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## **NARRATIVES OF THE “OTHER” IN TIMES OF WORLDVIEW WARS: TRUE FACE, MASKED FACE**

### **Abstract:**

*Modern day worldview wars are distinguished by the extraordinary role that information and its suppliers play in building perceptions of war events, whether real, falsified or invented. The paper analyses the means by which modern pro-Russian media try to reach their targets in the hybrid/information war. The following narratives are specially noted as defining the current stage of the worldview war against Ukraine: narratives intending to humiliate the dignity of Ukrainian language speakers and the national idea, intending to raise malice and chagrin in speakers, intending to confuse and disorient, intending to involve into pre-meditated ideologems. As concerns linguistic means of recipient disorientation, the following are noted: simulacra, metonymies, resources of semantic-grammatical and semantic modality, logical, semantic and formal hybrids (chimeras), quotation marks and their verbal expression (the “so-called”), resources of sacral language, linguistic mind games, rhetorical questions. Receiver’s confusion is achieved by using linguistic means in a non-typical function, whereby the most common are simulacra, metonymies and the semantic-grammatical modality, and the most effective ones are hybrids of several kinds and mind games. The paper’s conclusion is that ideological tenets of old and new times presented in pro-Russian media in all their linguistic and semiotic variety are imprinted with means which are but missiles for a suggestive, non-rationally-controlled introduction and promotion of pro-Kremlin narratives.*

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*information warfare, strategic narratives, pro-Russian media, simulacra, critical discourse analysis, suggestion, political neomyths*

## Introduction

Modern day worldview wars are distinguished by the extraordinary role that information and its suppliers – the mass media – play in building perceptions of war events, whether real, falsified or invented, in the minds of the collective or individual information recipient. This recipient is the target landing of the suggestive (acting to bypass rational thinking) discourse. Since the directives under which pro-Kremlin mass media operate condition them to mask their true stance, understanding the direction that public opinion is being shaped by a subject of mass-media interaction is extremely challenging. To be successful, one must identify evaluative information – linguistic markers of ‘masked hostility’. This responsibility is of special weight during the hybrid war utilizing resources of military power, trade and diplomatic hostilities and the war for minds, historically known as the “war of Ares”, “war of Athena” and “war of Apollo”<sup>2</sup>. The last of those three is our primary subject of research.

In times of worldview conflict of societies, the information space is defined by the following: a raised level of malice, a simplified and harshly delineated world image, a high suggestivity; and also replicability, repetitiveness, canon conformity<sup>3</sup>, chaoticity<sup>4</sup>, emotiveness and information excess<sup>5</sup>, quasi-dialog nature in the web’s social environments<sup>6</sup>, radical simplification<sup>7</sup>, ritual-

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<sup>2</sup> K. Parshin, *Ukraina proigryvayet vojnu?*, <<https://www.obozrevatel.com/blogs/19034-ukraina-proigryvaet-voynu.htm>> (22.12.2017).

<sup>3</sup> G. Pocheptsov, *Psikhotravmy v istorii chelovechestva*, <[http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/trends/1411978127/psikhotravmy\\_v\\_istorii\\_chelovechestva/](http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/trends/1411978127/psikhotravmy_v_istorii_chelovechestva/)> (19.01.2018).

<sup>4</sup> A. Tverskoy, *Vy – eto i yest' vojna: rossiyanin zhestko obratilsya k sograzhdanam iz-za Ukrainy*, <<https://www.obozrevatel.com/society/36924-vyi-eto-i-est-vojna-rossiyanin-zhestko-obratilsya-k-sograzhdanam-iz-za-ukrainyi.htm>> (28.12.2017).

<sup>5</sup> G. Pocheptsov, *Novyye osobennosti sovremennoy propagandist-skoyvoyny*, <[http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/trends/1411978127/novye\\_osobennosti\\_sovremennoy\\_propagandistskoy\\_voyny/](http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/trends/1411978127/novye_osobennosti_sovremennoy_propagandistskoy_voyny/)> (14.02.2018).

<sup>6</sup> G. Pocheptsov, *Kontrpropaganda kak ob'yekt*, <[http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/trends/1411978127/kontrpropaganda\\_kak\\_obekt/](http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/trends/1411978127/kontrpropaganda_kak_obekt/)> (12.02.2018).

<sup>7</sup> G. Pocheptsov, *Propagandist-skoye vozdeystviye: na chuzhiye mozgi i na svooy mozg*, <[http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/trends/1411978127/propagandistskoe\\_vozdeystvie\\_na\\_chuzhie\\_mozgi\\_i\\_na\\_svooy\\_mozg/.6](http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/trends/1411978127/propagandistskoe_vozdeystvie_na_chuzhie_mozgi_i_na_svooy_mozg/.6)> (19.01.2018).

ized messaging<sup>8</sup>, absence of moral and ethical constraints<sup>9</sup>, and finally, narrativity – the building of ‘own’ narratives as building blocks of virtual and informational products<sup>10</sup>. Narrativity is a way of telling a story under an own angle of view, introducing one’s own image of the world which has today become postmodern: a world with man stripped of his existential identity and turned into a simulacrum, a copy without an original. Presented in this way, media information is not a reflection of true and objective facts but a contest of conflicting narratives whose authors’ intentions are well masked. In worldview wars, there is a steady tendency to mask the stance of the mass-media interaction participant, individual or collective, which makes the direction public thought is being shaped extremely difficult to read and possible only via new methods of identifying the speaker’s intention. One of the tools fit for the task is a method of uncovering value-marked information – linguistic markers of ‘masked hostility’ in the text.

Discourse plays a key role in the embedding of own narratives (definition of discourse: text including the sender and recipient of the message in their bilateral influence on the situation and the situation’s converse influence upon them). Discourse holds value-marked information showing the sender’s “angle of view”. Analyzing recurrent constructions in a narrative with masked intentions makes it possible to see how “language matter” forms, promotes and installs in the mind “a new reality” during the worldview wars of today; we may also uncover the speaker’s hidden intentions by analyzing value-markers.

This undertaking has always been critical in times of conflict, and is even more so in the contemporary postmodern world where the intertextuality of narratives is destroyed through systemic references to falsehoods; where simulacra (fakes) overshadow real events as constituents of discourse that, in turn, take over reality; where sacral texts are replaced by quasi-myths: the intentional and pragmatic chaotization and carnivalization of the world are served up as the complexity of the