank of Ukraine, *Information On The Owners Of Substantial Participation In The Banks Of Ukraine*, 2015
<http://www.bank.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=6738234&cat_id=51342>
(10.08.2015).

...
158.	Melior bank	190000,00	0,00	0,00
	Group IV Total	22358121,09	340716,38	1709549,71
	Group I-IV Total	179207512,04	5381648,23	21676913,84

The level of offshorization of banking capital of Ukraine was calculated as of 01.01.2015 according to both offshore lists: list of Ukraine and list of the OECD (table 4).

Table 4. The offshorization level of the bank capital of Ukraine as on 01.01.2015

Bank group	The offshorization level (Ukrainian list), %	The offshorization level (OECD list), %
Group 1	3,04	10,48
Group 2	1,87	19,44
Group 3	6,66	14,62
Group 4	1,52	7,65
Total	3,00	12,10

The results show the following: 12,10% of the banking capital of Ukraine are formed through offshores according to the OECD report, and 3.00% - according to the list of Ukrainian offshore centers; the most popular offshores to form the capital by banks are Cyprus, Luxembourg and the British Virgin Islands; beneficiaries of some banks with offshore capital are politically exposed persons (PEP).

Indicators of offshore banking capital of Ukraine, calculated in accordance with Ukrainian and international standards, differ significantly. Obviously, this is caused by the fact that the Ukrainian list of offshore zones has not been updated since 2011 and the criteria of this list remain unclear, while offshore list of OECD is regularly updating on the basis of the assessment of jurisdictions. Therefore it is necessary to make the changes to the Ukrainian procedure of defining offshore zones and to provide the periodic updates of this list.

The analysis of the ownership structure of commercial banks in Ukraine showed that the typical scheme of ownership structure with the use of offshores is registration of Ukrainian bank for the company in Cyprus or other unusual offshore (in the Netherlands, Luxembourg), which, in turn, are registered for the companies in the classic offshore like Belize, British Virgin Islands, Panama, Seychelles, where information about owners of companies is secret.

The final nominal owner is often a citizen of an offshore jurisdiction, which is connected to the Ukrainian real owner by the Trust Agreement.

The analysis of the ownership structure of some commercial banks was complicated because lawmakers demanded to disclose only the owners of significant participation (individuals who own more than 10% of the capital of the institution). Therefore, the scheme was built as follows: the bank's capital was divided into 11-12 shares, each with less than 10%, and owned by an offshore company, and the final beneficiary of all these companies was one person. As there were no owners of substantial participation, the commercial bank was not obligated to make its ownership structure public.

Law "On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Concerning Responsibility Of The Persons Associated with the bank" of 02.03.2015¹¹ and the Procedure of the National Bank concerning presenting the information of the ownership structure of the bank of 21.05.2015¹² were aimed to increase the transparency of the banking system of Ukraine, which aims to prevent such ownership structures.

In particular, the concept of "a key member of the legal entity" was introduced as the person owning 2% or more of corporate rights. Banks were required to submit to the National Bank their renewed ownership structures according to the new requirements within two months from the effective date of these changes, which makes it possible to get a more accurate indicator of offshorization of bank capital of Ukraine¹³.

Furthermore, the National Bank published the main types of non-transparent structures of banks in 2015:

1. Structure of shareholders who own less than 10%. NBU considers such a scheme as a method of avoiding approval of acquiring significant participation in the bank;
2. Structure with complicated ownership relations, cross-shareholdings or cyclical shareholdings;
3. Using trust declarations to avoid responsibility in the case of insolvency of the bank;
4. Disclosure of non-resident individuals in the ownership structure (not necessarily, but often from Cyprus or other offshores), who are considered to be nominal holders of shares of the bank¹⁴;

¹¹ Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, *On Amendments To Some Legislative Acts Of Ukraine Concerning Responsibility Of The Persons Associated with the bank*, 02.03.2015 <<http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/218-19>> (10.08.2015).

¹² National bank of Ukraine, *On Amendments To Some Legislative Acts Of The National Bank Of Ukraine*, 21.05.2015 <<http://www.bank.gov.ua/doccatalog/document?id=17632829>> (10.08.2015).

¹³ Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, *On Amendments To Some Legislative Acts Of Ukraine Concerning Responsibility Of The Persons Associated with the bank*, 02.03.2015 <<http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/218-19>> (10.08.2015).

¹⁴ National bank of Ukraine, *New Requirements For Banks' Ownership Structure And The Consequences Of Their Non-transparency*, May, 2015 <<http://www.bank.gov.ua/doccatalog/document?id=17998289>> (10.08.2015).

5. Structure with "dead souls" - shareholders, who still own share, but these people have already died¹⁵.

If ownership structure of the bank doesn't meet the requirements for transparency, NBU offers the bank to bring its structure into compliance. If it is not done in time, set by NBU, the ownership structure of the bank recognizes to be non-transparent¹⁶ and NBU has the right to prohibit the person to acquire or increase a significant participation in the bank¹⁷.

According to the amendments to banking law and regulations, aimed to increase the transparency of ownership structures of commercial banks in Ukraine, we consider the calculation of the level of offshorization of bank capital of Ukraine as of 01.07.2015 is necessary (tab. 5).

Table 5. Comparison of the offshorization level of the bank capital of Ukraine (Ukrainian list and list of OECD as on 01.01.2015 and as on 01.07.2015).

Bank group	The offshorization level (Ukrainian list), %		The offshorization level (OECD list), %	
	01.01.2015	01.07.2015	01.01.2015	01.07.2015
Group 1	3.04	2.92	10.48	6.61
Group 2	1.87	2.84	19.44	12.33
Group 3	6.66	6.29	14.62	17.76
Group 4	1.52	1.74	7.65	18.46
Total (solvent banks)	3.00	3.05	12.10	8.88
Total (insolvent banks)	-	0.00	-	39.77
Total (bank system)	-	2.91	-	10.31

The dynamics analysis of offshorization of bank capital of Ukraine in the accordance with the Ukrainian offshore list has shown only a slight change of direction in increase or decrease primarily due to decrease or increase of the total capital of banks of the each group. At the same analysis in the accordance with the offshore list of OECD has shown the following:

¹⁵ Forbes, *The List of 48 Banks With Non-transparent Ownership Structure*, 2015 <<http://forbes.net.ua/ua/news/1403447-spisok-48-bankiv-iz-neprozoroyu-strukturoyu-vlasnosti>> (10.08.2015).

¹⁶ National bank of Ukraine, *The Procedure For Submission Of Information On The Ownership Structure Of The Bank*, 21.05.2015 <<http://www.bank.gov.ua/doccatalog/document?id=17632797>> (10.08.2015).

¹⁷ Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, *On Banks And Banking*, 07.12.2000 <<http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2121-14>> (10.08.2015).

1. the share of offshore capital of the Group 1 and Group 2 has decreased by the assignment of some banks as insolvent and their liquidation;
2. the level of offshorization of the Group 3 and Group 4 has grown because of the detailed disclosure of the ownership structure of commercial banks.

The most popular offshore for Ukrainian banks remain Cyprus, British Virgin Islands, Luxembourg.

It should be noted that some banks have quite low level of offshore capital, but the majority of those banks which are using offshore ownership structures, form 60-100% of their capital through offshores (Table 6). To minimize the risks of commercial banks and Ukrainian banking system in general it is necessary to introduce an allowable threshold value of offshorization of bank capital.

Table 6. Distribution of commercial banks in Ukraine by the level of offshorization

Share capital, formed in offshore zones	Ukrainian list			OECD list		
	Amount of banks	Capital amount, *1000 UAH	The proportion in relation to all banks with offshore capital, %	Amount of banks	Capital amount, *1000 UAH	The proportion in relation to all banks with offshore capital, %
80-100%	4	1,088,417.62	19.80	20	11,839,211.33	61.79
60-80%	2	319,085.97	5.80	5	2,466,110.32	12.87
40-60%	0	0.00	0.00	0	0	0.00
20-40%	0	0.00	0.00	4	503,213.49	2.63
0-20%	9	4,089,808.05	74.40	18	4,352,842.06	22.72

Conclusions

Ukraine has a quite high level of offshorization of bank capital – 12,10% as of 01.01.2015 according to the OECD offshore list. The most popular offshores to form the capital by banks are Cyprus, Luxembourg (both are not included to the Ukrainian offshore list) and the British Virgin Isles.

We can conclude that the OECD has a clear and defined system of evaluation according to which certain countries are considered to be offshore jurisdictions. In addition, if the country improves its legislation on transparency and exchange of financial information, evaluation can be carried out again. In our opinion, it provides the high relevance and objectivity of the offshore list,

formed by OECD. When comparing this offshore list and the one of OECD we see that only a small amount of jurisdictions are on both lists. However, the selection criteria of the jurisdictions that are considered to be offshores remain unclear and need the periodical revision of the list.

The dynamics analysis of offshorization of bank capital of Ukraine in the accordance with the Ukrainian offshore list has shown only a slight change of direction in increase or decrease primarily due to decrease or increase of the total capital of banks of the each group. At the same analysis in the accordance with the offshore list of OECD has shown the following:

1. the share of offshore capital of the Group 1 and Group 2 has decreased by the assignment of some banks as insolvent and their liquidation;
2. the level of offshorization of the Group 3 and Group 4 has grown because of the detailed disclosure of the ownership structure of commercial banks.

It is caused by the relevant regulatory acts of NBU that are aimed to increase the transparency of bank system in Ukraine. To minimize the risks of commercial banks and Ukrainian banking system in general it is necessary to introduce an allowable threshold value of offshorization of bank capital.

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WSPÓŁCZESNE WYZWANIA DLA UKRAINY A POLSKA

(The contemporary challenges for Ukraine and Poland)

Streszczenie:

W uwagach wstępnych autorzy pokrótce naszkicowali tło obecnych przemian społeczno-ustrojowych na Ukrainie. Następnie skupili uwagę na prawnopolitycznych zasadach formowania polityki zagranicznej Ukrainy od czasu zdobycia przez nią niepodległości, analizując przede wszystkim uchwałę Najwyższej Rady Ukrainy „O głównych kierunkach polityki zagranicznej Ukrainy”. Z kolei przestudiowali prawnopolityczne podłoże ukraińsko-polskich stosunków międzypaństwowych, wskazując na doniosłą rolę Traktatu między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Ukrainą o dobrym sąsiedztwie, przyjaznych stosunkach i współpracy. Naświetlono również działalność ukraińsko-polskich instytucji międzypaństwowych, powołanych dla spełnienia powstałych zadań.

W artykule podkreślone zostało poparcie przez Polskę dążeń eurointegracyjnych Ukrainy. Kluczowym momentem z tego punktu widzenia jest kwestia podpisania umowy stowarzyszeniowej UE z Ukrainą. W ostatniej części referatu autorzy wskazują, iż agresja Rosji skierowana przeciwko Ukrainie spowodowała rewizję umów międzynarodowych i była początkiem gruntownych zmian w świadomości Ukraińców.

Summary:

In the introductory remarks the authors drafted a background of present-day social and constitutional shifts in Ukraine. Then they focused their attention on legal and political principles of formulation of Ukraine's foreign policy since gaining independence, analysing, first and foremost, the resolution enacted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine entitled "On the main directions of Ukraine's foreign policy". They also studied legal and political ground of Ukrainian-Polish bilateral relations, pointing to a weighty role of the Treaty on Good Neighbourhood, Friendly Relations and Cooperation between the Republic of Poland and Ukraine. As well, they elucidated the activity of the Ukrainian-Polish bilateral institutions established for realization of the resultant tasks. The support of Ukraine's aspirations for deeper integration with Europe by Poland were accentuated in the article. An issue of the signing of the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement is crucial from this viewpoint. In the

last part of the paper the authors indicate that Russia's aggression against Ukraine resulted in a revision of international accords and initiated a thorough changes in Ukrainians' identity .

Słowa kluczowe:

Ukraina, Rosja, Polska, wojna hybrydowa,

Key words:

Ukraine, Russia, Poland, hybrid war

Wstęp

Nieogłoszona wojna Federacji Rosyjskiej z Ukrainą, trwająca już bez mała dwa lata, uznawana za wojnę domową w samej Ukrainie, wymaga szczegółowego przestudiowania. Analizy wymaga także miejsce Ukrainy we wspólnocie europejskiej, a także na świecie. Wydarzenia w toku Majdanu i po nim, czyli od listopada 2013 r. do dnia dzisiejszego, całkowicie zmieniły w świadomości przeciętnego Ukraińca rozumienie własnego honoru narodowego. W ciągu stuleci Ukraińcom na ziemiach podległych Rosji wpajano, iż nie istnieje odrębny naród ukraiński. Ukraińcy mieli być jakoby częścią wielkiego narodu rosyjskiego. Za czasów ZSRR odwrotnie – uznano Ukraińców za naród, jednak nierozzerwalnie związany z „wielkim” narodem rosyjskim. W dzisiejszej Federacji Rosyjskiej ponownie odradza się mit jedyne go narodu rosyjskiego.

Powyższa koncepcja nie ma wiele wspólnego z rzeczywistością. Nie budzi wątpliwości ani odrębność narodowa ani europejska tożsamość Ukraińców¹. Pojawia się jednak, widoczny ponad 20 lat po rozpadzie ZSRR, problem całkowitej rozbieżności ukraińskich dążeń do integracji z Europą, z próbami zatrzymania Ukrainy w rosyjskiej strefie wpływów.

W zaistniałej sytuacji ważną rolę w powrocie Ukrainy do Europy odgrywa stanowisko Polski – niezależnie od traumatycznych przeżyć w relacjach obojga narodów.

Zasady formowania polityki zagranicznej Ukrainy

Z chwilą proklamowania niepodległości Ukrainy (przypomnijmy, że pierwszym państwem, które uznało tę niepodległość, była Polska) przed Kijowem zrodził się niełatwy, ale niezwykle ważny problem — określenia orientacji polityki zagranicznej. Jak pokazało życie, rozstrzygnięcie tej kwestii okaza-

¹ Zobacz np.: *Ukraine: A bibliographic guide to English-language publications*, ed. B. Wynar, Englewood 1990; *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. V, Toronto 1993, s. 344 et. al.; W. Serhijczuk. *Українське історичне товариство в дослідженні формування й розвитку українського етносу* [w:] *На службі Клію*, red. М. Брайчевський і in., Київ-Нью-Йорк-Торонто-Париж-Львів 2000, s. 516-523, i in.

ło się niezwykle trudnym. Tym niemniej, Ukraina musi odnaleźć swoje miejsce w Europie i na świecie. Leży to przede wszystkim w jej własnym interesie. Z drugiej strony, należy stale liczyć się z tym, jak postawę Ukrainy i jej zachowanie się na arenie międzynarodowej oceniają jej bliscy i niezupełnie bliscy sąsiedzi².

Jednak, jak się wydaje, czynnikiem decydującym przy kształtowaniu polityki zagranicznej Ukrainy jest zwartość społeczeństwa, poziom jego rozumienia potrzeb i kierunków własnego rozwoju, poziom świadomości narodowej każdego obywatela. Z tego punktu widzenia prawdziwym nieszczęściem dla społeczeństwa ukraińskiego był brak własnej państwowości w ciągu stuleci, znajdowanie się ziem ukraińskich pod rządami innych państw. Wywarło to głęboki negatywny wpływ na Ukraińców, spowodowało i rozwinęło w nich poczucie własnej „mniejszej wartości”, utratę wiary w możliwość zbudowania samowystarczalnego państwa ukraińskiego. Stąd właśnie te zjawiska, które dostrzegamy po uzyskaniu niepodległości przez Ukrainę³. Zbadanie tego fenomenu ukraińskiego – to oddzielny, obszerny temat.

Rozpad bloku wschodniego, w tym Związku Radzieckiego, spowodowały powstanie nowego, światowego systemu stosunków międzynarodowych. Powstałe państwo ukraińskie musiało od samego początku zadbać o fundament własnego kursu polityki zagranicznej. Przewodnie zasady i kierunki polityki zagranicznej niepodległej Ukrainy zostały wytyczone w Uchwale Najwyższej Rady z dnia 2 lipca 1993 r. „O głównych kierunkach polityki zagranicznej Ukrainy”⁴. Ogólnie rzecz biorąc te kierunki są aktualne również w dniu dzisiejszym, po prawie ćwierćwieczu niepodległości. Postulatem przewodnim w prowadzeniu polityki zagranicznej nadal pozostaje pełne, wszechstronne i efektywne zapewnienie interesów narodowych Ukrainy.

Głównymi grupami interesów narodowych Ukrainy są:

- interesy strategiczne i geopolityczne, związane z zapewnieniem bezpieczeństwa narodowego Ukrainy oraz ochroną interesów politycznych państwa;
- interesy gospodarcze, związane z integracją gospodarki Ukrainy do gospodarki światowej;
- interesy regionalne, subregionalne oraz lokalne, związane z zapewnieniem wszystkich potrzeb dla rozwoju wewnętrznego Ukrainy⁵.

Wymieniona wyżej Uchwała Najwyższej Rady Ukrainy przewidywała, że

² Ю.Макар. *Зовнішньополітична орієнтація України: проблеми вибору стратегічного партнерства*, „Науковий вісник Чернівецького університету”, 2012, nr 607-609, s 120-126; Idem, *Парламентські вибори в Україні: їх позитиви та проблеми*, „Annales. Universitatis Mariae Curie Skłodowska”, Sectio K, Vol. XXI, 2014, nr 1, s. 163-164.

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ *Конституція і конституційні акти України. Історія і сучасність*, Київ 2001, s. 194-195.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

realizacja polityki zagranicznej państwa winna bazować na następujących zasadach:

- otwarta polityka zagraniczna i współpraca z każdym partnerem zainteresowanym czynić to na zasadach równości, czyli bez zależności od poszczególnych państw lub grup państw;
- ustalenie swoich dwustronnych lub wielostronnych stosunków z poszczególnymi państwami albo organizacjami międzynarodowymi na zasadach dobrowolności, wzajemnego szacunku, równoprawności, wzajemnej korzyści oraz nie ingerowania w sprawy wewnętrzne;
- odrzucenie wojny jako narzędzia polityki narodowej, nie stosowanie siły lub groźby rozwiązania siłą jakichkolwiek sporów międzynarodowych, rozwiązywanie ich wyłącznie sposobami pokojowymi;
- brak pretensji terytorialnych do państw sąsiednich, jak również nieuznanie pretensji terytorialnych wobec siebie;
- bezwarunkowe przestrzeganie standardów praw jednostki, zapewnienie praw mniejszości narodowych na terenie własnym, jak również stosowanie należitych środków i gwarancji przynależności narodowościowej Ukraińców mieszkających poza granicami państwa, zgodnie z normami prawa międzynarodowego;
- przestrzeganie zasady niepodzielności pokoju i bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego, pierwszeństwo uznanych przez ogół norm prawa międzynarodowego przed normami prawa wewnętrznego oraz uczciwe wykonanie wszystkich zobowiązań międzynarodowych;
- opieranie się w polityce zagranicznej na fundamencie wartości ludzkich oraz osdrzucenie podwójnych standardów w stosunkach międzynarodowych;
- nierozmieszczanie sił zbrojnych innych państw na terytorium Ukrainy, jak również wojska ukraińskiego na terenach innych państw, bez ich wyraźnej zgody, poza przypadkami stosowania sankcji międzynarodowych zgodnie ze Statutem ONZ;
- stosowanie sankcji pozaprzymusowych w ramach prawa międzynarodowego wyłącznie w przypadkach konfliktów międzynarodowych, które mogłyby wyrządzić szkodę Ukrainie;
- zastosowanie ukraińskich sił zbrojnych w przypadku agresji lub innych prób – przy pomocy wojska – podważających niepodzielność terytorialną Ukrainy i nienaruszalność jej granic państwowych⁶.

Ukraina pragnie, opierając się o wyżej wymienione zasady, prowadzić aktywną i zbalansowaną politykę zagraniczną, której głównymi kierunkami są:

- rozwój dwustronnych stosunków międzypaństwowych;
- poszerzenie udziału w europejskiej współpracy regionalnej, przede wszystkim z państwami ościennymi, w tym z państwami WNP;
- aktywna działalność w ONZ oraz innych organizacjach międzyna-

⁶ *Ibidem.*

wych;

- podtrzymywanie kontaktów z diasporą ukraińską⁷.

Innymi, nie mniej ważnymi krokami na drodze ku umocnieniu międzynarodowo-prawnego statusu Ukrainy, jej wejścia do wspólnoty ogólnoswiatowej jako suwerennego podmiotu kontaktów międzynarodowych, stał się szereg odpowiednich dokumentów Najwyższej Rady, uchwalonych przed i po ukazaniu się wspomnianej Uchwały. Przykładowe dokumenty to: „O prawonastępstwie Ukrainy” (12 września 1991), „Do parlamentów i narodów świata” (5 grudnia 1991), „O umowach międzynarodowych na terytorium Ukrainy” (10 grudnia 1991), „O przyłączeniu Ukrainy do Umowy o nierozpowszechnianiu broni jądrowej z dnia 1 lipca 1968 r.” (16 listopada 1994) i in.⁸

Wkraczając na arenę międzynarodową, Ukraina stawiała przed sobą ambitne zadania – wejście do Rady Europy, udział w Radzie Wspólnoty Północnoatlantyckiej, działalność w ramach OBWE oraz innych ważnych europejskich i pozaeuropejskich organizacjach międzynarodowych⁹.

Podłoże prawno-polityczne ukraińsko-polskich stosunków między państwowych

Mówiąc o wytyczaniu przez Ukrainę własnej drogi rozwoju wewnętrznego, a także polityki zagranicznej, należy pamiętać, że należałoby to robić stosując jakiś model, wykorzystując doświadczenia pobliskich państw sąsiednich o podobnej przeszłości i zbliżonych dążeniach na przyszłość. Niewątpliwie, taki model Ukraina może stworzyć wykorzystując doświadczenia Polski. Tym bardziej, że Polska, z własnej inicjatywy, u zarania ukraińskiej państwowości, podjęła się roli „advokata” Kijowa w stosunkach z Zachodem. Po uznaniu przez Polskę niepodległej Ukrainy zapoczątkowano intensywny dwustronny dialog polityczny w postaci bilateralnych umów i porozumień, utworzono szereg instytucji dialogu politycznego, gospodarczego, regionalnego i społecznego. Już 28 lipca 1990 r., od razu po ogłoszeniu Deklaracji Najwyższej Rady ZSRR o suwerenności państwowej Ukrainy, Sejm RP uznał prawo narodu ukraińskiego do samostanowienia, a po uchwaleniu Aktu o niepodległości Ukrainy 24 sierpnia 1991 r., Sejm powitał go jako „spełnienie dążeń narodu ukraińskiego, wyrażenie prawa Ukrainy na wolny wybór pozycji wewnątrzpaństwowej i zagranicznej”¹⁰. Po referendum z 1 grudnia 1991 r. parlament polski wyraził przekonanie, iż ta data „otwiera nową epokę w dziejach stosunków polsko-ukraińskich” oraz stwierdził, że „pojawienie się niepodległego państwa ukraińskiego jest ważnym zjawiskiem nie tylko dla Ukrainy, lecz również dla

⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁸ *Міжнародні відносини та зовнішня політика: 1980-2000*, red. Л.Ф.Гайдунів і ін., Київ, 2001, s. 338-339.

⁹ J. Makar, *Poparcie przez Polskę dążeń eurointegracyjnych Ukrainy*, „Україна – Європа – Світ”, 2011, nr 5, cz 2, s. 108.

¹⁰ *Monitor Polski*, 1991, nr 29, poz. 205.

Europy i całego świata”¹¹.

Wśród wielu podpisanych pomiędzy obydwooma państwami aktów należy przede wszystkim wymienić Traktat między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Ukrainą o dobrym sąsiedztwie, przyjaznych stosunkach i współpracy, podpisany w Warszawie, 18 maja 1992 r. Przewidywał on:

- nienaruszalność granicy międzypaństwowej i brak wzajemnych pretencji terytorialnych;
- kształtowanie wzajemnych stosunków w duchu przyjaźni, współpracy, wzajemnego szacunku, wyrozumiałości, zaufania oraz dobrosąsiedzkich stosunków zgodnie z prawem międzynarodowym, Statutem ONZ, aktem końcowym KBWE, jak również innymi konwencjami międzynarodowymi;
- zobowiązania obu stron w zakresie korzystnej, wzajemnej współpracy w sferze handlu, transportu oraz ekologii;
- przyznanie mniejszościom narodowym – ukraińskiej w Polsce, polskiej na Ukrainie – prawa do zachowania, wyrażania i rozwoju swojej tożsamości z jednoczesnym zobowiązaniem do lojalności wobec państwa, w którym mieszkają;
- współpracę w dziedzinie kultury, edukacji, nauki, ochrony zdrowia, jak również między ośrodkami władzy;
- nawiązanie stosunków konsularnych i prawnych¹².

Dalszemu rozwojowi ukraińsko-polskiego dialogu sprzyjało podpisanie w latach następnych wielu oficjalnych dokumentów międzypaństwowych.

Należy również zaznaczyć, że na podstawie podpisanych umów obydwu państwom udało się osiągnąć intensywny dialog polityczny, sformułować dobrosąsiedzkie zasady i – co ważne – stworzyć szereg instytucji dla rozwoju tego dialogu w dziedzinach polityki, gospodarki, na poziomie regionalnym i wewnątrz społeczeństwa. Takimi instytucjami są:

- Komitet Konsultatywny Prezydentów Ukrainy i Polski, inauguracja którego odbyła się 24 maja 1993 r. w Kijowie przy udziale prezydentów Leonida Krawczuka i Lecha Wałęsy. Posiedzenia Komitetu odbywają się cztery razy do roku. Należy podkreślić, że forum to działa po dzień dzisiejszy;
- Ukraińsko-Polska Międzyrządowa Rada Koordynacyjna ds. Współpracy Międzyregionalnej – została powołana na mocy porozumienia z dnia 23 maja 1993 r. Na jego mocy zachodnie obwody ukraińskie i wschodnie województwa polskie nawiązały współpracę i utworzyły, m.in., euroregiony „Bug” i „Karpaty”;
- Polsko-Ukraińska Stała Konferencja ds. Integracji Europejskiej – funkcjonuje od września 1998 r. Jej celem jest wymiana doświadczeń integracyjnych. Pierwotnie chodziło o przekazanie ukraińskim partnerom

¹¹ Monitor Polski, 1991, nr 45, poz. 316.

¹² Dziennik Ustaw RP, 1993, nr 15, poz. 573.

informacji, w tym pakietu ustaw, uchwalonych przez Polskę w procesie uzyskania członkostwa w UE. Obecnie Polska dzieli się z Ukrainą doświadczeniem wieloletniego funkcjonowania w strukturach UE, w tym osiągnięciami i wciąż powstającymi problemami oraz wyzwaniem;

- Polsko-Ukraińska Komisja Mieszana ds. Współpracy Zagranicznej i Handlu, prezydująca pod przewodnictwem premierów obu państw. Rozpatruje ona kwestie współpracy gospodarczej w sektorach: paliwo-wo-energetycznym, przemysłowym, inwestycyjnym, rolnictwa oraz transportu;
- Ukraińsko-Polska Grupa Parlamentarna i Polsko-Ukraińska Grupa Parlamentarna¹³.

Wymienione struktury powstały w latach 90. lub na początku następnej dekady. Na bazie ich doświadczenia powstawały nowe instytucje, działające dzisiaj bardzo owocnie, m.in. Polsko-Ukraińska Międzyrządowa Komisja Współpracy Gospodarczej, do kompetencji której należą energetyka, transport, sektor bankowy, turystyka, rolnictwo i inne¹⁴.

Poparcie przez Polskę dążeń eurointegracyjnych Ukrainy

Możnaby przytoczyć wiele innych przykładów wzajemnej, korzystnej współpracy ukraińsko-polskiej lub reprezentowania przez Polskę interesów Ukrainy na Zachodzie. Można byłoby również kontynuować dywagacje na temat współpracy Ukrainy z wielkimi mocarstwami, z krajami sąsiednimi, działalności w organizacjach międzynarodowych itp. Każdy jednak aspekt polityki zagranicznej zależy w dużej mierze od czynnika wewnętrznego. Dla powszechnego uznania Ukrainy na arenie międzynarodowej, dla odbierania jej jako przewidywalnego partnera, nieodzownym jest zjednoczenie społeczeństwa ukraińskiego wokół interesów ogólnonarodowych, bronić których winni wszyscy politycy, pomimo odmiennych interesów partyjnych. Jeżeli rozważać tylko sprawę przystąpienia Ukrainy do Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego, o czym dyskutuje się od lat, to, jak zauważył analityk Olaf Osica, „Ukraina od kilku lat nie potrafi uczynić z członkostwa w NATO rzeczywistego, a nie jedynie deklarowanego priorytetu”¹⁵. Z kolei po wyborach prezydenckich 2010 r. prezydent Wiktor Janukowycz postanowił zdjąć z porządku dziennego sprawę wejścia Ukrainy do Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego¹⁶.

Wydarzenia lat prezydentury Janukowicza nie zachęcały do optymizmu. Perspektywa ostatecznego przyjęcia Ukrainy do struktur europejskich, mimo mocnego wsparcia ze strony Polski, jak również innych państw Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, nie przybliżała się wskutek niezdecydowanej polityki za-

¹³ H. Wujec, *Polsko-ukraińskie stosunki w perspektywie polskiej*, „Warszawskie Zeszyty Ukraińoznawcze”, 2002, nr 13-14, s. 79.

¹⁴ J. Makar, *Poparcie...*, s. 109.

¹⁵ O. Osica, *Otwarcie na zmianę*, „Newsweek Polska” 2009, nr 8, s. 40.

¹⁶ J. Makar, *Poparcie...*, s. 110.

granicznej i niesprawności polityki wewnętrznej. Ale jak pisał francuski dziennikarz pochodzenia polskiego Piotr Moszyński, „Ukraińcy mieli o wiele trudniejszy start niż Polacy. W dodatku ciągle mają na głowie Rosję. Jeśli jednak ukraińska klasa polityczna szybko wyjdzie z kłopotliwego okresu dojrzewania, powinno być dobrze”¹⁷.

Jeżeli dzisiaj mówimy o udziale Ukrainy, Niemiec i Polski w procesie budowy Partnerstwa Wschodniego, ostatecznie przyjętego na Szczycie UE w Pradze w maju 2009 r. z udziałem prezydentów sześciu krajów z byłego ZSRR: Armenii, Azerbejdżanu, Białorusi, Gruzji, Mołdowy oraz Ukrainy, to należy wskazać na to, że PW jest swoistym przedłużeniem Europejskiej Polityki Sąsiedztwa, zapoczątkowanej jeszcze w roku 2004.

Analiza polityki państw członkowskich UE, stosownie PW, pozwala na wniosek, że widzą one konieczność większego zaangażowania Unii się w sprawy Europy Wschodniej oraz Południowego Kaukazu. Popierają idee tworzenia „strefy wolnego handlu i umów stowarzyszeniowych” pomiędzy krajami UE a państwami-partnerami, o których mowa.

Inicjatywa PW wywołała znaczne dyskusje na płaszczyźnie UE – Rosja, przede wszystkim w kontekście Europy Wschodniej oraz Południowego Kaukazu, które to obszary Rosja uważa za strefę swoich interesów narodowych. Jedne państwa członkowskie UE uważają, iż polityka PW nie powinna prowadzić do konfrontacji pomiędzy Unią a Rosją, inne zaś stoją na stanowisku, że PW nie należy rozpatrywać przez pryzmat interesów rosyjskich. Tym niemniej wszystkie kraje UE wypowiedziały się za równomiernym rozwojem „wschodniego wymiaru” Europejskiej Polityki Sąsiedztwa¹⁸.

Wydaje się, że w przeciągu ostatnich lat, a szczególnie po wyborach prezydenckich 2010 r. na Ukrainie, pod wpływem „starych członków” UE, przeważnie Niemiec, Francji i in., stopniowo zmieniało się stanowisko Unii wobec Rosji.

Według politologa Ryszarda Zięby, w swojej wizji policentrycznego porządku międzynarodowego „Rosja chce być niezbędnym elementem równowagi globalnej; sytuje siebie najbliżej Zachodu, lansując idee ‘ograniczonej dwubiegunowości’ ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi oraz trójkąta Rosja - USA - Unia Europejska. Nie oceniając spójności tych idei z ogólną koncepcją wielobiegunowości, należy zauważyć i docenić, że Rosja sytuje się po stronie cywilizacji europejskiej i świata zachodniego. Oznacza to, że Rosja uważa, iż w ten sposób można będzie zachować wpływ cywilizacji europejskiej na ewoluujący

¹⁷ P. Moszyński, *Déjà vu*, „Newsweek Polska” 2009, nr 8, s. 76.

¹⁸ J. Makar, *Dwudziestolecie relacji ukraińsko-polskich: osiągnięcia, problemy a perspektywy na przyszłość* [w:] *Polska, Słowacja, Europa Środkowa XIX-XXI wieku. Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana Profesorowi Ewie Orlof*, red. J. Pisuliński, E. Rączy, K. Żarna, Rzeszów 2011, s. 407-415.

porządek międzynarodowy”¹⁹. Walka polityczna pomiędzy Zachodem i Rosją o Ukrainę trwa od lat i ma ona tym większe znaczenie, że Ukraina z powodu swojego położenia pomiędzy Europą i Azją, potencjału ludzkiego i gospodarczego, jest potencjalnie ważnym elementem europejskiej i światowej wspólnoty.

Być może teza o myśleniu w kategoriach „kraju buforowego” jest stawiana na wyrost, ale zachowanie się przywódczych sił politycznych samej Ukrainy jeszcze na początku 2014 r. dawało ku temu powody. Niestety politykom ukraińskim brakowało w przeszłości myślenia w kategoriach państwowych, aby w pełni skorzystać z położenia strategicznego pomiędzy Wschodem a Zachodem. Ukraina z własnej inicjatywy straciła w pewnym czasie szansę, która pojawiła się po pomarańczowej rewolucji. Szansą ową było wykorzystanie szerokich możliwości tak dla rozwoju wewnętrznego, jak i dla uzyskania należytego miejsca na arenie międzynarodowej, w tym w dziedzinie integracji europejskiej i euroatlantyckiej. Zbiegły prezydent Janukowycz co prawda wypowiadał się za integracją Ukrainy z UE, jednak uważał, że już z NATO Ukraina może jedynie współpracować, ale nie integrować się. Ze swojej strony UE i NATO, ze względu na niewyraźną politykę Ukrainy w jej dążeniach integracyjnych, przestały uważać Kijów za przewidywalnego partnera.

Jak w takiej sytuacji miałyby się zachowywać wobec Ukrainy Polska? Oczywiście nie odmawiała ona poparcia Ukrainy na arenie międzynarodowej, jednak najpierw musiała liczyć się ze swoim własnym interesem narodowym i lojalnością wobec UE. Dlatego można było dostrzec pewne ochłodzenie w relacjach z Ukrainą, jakkolwiek Polska nie wyrzekała się działań na rzecz wschodniego sąsiada, jak i dalszego pogłębienia wzajemnych stosunków.

Agresja Federacji Rosyjskiej przeciw Ukrainie

Na tle obecnych wydarzeń na Ukrainie i ich reperkusji na arenie międzynarodowej, nadszedł czas na ocenę dotychczasowego stanowiska UE, NATO i USA wobec Ukrainy oraz jej relacji z Federacją Rosyjską, jak również zasad polityki zagranicznej Kremla.

Rządy Janukowycza doprowadziły do kolejnego wybuchu niezadowolenia społecznego na Ukrainie. Tym razem pod hasłem „rewolucji honoru”. Sprawdzianem nastrojów społecznych stało się niepodpisanie przez Janukowycza w listopadzie 2013 r. umowy stowarzyszeniowej z UE na szczycie w Wilnie. Janukowycz z premierem Azarowem grali, jak się okazało, podwójną grę. Pierwszy oszukiwał Zachód, a drugi przygotowywał grunt dla wcielenia Ukrainy do Unii Celnej. W końcu doprowadziło to do niepokoju społecznych, które doprowadziły do obalenia władzy, działającej wbrew interesom narodowym. Do-

¹⁹ R. Zięba, *Wschód jako priorytet polskiej polityki zagranicznej* [w:] *Partnerstwo Wschodnie. Wymiary realnej integracji*, red. M. Zdanowicz, T. Dubowski, A. Piekutowska, Warszawa 2010.

tychczasowi przywódcy ukraińscy zbiegli do Rosji²⁰.

Wyłonione na fali zrywu społecznego nowe władze państwowe próbowały: po pierwsze, uniezależnić Ukrainę od FR, na ile to pozwalałyby warunki wewnętrzne i zewnętrzne; po drugie, poszukują należytego miejsca dla kraju we wspólnocie europejskiej i światowej. Nowy prezydent Petro Poroszenko, wybrany w maju 2014 r., już w pierwszej turze, co na Ukrainie nie zdarzało się od lat, podpisał 27 czerwca 2014 r. w Brukseli umowę stowarzyszeniową, zaś Najwyższa Rada ją ratyfikowała 16 września 2014 r.²¹

Zagarnięcie Krymu przez FR i faktyczny najazd Rosji na wschodnie obwody Ukrainy wysunęły przed Ukrainą, jak zresztą przed Europą i resztą świata, nowe wyzwania. Rosja bezprecedensowo złamała prawo międzynarodowe, ignorując *de facto* gwarancje nietykalności granic Ukrainy, dane jej w 1994 r. w Budapeszcie. Mimo formalnej niepodległości Ukrainy, w praktyce trudno mówić o politycznej czy gospodarczej suwerenności od Rosji. Moskwa uważa Ukrainę za strefę swoich interesów narodowych i zazdrośnie obserwuje, aby ktoś nie próbował zagarnąć tej strefy. Stąd przyłączenie Ukrainy do jakiegokolwiek struktury międzynarodowej pozostającej poza wpływami Rosji, wywołuje kolejne fale niezadowolenia na Kremlu²².

Wydarzenia na Ukrainie zmuszają od nowych władz zajęcia właściwego stanowiska. Jednak na przeszkodzie stoją: polityczny bezład w społeczeństwie, ruina życia politycznego oraz gospodarki narodowej, ingerencja Rosji w sprawy wewnętrzne i zewnętrzne Ukrainy, nie zupełnie należyte (w rozumieniu ukraińskim) poparcie ze strony Zachodu.

Jak w tej sytuacji zachowują się najbliżsi sąsiedzi Ukrainy, w tym przede wszystkim Polska? Od lat Warszawa bezwarunkowo popiera eurointegracyjne dążenia Ukrainy. Oczywiście nie czyni tego wbrew własnemu interesowi narodowemu. Sytuacja, która wytworzyła się obecnie, zaniepokoiła cały świat cywilizowany. Przede wszystkim zaś kraje ościenne Ukrainy, w tym Polskę, ponieważ pogrożki wobec Ukrainy mogą również być adresowane wobec wschodnich obszarów NATO – m. in. Polski i krajów bałtyckich²³.

Wizerunek Polski jak swoistego „rzecznika interesów” Ukrainy czy, jak powszechnie mówiono, jej „advokata” w Europie, nabrał nowego znaczenia po agresji Rosji wobec Ukrainy. Efektem tego było polskie poparcie działań na rzecz usunięcia zagrożenia dalszej rosyjskiej inwazji i „powrotu” Ukrainy do Europy, widoczne ze strony władz państwowych, jak również społeczeństwa

²⁰ Ю. Щербак, *Територія демократії почала скорочуватись*, „Зовнішні справи” 2014, nr 7, s. 6-11.

²¹ J. Wilczak, *Dwie strony medalu*,

<<http://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/swiat/1592747,1,umowa-stowarzyszeniowa-ue-ukraina-ratyfikowana-co-ona-oznacza.read>> (01.03.2016).

²² В. Огризко, *Сила права чи право сили?*, „Зовнішні справи” 2014, nr 3, s. 14-17.

²³ *Putin przeży muskuly i straszy sąsiadów wizją najazdu*,

<http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,16667515,Putin_prezy_muskuly_i_straszy_sasiadow_wizja_najazdu.html> (01.03.2016).

polskiego. Dowodem powyższego są m.in. oświadczenie polskich intelektualistów, podpisane przez Zbigniewa Bujaka, Zofię Romaszewską, Czesława Bieleckiego, Bogdana Lisa, o. Macieja Ziębę, Władysława Frasyniuka, Jana Malickiego i in.²⁴ Nieco wcześniej 20 polskich intelektualistów zwróciło się do obywateli i rządów krajów Europy z apelem o wstrzymanie agresji Rosji przeciwko Ukrainie. Apel podpisali m. in. były więzień obozu koncentracyjnego w Oświęcimiu i były minister spraw zagranicznych Polski Władysław Bartoszewski, reżyser filmowy Andrzej Wajda, pisarki: Dorota Masłowska, Olga Tokarczuk i in. Autorzy apelu napominali przywódców politycznych, iż gwałtowny wzrost napięcia w stosunkach międzynarodowych przypomina sytuację z 1939 r., ostrzegając przed niepożądanymi następstwami²⁵. Innym ważnym wskaźnikiem poparcia prozachodniego kursu Ukrainy są dane sondażowe, mówiące iż 63% Polaków uważa, że NATO powinno zaproponować Ukrainie członkostwo (średnio w UE – 46%). To samo dotyczy wejścia Ukrainy do Unii Europejskiej. W całej Unii wypowiada się za tym 52% respondentów, w Polsce – 69%. Jednocześnie Polacy wypowiadają się za „mocniejszymi sankcjami ekonomicznymi” wobec Rosji (77 %). Polska jest jedynym krajem, w którym większość obywateli (52%) opowiada się za przekazaniem broni armii ukraińskiej²⁶.

Sympatie społeczne są tożsame z polityką władz państwowych, które zaakceptowały przemiany wydarzeniach zimowych 2013/2014 r. na Ukrainie. Stąd też na Ukrainie gości wielu doradców z Polski, jak byli prezydenci: Lech Wałęsa, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, a także inni politycy występujący w imieniu UE. We wrześniu 2014 r. Prezydent RP Bronisław Komorowski, na sesji Zgromadzenia Generalnego ONZ, zaapelował o reformę systemu głosowań tak, aby Rosja nie mogła wetować w Radzie Bezpieczeństwa działań m. in. w sprawie Ukrainy²⁷. Premier RP Ewa Kopacz swoje stanowisko wobec Ukrainy wypowiedziała podczas wizyty w Berlinie. Problem ukraiński został poruszony podczas spotkania z Kanclerz FRN Angelą Merkel. Obydwie strony opowiedziały się za pomocą Ukrainie²⁸. Najbliższy czas pokaże jak będzie wyglądało stanowisko nowych władz polskich wobec Ukrainy.

²⁴ *Польские интеллектуалы: Для помощи Украине необходимы не слова, а действия*, <<http://www.charter97.org/ru/news/2014/10/6/119301>> (01.03.2016).

²⁵ „Nasze Słowo”, 07.09.2014.

²⁶ „Nasze Słowo”, 28.09.2014.

²⁷ *NYT: Komorowski zaapeluje w ONZ o zmianę zasad głosowań, aby Rosja nie mogła blokować działań organizacji w naszym regionie*,

<http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,16668122,NYT_Komorowski_zaapeluje_w_ONZ_o_zmiane_zasad_glosowan_.html?disableRedirects=true> (01.03.2016).

²⁸ *Премьер-министр Польши высказалась за вступление Украины в ЭС*, <www.dw.com/ru/премьер-министр-польши-высказалась-за-вступление-украины-в-ес/a-17985159> (01.03.2016).

Wniosek końcowy

W chwili obecnej decyduje się los Ukrainy jako kraju suwerennego. Składają się na to dwa czynniki – wewnętrzny oraz zewnętrzny. Pierwszy jest czynnikiem dominującym. Wydarzenia w czasie pomarańczowej rewolucji i na przełomie lat 2013/2014, jak i później pokazują, iż zdrowy narodowo element przeważa w społeczeństwie. Jednak nie można się nie liczyć z głębokim kryzysem społeczno-politycznym oraz socjalno-ekonomicznym w kraju. Ewentualne zahamowanie tego kryzysu zależeć będzie od tego, jak nowa władza będzie sobie radziła z rozwiązaniem powstałych problemów we wszystkich dziedzinach życia społecznego. Co istotne, od tego też zależy stosunek Zachodu do państwa ukraińskiego. Czynniki zewnętrzny może sprzyjać lub nie w pewnych dążeniach Ukrainy. Ale zagranica nie może za Ukraińców zrobić tego, co muszą zrobić sami.

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POLISH-UKRAINIAN COOPERATION ON THE SELF-GOVERNANCE REFORM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS

Summary:

The article puts focus on the main trends of the Polish-Ukrainian cooperation on the self-governance reform under the condition of the current crisis in Ukraine. Particular emphasis is put on the role and effectiveness of the Eastern Partnership Initiative as well as the initiatives on territorial cooperation. Furthermore, the role of Polish and Ukrainian non-governmental organizations in the reforming process in Ukraine is taken into consideration. Finally, the article makes an attempt to answer the question whether Polish experience of the self-governance reform might be beneficial on the Ukrainian ground as regards creating favorable conditions for the decentralization processes.

Key words:

Self-government reform, decentralization, non-governmental organizations, Eastern Partnership, cross-border cooperation

Introduction

A respected Ukrainian newspaper *Day* published an article on the necessity to implement the Polish experience of decentralization reform in Ukraine putting the quote of the prime minister Yatseniuk as its title: *‘Decentralization in Ukraine will follow the example of Poland’*¹. Given quote and similar declarations² of top Ukrainian officials responsible for self-governance reform may

¹ <<http://www.day.kiev.ua/uk/news/060415-decentralizaciya-v-ukrayini-proyde-za-zrazkom-polshchi-yacenyuk>> (21.07.2015).

² During his first official visit to Poland, Petro Poroshenko asserted that Polish experience in decentralization reform is the most relevant for Ukraine and it would be taken as a basis during works of Constitutional Committee in Ukraine. See more:

<<http://www.5.ua/polityka/poroshenko-y-polshi-domovivsya-pro-dopomogy-z-reformami-v-ykrajni-64957.html>> (21.07.2015). Volodymyr Groysman requested Polish government to provide Ukraine with practical advice on self-governance reform. See more: <<http://nbnews.com.ua/ru/news/117235/>> (21.07.2015).

serve as a proof for the topicality of the analysis on Ukrainian – Polish cooperation regarding the issue of effective self-government implementation, the chances of the Polish model to be successful on the Ukrainian ground, and the significance of a similar cooperation between two states under the conditions of the current Ukrainian crisis.

New Parliament and the Place of the Self-governance Reform in the Political Agenda of Ukraine

After unprecedented series of protesting events in Kyiv and major Ukrainian cities, annexation of Crimea peninsula by the Russian Federation and the launch of military actions in parts of Doneck and Lugansk regions, Ukraine entered autumn 2014 with a new President and new Parliament.

To follow the topicality of the self-governance reform in times of military and political tensions one should analyze the election programs of newly elected political parties in reference to the issue of decentralization and self-governance reform. The survey results illustrate that all parties declared their strong support for democratic transformations and decentralization. As a matter of fact, committee of voters of Ukraine³ (komitet vyborciv Ukrainy) conducted comparative text analysis of all nine programs of parties participating in the 2014 early parliamentary election on the matter of decentralization. The table below shows the most popular key messages used in text of the programs concerning the plans on self-governance reform realization and amount of times they were repeated in given documents.

Table 1. Major categories in election programs of political parties on the matter of decentralization and self-governance

	Category	Repetition
1.	Decentralization of power, reform of self-governance	23
2.	More financial independence for local governments	18
3.	Increase of range of powers for local governments	14
4.	The abolition of district and regional state administrations and the creation of executive committees of local councils	14
5.	Improvement of administrative services system, implementation of e-government	9
6.	The implementation of referendums and other forms of direct democracy, empowerment of the community (councils or executive committees) to appoint/resign "officials of the central	8

³ Ukrainian NGO, whose primary task is to monitor the election campaigns, maintain the link between voters and the government, protect electoral rights. Official website of the organization: <<http://www.cvu.org.ua/>> (31.07.2015).

	government"	
7.	Restriction of central authorities' functions	3
8.	Territorial administrative reform	2

Source: <http://buknews.com.ua/page/eksperty-kvu-pidtvurdyly-shcho-u-prohramakh-odnoho-z-magorytarnykh-kandydativ-ta-odniiei-z-politychnykh-partii-predstavliayut-rizni-chastyny-politychnoho-spektru-mistytsia-identychnyi-tekst.html> (21.07.2015).

In addition to that, another table below represents list of statements on decentralization which were included in the election programs of six parties that gained seats in Ukrainian parliament. The table gives more precise information concerning the link between most popular statements of the election campaign and programme of particular party that might be helpful in creating better picture of each party position.

Table 2. The main ideas contained in the party programs.

Main idea	Po-roshenko Block	People's Front	Radical Party	Bat-kivshchyna	Samo-pomich	Opposition block
Decentralization	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Liquidation of local state administrations	Yes			Yes		Yes
Lustration	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Reduction of the number of state officials	Yes		Yes	Yes		
"single window"		Yes		Yes		
e-government		Yes		Yes		
Civil society control of the government		Yes		Yes	Yes	

Source: <http://voxukraine.org/2014/10/20/political-parties-programs-what-to-choose-when-theres-nothing-to-choose-from/> (31.07.2015).

Data from both tables give ground to confidently assert that the rhetorical tradition of emphasizing strong intentions to realize reform of local self-governance system remained and took top positions at election programs⁴ of all

⁴ More on contents of 2014 election programs of Ukrainian parties see: <http://voxukraine.org/2014/10/20/political-parties-programs-what-to-choose-when-theres-nothing-to-choose-from/> (31.07.2015).

political parties participating in the election campaign. As it came to light, Yulia Tymoshenko party Batkivshchyna has the biggest amount of promises including such innovations as “single window” and e-government platform to make the citizen-official cooperation easier that, in turn, is supposed to improve the performance of institutions in the long run.

Interestingly, all parties support the idea of lustration except for the Opposition Block, which pleads “to stop thoughtless firing of state officials and chasing of political opponents under the lustration motto”⁵. At the same time, the idea of downsizing the government is not declared by People’s Front, Samopomich party and Radical Party. The first two, however, put accent on creating conditions for civil society to control the government.

Particular attention should be paid to political declarations of winners of the election campaign: the Petro Poroshenko block and People’s Front party (Narodnyy Front) under the leadership of prime minister Yatseniuk and Oleksandr Turchynov, former close associate of Yulia Tymoshenko. As far as the presidential party is concerned, its election programme put issue of decentralization into the top category called ‘To live freely’. Among main aspects one might find declaration to give more rights and money to ‘hromady’ (communities) or to empower executive committees of local councils to make executive decisions. Moreover, specific features of every region are said to be taken into consideration⁶. Important moment is that the text of the document was written in March 2014 before presidential election and before military crisis escalation in Donbas, which may be an explanation for not putting security issue on the top position of party programme.

In terms of People’s Front party programme, it did put security matter at the very beginning of the document. In fact, some analysts regard that programme as the most realistic⁷. As for decentralization issue, the paper did not include much information. Party supported primarily financial decentralization. Emphasis was put on encouragement of citizens to take active position in building the democratic state as citizens were said to be the most important element of state construction⁸.

Overall, even though election programs did not introduce detailed plan for the reform, they sent significant signal for both Ukrainian and international observers on firm inte

⁵ <<http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2014/WP502?pt001f01=910&pf7171=199>> (16.07.2015).

⁶ <http://solydarnist.org/?page_id=874> (15.07.2015).

⁷ <<http://apostrophe.com.ua/article/politics/2014-10-23/parad-peredviborchih-obtsyanok-abo-z-yakimi-programami-provdn-part-dut-na-vibori/612>> (15.07.2015).

⁸ <<http://nfront.in.ua/programa-partii/>> (15.07.2015).

Overview of the Ukrainian-Polish Cooperation on the Matter of Self-governance European policy for Eastern partnership

As it was presented in the introductory part, the Polish model of self-governance reform is said to be an example for Ukrainian authorities in their declared attempts to decentralize Ukraine and build democratic institutions on local scale around the country. Similar declarations predict intense cooperation between two sides and mutual eagerness to reach fruitful results. Therefore, this part of the article is focused on analysis of key elements of Ukrainian-Polish cooperation on self-governance reform with particular emphasis on steps undertaken by Poroshenko and Yatseniuk administration with their counterparts from Poland after the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine. Brief overview of main directions and results of cooperation between two states during previous administrations are presented in order to follow general tendencies of Ukrainian-Polish cooperation on the matter of decentralization.

Since the 2004 EU enlargement process, Poland has been perceived as a key country for success of European policy for Eastern partnership⁹. Significant aspect for the article analysis is that the Initiative was warmly received by local self-governments both in Poland and Ukraine as well in other countries covered by the project. As a matter of fact, the meaning of cooperation between Polish local self-governments and representatives of local and regional authorities in Ukraine was clearly emphasized by the Committee of Regions in its official documentations. The example might be the Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the role of local and regional authorities within the Eastern Partnership published on 22 April 2009. The paper considered the development of local democracy as a central element in cooperation between the European Union and countries from the Eastern Partnership project¹⁰.

Similar opinion on importance of local institutions was expressed by the scholarship circles who underlined the key role of regional self-governments in implementation of European integration. Additionally, experts pointed to the significant social meaning of regional authorities' engagement in the Eastern partnership initiative. That in turn would lead to growing interest among citi-

⁹ In fact, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative of the European Union intended to provide a venue for discussions of trade, economic strategy, travel agreements, and other issues between the EU and its eastern neighbors. Important aspect is that the project was initiated by Poland and a subsequent proposal was prepared in co-operation with Sweden. It was presented by the foreign ministers of Poland and Sweden at the EU's General Affairs and External Relations Council in Brussels on 26 May 2008. The Eastern Partnership was inaugurated by the European Union in Prague on 7 May 2009. More on the topic see: <<https://euobserver.com/foreign/26194>; <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2027636/Poland-takes-on-Russia-with-Eastern-Partnership-proposal.html>>; (03.08.2015); <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/07/russia-eu-europe-partnership-deal>> (03.08.2015).

¹⁰ http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2009.200.01.0031.01.POL (03.08.2015).

zens in situation in the particular region. Furthermore, such partnership policy was considered as a promotion tool for basic values of European Union¹¹.

Analysts agree that the strong and well organized potential of local and regional authorities improves efficiency of governance and plays key role for successful democratization. In this regard, empirical experience of self-governments (local, regional, state, European and international) cooperating in a decentralized way with partners in Eastern Partnership are considered to be of primary importance. At the same time, there appeared a need to create common discussion platform in order to receive optimal results and fruitful solutions using diverse experience of a wide range of local actors. Such platform known as Conference of Regional and Local Authorities for the Eastern Partnership (“CORLEAP”) was created in 2011 as the political forum of local and regional authorities from the European Union and the Eastern Partnership countries. CORLEAP is positioned by its initiators as the only EU platform that offers an opportunity to discuss the contribution by cities and regions in the development of the Eastern Partnership¹².

It should be particularly emphasized that CORLEAP is considered to be a basis of the Eastern Partnership as far as its regional dimension is concerned. Being created as a result of common efforts of the European Commission and the Committee of the Regions, CORLEAP opened doors for political cooperation between local and regional authorities in the EU and partners from the EaP. According to Taczyńska, such cooperation would result in the increase of local authorities’ impact on regional political strategy development and would strengthen the citizen-official cooperation in partner states that all together would lead to stronger local government¹³.

Interestingly, it was the presentation of the Vinnytsia Region of Ukraine on 15 September 2011 in the Committee of the Region that was the first presentation of a region from the partner country in the Committee within the framework of the “open door policy” suggested in CORLEAP action plan¹⁴.

¹¹ More on this topic see: J. Taczyńska, *Współpraca polskich jednostek samorządu terytorialnego z władzami regionalnymi i lokalnymi oraz innymi podmiotami z państw objętych inicjatywą Partnerstwa Wschodniego*. Online access:

<<http://www.umww.pl/attachments/article/36935/Partnerstwo%20Wschodnie%20E2%80%9393%20Samorzady.pdf>>; (03.08.2015); M. Kołodziejcki, K. Szmigiel, *Międzynarodowa współpraca transgraniczna i międzyregionalna w kontekście polityki regionalnej państwa na lata 2007-2013*, Centrum Rozwoju Lokalnego, Warsaw 2004. Opinion of the Committee of the Regions: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2011.042.01.0064.01.POL> (3.08.2015).

¹² <<http://cor.europa.eu/en/activities/corleap/Pages/corleap.aspx>> (03.08.2015).

¹³ J. Taczyńska, *Współpraca polskich jednostek...*p. 37. More on goals of the CORLEAP initiative see: <<http://cor.europa.eu/en/events/Pages/corleap-conference-29-sept-2014.aspx>> (04.08.2015).

¹⁴ <http://cor.europa.eu/en/activities/corleap/Documents/activity_till_vilnius.pdf> (04.08.2015).

As far as Ukraine is concerned, commentators regard learning from the Polish and European experience as productive for a number of reasons. As a matter of fact, interregional cooperation is considered to be beneficial for the regional adaptation to the European standards. New opportunities for the participation in a range of joint programs provide Ukrainian regions with opportunities to develop effective institutional component and reach fruitful results in terms of interregional and cross-border cooperation. Finally, similar cooperation encourages citizens to actively participate in life of their region and implement the European standards of governance on local scale¹⁵.

Euroregions

Analysts underline the significant role of Euroregions, which became an assisting tool of relationship regulations between Poland and its non-EU partners. Vasylova summarizes criteria for the identification of Euroregions:

- an association of local and regional authorities on either side of the national border, sometimes with a parliamentary assembly;
- a transfrontier association with a permanent secretariat and a technical and administrative team with own resources;
- of private law nature, based on non-profit-making associations or foundations on either side of the border in accordance with the respective national law in force;
- of public law nature, based on interstate agreements, dealing among other things, with the participation of territorial authorities¹⁶.

Further research in that area proves that the important feature of Euroregions' institutions is their ability to act on a wide range of directions: from economy to culture. Moreover, institutions of Euroregions have possibility of cooperating with the non-governmental sector in a spontaneous way. Such characteristics made Euroregion a very effective tool of activity in border areas of Central-Eastern Europe¹⁷.

At the same time, Wolczuk and Wolczuk point out to the beneficial impact of euroregions in establishing direct links between regional and local government bodies assisting in elimination of communist era legacies when there were no relations between two states. However, scholars assert that lack of finance became an impediment for the concept of euroregions to develop Polish-

¹⁵ N. Buglay, *Ukrainian-Polish Cooperation at Regional Level in the Context of the European Integration*, "Central European Papers", 2013/1/2, p. 81.

¹⁶ V. Vasylova, *Euroregions in Ukraine-Romania-Republic of Moldova Area: Expectations, Experience and Prospects*, online source:

<http://www.ceswp.uaic.ro/articles/CESWP2012_IV4_VAS.pdf. (04.08.2015); More on Euroregions see: http://www.aebr.eu/en/news/news.php?cat_id=1> (04.08.2015)

¹⁷ J. Taczyńska, *Współpraca polskich jednostek...*, p. 45.

Ukrainian contacts¹⁸. Similar ideas are expressed by Hooper and Klamsch who state that there is a considerable interest in Ukrainian and Polish border regions to participate in common projects. However, scholars underline that the Euroregions are outside mainstream national administrative structures and therefore are often marginalized in the project selection process by central governments¹⁹.

As far as Ukrainian case is concerned, presidential order on Strategy of economic and social development of Ukraine “On the Road to European Integration”²⁰ on 2004-2015 stressed the necessity to implement the following:

- to increase the role of the regions in economic cooperation, active position of regions in joining the international organizations and groups, intensification of interregional and cross-border cooperation;
- to solve common regional and inter-regional development issues by combining the financial resources of local authorities and local governments;
- to increase the role of regions in the implementation of environmental policy;
- to adapt national legislation on regional policy with the norms and standards of the European Union.


In fact, 19 out of 25 Ukrainian regions that constitute 77% of Ukrainian state are border regions. Majority of the regions participate or participated in a number of Euroregions with partners from such countries as Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, Russia, and Belarus (See map 1). In other words, the partners in terms of cross-border cooperation might be divided into two main categories: EU and non-EU partners.

¹⁸ K. Wolczuk, R. Wolczuk, *Poland's Relations with Ukraine: A challenging 'strategic partnership'* [in:] *Through the Paper Curtain: Insiders and Outsiders in the New Europe* (eds. J. Smith, C. Jenkins), London 2003, p. 82.

¹⁹ B. Hooper, O. Kramsch, *Cross-Border Governance in the European Union*, Routledge 2004, p. 122.

²⁰ <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/493/2004>. The order lost its validity on 10.07.2015, (04.08.2015).

Map 1. Ukrainian participation in Euroregions



Source: [http://www.quadrivium.org.ua/ua/articles/view?obj\[userinput_id\]=3350613](http://www.quadrivium.org.ua/ua/articles/view?obj[userinput_id]=3350613) (04.08.2015).

Dolotina names major spheres of cooperation between member states in Euroregions with the participation of Ukraine:

- science and innovative activity;
- tourism and culture;
- improvement of border crossing process;
- improvement of life quality for citizens;
- ecology and environment protection;
- infrastructure, communication and transport;
- economic development;
- prevention of and dealing with emergency situations.

Scholar underlines the potential of Ukrainian regions for the development of cross-border cooperation in the long perspective. In terms of interaction and cooperation of Polish and Ukrainian border institutions, the projects are mainly aimed at the formation of civil society and overcoming negative historical and cultural stereotypes existing among residents of cooperation areas. However, similarly to European colleagues, Dolotina points out a number of problems that impede given process: lack of financing, insufficient level of the development of cross-border infrastructure, imperfectness of legal framework for cross-border cooperation, uncertainty regarding legal responsibilities of local authorities, significant differences in economic development of partner regions, etc.²¹

²¹ K. Dolotina, *European Regions on Territory of Ukraine: State and Problems of Development*, "East Ukrainian National University Scientific Volume # 4" 2013, 192, p. 196. More on topic of areas of Polish-Ukrainian cross border cooperation see: H. Shcherba, *Cross-border Cooperation between Ukraine and Poland under Condition of Financial Crisis*, electronic access:

In their article, Hordienko, Bondarenko and Martynenko refer to similar problematic aspects defining main tasks for further development of Euro-regions:

- adoption of necessary tools to gradually minimize and eliminate the administrative and legal impediments which restrain the cross-border cooperation;
- adjustment of Ukrainian legal basis to the international norms and development of legal acts regulating the activity of local authorities that are engaged in Euroregions cooperation;
- development of complex state programs of regional cooperation and their funding²².

In this regard, Velychko asserts six steps for Ukrainian government to take so that the Euroregions in Ukraine function effectively:

1. a strategy for each Euroregion;
2. Custom and Tax Codex improvement;
3. development of financial infrastructure of Euroregions (e.g. banks, funds);
4. transport system in accordance with the European standards;
5. creation of cross-border information server;
6. establishment of monitoring and coordinating sub-councils in European regions²³.

Non-governmental Organizations

In addition to governmental ties between Poland and Ukraine, particular emphasis should be put on cooperation between representatives of the non-governmental sectors. The analysis shown below presents main directions of major NGOs acting in Poland and Ukraine as well as level of their engagement in the policy making process of local governance under current political circumstances.

To remind, institutions of civil society are seen as the following:

- as a tool for self-expression of individuals, their self-organization and realization of their own interests. Solving a number of significant issues of social importance they assist the state in implementing its functions;
- as a guarantee for citizens' individual rights and may serve as a helping instrument in cases of citizens' struggle with the state;
- as an advocate for particular social group at the level of state official;
- as a basis for democratic state order, etc²⁴.

<<http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-9d8d224d-4982-4d7b-b3e1-cda39e6d8159>> (02.09.2015).

²² <http://business-inform.net/pdf/2011/8_0/13_16.pdf> (02.09.2015).

²³ V. Velychko, *The Features of Functioning Euroregions in Ukraine*, "Economy and Region #4", 2012, 35, p. 134.

Speaking about scholarship approach in Poland, Aleksander Smolar considers NGOs to be a part of civil society underlying its role in different types of relationships among people at the level beyond the state and the market. Such relations come from common interests, beliefs and ideas. Particularly, the analyst stresses the importance for state not to interfere with NGO activities and the need to create conditions for NGOs to act independently and autonomously²⁵. Furthermore, an Ukrainian expert Antonina Kolodii makes an attempt to summarize the theoretical research on the issue of civil society illustrating its contradictory nature. In fact, the contradictory character lies in two directions. The first approach states that civil society is supposed to support liberal institutions and relevant civic culture that is favorable to liberal political institutions. The second approach, however, sees civil society as a power resisting to government and giving space to diverse beliefs and practices²⁶.

In this regard, a character of organizations acting in Poland and Ukraine should be analyzed. As a matter of fact, apart from focus on local democracy Polish and Ukrainian non-governmental organizations concentrate on a wide range of areas: macroeconomic reforms, regional government, independent media, human rights, education, science, culture, and the consequences of Polish integration into the European Union. In fact, the major areas of cooperation included the exchange of Polish reform implementation after 1989. Krzysztof Stanowski divides the cooperation between Polish and Ukrainian NGOs after 1989 into three stages:

1. 1989 – 1994 – initial period of creating contacts between partners. Mainly it included organizations engaged in opposing activities such as: Fundacja Edukacja dla Demokracji, Helsińska Fundacja Praw Człowieka, Fundacja Ośrodka KARTA, Fundacja Solidarności Polsko-Czesko-Słowackiej, or Instytut na rzecz Demokracji w Europie Wschodniej IDEE. The period is characterized by the launch of the first international projects. Additionally, the donations were provided by American foundations: National Endowment for Democracy, Ford Foundation or Charles Stewart Mott Foundation.
2. 1995 – 1998 – the period is characterized by engagement of Polish NGOs actively performing on Polish inner stage in the international projects. As an example might be Fundacja Demokracji Lokalnej.
3. Since 1999 – significant increase of NGOs cooperating with Ukrainian partner organizations. Practically, every respected NGO in Poland was engaged in different forms of cooperation with Ukrainian counterparts. At the same time, a number of local organizations from Eastern and

²⁴ <http://political-studies.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/Kolodiy_Na_Slyahu.pdf> (07.09.2015).

²⁵ <<http://www.eastbook.eu/en/2013/04/country-en/poland-en/aleksander-smolar-appealing-to-politicians-means-appealing-to-both-the-ruling-party-and-the-opposition/>> (25.08.2015).

²⁶ <<http://political-studies.com/?p=742>> (25.08.2015).

Southern regions of Poland expressed their will to cooperate with the Ukrainian side²⁷.

Particular attention should be put to educational initiatives and scholarship funds such as the Lane Kirkland Scholarships Program²⁸ or PAUCI Foundation²⁹.

To sum up, the cooperation between Ukrainian and Polish non-governmental organizations has been active and fruitful in a number of areas since 1989. Experts agree that majority of projects concentrated on results of Polish reforms and possibilities of their implementation on Ukrainian ground. At the same time, the evaluations of NGOs' role remain ambivalent. On the one hand, the active role on NGOs on the international arena is complimented for numerous benefits they bring such as flexibility, ability to make quick decisions and act independently while making proposals on particular issue³⁰. On the other hand, a number of analysts point out to the fact that cooperation between non-governmental cooperation and local government units has not reached satisfactory level so far.

Summary

As far as conclusion remarks are concerned, the attention should be put on the *Memorandum of cooperation to support local self-government reform in Ukraine* that was signed in Warsaw on 17 December 2014. The signed document predicts cooperation in the form of consultative activities during preparation of draft normative and legal acts on local self-government reformation in Ukraine and educational activities in the area of local self-government reform implementation, particularly, educational and training visits, financed from the state budget of the Republic of Poland, provision of support under mediation of non-governmental organizations.³¹

Similar declarations from state authorities as well as experience of cooperation between Ukrainian and Polish local and regional authorities and NGOs give ground for certain level of optimism concerning the future of their cooperation and the future of the self-governance reform in Ukraine. However, to suc-

²⁷ P. Kosiewski, *Lata doświadczeń i perspektywa europejska*, [in:] „Polska-Ukraina, Współpraca organizacji pozarządowych”, Warsaw 2003, p. 8-9.

²⁸ The programme supports democratic and free market transformations in other Central and Eastern European countries. The Program is financed from the funds of the Polish-American Freedom Foundation and administered by the Education for Democracy Foundation. For more information see: <<http://www.kirkland.edu.pl/en>> (07.09.2015).

²⁹ Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation PAUCI supports the Ukrainian efforts to integrate into the EU and transatlantic structures, to develop the civil society structures, etc. For more information see: <<http://en.pauci.org/about.php>> (07.09.2015).

³⁰ More on the role of NGOs in the state foreign policy see: *Partnership in Foreign Policy. A proposal for co-operation between public authorities and non-governmental organizations*. [in:] “*Social Diplomacy. The Case of Poland*”, G. Czubek (ed.), Warsaw 2002.

³¹ <<http://decentralization.gov.ua/en/news/item/id/294>> (01.08.2015).

cessfully reach given objective a number of aspects should be taken into consideration:

- the level of academic engagement in the process of project development in particular region;
- the level of trust and mutual interest in the relationship between theorists and practitioners;
- the level of motivation and encouragement from the state as regards the scientific-administrative cooperation, etc.

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THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN ECONOMIC WAR

Summary:

In the text the author focuses on the economic aspects of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that erupted in 2014. Undoubtedly, the economic war is a crucial dimension of hybrid war in Ukraine that definitely should not be neglected. The author clearly differentiated six principal constituents of the Russian-Ukrainian economic war which were subsequently discussed in the text. Notably, even during periods of unreliable and frail cease-fires economic war were still was continued. Economic war appears to become a permanent and fixed element of bilateral Russian-Ukrainian relations at least in the short to medium term.

Key words:

economic war, financial war, Russia, Ukraine, Russian-Ukrainian conflict

Introduction

The hybrid war that Russia has been waging with Ukraine since at least March 2014 comprises of several various elements: military, diplomatic, information, cultural and – the last but not least – economic. It is just this economic factor that will be briefly described in the article. The main thesis of the author is that economic dimension of the hybrid war between the Russian Federation and Ukraine is inextricably linked to the entirety of the hybrid war. The second thesis put forward in the text by the author is that nowadays we witness a fundamental shift in the economic relations between Russia and Ukraine. The very old and very close economic bonds that in the past used to link both countries have been suddenly interrupted, broken and discontinued. These revolutionary changes will have a deep long-run ramifications for the Eastern European geopolitics and geo-economics. The author tries to find the answer for the question, what are the consequences of Russian-Ukrainian economic war.

The main economic instruments of war we can perceive in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine are as follows:

- embargos;
- plundering and destruction of adversary's industries;
- sanctions;

- energy cutoffs;
- financial destabilization.

Embargos

Since the outset of Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine, embargoes have become one of the main instruments of exerting economic pressure on adversary. In 2014 Russia banned import of miscellaneous dairy products, cheese, confection, alcohols, tinned fish, fruit, vegetables and seeds from Ukraine. In response Kyiv sued Moscow for breaking international trade regulations in the World Trade Organization. Some actions on the side of the Kremlin seem very controversial from the socio-economic viewpoint. Namely, Ukrainian fruit and vegetables used to be very common at Russian market places. Now, it is very likely that in the wake of prohibition of imports of Ukrainian groceries, their price in Russia is going to rise considerably, especially fruit and vegetables¹.

In October 2015 Russia prohibited exports of diesel fuel to Ukraine as well as LPG gas. The pretext for this move is a fact that some of exported diesel oil is later used in Ukraine's military. 40% of diesel oil consumed in Ukraine was imported from the Russian Federation. 70% of LPG gas consumed in Ukraine was imported from Russia as well². Whereas, import of diesel fuel could be relatively easily substituted by the import from Poland and Lithuania, it is much harder in the case of LPG gas. The ban for exports of Russian LPG gas to Ukraine resulted in an approximately 25% rise of prices for this fuel in Ukraine³.

Interestingly, not only formal, official embargos have a big impact on mutual trade. Also, informal boycotts are salient in this context. For example, as a result of boycott of Russian products by Ukrainians the sale of Russia-made goods in big Ukrainian supermarkets fell even by half⁴.

Ukraine forbade exports of weapons systems, weapon components and ammunition to Russia and vice versa. In consequence once strong bonds of Russian and Ukrainian military industrial complexes almost completely severed. This fact is of utmost importance for Moscow. A great deal of weapon

¹ I. Trusewicz, *Rosja uderza sankcjami w Ukrainę*, Rp.pl, 02.11.2015, <<http://beta.rp.pl/gospodarka/311029856-rosja-uderza-sankcjami-w-ukraine.html?template=restricted>>, (02.01.2016).

² *Rosja wymierza nowy cios w Ukrainę. Wstrzymuje eksport oleju napędowego*, Dziennik.pl, 21.10.2015, <<http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/swiat/artykuly/503546,kreml-zakrecal-ukrainie-kurek-rosja-wstrzymala-eksport-oleju-napedowego-na-ukraine.html>> (02.01.2016).

³ *Rosja wymierza nowy cios w Ukrainę. Wstrzymuje eksport oleju napędowego*, Dziennik.pl, 21.10.2015, <<http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/swiat/artykuly/503546,kreml-zakrecal-ukrainie-kurek-rosja-wstrzymala-eksport-oleju-napedowego-na-ukraine.html>> (02.01.2016).

⁴ P. Kościński, *Ukraine: A DCFTA after All*, "The Polish Institute of International Affairs Bulletin", 2015, No. 110 (842), p. 1.

systems used in Russian armed forces have some components or parts produced in Ukraine. 95% of Russian attack and multi-purpose helicopters are equipped with engine produced by Ukrainian firm Motor Sich from Zaporizhya⁵. Currently, Russian factories neither have industrial capacity nor the specialized knowledge to produce some kinds of helicopter engines. Another example of Russian dependence on crucial military components produced on Ukrainian territory are maritime gas turbines. Many Russian Navy's vessels are driven by gas turbines made by Zorya Mashproyekt enterprise situated at Mykolaiv at Black Sea. The supplies of gas turbines units to Russian warships were broken. Ukrainian engineers are also forbidden to take part in repairs of yet supplied turbines⁶. As a result Russia had to cancel the construction of at least three guided missile frigates of design 11356, also known as Admiral Grigorovich class⁷. As well, the currently constructed and commissioned guided missile frigates of project 22350, also known as Admiral Gorshkov class, initially were to be propelled by Ukrainian marine gas turbines. After the implementation of embargo Russia has to either reduce the overall number of Gorshkov class frigates produced or substantially extend their construction schedule⁸. Regardless of the choice, this situation largely complicates and impedes Russia's naval modernization efforts. Due to the lack of possibility of importing marine gas turbines from Ukraine and from the West, Russia had to limit the number of commissioned frigate of project 20385, also known as Gremyashchiy class, to solely two⁹. There are many other cases of Russian dependence on Ukrainian military industry – the above mentioned instances are just a tip of an iceberg.

Of course, Moscow initiated a special program aimed at substitution of military parts and components that Russia used to import from Ukraine beforehand, but this process will take at least several years and will be costly. The Kremlin wants to attain self-sufficiency in military production to 2018¹⁰. Obviously, Ukrainian enterprises from the defence sector also suffer a lot from breaking cooperation bonds with their Russian equivalents, nonetheless it seems that this situation is more harmful to the Russian Federation.

⁵ W. Łuczak, *Rosja bez dostaw z Ukrainy?*, Altair.com.pl, <http://www.altair.com.pl/magazines/article?article_id=5169> (02.01.2016).

⁶ *Rosyjskie okręty wojenne bez silników. Ukraina odmówiła dostaw*, Kresy24.pl, 07.05.2015, <<http://kresy24.pl/67786/rosyjskie-okrety-wojenne-bez-silnikow-ukraina-odmowila-dostaw/>> (02.01.2016)

⁷ *The Russian Navy: A Historic Tradition*, Office of Naval Intelligence, December 2015, p. 22.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 23.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 22.

¹⁰ A. Wilk, *Zbrojeniowy impuls*, PolskaZbrojna.pl, 27.10.2014, <<http://polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleinmagazineshow/14096?t=ZBROJENIOWY-IMPULS>> (02.01.2016).

Plundering and destruction of adversary's industries

The majority of industry of so-called Donetsk and Luhansk's Peoples Republics was either plundered and removed to Russia or simply devastated. Plenty of plants and factories located in Donbas have been intentionally dismantled and moved to the Russian Federation. For instance, all movable property belonging to factory "Topaz" situated in Donetsk that specialized in production of electronic warfare devices has been totally disassembled and transported to Russia¹¹. Another telling example is the fate of Luhansk electronic machine-building plant "Mashzavod-100" that specialized in production of advanced monocrystals. The whole plant has been disassembled and removed to Chuvashia deep inside Russia. Interestingly, apart from machines, devices and documentation belonging to the factory also about 1000 workers together with their families were removed to the new location of their workplace¹². Of special importance to Moscow are plants which produce hi-tech and armament products situated at territories controlled by separatists. These plants are the most frequently subjected to deliberate and organized disassembly and removal. Similarly, many coal mines have purposely or accidentally been flooded or damaged in other ways. Lot of metal equipment belonging to coal mines and various plants have simply been robbed and sold as scrap metal usually somewhere in Russia. Separatists quite often tend to rob, plunder, confiscate and steal cars, apartments and houses of people living in territories conquered by them behaving like plain bandits. Expropriations are commonplace in Luhansk and Donetsk's People's Republics especially towards the property of people who, due to different causes, left Donbas¹³. Miscellaneous technical difficulties forced hundreds of Donbas' factories to either limit or totally stop the production.

All this means that Donbas, which once was an industrial heart of the whole Ukraine, will not be economically useful for Ukraine for many years ahead. The loss of access to coal seems to be especially worrying for Kyiv due to the fact that a significant part of Ukraine's power plants is fueled by coal. Additionally, the loss of Crimean peninsula also contributed to the reduction of electrical energy output in Ukraine. Nowadays after all these unfriendly actions of the Russian Federation, Ukraine faces a sort of energy crisis.

¹¹ *Zobacz co Rosja zrabowała Ukraincom z Donbasu. Rozkradli wszystko do „golej ziemi”!*, Kresy24.pl, 20.10.2015, <<http://kresy24.pl/74262/zobacz-co-rosja-zrabowala-ukraincom-z-donbasu-rozkradli-wszystko-do-golej-ziemi/>> (03.01.2016).

¹² *Rosja rabuje Ukrainę – wywożą co się da! Konwojami humanitarnymi...*, Kresy24.pl, 21.10.2014, <<http://kresy24.pl/57663/rosja-rabuje-ukraine-wywoza-co-sie-da-konwojami-humanitarnymi/>> (03.01.2016).

¹³ *Putin's locusts at work: stripping Donbas of industrial assets*, EuroMaidanPress.com, 19.11.2014, <<http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/11/19/putins-locusts-at-work-stripping-donbas-of-industrial-assets/#arvlbdata>>, (03.01.2016).

Energy cutoffs

It must be emphasized that in the long term building new gas pipelines omitting Ukraine is an element of Russia's economic war against Ukraine too. Particularly Turkish Stream and the second string of the Nord Stream appear to be aimed mainly at avoiding transit of Russian gas through Ukrainian territory. So far about 80% of Russian gas sold to Europe was transported via Ukraine. But Moscow seems to be determined in putting an end to its dependence on Ukraine on this issue. If all Russian gas transported to Europe could be redirected in such a way to bypass Ukraine, then Ukraine would be slightly more susceptible to Russia's energy blackmail and would also lose revenues for transit.

Turkish Stream was a gas pipeline across the Black Sea, which construction was lobbied intensively by the Kremlin in latest years. The Russian-Turkish bilateral relations have clearly gone into downward spiral in the aftermath of the downing of the Russian frontline bomber Su-24M in the airspace over the Turkish-Syrian border, so the prospects of Turkish Stream are currently dubious at best. In contrast to that, the Nord Stream 2 will very probably be brought to a successful outcome, despite some protests from the European Commission and from Central-Eastern European states.

In the past Russia on two different occasions – in 2006 and 2009 – temporarily cut exports of its natural gas to Ukraine, trying to force Kyiv to various economic and political concessions. In June 2014 the Kremlin once again resorted to gas weapon and for four months shut down supply of gas to Ukraine. Then the EU made a decision to act as a go-between and successfully convinced the disputed governments to strike a deal known as “winter package” due to which in October the blue hydrocarbon flows were restored. Brussels was vitally interested in working out a compromise between feuding states because it wanted to prevent siphoning off Russian gas earmarked for countries downstream by Ukraine, which it used to practice in previous gas crises¹⁴. In November 2015 Russia again cut off supplies of its gas to Ukraine claiming that it will be restarted after Ukraine pays prepayments for future gas supplies. Interestingly, this cutoff took place soon after Ukraine stopped to transmit electric current to Crimea as a result of sabotage of electric grid. Thus, this Kremlin's action may be interpreted as a tit-for-tat.

Bearing this in mind, one should not overestimate the probability of Moscow resorting to this kind of economic weapon against Ukraine. Nowadays the Kremlin has much less possibilities to energetically blackmail Ukraine. First of all, in the wake of constantly falling prices of hydrocarbons and rouble exchange rate, Moscow more and more desperately needs export revenues, even from its enemies. Secondly, Ukraine diminished its gas consumption in the last

¹⁴ *Why Ukraine Can Live Without Russian Gas for Now*, Naftogaz-Europe.Com, 08.07.2015 <<http://naftogaz-europe.com/article/en/ukrainecanlivewithoutrussianguas>> (01.01.2016).

two years significantly. The severe economic depression together with the loss of industrial centre in Donbas led to a 15% decrease in gas consumption relative to 2013. Whereas in 2011 Ukraine consumed totally 59,3 bcm, in 2013 (the last year of peace in Ukraine) 50,4 bcm, in 2014 it consumed merely 42,6 bcm¹⁵. According to preliminary assessments in 2015 Ukraine managed to further reduce its overall gas consumption by about 25% in relation to 2015¹⁶. That means that in 2015 Ukraine needed merely about 32 bcm. Thirdly, new pro-Western Ukrainian government took many actions clearly aimed at making the state energetically independent of Russia. Ukraine can substitute the natural gas that it in previous times used to import from the Russian Federation with increased import from the EU member states – primarily from Hungary (the technical capacity to import 14,5 billion bcm annually), but also from Slovakia (the technical capacity to import 5,8 bn bcm annually) and from Poland (the technical capacity to import 1,5 billion bcm a year).

Naturally, as a consequence of all the factors mentioned above, Ukraine's import of gas from Russia has drastically decreased. In 2008 Ukraine was a biggest customer of Gazprom that bought 56 bcm of gas from this energy giant. In 2014 Kyiv bought from Gazprom humble 14,5 bcm of blue hydrocarbon¹⁷. In a way, it is possible that in the future Russia will be more dependent on transit of its gas through Ukraine than Ukraine on imports of gas from Russia. That in turn means that Ukraine will be able to use gas weapon against the Russian Federation, though, the probability of leveraging this position is low because of potential diplomatic repercussions with EU states. The gas weapon used by Russia against its weaker neighbour in 2014 turned out to be ineffective. In the future the role of this means of economic warfare in Russia's arsenal will likely be less important.

On its part, Ukraine could block electric current supplies to Crimea. In 2015 several mysterious incidents of sabotage of electricity grid in Southern Ukraine, which was used to transmit electricity to Crimean Peninsula, occurred. Usually, commentators ascribe these acts of sabotage either to Tatar activists or to right wing Ukrainian extremists, yet one not to exclude the possibility that Ukrainian authorities covertly support these actions. Anyway, so far nobody admitted to these acts. This situation is troublesome for Crimeans making their daily lives harder¹⁸.

¹⁵ W. Konończuk, *Reform#1. Why Ukraine has to reform its gas sector*, "OSW Commentary", 2015, No. 181, p. 9.

¹⁶ *Ukraine's gas consumption reduced by 25% in 2015*, En.Trend.az, 27.12.2015, <<http://en.trend.az/world/other/2474737.html>> (01.01.2016).

¹⁷ I. Trusewicz, *Ukraina kończy z rosyjskim gazem*, Rp.pl, 29.10.2015, <<http://www.rp.pl/Surowce-i-Chemia/310299938-Ukraina-konczy-z-rosyjskim-gazem.html>> (01.01.2016).

¹⁸ See for instance: *Krym zamarza! Runęła kolejna linia! Ukraina całkowicie wstrzymała dostawy prądu*, Kresy24.pl, 31.12.2015, <<http://kresy24.pl/76517/krym-zamarza-runela-kolejna-linia-ukraina-calkowicie-wstrzymala-dostawy-pradu/>> (01.01.2016).

Sanctions

Since the breakout of the war Kyiv and Moscow repeatedly are implementing new sanctions against one another. People and institutions that in the opinion of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine supported annexation of Crimea by Russia and separatists in Donbas have been included on a special list of subjects embraced by sanctions.

Both Ukraine and Russia implemented mutual sanctions against Russian and Ukrainian airlines. At the beginning of the conflict in March 2014 Ukraine's authorities closed airspace over the disputed Crimean Peninsula – this decision is still mandatory. Ukrainian as well as third-party's airlines comply with this prohibition in blatant contrast to Russian airlines. Since 25th October 2015 there are no direct flights between Russian and Ukraine at all¹⁹. This fact is troubling for ordinary inhabitants of both feuding countries because many Russians and Ukrainians have relatives in both states. As a consequence all flights between two disunited states are suspended. As a result of sanctions railway transportation between two states also is significantly restricted and reduced.

The Russian prime minister Dmitry Medvedev announced that since the beginning of 2016 Ukraine as a country that joined to Western sanctions against Russia will be embraced by Russian counter-sanctions. Till October 2011 Ukraine and the European Commission concluded negotiations on the DCFTA (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area)²⁰. On 16th September 2014 after the revolution of the dignity which broke out partly in result of rejection of the Association Agreement by the then president of Ukraine – the now infamous Viktor Yanukovich, the European Parliament and the new Ukrainian parliament dominated by pro-Western politicians ratified the Association Agreement with DCFTA. Nevertheless, the European Commission proposed that the full implementation of DCFTA would be delayed by 14 months²¹. By this move Brussels (encouraged by Berlin) intended to – at least partly – soothe Moscow's anger. Since that time Moscow, Kyiv and Brussels over 18 months negotiated an agreement endeavouring to work out some compromise concerning the DCFTA. The negotiations concluded with fiasco. According to Cecilia

¹⁹ M. Sigmund, *Ukraińsko-rosyjska wojna na zakazy*, „Skrzydłata Polska”, 2016, No. 1 (2435), p. 46.

²⁰ *Ukraine: DCFTA negotiations completed; prospects for signing the Association Agreement*, Centre for Eastern Studies, 26.10.2011, <http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2011-10-26/ukraine-dcfta-negotiations-completed-prospects-signing-association> (30.12.2015). DCFTA is a part of the more comprehensive the UE-Ukraine Association Agreement.

²¹ R. Sadowski, A. Wierzbowska-Miazga, *Russia is blocking a free trade area between the EU and Ukraine*, Centre for Eastern Studies, 17.09.2014, <<http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-09-17/russia-blocking-a-free-trade-area-between-eu-and-ukraine>> (30.12.2015).

Maleström, the EU's commissioner for trade, Moscow did not express the will of agreement. On 16th December, 2015, the Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree that banned the up to then obligating rules of trade between Russian and Ukraine. With this move, the Kremlin de facto discarded Ukraine out of the Commonwealth of Independent Nations' free trade area. Moscow consequently convinces that DCFTA and CIS free trade area are absolutely irreconcilable. In other words, not a single state can be a member of both free trade areas simultaneously. According to the prognosis of the Ukraine's prime minister Arseniy Yatseniuk, the above mentioned Russia's trade retaliation could cost his country approximately \$600 million a year²². The Kremlin did as it announced. Since the outset of 2015 Russia de facto has blocked the import of approximately half of Ukrainian food articles. All the previous preferences for Ukrainian products have been annulled. In response Ukrainian authorities implemented analogous sanctions prohibiting imports of Russian milk, meat, fish, candies, coffee, vodka and caviar as well as implementing additional duties on many other Russian goods²³. As a result of miscellaneous Russian sanctions only in 2015 Ukraine lost \$10 billion²⁴. For a cash-strapped society it was a very heavy financial loss.

Financial destabilization

It is evident that Moscow tries hard to maximally worsen the fiscal condition of Ukraine and to impede economic recovery of Ukraine. It is calculated to weaken Ukrainian's will of resistance as well as to spur social unrest in Ukraine that could even at some point lead to ousting of Ukrainian government and certainly deepen chaos. By that the Kremlin wants to not only vassalize Ukraine, make impossible Ukraine's integration with the EU and NATO, but, first and foremost, show Russian society that any revolution, any attempt of overthrowing the legal authorities unavoidably, inescapably and inevitably results in chaos, anarchy, long and serious economic depression and bloodshed. This message is constantly hammered in Russians to make them believe that it is absolutely unwise, imprudent and pernicious to revolt or rebel against their own authorities.

Throughout 2015 Moscow threatened that if Ukraine's debt owed to Russia would not be paid in full, it would veto proposed IMF loan to Ukraine worth

²² T. Bielecki, *Kreml idzie na wojnę handlową z Kijowem. Za europejskie ciagoty*, „Gazeta Wyborcza”, 25.12.2015, p. 11.

²³ *Rosyjska wódka i kawior znikną z ukraińskich stołów. Kijów odpowiada na moskiewskie sankcje*, TVP.info, 02.01.2016, <<http://www.tvp.info/23422224/biznes/rosyjska-wodka-i-kawior-znikna-z-ukrainskich-stolow-kijow-odpowiada-na-moskiewskie-sankcje/>> (02.01.2016).

²⁴ R. Szoszyn, *To będzie przełomowy rok dla Ukrainy*, Rp.pl, 29.12.2015, <<http://www.rp.pl/Konflikt-na-Ukrainie/312299870-To-bedzie-przelomowy-rok-dla-Ukrainy.html#ap-1>> (30.12.2015).

\$17,5 billion within the framework of the so-called extended fund facility. In March 2015 the Board of Directors of the IMF approved the loan mentioned above to Kyiv on condition of implementation of specific economic reforms²⁵ as well as previous reduction in debt service. It is important to notice that previously under the regulations of the International Monetary Fund, this institution could not aid the states which were in arrears on an official loan or in other words, which did not pay its debts on a regular basis or were involved in debt disputes with some other state or states. In December 2015 the IMF accommodated the Ukrainian government and resigned from the once unquestionable principle of not granting loans to states that fell into arrears with payments of other states²⁶.

In August 2015 after long and arduous negotiations, Ukrainian government struck a deal with private debtholders. The negotiating parties agreed that the face values of bonds will be reduced by 20% from \$19,1 billion to \$15,5 billion. As well, the maturities of these bonds will be prolonged to 2019²⁷.

The most famous Russian-Ukrainian financial disputation regards Ukrainian bonds worth \$3 billion sold to Moscow in December 2013 on relatively convenient for Ukraine terms. The transaction took place before ousting of the former president Victor Yanukovich. The loan was a sort of sweetener for Yanukovich for conceding to Kremlin's demands²⁸. It is obvious that Moscow by persisting in paying this debt in full wanted to block any financial aid on the part of the IMF for Ukraine. Although, at some point Kremlin significantly softened its stance, it ultimately disagreed on any reduction in the debt Ukraine owes Russia. Ukrainian government takes a definite stand on this issue claiming that \$3 billion debt in dispute should be treated as a commercial loan. This position implies that in the wake of it the debt should be subjected to analogous debt cuts as was agreed in August 2015 during negotiations with private debtholders. In contrast to Kyiv's position, the Kremlin claims that the loan in question should be regarded solely as an interstate debt. If this interpretation prevails it would mean that arrangements negotiated with private loan-holders are not binding for the Russian Federation and that in turn means that Ukraine ought to pay back its debt to Russia in full, without 20% reduction. The Russian government could sue Ukraine in either Permanent Court of Arbitration

²⁵ T. Iwański, *A ship run aground. Deepening problems in the Ukrainian economy*, "OSW Commentary", 2015, No. 178, p. 2.

²⁶ R. Sadowski, *A lifeline for Ukraine from the IMF*, Centre for Eastern Studies, 16.12.2015, <<http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-12-16/a-lifeline-ukraine-imf>> (30.12.2015).

²⁷ M. Lasek, *Fundusze umorzą część długów Ukrainie, Rosja nie*, „Gazeta Wyborcza”, 28.01.2015, p. 22.

²⁸ M. Wolf, *Resist Russia's blackmail over Ukraine's debt*, FT.com, 20.10.2015, <<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5e295484-7647-11e5-a95a-27d368e1ddf7.html>> (21.10.2015).

situated in the Hague or in the London Court of International Arbitration²⁹. Moreover, Moscow before giving a \$3 billion loan to Ukraine guaranteed itself in the deal that if the relation of Ukrainian government's total debt to gross domestic product at some point excels the 60% level, Moscow could demand instantaneous payment of the loan in total³⁰. Indeed, Ukraine's government debt rose above that level so Moscow gained an additional leverage to exert financial pressure on Ukraine. Finally, the IMF concurred with the Kremlin's interpretation pronouncing that the unlucky \$3 billion loan should be regarded as an official loan between states. In the light of this controversial resolution Ukrainian government now has to at least try to reach Russia's approval for the debt reduction³¹. Nonetheless, Ukraine's authorities did not yield to pressure and suspended service of problematic debt that in the meantime rose to \$3,582 billion. The Ukraine's prime minister A. Yatseniuk publicly announced that his state is ready for trial in court with Russia on the whole issue. Moscow – by lips of Russian Deputy Finance Minister – Sergei Storchak verbally expressed its readiness to negotiations, but Kyiv in response unambiguously stated that the repayment of the questionable loan on Moscow's conditions would be tantamount to Ukraine's bankruptcy³². The majority of lawyers claim that the IMF's resolution favourable in this respect for Moscow will give it advantage in the potential trial, nevertheless the court's ultimate rule on no account should be taken for granted.

Conclusions

As a consequence of economic war in 2015 Ukraine's GDP plummeted by 10%³³ or even – according to other sources – by 12%³⁴. It is a very serious drop

²⁹ *Rosja powinna wygrać z Ukrainą w sądzie w sprawie długu wynoszącego 3 mld dol*, Rp.pl, 21.12.2015, <<http://www.rp.pl/artykul/1248407-Rosja-powinna-wygrac-z-Ukraina-w-sadzie-w-sprawie-dlugu.html>> (30.12.2015).

³⁰ J. Cohen, *Russia Has Ukraine's Economy in a Choke Hold*, TheMoscowTimes.com, 31.03.2015, <<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russia-has-ukraines-economy-in-a-choke-hold/518324.html>> (01.01.2016).

³¹ *MFW zmusiło Ukrainę do płacenia Rosji. Kijów w szoku*, Kresy24.pl, 17.12.2015, <<http://kresy24.pl/76122/mfw-zmusilo-ukraine-do-placenia-rosji-kijow-w-szoku/>> (01.01.2016).

³² *Kijów do Moskwy: Nie będziemy wam spłacać długu Janukowycza. Możecie nas podać do sądu*, Kresy24.pl, 18.12.2015, <<http://kresy24.pl/76188/kijow-do-moskwy-nie-bedziemy-wam-splacac-dlugu-janukowycza-mozecie-nas-podac-do-sadu/>> (01.01.2016).

³³ R. Szoszyn, *To będzie przełomowy rok dla Ukrainy*, Rp.pl, 29.12.2015, <<http://www.rp.pl/Konflikt-na-Ukrainie/312299870-To-bedzie-przelomowy-rok-dla-Ukrainy.html#p-1>> (30.12.2015).

³⁴ T.A. Olszański, T. Iwański, *Ukraińska polityka w końcu 2015: niestabilna równowaga*, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, 30.12.2015, <<http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2015-12-30/ukrainska-polityka-w-koncu-2015-niestabilna-rownowaga>> (31.12.2015).

comparable only to the plunge in economic output in the first years of Ukraine's independence at the beginning of 1990's. What is even worse, the drop in GDP in 2015 was deeper than in 2014 (6,8%). Following the Russian aggression Ukraine's public debt relative to its GDP rose enormously from about 40% GDP in 2013 to 70% of GDP in 2014³⁵. That was truly a huge rise over a very short period of time. According to the World Bank, Ukraine's foreign debt at the end of 2015 will reach the level 156% of its GDP³⁶, which is undoubtedly worrying and dangerous for financial stability of the state. In comparison, the IMF experts assess that Russia's GDP fell in 2015 "merely" by 3,8%³⁷.

The economic war between Russia and Ukraine will, without doubt, have relevant ramifications for both of these states. For one thing, it led to situation of an almost total reorientation of Ukrainian trade – to put it simply – from the East toward the West. Trade and industrial bonds that in the past linked both countries now are interrupted. Numerous mutual sanctions and embargoes will stay in the predictable future. This important (geo)economical change arguably is irreversible in the short to medium term. Ukrainian society collectively took a decision to reorient their motherland toward the West. It must also be highlighted that both warring states are mutually weakening one another. The war is also economically harmful for both of them. Economic depression currently afflicts Ukrainians harsher than Russians, yet in the longer perspective this could easily change. As hydrocarbon prices, rouble and Russia's foreign exchange reserves fall, so the general economic situation in Russia will worsen. Interestingly, many indirect evidence cue that also the West (in particular the United States in cooperation with Saudi Arabia) is waging its own economic war against Russia – the prices of hydrocarbons are probably intentionally being lowered to hit economies of Washington's and Riyadh's foes – namely: Russia, Iran and Venezuela. In this economic war the Russian state has much less trump cards than in its economic war with Ukraine.


³⁵ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html> (30.12.2015).

³⁶ T.A. Olszański, T. Iwański, *op. cit.*

³⁷ A. Aslund, *Jaka jest strategia Putina?*, Rp.pl, 31.12.2015, <<http://www.rp.pl/Publicystyka/151239952-Jaka-jest-strategia-Putina.html> > (30.12 2015).



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THE ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN UKRAINE AND RUSSIA AT THE PRESENT STAGE

Summary:

The article deals with contemporary economic relations between Russia and Ukraine. It is said that Russia remains the main foreign trade partner of Ukraine. Adequate replacement of the Russian market of European market did not happen. But it is pointed out that for the first six months of 2015 60 percent of trade turnover with Ukraine were lost. The most sensible loss for Russian – Ukrainian gas market. Also according to the calculations of the Moscow World Trade Center many non-commodity exports fell. Examples are shown. It is also said that there are products whose export from Russia to Ukraine in the last year managed to increase. At the end it is stating what trade relations between Ukraine and Russia might be in 2016. Some examples of Russian investments in Ukrainian companies and Ukrainian into Russian are shown.

Key words:

economic relations, trade partner, exports to Ukraine, gas market, investments

Russia remains the main foreign trade partner of Ukraine. Despite the trade preferences of the EU in relation to the Ukrainian goods, adequate replacement of the Russian market of European market did not happen. This is against the backdrop of an unprecedented reduction of trade turnover between the two countries - in 2014 by 30% to \$ 28 billion¹.

For the first six months of 2015 60 percent of trade turnover with Ukraine were lost, - the Ministry of Economic Development stated. - Affected areas in which cooperation has traditionally been strong. First of all it concerns the military-technical cooperation. Any decline in trade of metallurgical products, mineral and chemical industries².

¹ А. Коваленко, *Торгово-Экономические Связи Между Россией И Украиной - Жить Придется Вместе*, „гражданин созидатель” (online), September 30, 2015, <<http://www.gr-sozidatel.ru/articles/torgovo-ekonomicheskie-svyazi.html>> (15.10.2015).

² А. Коваленко, *Развелись, но жить придется вместе*, „Новости oilru.com” (online) September 28, 2015, <<http://www.oilru.com/news/480302/>> (15.10.2015).

The value of exports to Ukraine, steadily increasing in 2000-2008 from the crisis greatly reduced in 2009 and increased sharply in 2010-2011, reaching the absolute maximum - 30.5 billion dollars, according to the Center for Integration Studies of the Eurasian Bank Development. Then, in 2013, they dropped to 23.8 billion dollars, but it is still significantly exceeded the pre-crisis level. At the end of 2014 the volume of exports narrowed to \$ 17 billion³. Thus its commodity structure remained more diversified than Russian exports as a whole. However, fuel products were dominated here too: if all countries with an average of 69.5%, while in Ukraine - 60.4%. In addition to the fuel Russia exported to Ukraine chemical products (16%), machinery and equipment (10%), metals and metal products (4.4%)⁴.

"The most sensible loss - Ukrainian gas market, which for many years we have been export monopoly" - the deputy dean of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs Andrei Suzdaltsev from the HSE believes.

According to the State Statistics Service, last year, Ukraine reduced natural gas imports from Russia by nearly 44% compared to 2013 - up to 14.4 billion cubic meters. In January-June of 2015 deliveries of Russian gas were reduced to 3.7 billion cubic meters. on the 1 of July, imports of gas from Russia to Ukraine in general has been suspended.

"The reduction of mutual trade will worsen in 2015 - Suzdaltsev predicts. - For example, the Ukrainian side is actively promoting the project of replacement of Russian nuclear fuel for Ukrainian nuclear power plants American nuclear fuel."

In the first half of this year there was more than a halving of Russian exports to Ukraine. Exports of military and dual-purpose goods fell by 75.4% to \$ 1.3 billion.

According to the calculations of the Moscow World Trade Center many non-commodity exports fell.

A significant decrease (43%) occurred in the section "Machinery and equipment", to 447 million dollars. Supply of products of metallurgical industry decreased to 182 million dollars, more than half. Deliveries of steel products fell to 55%.

Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine (MMC). In 2014, according to the Federal Customs Service, it did not put to the Ukraine products (mainly steel sheet rolling) of 134 million dollars. The share of Ukraine's exports of MMC decreased from 11 to 3%.

³ *Товарооборот Украины с РФ за квартал упал на 63%,"РИА Новости Украина"* (online) May 18, 2015, <<http://rian.com.ua/economy/20150518/367692380.html>> (18.08.2015).

⁴ *Торговое Представительство Российской Федерации В Украине, Торгово-экономическое сотрудничество Российской Федерации с Украиной*, May 2015, <http://ukr.ved.gov.ru/dvustoronniy_otnosheniya/obzor_torg/> (15.10.2015).

According to the MMC, shipment of metal entering the Ukrainian market, have been reoriented to the markets of the CIS countries, particularly in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Urals Pipe Works (drop of supplies to Ukraine in 2014 - 20%) refocused flows from Ukraine to Kazakhstan and Belarus.

"Energomash" plant named after Glushko completely stopped deliveries of engines and power plants to Ukraine in 2014 (in 2013 they were 23% of exports, the loss - \$ 25 million). Deliveries redirected to the USA⁵.

Zavolzhsy Plant, a branch of Kazan Motor software (99% of production - turbo jet and turboprop engines, gas turbines - in 2013 all products were delivered to Ukraine), in 2014, products redirected to Uzbekistan and Lithuania.

AvtoVAZ has reduced the share of Ukraine's exports in 2014 from 40 to 13%. Now, most of the products the company exports to Azerbaijan, Belarus and Egypt⁶.

The chemical industry is also trying to find new markets or increase supplies to traditional markets. For example, from Russia to Ukraine over the past three years, more than 65% of all deliveries of ammonia were sent. They decreased by 13%, or almost by \$ 70 million. But there was an increase of supply of ammonia to other countries. In the first half of 2015 export of ammonia from Russia to Belgium and Germany has increased by nearly 62 million dollars⁷.

Also nearly 15% of Russian export of mineral fertilizers was supplied to Ukraine. These deliveries were down by 15%, or 16.4 million dollars. At the same time, export of fertilizers increased to India (74 million), Brazil (23 million), Thailand (to 31 million), Switzerland (15 million dollars). Export of ammonium nitrate to Ukraine dropped by 99%, or \$ 44 million. But the traditional buyer of this commodity, Brazil, in 2015, increased its purchases by nearly 44% to \$ 212 million⁸.

In general, non-oil export (excluding defense goods, ores, slag, ash, mineral fuels, oils and products of their distillation) in the first half of 2015 compared with the first half of 2014 fell in 2794 from 5935 exported goods to Ukraine, from 3.3 to \$ 1.6 billion⁹.

But there are products whose export from Russia to Ukraine in the last year managed to increase. According to General Director of the World Trade Center of Moscow Vladimir Salamatov supply of certain types of fertilizers and other products of chemical industry, certain products of nonferrous and ferrous met-

⁵ <http://www.ved.gov.ru/export/countries/ua/ua_ru_relations/ua_ru_projects/> (18.08.2015).

⁶ *Развелись, но жить придется вместе – исследование ЦМТ по взаимной торговле России и Украины в материале журнала "Эксперт", „World Trade Center Moscow”* (online), September 28, 2015, <<http://www.wtcmoscow.ru/news/actual/razvelis-no-zhit-pridetsya-vmeste-issledovanie-tsmt-po-vzaimnoy-torgovle-rossii-i-ukrainy-/>> (15.10.2015).

⁷ *Торговое Представительство Российской...*

⁸ *Ibidem.*

⁹ *Развелись, но жить придется вместе...*

allurgy, some products of the sections of "machinery and equipment" and "Means of land transport" increased. For example, more than 20 times the supply of public railway freight wagons increased (with the board height 60 cm) - from 65 to 1 704 units to 23 million dollars¹⁰.

Supplies of diesel in the first half of 2014 were not carried out at all. Its export reached 649 thousand tons from a zero value. Russian oil refineries due to flexible pricing policy in the Ukrainian market pushed the main supplier - Belarusian refiners.

In addition to the fuel sharply (33 times) increased the supply of electricity - up to 1.5 million KW h. The increase is due to the fact that Ukraine, in 2014 did not buy Russian electricity. In December of the last year against the backdrop of the fuel crisis, signed an agreement with "Inter RAO" of imports to 1.5 GW¹¹.

What can happen to the Russian-Ukrainian trade in 2016? In total, the Ukrainian economy should take more than 15 thousand technical EU standards. Ukraine's transition to European standards has some fear among experts that Ukrainian companies that will not be able to meet the specified schedule periods of transition to these standards will be forced to dump on the Russian market, directing to it products that do not meet the new standards.

In addition, there will be a substantial narrowing of the range of Russian exports to Ukraine, its de-industrialization. Russian supplies of medicines, chemical products with high added value, tires, fuel, power engineering products, electric motors, electrical equipment, railway equipment, and refrigerators will be forced from the Ukrainian market.

The supply of goods, production of which is established in Russia by multinational companies (pastries, coffee, tobacco, cosmetics, cars) will remain largely in the same volume. The supply of raw materials and intermediate goods, on which the EU is not a competitor to Russia (cement, ore, coal, oil and oil products, ammonia) will also be continued.

According to the head of the department of economic history of IIEIR Sergey Afontsev, even if the worst scenario, when Ukraine will begin to use the facilities of agreement in full force, the amount of economic damage to Russia will not be catastrophic: "Ukraine's economy is in a position that to wait some mass " repressed " export of Ukrainian goods is not necessary. During the transition of Ukraine to European technical standards risks may occur, we estimate them two and a half billion dollars a year in the current dynamics of the turnover. But these risks are realized only if all the provisions of the Association Agreement are met accurately and on time. In view of the situation in the Ukrainian economy, it is difficult to expect. It is difficult to assume that

¹⁰ А. Коваленко, *Торгово-Экономические Связи...*

¹¹ *Развелись, но жить придется вместе...*

Ukraine, in accordance with the schedule goes to European standards within the next two to four years, it is quite unrealistic scenario”¹².

It is difficult to respond to the main question, what will be the trade regime in the triangle Russia-Ukraine-EU. Tripartite consultations are continuing, they are closed to the public.

"Unfortunately, the consultations are not subject to open debate, neither Russia nor the EU and the risk creates that everything will be decided behind the scenes without taking into account the views of business and professional community" - Sergey Afontsev says¹³.

No one has seen yet an open comparison of figures provided by experts of any party, no one has reason to discuss the positions of the parties on the merits. Ukrainian and European sides clearly focused on the fact that since January of the next year the agreement enters into force.

Russian investments in Ukrainian companies:

1. Purchase of Lisichansk oil refinery (oil refining), Ukraine, the investor of TNC-BP, the volume of investments - 87.546% (an estimated 570 million US Dollars);
2. Purchase of Odessa oil refinery (oil refining), Ukraine, the investor of "Lukoil", the volume of investments is estimated to 500 million USD;
3. Purchase of "ZALK" plant (non-ferrous metals), Ukraine, the investor of "Rusal", the volume of investments - 68.01% of the authorized capital¹⁴.

Ukrainian investments in Russian companies:

1. Group "Energo" controls mines "Kostromovskaja" and "Zarechnaya" in Russia and develops Ivanovskoye coking coal deposit;
2. "Donbass Fuel - Energy Company" bought three coal mining enterprises in the Rostov region: 100% of open Joint Stock Company "Donskoy Anthracite", 100% of JSC "Shakhtoupravleniye" Obukhov " and 66.7% of "Sulinantratsit" (Rostov, Russia).
3. Corporation "Roshen" in 2001 bought Lipetsk factory "Likonf."
4. Company "Kiev-Konti owns "Confectioner-Kursk"¹⁵.

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¹² *Ibidem.*

¹³ *Ibidem.*

¹⁴ *Торговое Представительство Российской...*

¹⁵ <http://www.ved.gov.ru/export_countries/ua/ua_ru_relations/ua_ru_projects/> (18.08.2015).

(online). September 30, 2015, <<http://www.gr-sozidatel.ru/articles/torgovo-ekonomicheskie-svyazi.html>>, (15.10.2015).

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GEOEKONOMICZNE MOTYWY DZIAŁAŃ ROSJI WZGLĘDEM UKRAINY

(Goeconomic Motives of Russia's Activity Towards Ukraine)

Streszczenie:

Głównym celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie podejmowanych przez Rosję działań geoekonomicznych w relacjach z Ukrainą i najważniejszych motywów kierujących Rosją przy ich podejmowaniu. Poprzez szereg istotnych posunięć jak podwyższanie cen gazu czy nacisk związany ze splatą długu Ukrainy, Rosja chce uzależnić od siebie to państwo i nie dopuścić do opuszczenia przez Ukrainę rosyjskiej strefy wpływów. Rosja decyduje się na użycie metod geoekonomicznych, gdyż są one o wiele skuteczniejsze niż geopolityczne. Pokazuje to, że paradygmat geoekonomiczny zaczyna odgrywać coraz większą rolę w stosunkach międzynarodowych.

Summary:

The main aim of this article is presenting actions, conducted by Russia in relations with Ukraine and most important reasons, why Russia decided to become involved in it. By important deals like: increasing gas prices or putting pressure connecting with Ukrainian debt, Russia wants Ukraine to fall into dependency and stop this country from leaving Russian sphere of influence. Russia decided for using goeconomic methods, because this solution is more effective than geopolitical scheme. This situation shows that geopolitical paradigm is more and more important in international relations area.

Słowa kluczowe:

Ukraina, geoekonomia, wojny gazowe, integracja ekonomiczna, strefa wpływów

Key words:

Ukraine, goeconomics, gas wars, economic integration, sphere of influence

Wstęp

Jednym z państw, które decyduje o układzie sił w stosunkach międzynarodowych jest Federacja Rosyjska. Państwo to, po rozpadzie ZSRR, stara się dalej odgrywać wiodącą pozycję w międzynarodowych relacjach. Mimo podejmowanych starań nie ma pozycji równej dawnemu Związkowi Radzieckiemu. Wynika to z wielu czynników: słabej gospodarki, mniejszego potencjału militarnego oraz utraty obszarów należących niegdyś do ZSRR.

Jednakże współczesna Rosja pod rządami prezydenta Władimira Putina jest krajem niezwykle ambitnym, chcącym odgrywać ważną pozycję w międzynarodowym porządku. Świadczy o tym fakt uczestnictwa Rosji w wielu międzynarodowych przedsięwzięciach, które mogą odgrywać duże znaczenie w przyszłości, jak grupa wschodzących potęg – BRICS – oraz aktywna polityka gospodarcza tego państwa. W ramach prób odbudowy swej pozycji na arenie międzynarodowej Rosja podejmuje także szereg istotnych działań o charakterze ekonomicznym. Przykładem przedsięwzięć służących wzrostowi rosyjskiej pozycji są zabiegi na obszarze tzw. „bliskiej zagranicy”, czyli krajów byłego ZSRR.

Niniejszy artykuł ma za zadanie przedstawić najważniejsze działania geoeconomiczne podejmowane przez Rosję w celu wywierania wpływu na jednego z sąsiadów – Ukrainę. Kraj ten, będący w ZSRR drugą najważniejszą republiką związkową, jest postrzegany przez rosyjskich decydentów jako niezwykle istotny, zarówno pod względem politycznym jak i ekonomicznym. Jednakże przy analizie geoeconomicznych działań Rosji względem Ukrainy ważny jest nie tyle sam ich przebieg, ile motywy, które kierowały stroną rosyjską przy ich podjęciu. Tymże motywom poświęcona będzie główna część tego artykułu. Geoeconomiczne motywy rosyjskich działań pozwolą na lepsze zrozumienie obecnej polityki tego państwa, gdyż ma ona swoje ściśle określone źródła, determinujące ją w ogromnym stopniu.

Nim jednak zostanie dokonany opis wymienionych kwestii warto zastanowić się nad znaczeniem paradygmatu geoeconomicznego we współczesnej polityce międzynarodowej i jego relacji do paradygmatu geopolitycznego. To właśnie model geoeconomiczny kieruje obecnymi działaniami Rosji, która – jak może się wydawać – odchodzi stopniowo od obowiązującej przez długie lata geopolityki, dlatego niezbędne jest wyjaśnienie jego podstawowych założeń.

Paradygmat geoeconomiczny

W dzisiejszych czasach można zaobserwować pojawienie się w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych, obok tradycyjnego paradygmatu geopolitycznego, nowego modelu badania procesów zachodzących w międzynarodowej przestrzeni – modelu geoeconomicznego. Czym jest geoeconomia, słowo, które stosunkowo niedawno pojawiło się w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych?

Pojęcie geokononomii definiowane było przez wielu badaczy. Próbę tą podjęli m.in. Edward Luttwak, Edward Haliżak i Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse. Luttwak określił geokononomię jako mieszaninę handlowych metod i logiki konfliktu. Geokononomię można więc – parafrazując słowa tego badacza – zdefiniować jako wykorzystanie argumentów i sposobów typowych dla działań gospodarczych w pojawiających się na arenie międzynarodowej sytuacjach konfliktowych. Bardziej rozszerzoną definicję prezentuje Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse, nazywając geokononomię połączeniem celów gospodarczych i geopolitycznych, w celu podporządkowania polityki gospodarczej priorytetowym zadaniom geostrategicznym. Najkrócej geokononomię definiuje Edward Haliżak – jako przeciwieństwo geopolityki, gdyż główne cele dla geopolityki i geokononomii są różne. Dla pierwszego pojęcia istotne są kwestie związane z bezpieczeństwem, natomiast dla drugiego – dobrobyt państwa. Ta definicja dotyka istotnej kwestii związanej z geokononomią: jej relacji do geopolityki¹.

Jak wspomniano wcześniej, geokononomia i geopolityka inaczej definiują główne cele, do których powinno dążyć państwo. W związku z tym inne formy aktywności państwa w środowisku międzynarodowym będą brane pod uwagę jako te, którym państwo powinno poświęcać jak najwięcej uwagi. Najważniejszą aktywnością państwa powinno być – według paradygmatu geokonomicznego – zapewnienie najlepszych możliwości rozwoju gospodarczego, np. przez ekspansję swojego kapitału czy odpowiednią politykę monetarną. Schemat geopolityczny z kolei przyjmuje jako najważniejsze opanowywanie konkretnych obszarów geograficznych przy wykorzystaniu siły militarnej².

Czy geokononomia i geopolityka, wobec przeciwnych środków i celów, są w związku nierozrwalnej sprzeczności? Otóż nie. Zdaniem Tomasza Grzegorza Grosse geokononomia może być traktowana jako jeszcze jeden typ strategii geopolitycznej. Głównym zasobem państwa jest nie siła militarna, czy wielkość posiadanego terytorium, tylko siła gospodarki – głównego państwowego instrumentu w międzynarodowej rywalizacji. Podobnie wypowiada się na ten temat Roman Kuźniar, dla którego geokononomia i geopolityka nie stoją w sprzeczności, a wręcz przeciwnie, wiele państw stosuje obydwa te paradygmaty równorzędnie³. Geokononomia i geopolityka mogą uzupełniać się wzajemnie, co więcej, połączenie metod i celów stosowanych w obydwu modelach może mieć wielką korzyść dla stosującego je podmiotu.

Obecnie paradygmat geokonomiczny zaczyna coraz bardziej dominować w stosunkach międzynarodowych. O potencjale państwa i jego pozycji na arenie międzynarodowej decyduje w dużej mierze skuteczna polityka ekonomicz-

¹ R. Szymanowski, *Geokononomia strefy euro*, <http://www.academia.edu/12163787/Geokononomia_strefy_euro>, (05.11.2015).

² P. Musiałek, *Geokononomia czy geopolityka? Strategia Gazpromu na rynku państw Unii Europejskiej*, „Kultura i polityka. Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Europejskiej im. księdza Józefa Tishnera w Krakowie”, 2014, nr 14, s. 82-95.

³ R. Szymanowski, *Geokononomia...*

na⁴. Jednakże – zdaniem wspomnianego wcześniej Edwarda Luttwaka – nie oznacza to radykalnej zmiany reguł gry w stosunkach międzynarodowych. W dalszym ciągu będzie dominował zero-jedynkowy model rywalizacji pomiędzy państwami a jedną z głównych funkcji państwa będzie zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa. Konflikty pomiędzy podmiotami stosunków międzynarodowych nie wygasną. Zmiana będzie dotyczyła metod, którymi państwa będą osiągały wytyczone cele. Jednym z dążeń na pewno pozostanie osiągnięcie wysokiej i stabilnej pozycji, umożliwiającej spokojny rozwój na arenie międzynarodowej⁵. Coraz częściej państwa używają do osiągnięcia tego celu metod związanych z budowaniem silnej gospodarki.

Jako przykład może posłużyć Japonia – państwo, które postawiło na rozwój gospodarczy. Obecnie, jako druga potęga gospodarcza świata, niewielka terytorialnie Japonia zaczyna coraz częściej myśleć o wiodącej roli na arenie międzynarodowej, także pod względem politycznym. Ten przykład pokazuje, że silna gospodarka może być punktem wyjścia dla budowy własnego międzynarodowego statusu. W ślady Japonii idą inne kraje, np. Chiny, dla których to właśnie rozwój gospodarczy – nie ogromne terytorium czy siła militarna – stał się podstawą dla budowy pozycji jednej z największych potęg świata. Schemat geoeconomiczny może być schematem wyznaczającym najważniejsze aspekty postępowania państw w XXI wieku.

Ekonomiczne działania Rosji względem Ukrainy

Państwem, które także zaczyna wykorzystywać czynniki geoeconomiczne w procesie odbudowy swojej mocarstwowej pozycji jest Rosja. Po upadku Związku Radzieckiego kraj ten został zdegradowany do roli mocarstwa regionalnego. Obecnie Rosja podejmuje działania, które mają na celu przywrócenie utraconej pozycji, m.in. przez odbudowę swojej strefy wpływów, obejmującej obszar byłego ZSRR. W Rosji silny jest „syndrom postimperialny” – tęsknota za wielkością Związku Radzieckiego, kraju, który był jednym z dwóch najpotężniejszych aktorów na światowej scenie. Nieprzypadkowo Władimir Putin nazwał rozpad ZSRR „największą katastrofą geopolityczną XX wieku”. Jego zdanie podziela znaczna część rosyjskich polityków. Nic więc dziwnego, że Rosja podejmuje działania w celu odbudowy swojej silnej międzynarodowej pozycji.

Jednym z państw leżących w sferze zainteresowań Rosji jest Ukraina – kraj, który po odzyskaniu niepodległości postanowił zbliżyć się do Europy Zachodniej. Dla Rosji Ukraina jest naturalną częścią jej strefy wpływów, gdyż od XVII wieku pozostawała w zależności od Rosji. Co więcej, Rosjanie często kwestionowali odrębność narodu ukraińskiego, postrzegając go jako podgrupę

⁴ B. Góralczyk, *Geoekonomia wypiera geopolitykę*, <http://www.obserwatorfinansowy.pl/tematyka/makroekonomia/geoekonomia-wypiera-geopolityke/>, (14.10.2015).

⁵ R. Szymanowski, *Geoekonomia...*

etniczną w ramach nacji rosyjskiej. Ukraina miała też ogromne znaczenie w byłym ZSRR, gdyż była republiką, w której koncentrowała się większość radzieckiego przemysłu ciężkiego⁶. Utrzymanie Ukrainy w rosyjskiej strefie wpływów jest dla Moskwy jedną z priorytetowych kwestii, dlatego wszelkie europejskie aspiracje Ukrainy Rosja odbiera jako potencjalne zagrożenie. W celu zatrzymania Ukrainy w swoim obszarze wpływów Rosja posługuje się zarówno argumentem siły militarnej, typowej dla paradygmatu geopolitycznego (czego najlepszym przykładem jest aneksja Krymu), oraz argumentami charakterystycznymi dla schematu geoeconomicznego. Druga grupa metod jest przez Rosję używana w ostatnich latach coraz częściej.

Najbardziej znanym przykładem prób wywierania ekonomicznego nacisku na Ukrainę są tzw. wojny gazowe. Są to próby presji stwarzanej przez Rosję na Ukrainę w zakresie cen i dostaw gazu ziemnego. „Wojny gazowe” między Rosją a Ukrainą miały miejsce od lat 90. – Rosja parokrotnie odcinała dostawy gazu w wyniku nieregulowania płatności przez stronę ukraińską. Rosja oskarżała także Ukrainę o podbieranie gazu z tranzytowych rurociągów, powodujące duże straty. Ukraina odpierała te zarzuty, m.in. prezes Naftohazu – ukraińskiego państwowego przedsiębiorstwa paliwowego stwierdził, że Rosja przesyłała zmniejszone ilości gazu krajom Europy Zachodniej i Środkowej, by móc o te braki oskarżyć Ukraińców⁷. Innym elementem wywierania nacisku na Ukrainę ze strony Rosji były próby zawyżania cen gazu, na co Kijów nie wyrażał zgody.

„Kryzysy gazowe” między obiema stronami były niezwykle częste w początku XXI wieku – najpoważniejszy miał miejsce na początku 2009 roku, kiedy w wyniku odcięcia rosyjskiego gazu ucierpiała nie tylko Ukraina, ale też inne kraje Europy Środkowej. Wiele z nich zanotowało spadki dostaw gazu z Rosji: Rumunia o 30 proc., Bułgaria o 15 proc., Chorwacja o 7,5 proc. Głównym powodem ograniczenia dostaw było – według strony rosyjskiej – nieregulowanie przez Ukrainę płatności za dostawy rosyjskiego gazu oraz kradzież – Gazprom oskarżył stronę ukraińską o kradzież 50 milionów metrów sześciennych gazu i użycie go na swoje własne potrzeby⁸. Naftohaz odpierał zarzuty twierdząc, że musi dokładać do dostaw Gazpromu własne zasoby, by Europejscy kontrahenci rosyjskiej spółki mogli odebrać obiecane ilości gazu⁹. Dzięki

⁶ M. Tomaszewicz, *Czy rozbiór Ukrainy się Rosji opłaca?*, <<http://swiat.newsweek.pl/agresja-rosji-na-ukraine-czy-rosja-zajmie-ukraine-newsweek-pl,artykuly,282987,1.html>>, (05.10.2015).

⁷ *Ukraina: Rosja wysyła mniej gazu, by móc oskarżyć nas o kradzież*, <<http://news.money.pl/artykul/ukraina;rosja;wysyla;mniej;gazu;by;oskarzyc;nas;o;kradziez,157,0,412573.htm>>, (05.11.2015).

⁸ *Kto kradnie gaz? Rosja oskarża Ukrainę*, <<http://tvn24bis.pl/wiadomosci-gospodarcze,71/kto-kradnie-gaz-rosja-oskarza-ukraine,81636.html>>, (05.11.2015).

⁹ A. Kublik, *Kryzys gazowy Rosji z Ukrainą idzie na Europe*, <http://wyborcza.biz/biznes/1,100896,6119910,Kryzys_gazowy_Rosji_z_Ukraina_idzie_na_Europe.html>, (05.10.2015).

mediacji Komisji Europejskiej kryzys udało się zakończyć. Jednakże podobna sytuacja miała miejsce w 2014 roku, gdy Rosja zagroziła po raz kolejny odcięciem Ukrainie dostaw tego surowca. Prezydent Putin ostrzegł wtedy, że już niedługo Gazprom przejdzie na system przedpłat przy rozliczaniu dostaw gazu ze stroną ukraińską¹⁰. Przywódca Rosji wskazał na ogromne zadłużenie Ukrainy względem jego kraju za dostawy gazu – wynosi on 2,2 mld dolarów. W związku z tak ogromnym zadłużeniem Gazprom będzie domagał się od Naftohazu zapłaty z góry, by nie generować długu w przyszłości i zabezpieczyć swoje roszczenia. Putin zagroził w kwietniu 2014 roku, że jeśli w ciągu miesiąca Ukraina nie zapłaci stronie rosyjskiej za dostawy gazu, Gazprom będzie stosował system przedpłat. Oprócz tego Gazprom podniósł po raz kolejny ceny gazu dla strony ukraińskiej¹¹. W czerwcu 2014 roku, po odmowie strony ukraińskiej na podwyższenie cen gazu, Rosja przerwała dostawy tego surowca na Ukrainę.

„Wojny gazowe” miały swoje źródło w wewnętrznej polityce energetycznej Ukrainy. Gaz ziemny jest bazowym paliwem dla tego kraju. Ukraina jest 13. konsumentem gazu ziemnego na świecie i 5. w Europie. W przybliżeniu 40 procent konsumpcji gazu na Ukrainie przypada na przemysł ciężki¹². Jest to także dominujące źródło energetyczne w tym kraju¹³. Według ministra energetyki Ukrainy Wołodymyra Demeszczyna gospodarstwa domowe w tym kraju zużywają 14 miliardów metrów sześciennych gazu na rok¹⁴. Te liczby pokazują skalę uzależnienia Ukrainy od zużycia i dostaw gazu z Rosji, nic więc dziwnego, że Rosja wykorzystuje ten surowiec jako swój główny „oręż” w walce ze zbyt ambitną polityką Ukrainy.

Jaki był główny cel Rosji? Poprzez wykorzystanie gazowego konfliktu Rosja chciała doprowadzić do utraty wiarygodności Ukrainy, szczególnie w oczach krajów UE. W ten sposób chciała nie dopuścić albo maksymalnie ograniczyć szansę Ukrainy na integrację z UE i NATO, w celu utrzymania tego kraju w swojej strefie wpływów¹⁵. Przykładowo przez oskarżenie Ukrainy o

¹⁰ Putin : sytuacja z długiem Ukrainy za rosyjski gaz jest tragiczna, <<http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/putin-sytuacja-z-dlugiem-ukrainy-za-rosyjski-gaz-jest-krytyczna/80bcl>>, (06.11.2015).

¹¹ A. Kublik, *Putin daje Ukrainie miesiąc. Słowacja nie pomoże*, <http://wyborcza.biz/biznes/1,100896,15821058,Putin_daje_Ukrainie_miesiac_Slowacja_nie_pomoze.html>, (06.11.2015).

¹² K. Czerniewicz, *Gazowa rewolucja na Ukrainie*, <<http://oaspl.org/2015/06/08/gazowa-rewolucja-na-ukrainie/>>, (16.10.2015).

¹³ P. Godlewski, *Ukraina, Rosja i UE w gazowym kłinczu*, <http://www.mojeopinie.pl/ukraina_rosja_i_ue_w_gazowym_klinczu,3,1399751277>, (16.10.2015).

¹⁴ P. Stępiński, *Ukraina potrzebuje 9 miliardów metrów sześciennych gazu z zagranicy*, <<http://biznesalert.pl/ukraina-potrzebuje-9-mld-m3-gazu-z-zagranicy/>>, (06.11.2015).

¹⁵ Sz. Urlik, *Konflikt gazowy narzędziem zwiększenia rosyjskich wpływów w Europie*, [w:] *Miedzy kryzysem a współpracą gospodarczą. Przykłady wyzwań i problemów w stosunkach międzynarodowych końca pierwszej dekady XXI wieku*, red. M. Lasoń, Kraków 2010, s. 198.

kradzieże gazu, Rosja pragnęła ją zdyskredytować jako zagrożenie dla dostaw tego surowca, a w konsekwencji dla bezpieczeństwa energetycznego w Europie¹⁶. Ukraina jako kraj niewywiązujący się ze swoich zobowiązań i nie podejmujący działań by tą sytuację zmienić, np. reform polityki energetycznej, nie miałaby szans na szybką integrację ze strukturami zachodnioeuropejskimi. Jedyłą alternatywą pozostałaby Rosja, a ściślej integracja z utworzoną przez nią Unią Euroazjatycką.

Innym elementem rosyjskiej presji ekonomicznej na Ukrainę jest problem restrukturyzacji jej długu. Skala zadłużenia zagranicznego tego państwa wynosi obecnie 109, 8%. Jest to jest jedną z najważniejszych przeszkód na drodze do przeprowadzenia reform strukturalnych gospodarki. Ukraina jest także bardzo zadłużona względem Rosji, która m.in. udzieliła jej w roku 2013 3 miliardy dolarów kredytu. Pożyczka miała miejsce w okresie prezydentury Wiktora Janukowicza, polityka przychylnego zbliżeniu Ukrainy z Moskwą, nie z UE. Rosja ma możliwość manipulowania formą tego kredytu – formalnie pożyczka udzielona Ukrainie była kredytem prywatnym, ponieważ jednak została zawarta między instytucjami państwowymi może być uznawana za pożyczkę państwową. Rosja może – w zależności od sytuacji – uznać kredyt za publiczny lub za prywatny. W obydwu wypadkach niespłacenie kredytu może dla Ukrainy oznaczać problemy w wypadku chęci zaciągnięcia innych kredytów u podmiotów prywatnych lub w Międzynarodowym Funduszu Walutowym.

Ukraina obecnie nie posiada środków pozwalających jej spłacić dług względem Rosji¹⁷. Zdaniem ekonomisty Janusza Jankowiaka dług jest idealnym narzędziem do wywierania presji na Ukrainę – jeśli stosunki między tymi państwami będą układały się źle, Rosja wystawi sąsiadowi rachunek¹⁸. Rosja odmawiała udziału w rozmowach dotyczących restrukturyzacji ukraińskiego długu, domagając się jego całkowitego zwrotu w grudniu 2015 roku. Według rosyjskiego ministra finansów Antona Siłuanowa Ukraina naruszyła warunki umowy kredytowej, gdyż poziom długu tego państwa przekroczył 60 procent jej PKB. Tym bardziej Rosja może domagać się wcześniejszego zwrotu całej pożyczki¹⁹. 14 października 2015 roku wszyscy wierzyciele Ukrainy wyrazili zgodę na restrukturyzację długu, z wyjątkiem Rosji, której przedstawiciele nie pojawili się na wyznaczonym spotkaniu. Minister Siłuanow twierdzi, że poro-

¹⁶ A. Szcześniak, *Ukraina – epicentrum międzynarodowej rywalizacji*, <<http://nowadebata.pl/2014/06/23/ukraina-epicentrum-miedzynarodowej-rywalizacji/>>, (17.10.2015).

¹⁷ R. Sadowski, *Ukraina na froncie finansowym – problem zagranicznego zadłużenia publicznego*, <<http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2015-08-05/ukraina-na-froncie-finansowym-problem-zagranicznego-zadluzenia>>, (17.10.2015).

¹⁸ *Ukraina jest bankrutem. Długi wobec Rosji sięgają 30 mld dolarów*, <<http://biznes.newsweek.pl/ukraina-na-skraju-bankructwa-na-uratowanie-potrzeba-150-mld-dolarow,artykuly,281060,1.html>>, (17.10.2015).

¹⁹ *Kolejny konflikt na linii Rosja – Ukraina. Moskwa żąda od Kijowa zwrotu pieniędzy*, <<http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1349924,Kolejny-konflikt-na-linii-RosjaUkraina-Moskwa-zazada-od-Kijowa-zwrotu-pieniedzy>>, (06.11.2015).

zumienie w sprawie restrukturyzacji długu dotyczy wierzycieli komercyjnych, natomiast Rosja jest wierzycielem państwowym i nie może przyjąć tego planu²⁰. Rozmowy Rosji i Ukrainy w sprawie restrukturyzacji długu stanęły w martwym punkcie i nie wiadomo, czy uda się rozwiązać tę patową sytuację.

Kolejną formą geoeconomicznego nacisku na Ukrainę są działania rosyjskie związane z umową stowarzyszeniową Ukrainy z UE, podpisaną w czerwcu 2014 roku. Jej istotną częścią jest umowa dotycząca całościowej i pogłębionej strefy wolnego handlu Ukrainy z UE. Jednakże jej wdrażanie w życie zostało przesunięte do końca 2015 roku pod presją Rosji, która brała udział w rozmowach dotyczących umowy i domagała się zmian w polityce celnej, która zapewniłaby jej dominującą pozycję w handlu z Ukrainą. Uwagi zgłaszane przez Rosję zostały uwzględnione w decyzji o przesunięciu wdrażania umowy w życie, podjętej przez UE i Ukrainę. W zamian za rezygnację z tych przywilejów Ukraina do końca 2015 roku miałaby korzystać z ulg handlowych na terenie Wspólnoty Niepodległych Państw²¹. Rosja, chcąc uwzględnienia swoich warunków, zagroziła wprowadzeniem cła na towary z Ukrainy od listopada, jeżeli opisywana umowa wejdzie w życie we wrześniu 2015 roku²².

Starania Rosji były jednoznacznie obliczone na zablokowanie procesu integracji ekonomicznej – a w konsekwencji politycznej Ukrainy z UE, poprzez odsuwanie w czasie istotnych postanowień, mogących wpłynąć na przyspieszenie tego procesu. Rosja wyzyskała złe położenie gospodarczo-polityczne Ukrainy, czyli wojnę na wschodzie kraju i kryzys gospodarczy, by móc forsować swój wariant. Zgoda UE na opóźnienie wdrażania umowy jest także – zdaniem wielu ekspertów – przyzwoleniem dla Rosji na dalszą dominację polityczną i ekonomiczną na obszarze postsowieckim, co może mieć konsekwencje w wypadku dalszych prób usamodzielniania się Ukrainy i innych byłych radzieckich republik²³. Nie jest wykluczone, że Rosja będzie próbowała zablokować proces integracji Ukrainy z UE także na późniejszych etapach, np. po wejściu w życie umowy dotyczącej strefy wolnego handlu.

Wnioski

Opisane powyżej przykłady pokazują jak silną presję geoeconomiczną Rosja wywiera na Ukrainę. Czemu jednak ona służy? Na pewno jednym z celów

²⁰ *Ukraina i Rosja nie porozumiały się w sprawie długu*, <<http://www4.rp.pl/Gospodarka/310109976-Ukraina-i-Rosja-nie-porozumialy-sie-ws-dlugu.html>>, (06.11.2015).

²¹ R. Sadowski, A. Wierzbowska-Miazga, *Rosja blokuje strefę wolnego handlu Ukrainy z UE*, <<http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2014-09-17/rosja-blokuje-strefe-wolnego-handlu-ukrainy-z-ue>>, (18.10.2015).

²² *Wdrażanie o wolnym handlu UE z Ukrainą odłożone do końca 2015 roku. Dlaczego?*, <<http://www.polskatimes.pl/artukul/3572265,wdrazanie-umowy-o-wolnym-handlu-ue-z-ukraina-odlozone-do-konca-2015-r-dlaczego,2,id,t,sa.html>>, (06.11.2015).

²³ R. Sadowski, A. Wierzbowska-Miazga, *op. cit.*

działań Rosji jest włączenie Ukrainy w budowaną obecnie przestrzeń geoeconomiczną, czego przykładem jest projekt Euroazjatyckiej Unii Gospodarczej (EUG). W skład tej organizacji wchodzi: Rosja, Białoruś, Kazachstan, Armenia i Kirgistan. Jednakże Rosja nie ukrywała, że najważniejszym ogniwem EUG byłaby Ukraina. Prowadzono nawet wstępne rozmowy w tej sprawie z prezydentem Janukowiczem na krótko przed jego obaleniem. Według tych planów Ukraina miała przystąpić do tej organizacji pod koniec 2015 roku²⁴. Dlaczego Rosji tak bardzo zależało na akcesji Ukrainy, kraju ze słabą i pogrążającą się w kryzysie gospodarką? Przecież wypadku przystąpienia Ukrainy, Moskwa musiałaby wspomagać jej gospodarkę dużymi dotacjami i inną formą gospodarczej pomocy. Przyłączenie Ukrainy do EUG byłoby więc działaniem niezwykle ryzykownym ekonomicznie. Jednakże Rosja jest gotowa to ryzyko podjąć, gdyż jej polityka ekonomiczna względem Ukrainy ma swoje źródło w czysto geopolitycznym spojrzeniu na ten kraj. Ukraina, jako była część ZSRR jest traktowana przez Rosję jako „chwilowo odłączona część składowa”. Działania podejmowane przez Rosję mają na celu uzyskanie kontroli nad Ukrainą, w sferze gospodarczej i politycznej. Rosja dąży do odbudowy swej pozycji wielkiego mocarstwa i zaczyna ten proces od rekonstrukcji strefy wpływów. Z trudem przyjęła do wiadomości przystąpienie do UE i NATO dawnych państw bloku wschodniego i krajów bałtyckich. Utrata Ukrainy byłaby jeszcze większym ciosem, gdyż oznaczałoby to porażkę rosyjskiej polityki zagranicznej, która pokazałaby, że Rosja nie jest krajem-liderem w regionie, przyciągającym inne państwa poradzieckie. A dla Rosji niezwykle istotny jest wizerunek państwa silnego, które jest motorem rozwoju na obszarze poradzieckim, przez co integruje inne kraje tego regionu. Dlatego też Moskwa liczy na dalszy rozwój EUG poprzez przyłączenie kolejnych państw poradzieckich.

Środki geoeconomiczne służące do uzyskania tego celu są o wiele skuteczniejsze i mniej kosztowne niż metody geopolityczne. Użycie siły militarnej może spowodować reperkusje na arenie międzynarodowej, czego najlepszym przykładem są nałożone na Rosję sankcje w roku 2014. Innym problemem mogą być nadmierne wydatki na zbrojenia, których Rosja może nie udźwignąć ekonomicznie. O wiele korzystniejsze okazuje się oddziaływanie czynnikami gospodarczymi, wyglądającymi z pozoru na pokojowe, a które w praktyce mogą zawierać w sobie elementy przymusu.

Przykładem takiego działania Rosji, nakierowanego na rozwój ekonomicznej strefy wpływów jest Euroazjatycka Unia Gospodarcza. Oficjalnie ugrupowanie to zostało powołane do wzmocnienia gospodarek krajów członkowskich, ich rozwoju i zbliżenia między nimi, jak stwierdził w przemówieniu prezydent Putin²⁵. W praktyce organizacja ta służy do wywierania ekonomicznego naci-

²⁴ *Euroazjatycka Unia Gospodarcza już w maju*,

<<http://www.euractiv.pl/rozszerzenie/artukul/euroazjatycka-unia-gospodarcza-ju-w-maju-005556>>, (07.11.2015).

²⁵ *Za rok ruszy Euroazjatycka Unia Gospodarcza*, <<http://tvn24bis.pl/wiadomosci-gospodarcze,71/za-rok-ruszy-euroazjatycka-unia-gospodarcza,382137.html>>, (07.11.2015).

sku przez Rosję na państwa członkowskie. Jako przykład można podać fakt mówiący o 10%-owym eksporcie do krajów EUG maszyn produkcji rosyjskiej, podczas gdy do innych krajów eksport tych produktów wynosi tylko 2%. Oznacza to, że Rosja po prostu narzuca członkom EUG swoje produkty i ceny²⁶, w ten sposób uzależniając ich ekonomicznie. Trzy komponenty, na których bazowała rosyjska mocarstwowość w czasach sowieckich i carskich, czyli: silna władza autorytarna, rozszerzanie swojej strefy wpływów przez podboje terytorialne, oraz ekonomia kładąca nacisk na stronę militarną są już coraz mniej aktualne²⁷. Kolejne rozszerzanie terytorium państwa byłoby dla Rosji niekorzystne poprzez brak odpowiednich środków finansowych i ryzyko coraz większej izolacji na arenie międzynarodowej, czego skutkiem mógłby być upadek gospodarczy tego kraju. Rosja woli wykorzystać swój relatywnie dobry, w porównaniu do innych krajów postradzieckich, potencjał gospodarczy i budować nową strefę wpływów – tym razem ekonomiczną. Odnosi się to szczególnie do Ukrainy, która poprzez swoją fatalną sytuację gospodarczą może być niezwykle łatwo zdominowana przez Rosję.

Gospodarcze środki przymusu wywierane przez Rosję na Ukrainę pokazują, że geoeconomia i geopolityka nie są przeciwstawnymi paradygmatami, wręcz przeciwnie, doskonale się uzupełniają i korzystają jeden od drugiego. Opisany przypadek dowodzi, iż często geopolityczny cel jest bazą dla geoeconomicznych środków jego osiągnięcia. Poprzez jego wyznaczenie i brak lub niemożność zastosowania odpowiednich metod charakterystycznych dla geopolityki (np. zaboru terytorium), państwa sięgają po sposoby geoeconomiczne, jako dające możliwość szybszej i bardziej efektywnej realizacji planu.

Jak geoeconomiczne naciski Rosji mogą wpłynąć na przyszłe relacje tego kraju z Ukrainą? Prawdopodobnie Rosja w dalszym ciągu będzie podejmowała starania w celu niedopuszczenia do rozwoju integracji Ukrainy z UE. Rosja może także w grudniu przymusić Ukrainę do spłaty swego zadłużenia, a wtedy Kijów będzie zmuszony ogłosić bankructwo. Może być to pierwszy krok do pełnego zwasalizowania Ukrainy przez Rosję, jak to miało miejsce w wypadku Białorusi. Konsekwencją może być pełne uczestnictwo Ukrainy w EUG. Ukraina może próbować podejmować próby integracji z Zachodem, jednak jej fatalna sytuacja ekonomiczna czyni na razie to zadanie niewykonalnym. Czas pokaże, która opcja przeważy. Możemy się spodziewać dalszych prób ze strony Rosji, podejmowanych w celu destabilizacji sytuacji na Ukrainie – a w konsekwencji realizacji swego planu budowy strefy wpływów.

²⁶ O. Wasiuta, *Integracja Eurazji jako globalny projekt geopolityczny Rosji*, „Przegląd Geopolityczny”, 2014, tom 7, s. 44.

²⁷ S. Bieleń, *Tożsamość międzynarodowa Federacji Rosyjskiej*, Warszawa 2006, s. 91-92.

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ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE EU-RUSSIAN SANCTIONS

Summary:

The current sustainable development of the world is threatened by a lot of factors, e.g. armed conflicts, terrorism, migration waves and others. Nowadays, the most significant factor for the Slovak Republic, and the whole Middle Europe, is the conflict in the Ukraine. The European Union has been joined to solution of this conflict since its beginning. The contribution summarizes the sanctions development between the Russian Federation and the European Union. The sanctions have relevant impact on the development of various economic indicators, through which we can describe the economy development of the country. The main aim of the paper is to describe the development of strategic raw materials prices and their correlation with imposed sanctions.

Key words:

sanctions, embargoes, crisis, Ukraine conflict, consequences

Introduction

The relationship between NATO and the former Soviet Union and now Russia has been at the centre of European and international politics for over 60 years. NATO and Russia have not been able to achieve the stated intention of forging a partnership. Russia's sensitivity regarding the enlargement of the NATO Alliance has been a consistent source of serious tension. Although few might have anticipated the deterioration of the European/Eurasian security environment that we have witnessed as a result of the Ukrainian conflict, in many respects, Russia's clash with the West over Ukraine might have been anticipated.

The tensions between Russia and NATO (EU) countries have culminated in the current crisis in Ukraine, which threatens not only to devastate the society, but also to unravel all progress achieved in building greater peace and security in Europe and the world since the end of the Cold War.

Background of conflict in the Ukraine

Conflict between the pro-Russian separatists and the Ukrainian armed forces represents a serious threat to the global security and the disruption of a peaceful order in Europe. It is so difficult to clearly identify what was the trigger sequence of events which resulted in the current situation. Perhaps we can only assume that dissatisfaction of Ukraine citizens come from results of elections in 2004 and the suspension of negotiations on the Association Agreement with the European Union has escalated so much that they started to show their opposition publicly. On 21st November 2013, the Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych suspended preparations for an Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the European Union. The announcement initiated protests among those favouring stronger ties with the European Union, which, in February 2014 resulted in a change of the Ukrainian government.

However, residents of southern and eastern Ukraine demonstrated against this new pro-European administration and eventually began to actually fight for closer ties with the Russian Federation. Conflict between Ukraine and pro-Russian forces has started on 27th February 2014, when the invaders took over the public buildings in Crimea¹.

On 1st March 2014, Russian president Vladimir Putin sent out troops to Crimea to protect ethnic Russians from anti-government protesters in Kiev. The Russian troops surrounded the Ukrainian military bases and within two days Crimea was in virtual control of Russia. On 4th March, Putin denied suspicion of military conflict though he maintained that Russia “reserves the right to use all means at its disposal to protect” Russian citizens and ethnic Russians in the region. On 25th March, Oleksandr Turchynov, Ukraine's acting president, ordered the Ukrainian troops to withdraw from Crimea after formal Russian annexation².

Ongoing fighting in Ukraine and loss of life or damage to property related to that cannot be unnoticed by the international organizations. They take an initiative to resolve the existing conflict as fast as possible in a peaceful way. The EU decided to solve the situation by imposition of sanctions (e.g. freezing Ukrainian government accounts) in February 2014, and then the sanctions were directed also against the Russian Federation, which according to available information supports pro-Russian separatist activities.

¹ S. Cross, *NATO–Russia security challenges in the aftermath of Ukraine conflict: managing Black Sea security and beyond*, “Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea”, 2015, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 151-177.

² S.J. Ahsan, *The Ukraine Crisis: Awaited Revolution*, “Defence Journal” 2015, 03, vol. 18, no. 8, pp. 25-33.

Brief history of the imposed sanctions

Organizations of international crisis management took an initiative to end the conflict in a peaceful way and as soon as possible. Mentioned sanctions imposed against the Russian Federation included:

- an asset freeze for certain individuals (total of 151) and entities (total of 37) and a travel ban for certain individuals because of their direct involvement in the situation development in Ukraine³;
- the sectorial sanctions targeting Russia's oil industry, financial sector and the military or arms industry, which include following restrictions:
 - restrictions on financing some companies owned by the Russian government (banks, oil companies and companies and entities engaged in designing production, sales or export of military equipment or services); this restriction includes a prohibition to deal in security and money market instruments, issued by the companies mentioned above, with a maturity above 30 days;
 - restrictions to provide, directly or indirectly, loans or credit to the above mentioned companies with a maturity exceeding 30 days;
 - restrictions on export of military and dual-use items to Russia and for use in Russia⁴;
 - restrictions on the export and supply of certain oil-related goods and technologies to Russia and for use in Russia;
- imposition of the strictest sanctions targeted towards trade with Crimea and Sevastopol in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol⁵.

General Assembly of the UN adopted resolution no. 68/262 about territorial integrity of Ukraine which recalls the obligations of all states under Article 2 of the Charter of the UN to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any

³ Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, <<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/SK/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014R0269&from=SK>> (16.10.2015).

⁴ Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, <<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/SK/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014D0512&from=EN>> (16.03.2015); Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, <<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/SK/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014R0833&from=EN>> (16.03.2015).

⁵ Council Regulation (EU) No 960/2014 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, <<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/SK/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014R0960&from=EN>> (16.03.2015).

State, and to settle their international disputes by peaceful means⁶. This resolution notes that the referendum held in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol in March 2014 was not authorized by Ukraine. In direct connection with the UN resolution, the EU Council adopted decision No. 2014/386/CFSP and EU Regulations No. 692/2014 (June 2014) and No. 825/2014 (July 2014), which were significantly extended by the EU Regulation No. 1351/2014 in December 2014. Through this regulation any trade and investment in Crimea and Sevastopol was practically restricted.

The Russian Federation responded with sanctions against the EU through the adoption of retaliatory measures in March 2014. At first, it was asset freeze and travel ban for people, including even government officials to Russia. In August, the Russian president V. V. Putin signed a decree on the application of specific economic measures, which imposed annual ban on import of majority of agricultural products from countries, which had adopted sanctions against Russia. Next day, the Russian Federation government adopted a decree with the list of countries and different products to which the embargo is targeted. It should be noted that before imposing an embargo, food export from the EU to Russia was approximately about 11.8 billion €, which represents 10% of the Russian consumption⁷.

The EU tries to resolve existing conflict by using different instruments than sanctions. In November 2014 an agreement has been signed between the EU and Ukraine on the establishment of a mission EUAM (the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Sector Reform Ukraine). This mission is focused on assisting and helping Ukraine in the security sector reform issues, including the security forces, prosecution, the judiciary and others. The mandate of the operation is approved for two years. An extension of it will be based on the achieved results. The headquarters of EUAM Ukraine is situated in Kiev. It is necessary to emphasize that EUAM Ukraine is a non-combatant and unarmed civilian mission of the EU⁸.

Sanctions consequences

Sanctions are a kind of trade nontariff barrier aimed at achieving political goals at the cost of unacceptable economic losses. However, in the open global economy, the introduction of sanctions in major countries leads to negative

⁶ Resolution Adopted by General Assembly No. 68/262 Territorial integrity of Ukraine, <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/262> (16.03.2015).

⁷ Russia Hits West with Food Import Ban in Sanctions Row, <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28687172>> (16.03.2015).

⁸ Fact Sheet – EU – Ukraine relations. 2015, <http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140514_02_en.pdf> (10.03.2015).

mirror effects⁹. Sanctions and embargoes are political and trade restrictions. They are imposed on target countries to maintain or restore peace and security in the region. According to Filip, sanctions are economic instruments used in international crisis management. They keep influencing on the state of a crisis development through the prosperity of another country¹⁰. They are divided into economic rewards and economic sanctions. The sanctions are a particular form of economic punishment against the target country. The domestic impact on Russia can be divided into three aspects:

- impact on the Russian economy,
- impact on the Russian domestic politics,
- impact on the current situation in Ukraine.

Economic sanctions have certain negative effects on the Russian economy. The most important for Russian channels of the sanctions impact on economic dynamics are limitations of debt financing on markets in the European Union, trade restrictions of dual use goods, the decrease in industrial cooperation, a reduction in foreign direct investment from the countries of the European Union, growth in the internal prices of certain products, and an embargo on access to high technologies in energy sector.

Economic impact of imposed sanctions also includes changes of rouble exchange rate against US dollar. Changes of several commodities prices, for example crude oil and gas, can be considered as an indirect consequence. Sanctions against Russia were adopted in March and December 2014. Restriction measures adopted in December can be classified as more strict. In August, Russia responded by imposing an embargo on import of agricultural products from countries which had adopted restrictive measures against it. This paper pays attention mainly to the development of the above mentioned indicators, namely, in short term after imposition of sanctions.


Progress of exchange rate reflects the confidence level of financial markets to a specific country. Figure 1 shows change of the rouble exchange rate against the exchange rate of the US dollar. The rouble exchange rate is significantly influenced by the EU sanctions. Due to the first sanctions introduced in March 2014, its exchange rate decreased. However, the decrease was not so significant, so the rouble remained relatively stable. After stricter sanctions imposed in December 2014, exchange rate of the rouble had already declined significantly, namely by over 10% per month. Russia has responded by adopting several monetary measures. Through them, the rouble exchange rate slightly appreciated in March 2015. It can be assumed that development of the rouble exchange rate will be influenced by Council Decision 2015/959 CFSP, which extended the sanctions until 23 June 2016. In absolute numbers in November 2013 was the rouble exchange rate against the dollar was 32,645 rouble per 1

⁹ A.A. Shirov, A.A. Yantovskii, V.V. Potapenko. *Evaluation of the Potential Effect of Sanctions on the Economic Development of Russia and the European Union*, "Studies on Russian Economic Development" 2015, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 317-326.

¹⁰ Novak L. et al., *Resource Planning for Solution of Crisis Situations*, Bratislava 2010.

dollar. In September 2015 it was 66,766 rouble per 1 dollar. Due to imposed sanctions the rouble against the dollar exchange rate is more than 2-times weaker than it was before sanctions¹¹.

Fig. 1. Graph of the rouble exchange rate development.



Source: Monthly Monetary and Financial Statistics (MEI): Interest Rates, <http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=86> (16.07.2015).

The short-term interest rate was and still is one of the most important tools used to stabilize the rouble exchange rate. After imposition of the sanctions in December 2014, the short-term interest rate in Russia increased above 20%. The main aim of this measure was to avoid mass cash withdrawal and thus subsequent loss of liquidity by Russian banks. Currently, value of the short-term interest rate is still higher than it was before sanctions imposing. Totally it was more than 7%. The average value of long-term interest rate was 8% in the Russian Federation, but after imposition of the sanctions in December 2014 it increased to 10%. On the contrary, value of the long-term interest rate in the EU has been decreasing since January 2014. It decreased from 3.21% in January 2014 to 0.85% in April 2015¹².

Inflation, as an indicator, expresses the increase of the price level. The highest inflation rate in Russia, since the sanctions imposition, was during December 2014 and January 2015. It was directly caused by the depreciation of


¹¹ Monthly Monetary and Financial Statistics (MEI): Exchange Rates (USD Monthly Averages), <http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=169> (16.07.2015).

¹² Monthly Monetary and Financial Statistics (MEI): Interest Rates, <http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=86> (16.07.2015).

rouble and increase of the short-term and long-term interest rates. Although, inflation rate in Russia is still growing after February 2015, its growth is slower. Before sanctions were imposed, inflation had index 124,2 (November 2013). After sanctions were imposed, inflations had index 153,5 (September 2015). Index 100 means level of inflation, which was at the selected month in year 2010¹³.

Russian gross domestic product (GDP) has survived the combined pressure of the global economy and sanctions quite well in 2014 by showing an average of 0,6 % growth (fig. 2). Negative effects appeared first in Q1 2015 when the Russian economy declined by 2,2 %. The decline was even deeper in Q2 2015 when the GDP dropped 4,5 %. When comparing the Russian GDP drop in Q2 2015 with the GDP growth of Eurozone (0,4%), the negative effect is evident. However, when one compares the decline of GDP in Russia with the economic decline in Ukraine (-17.2% in Q2 2015), it is even more evident that current sanctions have not been sufficient to bring the level of costs of continuing the conflict in Russia as high as it has been with the Ukrainian economy¹⁴.

Fig. 2. Graph of Russian GDP development.



Source: J. Jansen, *EU Sanctions Against Russia: New Targets and State of Play*, DLA Paper, 11.02.2015,

¹³ Consumer Prices (MEI): Consumer Prices,

<http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=MEI_PRICES#> (16.05.2015).

¹⁴ Veebel V., R. Markus, *Lessons from the EU-Russia Sanctions 2014-2015*, "Baltic Journal of Law and Politics" 2015, vol. 8 no. 1, pp. 165-194; Domestic product, <<https://data.oecd.org/gdp/quarterly-gdp.htm#indicator-chart>> (16.07.2015).

<<https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2015/02/eu-sanctions-against-russia/>> (16.03.2015).

Based on the selected indicators, we can conclude that the EU sanctions significantly influence economy of the Russian Federation. The European Commission estimates that GDP growth in Russia will decrease at least by 1.1 % in 2015 and it will be influenced by sanctions against Russia. Furthermore, rouble depreciated and significant outflow of capital from Russia began. Overall, capital value is in the amount of 130 billion dollars. According to estimates of the European Commission, the sanctions will also reduce GDP growth in the EU by 0.2-0.3 % in 2015. According to available information sources, decrease of export from the EU to the Russian Federation is in the amount of more than 60 %¹⁵.

The sanctions have caused no impact on Russia's domestic politics. The EU sanctions against Russia have inspired strong patriotism and nationalism in Russians. Rather than shake the public's support for the government, the sanctions have helped the government to mobilize its citizens. As phrased by Igor Yurgens, the President of the Russian think tank Institute for Contemporary Development, "Sanctions do not destabilize Russia's regime; on the contrary, they help Putin mobilize nationalism among the political elites"¹⁶

Sanctions' impact on raw commodity prices

In addition to the changes in exchange rates and inflation rate caused directly by sanctions and embargoes, there are also other indicators which should be paid attention to. It is, for example, price of strategic raw materials, such as oil and natural gas. These commodities are among the most important sources of the Russian Federation's income. The EU together with the United States has the political and economic instruments to reduce prices of these commodities, either by influencing the world stock exchanges, or exerting pressure on OPEC members¹⁷.

In fig. 3 we can see a decline in oil prices, which is more than 50% in one year. However, we can only assume that oil prices decline was an indirect revenge of the United States and other countries to which Russia imposed embargo on goods import¹⁸. Another explanation could be that production of crude oil is still growing more¹⁹ than demand on markets, which pushes price down.

¹⁵ J. Jansen, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ W. Wang, *Impact of Western Sanctions on Russia in the Ukraine Crisis*, "Journal of Politics and Law" 2015, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 1-6.


¹⁷ OPEC means Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.

¹⁸ Petroleum and others liquid, <https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_m.htm> (16.07.2015).

¹⁹ World Crude Oil Production, <https://ycharts.com/indicators/world_crude_oil_production> (16.07.2015).

Price of gas did not fall as much as the oil price. The gas price declined more than 25% in one year. More significant decline was after imposing sanctions against Russia in December 2014. Nowadays the natural gas price is still decreasing²⁰.

Fig. 3. Graph of crude oil Brent spot prices development.



Source: World Crude Oil Production,
https://ycharts.com/indicators/world_crude_oil_production (16.07.2015).

Situation in Ukraine influences the global security environment. Changes in the security environment also reflect in the economic environment, for example by growth of strategic commodities prices, namely oil and gas. The above mentioned strategic commodities are necessary for the sustainable economic growth of each country. Especially ensuring resources for future development of the country is considered as a strategic priority of security²¹. Sanctions raised concerns about the possible suspension of energy resources supply to Europe. Especially Eastern Europe countries are dependent on Russian gas. These countries rely on Russia for at least 60% of their gas²². Commodity prices did not increase, on the contrary, price decreased. Based on the current prices

²⁰ Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price,
https://ycharts.com/indicators/natural_gas_spot_price (16.07.2015).

²¹ A. Kelisek et al., *Economic Security - A Principal Component of Multilevel Security Concept in Global Economy*, "Communications – Scientific Letters of the University of Žilina" 2011, vol. 13. no. 2, pp. 44-48.

²² E. Sventekova et. al., *Solution of Gas Crisis as a Task of Risk Management in Slovakia*, Proc. of WMSCI 2009 The 13th World Multi-Conference on Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics (jointly with The 15th International Conference on Information Systems Analysis and Synthesis, ISAS 2009), Orlando 2009, pp. 384-388.

development, it can be stated that they will be regulated in some way by countries, which adopted sanctions against Russia. It could mean, from one point of view, as another form of sanctions against Russia. However, this statement is not possible to substantiate by any official sources.

Conclusion

We can make some conclusions based on the description of sanctions and embargoes as such, but these conclusions are mainly based on characterization of specific measures imposed by the EU against the Russian Federation. Imposition of sanctions by the EU definitely disrupted economy of the Russian Federation. The exchange rate of rouble decreased and inflation rate in the country increased. Whether the adoption of specific restrictive measures fulfilled the primary purpose is already difficult to say with certainty. The main purpose of all these measures was the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Ukraine. Another purpose was to persuade Russia to cease to support efforts of Crimea peninsula inhabitants to affiliate to the Russian Federation by its activities. Despite of the ceasefire, there are still a lot of attacks and fights, so the effectiveness of these measures is questionable.

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II. KOMUNIKATY

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EKONOMICZNE REFORMY NA UKRAINIE JAKO CZYNNIK BEZPIECZEŃSTWA NARODOWEGO

Streszczenie:

Zdaniem autorów agresywna i wojownicza polityka Kremla wobec Ukrainy świadczy o głębokim społecznym i gospodarczym kryzysie w samej Rosji, który w dużym stopniu, jest następstwem niezdolności Rosji do adaptacji do procesów globalizacyjnych i przyspieszonego postępu naukowo-technicznego we współczesnym świecie. Autorzy w swoim tekście w zwięzły i treściwy sposób usiłują wyróżnić najpoważniejsze i najbardziej dotkliwe problemy narosłe w ukraińskiej gospodarce w ciągu ostatniego ćwierćwiecza. W tekście wymieniono potrzebne reformy i działania ekonomiczne, które muszą zostać przedsięwzięte w celu „przebudzenia” uspionego potencjału ukraińskiej gospodarki. Kluczową receptą dla pobudzenia szybkiego rozwoju ukraińskiej gospodarki zalecaną w artykule jest paląca potrzeba odpolitycznienia i dezoligarchizacji ukraińskiej gospodarki.

Summary:

According to the authors, the Kremlin's aggressive and belligerent policy toward Ukraine is indicative of a deep social and economic crisis in Russia itself that is, to a large extent, a corollary of Russia's inability to adapt to globalization processes and an accelerated scientific-technical progress in the contemporary world. The authors in a concise and brief manner attempt to differentiate the most severe and poignant problems accrued in the Ukrainian economy in the last quarter-century in the text. The necessary economic reforms and actions that must be undertaken to “wake up” the dormant potential of Ukrainian economy are enumerated in the text. The key recipe to stir up the fast development of Ukraine's economy recommended in the paper is an urgent necessity to depoliticize and “deoligarchise” the Ukrainian economy.

Słowa kluczowe:

konflikt rosyjsko-ukraiński, Ukraina, gospodarka ukraińska, reformy gospodarki ukraińskiej

Key words:

Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Ukraine, Ukrainian economy, reforms of Ukrainian economy

Można dziś wyraźnie stwierdzić, że rosyjska aneksja Krymu i agresja militarna na wschodzie Ukrainy potwierdziły proces transformacji Ukrainy z kraju postsowieckiego w niepodległe państwo. Władze Kremla zostały zmuszone do użycia siły wojskowej, ponieważ czuły, że instrumenty utrzymywania Ukrainy w rosyjskiej orbicie wpływów stosowane przez minione 23 lata, przestały być skuteczne. Dziś państwo i społeczeństwo ukraińskie są zmuszone chwycić za broń, aby walczyć o prawo swobodnego wyboru priorytetów i kierunków rozwoju.

Wydarzenia na Ukrainie rozgrywają się w tle globalnych przekształceń. Naukowcy i eksperci są niemal jednomyślni w przewidywaniu, że świat znajduje się w przededniu nowego skoku technologicznego, po którym znacząco spadnie rola ropy naftowej, gazu ziemnego oraz innych paliw kopalnych. Energia odnawialna, biotechnologia, niskoenergetyczne reakcje jądrowe (zwane również zimną fuzją), samochody elektryczne, przełom w branży IT – to wszystko czeka na nas w niedalekiej przyszłości. Postęp technologiczny i radykalne zmiany, które zazwyczaj towarzyszą naruszaniu obowiązującego porządku świata, rodzą kryzys sektora bezpieczeństwa, który pod znakiem zapytania stawia skuteczność państw narodowych.

Globalizacja we współczesnym świecie przyspiesza. Na naszych oczach następują procesy integracyjne – transpacyficzne, transatlantyckie, powstanie Nowego Jedwabnego Szlaku. Organizacje międzynarodowe, przekształcając ład światowy, pogłębiają erozję państw narodowych. USA i Unia Europejska szukają modelu koegzystencji z ChRL. Rosja i Chiny starają się „przypomnieć” światu o swojej wielkości. Zmiany zachodzą na całym kontynencie euroazjatyckim, czego wynikiem jest konflikt bliskowschodni, napięcie w Azji Środkowej, problemy na Dalekim Wschodzie.

Rosja (albo raczej jej elity polityczne) odpowiedzi na powyższe wyzwania szuka w spowolnieniu obiektywnych globalnych procesów i powrocie do modelu konfrontacji „wielkich mocarstw” z XIX i XX w., a jeśli nie będzie to możliwe – w odizolowaniu postępu i odgródzeniu od cywilizowanego świata ściśle kontrolowanymi peryferiami (tzw. buforem bezpieczeństwa). To, naszym zdaniem, oddaje sens teorii o „specjalnej drodze Rosji”, jej unikalnej cywilizacji itd. Zamiast szybkiej modernizacji i adaptacji do nurtów obowiązujących w cywilizowanym świecie, władze rosyjskie „zdradziły społeczeństwo”, wybierając drogę samodegradacji.

Przyszłość Rosji może się jednak rozstrzygać gdzie indziej – niezależna, wolna i modernizująca się Ukraina może być kluczem do przekształceń systemu władzy w Rosji. Stąd też sukces Ukrainy w walce o prawdziwą niepodle-

głość, sprawną gospodarkę, prospołeczne reformy oraz praworządność w państwie będzie oznaczał zasadniczą transformację Rosji i jej odejście od autokratycznej dyktatury.

Aneksja Krymu i rozpoczęcie rosyjskiej agresji na wschodnią Ukrainę, jest cynicznym i rażącym naruszeniem prawa międzynarodowego, bezpośrednio uwidaczniającym głęboki kryzys współczesnego porządku światowego. Tak więc obecny konflikt rosyjsko-ukraiński jest jednym z wymiarów kryzysu światowego porządku, a także – co należy podkreślić – przejawem kryzysu rosyjskiego modelu społecznego. Stąd nie mamy tu do czynienia z „kwestią ukraińską”, lecz z kwestią rosyjską, która może znaleźć rozwiązanie tylko w ramach nowego globalnego układu sił.

W ciągu ostatnich dwóch lat Ukraina poszukiwała nowego paradygmatu rozwoju, starając się znaleźć sposób przekształcenia postsowieckiego oligarchicznego modelu stosunków społeczno-ekonomicznych w model bardziej efektywny. Ale zmienił się też otaczający świat, zwiększył się i pogłębił kryzys światowego bezpieczeństwa. Ukraina powinna w tej sytuacji kontynuować proces przekształceń, ponieważ pomimo pośrednich sukcesów, tylko odzyskanie pełnej suwerenności i niezależności państwowej pozwoli zapewnić krajowi pomyślny rozwój na następne dziesięciolecie. Przede wszystkim trzeba przeprowadzić szereg ważnych, ustrojowych reform, o znaczeniu strategicznym dla funkcjonowania państwa. Oczywiście jest, że strategia rozwoju kraju to nie tylko kwestie gospodarcze – to przede wszystkim fundamentalne perspektywy politycznej, społecznej, moralnej i oczywiście ekonomicznej, zrównoważonej transformacji.

Ukraiński produkt krajowy brutto w ciągu ostatnich 25 lat zmniejszył się o 35%. Według Banku Światowego jest to najgorszy wynik na świecie. Ze 166 krajów, które ujawniły swoje statystyki PKB za lata 1991-2014, sumaryczny spadek PKB zanotowało tylko pięć krajów. Ukraina „wyprzedziła” Mołdawię (-29%), Gruzję (-15%), Zimbabwe (-2,3%) i Republikę Środkowoafrykańską (-0,94%). Pozostałe kraje zanotowały wzrost PKB – od minimalnego, w przypadku Barbadosu (8,9%) i Tadżykistanu (10,6%), po dziesięciokrotny w przypadku ChRL. Ukraina straciła jedną trzecią PKB w ujęciu realnym; podczas gdy w 1990 roku PKB Ukrainy *per capita* (PPP) miał lepszą pozycję wyjściową od Malezji, Polski i Białorusi, był na równi z Turcją i Rumunią.

Taka bezprecedensowa ekonomiczna zapaść Ukrainy odbywała się w tle monopolizacji gospodarki, technologicznej prymitywizacji produkcji, dezindustrializacji, rozkwitu korupcji oraz powstania i utrwalenia systemu oligarchicznego. Natomiast te kraje, które postawiły na rozwój przedsiębiorczości, uczciwą rynkową konkurencję, nowe możliwości inwestycyjne oraz produkcję o wysokiej wartości dodanej, odnotowywały pomyślny rozwój. W rezultacie realny PKB Ukrainy na mieszkańca (według parytetu siły nabywczej) w 2014 roku wyniósł 8267 dolarów amerykańskich – dwa razy mniej niż PKB Białorusi, Rumunii, Turcji i trzy razy mniej niż PKB Malezji i Polski. Nominalny PKB na Ukrainie w 2014 r. wyniósł 2314 dolarów *per capita*.

Kontynuacja polityki rynkowego fundamentalizmu, z jednostronnym naciskiem na deregulację i prywatyzację jako uniwersalne panaceum, „zaciśnięcie pasa” przez społeczeństwo oraz fanatyczna konsolidacja fiskalna w połączeniu z regularnymi pożyczkami zagranicznymi, a także restrykcyjna polityka pieniężna Narodowego Banku Ukrainy, przyczyniły się do zakonserwowania modelu gospodarki, w którym Ukraina eksportuje za granicę surowce i mało zaawansowane technologicznie produkty o niskiej wartości dodanej, a także utalentowanych pracowników, natomiast importuje drogą energię, produkty o wysokiej wartości dodanej, otrzymując przy tym międzynarodową pomoc finansową.

W rezultacie militarnej agresji Rosji przeciwko Ukrainie oraz realizacji dysfunkcyjnej polityki gospodarczej, na początku 2015 r. wartość produkcji przemysłowej spadła o 18%, eksport towarów z Ukrainy zmniejszył się o 37,8%, bezpośrednie inwestycje zagraniczne spadły o 3,6 mld dolarów, oficjalna stopa bezrobocia (wg MOP) wyniosła 9,6%, (czyli 1,7 mln osób), a wśród młodych – prawie 23%. W rezultacie, zaktualizowana prognoza MFW przewidywała spadek PKB Ukrainy w 2015 roku rzędu 11%, zaś prognoza Banku Światowego - rzędu 12%.

Ukraina pogrążyła się w depresji gospodarczej, charakteryzującej się trwałą i długoterminową negatywną dynamiką PKB, spadkiem inwestycji, zwiększaniem zadłużenia państwa, spadkiem produkcji przemysłowej, eksportu, zatrudnienia i kursu hrywny oraz inflacją cen. Zamiast tworzyć nowe perspektywy rozwoju kraj stanął na skraju destabilizacji społecznej, miliony ludzi znalazły się na granicy ubóstwa, zaś przedsiębiorcy oraz młodzi ludzie coraz częściej emigrują za granicę w poszukiwaniu lepszego życia. Sytuację dodatkowo komplikują działania wojenne we wschodniej Ukrainie.

W obecnych realiach założenia wzrostu gospodarczego na poziomie nie mniejszym niż 5-6% jest staję się istotnym elementem strategii rozwoju państwa. Jednak przy całej rozciągłości rewolucyjnych przekształceń, nie może być ignorowana zasada ciągłości rozwoju. Początki katastrofalnego stanu ukraińskiej gospodarki leżą właśnie w ignorowaniu tej logiki. Za każdym razem, gdy nowe siły polityczne przychodzą do władzy, chcą wszystko rozpoczynać od początku i dokonywać nowego podziału własności. Żadna gospodarka nie jest w stanie tego wytrzymać, stąd problem odpolitycznienia systemu gospodarczego i jego „dezoligarchizacji” wydaje się kluczowym.

W związku z powyższym, wraz z podstawowymi reformami instytucjonalnymi, dotyczącymi sądownictwa, prokuratury, policji, służby cywilnej, powinna – naszym zdaniem – nastąpić radykalna zmiana podstawowego podejścia do polityki gospodarczej, w celu zapewnienia interesów narodowych Ukrainy (w tym w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa). Należy doprowadzić do realizacji trzech założeń:

1. likwidacji najważniejszych „obciążeń” i determinantów nierównowagi strukturalnej, które blokują przyspieszony rozwój gospodarczy:

- a. usunięcia „pętli zadłużenia” gospodarki – przeprowadzenie nowej fazy negocjacji w sprawie dodatkowego podliczenia długu publicznego z anulowaniem „pętającego” Ukrainę mechanizmu VRI (zgodnie z którym następne pokolenie będzie zmuszone oddać ukraińskim wierzycielom ponad jedną trzecią wzrostu gospodarczego kraju);
 - b. usunięcia „pętli energetycznej” gospodarki – całościowa energomodernizacja i wyeliminowanie marnotrawstwa zużycia energii oraz likwidacja zależności energetycznej od Rosji;
 - c. wyeliminowania „głodu zasobów” – przejście od polityki makroekonomicznej stabilizacji i restrykcyjnej polityki pieniężnej „drogich kosztów” w stronę stymulowania rozwoju gospodarki; uszeregowanie kluczowych priorytetów wg osi: a) inwestycje, b) eksport, c) konsument, d) wydatki publiczne.
2. koncentracji wysiłków rządu w celu stworzenia nowych możliwości inwestycyjnych i przyciągnięcia na szeroką skalę prywatnych inwestorów, poprzez ustanowienie korzystnych (w porównaniu z innymi krajami) warunków rozwoju biznesu wysokotechnologicznego oraz nowych gałęzi przemysłu (drogą stworzenia przewagi konkurencyjnej w zakresie rozwiązań instytucjonalnych, prawnych, fiskalnych, infrastrukturalnych, edukacyjnych i innych, a także poprzez realizację sektorowych i regionalnych programów rozwojowych).
 3. zaangażowania międzynarodowej pomocy finansowej w stworzenie efektywnej struktury gospodarczej. Uzyskane w ten sposób środki nie mogą być „przejedzone” przez budżet państwa, lecz przeznaczone – za pośrednictwem specjalnych instytutów rozwoju gospodarczego oraz przy wykorzystaniu doświadczeń innych krajów – na rozwój. Agencje kredytów eksportowych, narodowy bank rozwoju, agencja wsparcia małego biznesu, fundusz innowacyjny i tym podobne pozwolą zapewnić skuteczność, przejrzystość oraz odpowiedzialność w korzystaniu ze wspomnianych środków.

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THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL CRISIS ON THE BANKING SECTOR OF UKRAINE

Summary:

Especially relevant today is the impact of the crisis on peculiarities of the banking sector of Ukraine. The main problems domestic banking sector is the high dependence on foreign capital, a large amount of bad loans and risks banking portfolios. Significantly affect the banking sector of Ukraine shadow economy. Significantly increased the number of insolvent banks. Increased risks for banks with low levels of problem loans, but aggressive lending strategy. One of possibility a qualitative change in the situation is the introduction of modern banking relationships. Required gradual transformation of traditional banking institutions in creative banks.

Keywords:

Bank, banking sector, National Bank, financial risks, creative banks, banking risk management, Ukrainian banking system, problem loans, traditional banks.

Introduction

The rapid development of the banking sector requires more attention towards the activities of financial and credit institutions. That is why the risk management becomes especially relevant for the management of any bank because except being a means of loss prevention it also helps to make extra profits. Due to the constantly increasing influence of risks on financial activities the problem of banking risk management becomes especially relevant. Banking risks management refers to different ways of forecasting probable risks in banking activities and to the measures aimed at reducing the following risks.

Results of the research

Issues of formation and development of the banking sector have always interested foreign and domestic researchers (this can be explained by the fact that the banking sector has a considerable influence on the overall socio-economic processes within the country).

In 2011, report "Eastern European banking: Moving toward a New Paradigm" published by McKinsey & Company identified the Ukrainian banking sector as the weakest in the region. McKinsey & Company outlined such problems of the domestic banking sector as high dependence on foreign capital, a large amount of non-performing loans (35%) and the risks of bank portfolios. It should be noted that apart from the problems outlined by McKinsey & Company, the Ukrainian banking sector, in our opinion, has the following functional features that hamper its further development: fragmented processes which are beyond the control of the national regulator, low capitalization, a high level of economic and geographical concentration, a high level of risks and a significant influence of the shadow economy.

The following are the internal causes of functional failure of the Ukrainian banking system:

1. Banks with Ukrainian capital – governmental intervention in lending policies of public banks with the aim of solving current financial problems and the problem of state monopolies which leads to poor quality of loan portfolios in these banks; the uncertainty of the state policy of overcoming the economic crisis and, consequently, the uncertainty of the role public banks play in economic processes.
2. Banks with Western capital – a discrepancy between their current presence in Ukraine and their strategic objectives; the technological inability to provide loans; problems of receiving funds from parent banks.
3. Banks with Russian capital – the specific strategic objectives of their presence in Ukraine are contrary to the interests of the Ukrainian economy; the pressure of Russian policy on the loan policy of Russian banks in Ukraine; the subordination of banking business to political goals: political risks. Because of the low level of capitalization the build-up of capital and assets for Ukrainian banks is an objective necessity.

The minimum amount of regulatory capital of the bank (N1) which received a banking license till 11 July 2014 shall be equal to 120 million UAH till 10 July 2017; 150 million UAH - from 11 July 2017; 200 million UAH - from 11 July 2018; 250 million UAH - from 11 July 2019; 300 million UAH - from 11 July 2020; 350 million UAH - from 11 July 2021; 400 million UAH - from 11 July 2022; 450 million UAH - from 11 July 2023; 500 million UAH - from 11 July 2024.

A high level of economic and geographical concentration. As of 1 January 2015 sixteen largest Ukrainian banks (banks of the first group) owned 72, 99% of the total assets of the whole banking sector (961 093 million UAH), and the fourth group which includes 90 banks owns only 5, 08 % of banking sector assets.

As far as the regional concentration is concerned, the analysis of the bank network demonstrates that most banks are located in a few major cities. In the city of Kiev and Kiev Region 71% of the total number of banking institutions were located. Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk and Odessa Regions account for almost

16% of the total number of banks. This concentration can be explained by the fact that these regions are the most developed industrial regions of Ukraine with a high investment rating.

This situation requires further analysis of issues regarding the formation of regional and municipal banks with the aim of providing the individuals and legal entities with certain banking services that are tailored to the specific economic development of the region or city. In 2014 the loan borrowers faced major difficulties in servicing their loans which significantly increased the riskiness of the banking business. According to the National Bank of Ukraine, the share of negatively classified debts in the total volume of loan indebtedness of the banks within a year increased from 12, 9 to 19, 0%. In particular, the number of overdue loans increased by 92, 5%.

In our opinion, the basic ways of reducing the level of risks in the Ukrainian banking system in mid-term are the following:

- the diversification of bank assets and the introduction of new deposit programmes;
- the reduction of operating expenses and increase of income due to bank charges;
- the increase of capitalization level of the banking sector by attracting additional equity capital, the improvement of calculation methods of amounts and standards of the regulatory capital and risk standards;
- the improvement of procedures of bank resolution, reorganization and liquidation;
- the development of the structure of the banking sector towards the optimal combination of large banks with the extensive network of branches and regional or municipal banks;
- creation of conditions for attracting investment in the domestic banking system in amounts that will not create significant financial risks.

In Q3, most banks introduced no changes to the loan application approval standards. Specifically, 99% of banks reported the unchanged standards for mortgages and 71% of banks for consumer loans. However, 21% of banks noted minor softening of consumer lending standards. Over the next quarter, both consumer and mortgage lending standards are projected to soften. Lowering the lending standards can be primarily attributed to the reduced cost of resources and eased balance sheet restrictions. Cautious expectations concerning macroeconomic indicators and collateral risk were the major drags on lending. For the first time in the last two years, the approval rate for consumer loan applications increased; 30% of respondents recorded growth compared to 9% in the last quarter, while 7% (versus 31%, respectively) recorded its decrease. According to the majority of banks, the households demand changed neither for mortgages (89% of responses) nor for consumer loans (69%). However, 23% of banks noted a slight increase in demand for consumer loans. The respondents expect the trends to continue in the next quarter, with demand for consumer loans increasing (39% of responses) and demand for mortgages remaining flat (92%).

The main drivers pushing the demand for consumer loans upward were the expenses on durable goods and improved consumer confidence. The banks see the interest rates (38% of responses) as the key factor that restrained mortgage lending.

Informal (shadow) economy. It is common knowledge that the shadow economy is a set of uncontrolled and unregulated illegal economic relations between the subjects of economic activity. It is focused on such strategic directions of economic activity as industrial, commercial and financial sectors of economy. Alongside with legitimate economic institutions shadow economic institutions appear that duplicate the functions of the official economy.

According to different calculation methods proposed by the Ministry of Economic Development, in the first quarter of 2012 the size of the informal (shadow) economy in Ukraine amounted to 31-44% of GDP. Such size of shadow economy in Ukraine is becoming a threat to the national security. If the size of shadow economy exceeds 30% and the number of people engaged in it exceeds 40%, it will pose a threat to the controllability of the economy. It is widely known that one of the elements of fighting money laundering (transforming the proceeds of crime into ostensibly legitimate money) is a compulsory identification of bank clients.

According to the Law of Ukraine "On Banks and Banking", banks are not allowed to open and keep anonymous (numbered) accounts. In addition, banks are not allowed to enter into correspondent relations with banks or any other non-resident financial institutions that have no permanent registration and do not operate at the place of their registration, and/or are not subject to relevant supervision in their countries, as well as with banks and any other non-resident financial institutions that enter into such correspondent relations. Besides, in order to reduce the risk of money laundering in the banking sector the following measures are to be taken: State Committee for Financial Monitoring should timely provide domestic banking institutions with information on new types of fraud (securities fraud, fictitious bankruptcy and illegal withdrawal of money from bank accounts); a unified analytical system should be created to monitor illicit financial transactions and enlarge the list of transactions subject to monitoring (for example, operations with precious metals or real estate); criminal responsibility for fraud and economic crimes in banking sector should become more severe. Therefore, the conducted analysis of the Ukrainian banking sector demonstrates that poorly controlled fragmented processes, a low level of capitalization, a significant economic and geographical concentration, a high level of risks together with a big threat posed by the shadow economy hamper the development of Ukrainian banking sector. A proper way of changing this situation is to enhance modern banking with such elements of alternative banking as a gradual (evolutionary) transformation of traditional banks into "creative" banks. So, in order to ensure the effective functioning in the conditions of the "creative economy", banks should be involved in a continuous process of conversion (transformation) by diversifying their strategies and business directions.

In addition, the risk management system of a "creative" bank is a response to threats of the external environment which ensures further development of such bank by changing its internal organizational capabilities and creating new strategies.

It should be noted that Islamic banks are currently using some tools of "creative" banks. Islamic banks pay exceptional attention to the essence and potential of projects in which they are investing money, while traditional banks often assess projects only by the factor of loan collateral. Given the fact that speculative activities are prohibited by Sharia Law, Islamic banks are more interested in funding the real sector (thus, by doing so they effectively stimulate the economy). In fact, Islamic banks were hardly affected by the financial banking crisis. So, the conducted analysis of the Ukrainian banking sector demonstrated the following key problems: the availability of fragmented processes, a high level of risks, a significant economic and geographical concentration, a significant impact of the informal (shadow) economy and a low level of capitalization. One way of solving the aforementioned problems (primarily, regarding the improvement of risk management system) is the gradual transformation of traditional banks into creative banks.

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BUSINESS EXPECTATIONS OF ENTERPRISES IN UKRAINE CRISIS

Summary:

The assessment information to assess the current and future business activity, changes in economic situation. The expected production of goods and services in the next 12 months improved. In the second quarter of 2015, the inflationary expectations slackened. In Q2 2015, the negative assessments of the respondents on all aspects of the economic activity over the next 12 months became somewhat weaker. Enterprises reported again positive expectations about the increase in the next 12 months of both total sales and external sales. For the second quarter in a row the respondents have expected decreases in investment.

Keywords:

Business activity, economic situation, crisis, agricultural and industrial enterprises, economic activity, small enterprises, financial and economic standing, investment, construction enterprises.

Introduction

In Ukraine should development of small and medium businesses. Formation and development of socially oriented entrepreneurship in our country is one of the components of the exit of Ukraine's economy out of crisis, how to enhance economic efficiency. Also, there is a need for study and practical application of economic levers of state in order to increase the effective functioning business. The main drawback of public policy is primarily a lack of sufficient scientific basis for economic reform and excessive politicization of process of their realization.

Main thesis

In Q2 2015, the negative assessments on all aspects of the economic activity over the next 12 months became somewhat weaker. Expectations of sales growth became positive. Such expectations resulted in improvement of the Business Outlook Index (BOI) by 11,0 p.p. to 94,5%. BOI below 100% is marked for the fourth running quarter. The respondents had the most optimistic

forecasts about total sales and sales in the external market (the balance of expectations was 0,7% and 0,3% respectively) (Table 1). The sale growth is expected in agricultural and industrial enterprises.

The most pessimistic forecasts for the next 12 months are concerning construction investments and number of employees. Forecasting the decrease of construction investments and number of employees for six consecutive quarters. The lowest assessments were reported from “other” types of economic activity, transport and communication enterprises.

Table 1. Assessments by Enterprise Top Managers of their current and future business activity and the economic situation in the country

	Balance of responses , %				
	Q2 2014	Q3 2014	Q4 2014	Q1 2015	Q2 2015
Macroeconomic Expectations in the next 12 months					
Developments of the output of goods and services in Ukraine	-26,2	-44,8	-38,6	-57,2	-35,3
Growth in prices for goods and services in Ukraine	11,8	18,4	20,5	27,3	27,1
The UAH/USD exchange rate dynamics developments 1	48,4	75,1	76,8	83,1	67,2
Economic Activity of Enterprises: assessments as of the time of the survey					
Current financial and economic standing of their enterprises	-12,5	-8,2	-5,6	-15,6	-5,9
Current finished goods inventory balance as compared with the desirable	-3,3	-3,0	-4,2	-9,9	-11,4
Productive capacity resources at their own enterprises	31,3	32,2	32,0	26,9	17,5
Expectations of changes in the next twelve months					
Business outlook Index, %	101,5	93,2	96,1	83,5	94,5
Financial and economic standing	8,3	-5,7	-7,1	-21,5	-3,1
Total own product sale	10,7	-3,1	-1,5	-12,6	0,7
Investment in construction works	-6,6	-10,4	-6,7	-18,0	-9,2
Investment in machinery, Equipment and Number of employees	2,6	-3,4	2,8	-12,5	-5,6
	-7,4	-11,4	-6,9	-17,8	-10,2
Prices for goods or services	58,7	64,2	63,7	75,1	59,8

their enterprises sell					
Production unit cost	42,7	49,3	50,3	59,8	55,5
Expenditures per one employee	28,6	30,6	32,4	29,4	37,1
Financial conditions					
Assessments of lending terms rigidity	38,7	32,6	36,3	47,6	55,6
Enterprises' needs in borrowed funds in the nearest	17,6	14,1	23,0	26,6	29,0
Proportion of respondents which plan to take out bank loans, %	37,6	39,7	36,7	35,0	35,4
Proportion of respondents that mentioned difficulties with effecting transactions using funds in bank	9,8	10,3	14,4	18,9	15,7
Proportion of respondents monitoring the NBU activities, %	91,2	89,4	90,1	92,7	90,8

The lowest BOI was reported of “other” types of economic activity (83,6%), construction (84,8%) and small enterprises (83,9%). Positive expectations were again from agricultural enterprises (BOI -101,9%), manufacturing enterprises and energy and water supply enterprises (100,6%) which are big enterprises (102,1%).

Expect the deterioration of financial and economic standing of their enterprises for the fourth quarter in a row.

However, in Q2 2015 the negative balance of assessments decreased considerably. The balance of expectations is “minus” 3,1% (in Q1 2015 - (-21,5%).

The enterprises of all types of economic activity regardless the size and line of business in creased their assessments. At the same time the most optimistic are the assessments from manufacturing and agricultural enterprises (the balances of responses are 8,4% and 6,7% respectively), the most pessimistic - the enterprises of “other” types of economic activity (the balance of expectations – (-15,8%) and energy and water supply enterprises (-15,0%). Enterprises reported again positive expectations about the increase in the next 12 months of both total sales and external sales: the balances of expectations 0,7% and 0,3% (in Q1 2015 – (-12,6%) and (-14,1%) respectively).

The most optimistic total and external sales forecasts were still given from agricultural enterprises (balance expectations made 22,3% and 40,7% respectively). The enterprises from manufacturing and mining and energy and water supply enterprises also expect the increase of sales. The optimistic expectations of these types of economic activity were due to hopes for a steady demand for the products over the next 12 months. They were also in line with the expectations of enterprises financial and economic standing.

For the second quarter in a row the respondents have expected decreases in investment and forecast investment decrease in expenditures on both construction and equipment to reduce in the next 12 months. At the same time the negative assessments dropped quarter-on-quarter - the balances of expectations are respectively (-9,2%) and (-5,6%) (in Q1 2015 - (-8,0%) and (-12,5%). Respondents from most types of economic activity improved their assessments of future investments quarter-on-quarter.

The most pessimistic expectations about the future investments in construction were reported by the enterprises of “other” types of economic activity (the balance of expectations is (-18,3%), with regard to the investment in equipment and instruments, the most pessimistic expectations are reported by respondents from construction enterprises.

Among the factors hampering the production growth the most often were mentioned:

- political instability (mentioned by 55,7%);
- significant fluctuations of the UAH exchange rate (55,6%);
- excessively high prices for energy, raw materials and supplies (referred to by 49,0% and 47,7%).

High energy prices were most often reported as a burden of agricultural and mining enterprises. For three quarters in a row, the respondents have been more confident about growth of the need for borrowed funds in the nearest future - the balance of responses 29,0% (in Q1 2015 -26,6%). The highest borrowing needs are at energy and water supply enterprises (the balance of responses - 36,4%), the lowest at construction enterprises.

In the second quarter of 2015, the inflationary expectations slackened. More than half of respondents (50,6 %) forecast consumer prices rise within the range of 15,1 % to 30 %. They expect that the consumer prices will rise by an average of 27,1 % over the next 12 months (in the first quarter 2015 -27,3 %). The highest inflationary expectations were shown by the respondents from mining industry, small enterprises and those not engaged in export and import operations. By regions, they are enterprises in Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Zhytomyr and Khmelnytsk oblasts.

Main restraining factors when attracting new loans reported are the excessively high loan interest rate (66,7%), significant fluctuations of the UAH exchange rate (33,0%) and excessively high requirements for the collateral (28,9%). In addition, construction and “other” types of economic activity reported as restraining factors “other funding sources availability”, transport enterprises - “uncertainty in the ability to repay debt timely”, energy and water supply enterprises - “excessively complicated document execution procedure”. Proportion who mentioned difficulties in executing transactions using funds in bank accounts, decreased to 15,7% (in Q1 2015 -from 18,9%). Most often difficulties were reported from energy and water supply (24,4%), “other” types of economic activity (19,4%) and trade enterprises (19,1%).

Conclusions

So business development will boost economic restructuring Ukraine, creation of new jobs, ensuring quick payback rapid response to changes in demand. That business, creating the appropriate market environment flexibly adapts to changes in market conditions, able to satisfy not only the domestic but also in international markets, the overcoming of sectoral and regional monopolies, increased competition, introduction of scientific and technological progress allows expand the scope of employment, create new employment opportunities, can significantly strengthen the economic base of regions, positive impact on economic development. Consequently, in the Ukraine at the present stage the problem of creating market infrastructure not only lost its relevance, but rather becomes more acute.

III. ARTYKUŁ GOŚCINNY NUMERU

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RECONCILING THE TWO WEST AFRICAS: MANAGING ETHNIC AND LINGUAL DIVERSITY FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Summary:

In international politics, language is core in inter-state trust and relationship, and the West African region (or sub-region), which is multi-ethnic, culturally plural and bi- or multilingual in imported languages, may never evolve an integrated region if the diversity is not converted from source of disconnections to source of connections. At best, West Africans have regarded themselves as pre-colonial kinsmen but post-colonial strangers as a result of the factor of language barriers created in the years of colonial rule. The Yoruba, Ewe, Ashante, Mende, Temne and many more had similarities of languages and cultures and led a regular life of communal conflict and cooperation until the arrival of the French, English, Portuguese and Germans, who established sharp misunderstandings and divisions along the lines of European lingua franca. From a participation-observation experience and perspective, and having consulted literature and government records on futile integration efforts, the study, adopting a functionalist model for analysis, submits that the differences have led to alienation among West Africans since independence, and ECOWAS, despite its spirited commitment to regional integration by the protocol on free movement across the borders, has faced brick-walls from human and social forces engendered by language barriers. This paper looks beyond the artificial linguistic barriers inherent in the bilingual or multilingual character of West Africa, by exploring the richness of the linguistic diversity to advance the cause of regional integration. The paper strongly advocates that local languages spoken across most of the West African states such as Hausa, Mandingo, Peul and Yoruba be taught in primary and secondary schools, while ECOWAS leaders should agree on making English, French and Portuguese compulsory in all secondary schools and higher institutions in their respective countries. These will help demystify and dismantle the artificial linguistic barriers created by the accident of colonialism and make the formal and informal instruments, including ECOWAS towards integration, more functional.

Key-words:

Bilingualism, Multilingualism, Integration, West Africa, ECOWAS

Introduction

West Africa is a vast territory with about 1,500 spoken native languages of the 2,500 total number of local languages spoken in Africa, which implies that the sub-continent alone constitutes seventy-five per cent of the entire spoken languages of the continent¹. A region made up of 15 countries politically and economically grouped into the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), West Africa has evolved some of the most popularly spoken languages on the continent; Hausa, Yoruba, Peul and Mandingo being four of the most commonly spoken across the borders. Other widely spoken languages include Ewe, Creole, Berber, Igbo and Ashanti. By reason of history, the peoples of West Africa were closely knit socio-culturally, economically and politically and language experts have identified language family groups that underline the significant pre-colonial ethnic and cultural ties between the peoples², a thesis scholars have also validated by research findings that show the presence of same ethnic group in long stretches of land or territory that cut across several present-day or post-colonial territorial demarcations³.

Research has shown that three of the four major ethnic/language groupings are present in West Africa⁴. These include Afroasiatic (or Hamito-Semitic), Niger-Congo and Nilo-Saharan branches. The Berber and Chadic languages spoken around the Lake Chad area comprising Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger, as well as the Tuareg of Burkina Faso and Mali constitute the Afroasiatic language branch. The Atlantic or Niger-Congo languages, which include Wolof, Fula and Serer are spoken in large parts of Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Senegal and The Gambia; while the Kwa, Mende and Gur language groups, which stretch from as far as Liberia to Ghana, Togo and Southwest Nigeria, complete the Niger-Congo family in West Africa. The Nilo-Saharan language group is not as large, but it has some semblance with the Afro-asiatic language family.

The indigenous languages are not the problem, *per se*, of this study, but the imported languages from Europe, which have redefined the social, cultural, political and historical contexts of the West African sub-continent. From the brief outline above, it is clear that the language factor was more of a unifying element in West Africa before the advent of English, French and Portuguese in West Africa. It is pertinent to note that the over one thousand languages no

¹ LAAF, The West African Languages, <<http://www.laaf.me/en/west-africa/the-west-african-languages.php>> (24.08.2015).

² J. Middleton, *Black Africa: Its Peoples and their Cultures Today*, London 1970.

³ B. Akinbobola, *Regional Integration in West Africa: Challenge for Emergent States*, Lagos 2007.

⁴ LAFF, *op. cit.*

longer count in the contemporary scheme of things as the global languages have since become the “currency of exchange” in Africa and international politics, and are, as such, the factor for social integration or disintegration.

Ironically, the three foreign languages, which have become the region’s *lingua franca*, should have been a unifying factor as the 1,500 ethnic groups would no longer be divided along 1,500 ethnic or linguistic lines. However, reverse is the case as the imported languages, particularly English and French have had more divisive influences on the peoples and countries of the region. The languages have come with much deeper inbuilt elements, such as ideology, philosophy and cosmology of the patrons, which have created sharply different identities among the recipients of the languages in West Africa. This is same for the entirety of the continent.

In post-colonial West Africa, the *Francophones* and *Anglophones* are two different Africans, whose allegiance is first and foremost to their metropolitan lords whose French and English have created a bond within Francophone and Anglophone blocs as well as bond between the blocs and their overlords, but disunity between the two West African blocs. This, for historians and political scientists has been the very factor in futile attempts at regional economic and political integration⁵ at informal or formal levels, including the ECOWAS mechanism to bring about regional unity. This paper thus constitutes a study on the bilingual and indeed multilingual bottlenecks towards the attainment of integration and how these bottlenecks can be converted to solvents for West Africa.

Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks

In contemporary global politics, *integration* is a concept that has passed through stages of redefinitions. Ordinarily, integration simply refers to a process of evolving an inclusive society, at any level. The concept is often viewed from a sociological lens, which connotes cultural bond and affinity; and from a political perspective, integration would mean a unification process, or sometimes be simply defined as unity. As a result of developments in Europe and North America, integration is taking the form of economic union and growing political interdependence. It is translating to dismantling of borders and barriers to movement of people, ideas, goods and services. This has informed, among other things, an evolution of the European common market, common currency and integrated immigration laws⁶.

The development around the world, particularly in Europe has informed the redefinition of integration in Africa and West Africa. The ECOWAS and AU, originally formed for economic and political cooperation between states of the

⁵ M. Kwanashie, *Historical Perspective on the Scramble for Africa*, [in:] *New Scramble for Africa*, C.E. Osita, C.A. Anigbo (ed.), Lagos 2010.

⁶ J. Lodge, *EC Policymaking: Institutional Dynamics*, [in:] *The European Community and the Challenge of the Future*, J. Lodge (ed.), London 1993.

sub-continent and continent respectively, have adapted the western model of economic and political integration, employing same integrative mechanisms such as visa-less and free movement protocols, common bank, currency and parliament⁷. But that kind of integration has been hampered by entrenched distrust and mutual suspicions between West Africans created by linguistic differences and lack of communication/understanding between them. Language is the key in international politics as it facilitates communication, establishes relationship and strengthens understanding and trust.

In terms of language, the problem of West Africa is multilingualism and bilingualism. Multilingualism refers to the presence of more than two major languages in a social space. Multilingualism in West Africa has created multiple leakages in the integration attempt, both at the formal and informal levels, namely between the social groups or nationals of countries and between governments of the region. It must however be understood that for the purpose of this paper, multilingualism does not refer to the existence of 1,500 native languages spoken in West Africa, but to the influx since the pre-colonial times from the fifteenth century, of foreign languages, such as French, English, and Portuguese.

Bilingualism is the major thrust of this paper. This is because in all of West Africa, there are two main language, cultural, ideological and political blocs-Francophone and Anglophone. Lusophone is less contentious as Portuguese is spoken only in the smaller countries of Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau, and besides, these countries align more with their Francophone counterparts. There are sixteen countries in West Africa, fifteen of which are members of ECOWAS. Five of these countries are English-speaking; nine are French-speaking while the remaining two are Portuguese-speaking states. In number, the strength of ECOWAS are the Francophone states; but in terms of resources, the ECOWAS fulcrum is the Anglophone state of Nigeria⁸. The two Lusophone states are like bystanders, which has made them, probably because of proximity to the Francophone countries, to have more relationship with Francophone West Africa.

Bilingualism for this paper will therefore be in the context of the dominating influence of English and French in the formal and informal life of the region. The contention is and has always been between French and English-speaking countries of West Africa, with France playing a key role in balancing of power in a sub-continent perceived to be dominated by Anglophone Nigeria⁹. The French colonial and post-colonial policy of assimilation is further

⁷ B. Akinbobola, op. cit., pp. 172-200.

⁸ S. Folarin, *Discovering Nigeria's Power and Influence in West Africa*, "National Mirror", Lagos, July 2015.

⁹ B.A. Akinterinwa, *French Security Arrangements with Francophone Africa: Implications for Nigeria's Relations with its Immediate Neighbours*, [in:] *Nigeria and Its Immediate Neighbours: Constraints and Prospects of Sub-Regional Security in the 1990s*, B.E. Ate, B.A. Akinterinwa (eds.), Lagos 1992.

strengthened to knit the bloc closely together and grow its bond and allegiance to France¹⁰. It is this context of bilingual forces at play in West Africa that forms the framework for discourse in the paper.

Having examined the contexts of integration and the *lingua franca* issues, it is appropriate to situate the concepts and issues in a theoretical context. The workability of integration processes is obscured by a dysfunctional society, structure and mechanism. If ECOWAS is to work and engender its major objective of regional integration, the language factor has to be considered as central in their discussions. A functional structure will more likely put together a functional mechanism. The functionality of ECOWAS is dependent on the functionality of processes, such as erasing or reducing the language barrier among West Africans.

This is why the functionalist theory becomes a framework for analysis. Indeed, functionalism has been one of the theories that have defined the integration initiative in West Africa. In the works of Asiwaju¹¹ and Le Vine¹², a distinction has been made between two sub-interrelated levels of regional integration in West Africa. These are the functionalism and neo-functionalism as well as the political or constitutional type otherwise referred to as Federation, which Adetula¹³ however perceives as inadequate in the theoretical positioning of ECOWAS, the regional body to superintend over the integration process.

The school of thought that functionalism may be inadequate to examine the totality of regional integration also holds for all the Less Developed Countries (LDCs), as it is believed that regional integration in the South is conditioned by different socio-economic and political dynamics from that of the developed countries. Flowing from this, Fayomi and Adeola¹⁴ argue therefore that, regional integration in Africa must recognize the processes of economic, political and social integration and also provide for the political weapon for implementing the programmes and policies. In fact, Bulmer¹⁵ even argues for a shift from such supra-nationalism/inter-governmentalism debacle to the intricate connections between the domestic and regional levels, that is, increasing people to people interaction.

One cannot agree more with the position above in a holistic study of regionalism. But when looking at the ethnic or linguistic factor in regionalism or

¹⁰ B.E. Ate, *The Presence of France in West-Central Africa as Fundamental Problem to Nigeria*, [in:] *Nigeria and Its Immediate Neighbours: Constraints and Prospects of Sub-Regional Security in the 1990s*, B.E. Ate, B.A. Akinterinwa (eds.), Lagos 1992.

¹¹ A.I. Asiwaju, *Borderlands Research: A Comparative Perspective*, El Paso 1983.

¹² V.T. Le Vine, *Politics in Francophone Africa*, London 2004.

¹³ V.A. Adetula, *ECOWAS and the Challenges of Integration in Africa*, [in:] *Milestones in Regional Integration*, U.J. Ogwu, W.O. Alli (eds.), Lagos 2009.

¹⁴ O. Fayomi, G.L. Adeola, *ECOWAS and Sub-Regional Integration in West Africa: An Appraisal*, "Covenant University Journal of Politics and International Affairs", Vol. 3 (1), 2015, pp. 7-13.

¹⁵ S. Bulmer, *Domestic Politics and European Community Policy-Making*, "JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies" Volume 21, Issue 4, June 1983, pp. 349-364.

regional integration, it would be seen that the position would be like digging for gold in a coal mine or using a paracetamol tablet to heal a wound. Rather, functionalism identifies the fundamentals, such as lingual or such deep social infractions, and then goes beyond scratching the surface (like most other studies of regionalism do, when they discuss very serious theoretical issues) and considers issues that appear simple and unserious such as language barriers, to identify the dysfunctionality of the system. For instance, like Aja¹⁶ observes, in modern integration schemes, states do not take their differences for granted any longer for the sake of mutual trust and confidence. In integrating states through institutional mechanism such as parliaments, banks, inter-ministerial committees and the likes, language is core in communication, comprehension and collaboration.

The West African Ethnic and Language Profile

Moving across the West African coastline, a fascinating and eye-opening discovery is that the borders are mere artificial barriers. The ethnicity and local language between two borderline towns between two countries are the same. From Idi Iroko in Nigeria to Igolo-Porto Novo and even Cotonou in Republic of Benin is the similarity of ethnic identity, culture, names and language. Whether the dialects are different is not an issue as even ethnic groups within same territorial sovereignty have different dialects; but the common ethnic group and language is Yoruba in these areas of Nigeria and Benin. In a similar vein, the borderline towns of Benin and Togo at Ave-Condji and Ilacondji respectively are another case of artificial boundaries because the peoples of both towns and beyond are of the Ga ethnic and language group.

From Baguida through Lome metropolis to Aflao and beyond are Ewe-speaking people of Togo and Ghana. Aflao thus becomes another artificial boundary. The Mende group cuts across Liberia, Sierra Leone and parts of Ivory Coast, while as earlier highlighted, several countries in the West African region speak similar languages, albeit with some dialectical differences. The artificial boundaries are the borders created by the Europeans after the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 to demarcate their “spheres of influence” and authority.

Deeper than the borders however were the artificial “nations” that emerged and the severance of close ties between the Yoruba of Benin and Nigeria, Ewe of Togo and Ghana, and Mandingo of The Gambia and Senegal, among other groups. The common denominator is either French or English language, which underlined totality of the way of life of the West African peoples- including social identity, culture, religion and language. Artificial boundaries and nations thus gave way to something much deeper and dividing for over a hundred years. At independence, the Africans had gotten accustomed to these dichotomies and had begun to see themselves as either British or French. In any case, the Yoruba in Nigeria speak English while their kinsmen in Benin speak French

¹⁶ A.A. Aja, *Selected Themes in International Economic Relations*, Ogui-Enugu 2002.

and the propensity of forgetting their common bond, the native language is high. The Ewe in Ghana became British while the Ewe in Togo were thoroughly Frenchified. These differences gave birth to a new Africa that became more westernized and more antagonistic of itself.

Interestingly, the Europeans who applied this weapon of division were themselves allies of each other. Aside being neighbours, their relationship dated back to the Anglo-Saxon years of hostility and moved to the Middle Age collaborations and 18th, 19th and 20thc alliance against common European enemies. But back in Africa, nationalism gored them to carve out distinct African empires and the best way to maintain their stranglehold unto the empires was by building sharply contrasting principles and identity that would keep the blocs safe. The policies of association and assimilation were an example, and the language factor became a more critical instrument to permanently keeping the divides apart¹⁷.

ECOWAS Integration Policy

Established at the instance of Nigeria and Togo in 1975, ECOWAS' main thrust has been economic integration. In the Chapter II, Article 3 of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty, its other objective includes the promotion of regional economic, social and cultural development through improved relations among member-states. Members of the organization are Burkina-Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Benin, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Niger, and Togo, which constitute the French Zone; and Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Liberia, The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Cape Verde and Liberia, that are regarded as the non-French-speaking countries.

Gambari¹⁸, like other scholars have averred that ECOWAS is emblematic of Pan-Africanism, a movement that actually gained momentum in West Africa in the colonial times, ahead of other regions. It is important to state that the French-speaking countries were initially not willing to identify with ECOWAS, but soon began to embrace the idea with the pressure from Eyadema of Togo and Gowon of Nigeria. It took a lot of efforts on the part of Nigeria and Togo to change their disposition. Since its inception, ECOWAS, has been making giant strides in the area of community integrative schemes, such as liberalization of regional trade; liberalization of movement of persons, goods and services; harmonization of monetary and fiscal policies; harmonization of business law; development of transport, communications and energy networks and involve-

¹⁷ B. Omole, *Nigeria, France and the Francophone States: The Joy and Anguish of a Regional Power*. 225th Inaugural Lecture, Ile-Ife 2010.

¹⁸ I.A. Gambari, *Political and Comparative Dimensions of Regional Integration: The Case of ECOWAS*, New Jersey 1991.

ment of private sectors in the regional integration process to enhance the integration of West African states¹⁹.

The ECOWAS schemes and protocols have taken into consideration relevance to the economic interests of the members and contribution to the ultimate goal of economic union²⁰. The ECOWAS Protocol on free movement is considered quite significant to the overall objective of the ECOWAS initiative as such a factor is very critical to integration. The Protocol is cognizant of the cultural, social and emotional ties between families, groups and relations who have found themselves in different sovereign territories since colonial times, and aims at reducing the tight custom and immigration laws around the borders. It is expected that these would not only promote the cultural ties, but also galvanize regional trade and commerce, mutual cooperation and assistance, and ultimately enhance national and international development²¹.

The Protocol has on paper, been impressive as it drives to create Free Trade Area, Customs Union, Common Market, and so forth, which would eventually culminate in full-blown economic union. The Protocol on free movement confers on the Community citizens the right to enter and reside in the territory of any member-state, provided they possess valid travel documents and internationally acceptable health certificate. The Protocol however, also grants member-states the right to refuse admission to any Community citizens who are inadmissible under the member-state's domestic law. For instance, the four supplementary protocols adopted between 1985 and 1990 committed member-states to provide valid travel document to their citizens, grant Community citizens the right of residence for the purpose of seeking and carrying out income-earning employment, ensure appropriate treatment for persons being expelled, not to expel Community citizens *en masse*, and limit the grounds for individual expulsion to reasons of national security or public order, et cetera²².

The Protocol in reality is, however, a far cry from the principle. The border security agencies in almost all the West African frontiers have turned the borders to open fields for day-light robbery through extortions from even those

¹⁹ G. Obiozor, A. Olikoshi, C. Obi, *The Challenge of West African Regional Integration: An Introductory Overview*, [in:] G. Obiozor, A. Olikoshi, C. Obi (eds.), *West African Regional Economic Integration: Nigerian Policy Perspectives For The 1990s*, Lagos 1996; A. Opanike, A.A. Aduloju, L.O. Adenipekun, *ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement and Trans-border Security in West Africa*, "Covenant University Journal of Politics and International Affairs", Vol. 3(1) 2015, pp. 14-18.

²⁰ G. Lansana, *Review of Africa and the War on Drugs* by N. Carrier, G. Klantschnig, <<https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2013/01/22/review-of-africa-and-the-war-on-drugs-by-neil-carrier-and-gernot-klantschnig/>> (25.08.2015).

²¹ Y. Gowon, *The Economic Community of West African States: A Study in Political and Economic Integration*, PhD Thesis, University of Warwick 1984.

²² B.E.Ate, B.A. Akinterinwa, *Cross-border Armed Banditry in the Northeast: Issues in National Security and Nigeria's Relations with its Immediate Neighbours*, Lagos 2011; A. Opanike, A.A. Aduloju, L.O. Adenipekun, *op. cit.*

with legitimate documents and those without any travelling documents. The border posts collect tolls and tributes from legitimate travellers, collecting un-receipted fees before entry-stamps are issued. The health officials do not care about using the temperature gadgets to detect and control Ebola and other transmittable regional diseases, but prefer to collect tolls for unavailability of health cards. The security posts officials are unduly harsh and would be more difficult with travellers from another zone- English or French²³. These practices do not only hinder movement, but also puncture the objective of ECOWAS of friendliness, association and integration.

Again, regional security, peace and trans-border movement is hampered by the collaboration between custom and immigration officials with criminals, smugglers, and illegal immigrants. With specified amount of money and sign language between the officials and the miscreants, trans-border movement is made at will. Again, money laundering, arms and drug deals are common across the borders, while the illegal currencies of certain countries are legal tenders in these areas. For instance, the outlawed Biafran Pound is spent in the borders of Togo-Benin, Togo-Ghana and Ghana-Ivory Coast²⁴. Also replete are enormous number of barriers and roadblocks, as well as unnecessary stoppages on international roads in different countries, which frustrate the ECOWAS Protocol. In 2005, it was reported that about 44 Ghanaians were killed in The Gambia by unknown assailants while moving into that part of the region²⁵.

It is pertinent to state that while ECOWAS seems to mean well for regional free movement for integration and development, the lawlessness in the uncontrolled borders go unchecked, which makes nonsense of the regional initiative and objective. One critical area is language barrier and the emphasis on Francophone-Anglophone backgrounds at the frontiers, which ECOWAS leaders seem to pay little attention to, but which is a sore point in the futile attempts to integrate West Africa.

The Bilingual Infractions

Adebayo Adedeji once said: “The general view was that setting up a sub-regional cooperation entity in West Africa that cuts across differences in language, culture and the relative size and economic strengths was an idea whose time had come. And this seal was put on the determination to end the centuries

²³ S. Folarin, *The ECOWAS “Disintegration” Process*, “National Mirror”, Lagos, May 2011, p. 12.

²⁴ Idem, *Discovering Nigeria’s Power...*; Idem, *Biafran Pound as a Legal Tender in West Africa*, “National Mirror”, Lagos, August 2015.

²⁵ *Murder of 44 Ghanaians: Gambian President Ordered Killings*, “Ghanaian Times” 9.08.2007, No. 15, 188.

of division and artificial barriers imposed on the people of West Africa from outside”²⁶.

The assertion above clearly captures the essence of ECOWAS- ending once and for all, the centuries of artificial barriers and divisions created by the Europeans. Incidentally however, the bilingual issue has remained an albatross for ECOWAS. The language barrier is not only at the non-state or informal level, in which travellers, buyers and sellers, commuters and other entities find it difficult to communicate or develop distrust for one another; but even at the governmental level, ambassadors and government officials feel like strangers in the land of another West African country. It has been argued that even in ECOWAS, relationship between leaders and senior representatives is often characterized by distrust, suspicion and hostility, as leaders speaking the same European language often feel more comfortable with each other²⁷. This submission is validated by the formation of a Francophone parallel of the ECOWAS in West Africa.

The language factor is often explained away as the factor for hostility at the borders. From personal experience, crossing Francophone borders for someone from an English-speaking country is often tough. The customs, immigration police and gendarmeries would put up a hostile reception, stop the movement of the traveller, or delay him, subject such a person to unnecessary scrutiny and most times extort more money from him than from a co-French-speaking traveller. Obtaining vehicle document (*lassiez passé*) is determined not by the ECOWAS Protocol, but by the foreign language a traveller can speak. A French-speaking driver who drives a Nigeria-registered vehicle in Grand Popo (Benin) is treated more courteously by the security operatives at the road blocks than an English-speaking driver who drives a Benin-registered vehicle in the same area. A Nigerian who is driving a car to Togo for the first time has to pay 31,000 FCFA for *laissez passé*, while a Beninoise in the same category is billed 10,000 FCFA only²⁸. In a similar vein, custom and immigration officers in Nigeria who flag down a vehicle and discovers that the passengers can barely communicate in English but speak French fluently, even if they have all the necessary documents, subject the occupants to undue scrutiny.

The hostility of Beninoise gendarmes towards Nigerians crossing the Seme border in Badagry, in spite of the stature and military might of the latter, is enormous and captured in several research and media literature. The hostility is however nothing compared to what an average Nigerian traveller faces at the Togo-Benin frontiers. This is explicable in the sense that the further the Nigerian moves away from the Nigerian frontiers, the harsher the reception. The less harsh reception at Seme compared to Ilacondji is as a result of the nearness between Nigeria and Benin, who, aside the French and English language prob-

²⁶ ECOWAS *Regional Integration Processes and International Cooperation*, “Cooperacion Espanola”, Vol. 4, Madrid, June 2014.

²⁷ B. Akinbobola, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-101.

²⁸ S. Folarin, *Discovering Nigeria's Power...*

lems, also share linguistic and cultural ties locally. The Yoruba and bits of French and English both sides can speak as well as the shared cultural and historical heritages reduce the tensions. But this is not the case with Togo, a largely Ewe-speaking group, which though belongs to the same Kwa-speaking language family as the Yoruba of Nigeria, is distant by the lack of shared boundaries and more by the distinction between the English and French ways of life entrenched in both countries. However, the reception to the Nigerian in Togo is yet less harsh compared to what the Nigerian will experience in Ivory Coast, another French-speaking country that has very little or no socio-cultural affinity with Nigeria. Aside being in the same linguistic family, many from the Ewe people of Togo have lived and worked in Nigeria, while so many of them still have families or relatives living and working in the country.

Similarly, the fact that many Nigerians have established social links and businesses in Togo, some with families and wives there, they tend to be less hostile to Togolese people living in Nigeria. An average Nigerian family employs Togolese as domestic and office staff as well as patronizes their artisans because of their professionalism in their services. This kind of social affinity has reduced the hostility toward the Togolese crossing Nigerian borders or living in Nigeria.

It is instructive to note that despite all the troubles, hostilities and long distances encountered by a Ghanaian crossing the borders from Ghana to Togo, and Togo to Benin, the average Ghanaian traveller finds warm reception at the Nigerian borders of Idiroko or Seme. What simply explains this is the language and colonial bond between the two countries. A Beninoise crossing the Togolese border will pay an illegitimate fee of 200 FCFA only, while a Nigerian crossing the same border will be compelled to pay 2,000 FCFA as a first-time crosser (if he has an international passport to show) or 1,000 FCFA as an old-timer²⁹. The issue in this case is the colonial and language factor.

A Pragmatic Approach to Integration: The Multilingual/Bilingual Academic Curriculum Options

The central argument of this paper is that the sharp language differences have created artificial but enormous barriers to mutual understanding, trust, confidence, sincerity, cooperation and integration among West Africans. Language is a unifying force; it is also a divisive tool. Global events and indeed configurations of power have been formed along linguistic lines. Natural allies of powerful states are first and foremost those that can understand and communicate in similar language³⁰. Hitler attempted to create a Greater Germany

²⁹ Idem, *Obstacles to ECOWAS Integration*, "National Mirror", Lagos, February 2014.

³⁰ K. Rajagopalan, *The Politics of Language and the Concept of Linguistic Identity*, "CAUCE:Revista de Filología y su Didáctica", No. 24, 2001, pp. 17-28; G. Orwell, *Politics and the English Language*,

around all Germanic people, thereby bringing several other states together by force because of the same ethnicity and language. The Second World War erupted in the course of this. Hence, ethnicity (nationalism) and language could be said to have caused the Second World War.

The Europeans understood this and that was why the first thing at colonization, was to change the tongue, mind and identity of the subjects. The attachments to the master would be built around the similar identity shared. West Africa and indeed the rest of Africa have been in these dire straits for a long time. The sense of belonging has been towards Europe- the direct colonial master- and not towards fellow Africans. Of course, the allegiance and subordination go to the *ex-metropoles* as well. As such, Africa would remain in a perpetual position of subjugation as the social and political divisions would not allow for joint or collective will to ward off neo-colonialism.

The ECOWAS leaders would require more decisive measures channeled at the social climate rather than always seeking political solutions to West Africa's disintegration or lack of integration. The Protocol on free movement is a good one because it promotes people to people interaction, which is more effective for integration. But the organization has to raise a committee that will monitor the land and sea borders as well as the airports to ensure that the Protocol terms and commitments are adhered to by security personnel of each country. There should also be dedicated military patrol team by each country to see to it that best practices stipulated by the ECOWAS Protocol are observed. The free and legitimate movement of persons, goods and services will enhance more of informal international collaboration that would lead to unity, rather than the placid and uncertain government to government interactions that have characterized ECOWAS over time.

A more effective way to facilitate de-colonization of West Africa and freeing up of the minds of the peoples to relate more with one another, which would enhance integration, is the agreement among ECOWAS leaders to implement a school curriculum in which four major indigenous languages in West Africa will be taught from primary to secondary schools. The four most spoken languages are considered to be Hausa, Mandingo, Yoruba and Peul. ECOWAS can decide better what the languages should be. However, pupils in West African schools should be compelled to pick at least two of the languages. Countries where the languages are common should make it mandatory for the students not to pick their indigenous language as one of the compulsory African languages to undertake. For instance, Hausa and Yoruba, which are widely spoken in Nigeria, should not be an option for the Southwestern schools and Northern schools in Nigeria respectively. Hausa is spoken in Northern Togo, Benin and Ghana, and beyond. The language will not be an option there. This

<http://www.npr.org/blogs/ombudsman/Politics_and_the_English_Language-1.pdf>
(26.08.2015).

should be institutionalized so much that Hausa or Mandingo will become one of the official languages in ECOWAS assemblies and summits.

Also, all governments should agree that West African universities make French and English compulsory at the undergraduate level for all students from the first to the final year. Alternatively, French should be made compulsory in Anglophone countries and English made compulsory for students in Francophone countries at the undergraduate level. Portuguese or Latin can be made an option. This will make every West African automatically bilingual in foreign languages and make communication and interaction with fellow West Africans easier. Anyone would have the ability and ease of switching to any language and the “borders” would have either been reduced or dismantled. In this way, the allegiance will be towards a fellow West African, and not to a foreigner whose interest is for the self and not to any former subject. By this, ECOWAS would find it easier to implement its integration agenda in the region.

Conclusion

The multilingual approach as far as local African languages is concerned and bilingualism in terms of western languages will be a mileage towards the reduction of the artificial borders in West Africa. The sub-continent has for too long been hijacked by the former colonial masters, whose colonial strategy of divide and rule, perpetuated by language barriers, has made regional cooperation and integration a herculean task.

ECOWAS leaders have the responsibility to be true to itself and set the region free from the stranglehold of neo-colonialism. It is understandable that it will be difficult to be assertive when some of these countries depend on the former colonial masters for virtually everything. But, it must be thought-out and realized too, that when there is economic and political synergy among West African states and peoples, as one indivisible group, they would pull down adversities and overcome challenges and grow into a formidable economic force.

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IV. RECENZJE

„*Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem*”
2015, nr 2(5)

Jewhen Magda, *Gibridnaja wojna. Wyżit' i pobiedit'*, Vivat Publishing, Charków 2015, ss. 320 (Leszek Sykulski)

Książka ukraińskiego dziennikarza, Jewhena Mahdy, która ukazała się równolegle w językach ukraińskim i rosyjskim¹, wpisuje się w aktualne zainteresowania opinii publicznej nowymi formami prowadzenia działań zbrojnych. Zajęcie Krymu przez Federację Rosyjską ożywiło zainteresowanie zachodnich ośrodków naukowych i analitycznych działaniami polityczno-militarnymi, łączącymi w sobie klasyczne operacje wojskowe z różnymi formami walki informacyjnej. Od 2014 r. w ośrodkach eksperckich NATO coraz popularniejsze stało się użycie terminu wojna hybrydowa (ang. *hybrid war*)².

Książka ukraińskiego dziennikarza nie jest typową monografią naukową, lecz raczej analitycznym spojrzeniem na sytuację bieżącą. Luźny styl autora, swobodny stosunek do źródeł czy subiektywny ton, nie odbierają jednak omawianej publikacji walorów poznawczych. Stanowi ona ważny przyczynek do analizy świadomości politycznej ukraińskich elit intelektualnych. Książka wskazuje także na wiele istotnych uwarunkowań geopolitycznej gry prowadzonej przez mocarstwa na terytorium Ukrainy.

Na kompozycję pracy składa się pięć głównych rozdziałów, poświęconych kolejno: roli wizerunku państwa w relacjach międzynarodowych i sposobu w jaki ten *image* jest podważany w wojnach hybrydowych, zasobom energetycznym jako czynnikom wojny hybrydowej, znaczeniu historii jako instrumentu walki politycznej na arenie międzynarodowej, analizie przypadku Ukrainy oraz społeczno-psychologicznym wymiarze wojny hybrydowej.

Jewhen Mahda posługując się pojęciem wojny, agresji hybrydowej, podkreśla, że cechuje ją przewaga komponentów niemilitarnych, które powodują, iż „nie wygląda jak wojna”³. Tego typu działania skutkują trudnościami w zaklasyfikowaniu ich jako wojny w rozumieniu prawnomiędzynarodowym. Agresja

¹ Recenzja oparta jest na wersji rosyjskojęzycznej.

² M. Wojnowski, *Mit „wojny hybrydowej”. Konflikt na terenie państwa ukraińskiego w świetle rosyjskiej myśli wojskowej XIX–XXI wieku*, „Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego” 2015, „Wojna hybrydowa” – wydanie specjalne, s. 8.

³ J. Magda, *Gibridnaja wojna. Wyżit' i pobiedit'*, Charków 2015, s. 29.

hybrydowa łączy w sobie działania propagandowe, militarne, dyplomatyczne i ekonomiczne.

Z uwagi na fakt, że Rosja dość szeroko wykorzystuje współczesne teorie wojen sieciowych oraz wojny psychologicznej, zaliczanej do idei tzw. kształtowanego odbioru, istotne wydaje się zwrócenie uwagi przez autora książki na elementy walki mentalnej prowadzonej przez Rosjan. W skład tych instrumentów wchodzi wszelkiego rodzaju metody mające na celu wpływanie na określone grupy społeczne. Zaliczamy do nich m.in. strategię informacyjną, mającą na celu przekonywanie – przede wszystkim własnej opinii publicznej – co do celowości danych działań (przykładem jest np. operacja na Krymie, czy utworzenie tzw. Noworosji), operacje psychologiczne, czyli działania ukierunkowane do wpływania na zagraniczną opinię publiczną przy wykorzystaniu mediów masowych, w tym mediów społecznościowych oraz operacje niejawne, prowadzone przez oficerów służb specjalnych.

Ważnym elementem podnoszonym przez Jewhena Mahdę jest znaczenie sektora energetycznego w wojnie hybrydowej (s. 84 i n.). Autor szeroko omawia rosyjską strategię energetyczną realizowaną m.in. przez koncern Gazprom. Szczególnie interesujące są rozważania autora dotyczące znaczenia ukraińskich rurociągów dla bezpieczeństwa energetycznego Europy. Innym z kolei zagadnieniem, wartym odnotowania, jest posługiwanie się historią jako rodzajem oręża politycznego (s. 158 i n.). Oba tematy, zdaniem autora, służą Rosji do oddziaływania na warstwę psychologiczną społeczeństw, tak ukraińskiego, jak i rosyjskiego.

Współcześnie spektrum możliwości wpływania na masy jest bardzo szerokie. Recenzowana książka nie omawia ich wszystkich, ale daje ciekawy przykład spojrzenia kogoś z wewnątrz kraju, przeciwko któremu obok klasycznych działań wojennych toczy się „niewidzialna wojna”. Wiele z metod opisywanych w książce jest osiągane w dużej mierze poprzez wzbudzanie uczuć odwołujących się do przynależności narodowej, państwowej, cywilizacyjnej o różnym natężeniu (np. od patriotyzmu do szowinizmu, od pobożności do fanatyzmu), w zależności od potrzeb, kładąc nacisk na sferę emocjonalną lub racjonalną. Częstym narzędziem stosowanym w tym obszarze jest tworzenie różnego rodzaju mniej lub bardziej fikcyjnych zagrożeń (ze strony określonych państw, organizacji międzynarodowych, międzynarodowych korporacji, czy organizacji przestępczych). Tworzone są iluzje braku, utraty czegoś (terytorium, zasobów itp.), mity, stereotypy, zbiorowe wyobrażenia przestrzeni (np. prawosławna wspólnota cywilizacyjna), kreowana jest zbiorowa wyobraźnia historyczna itp. Z tego punktu widzenia publikacja Jewhena Mahdy jawi się jako istotne źródło, przydatne dla wszystkich badaczy i ekspertów zajmujących się szeroko pojętym obszarem walki informacyjnej.

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

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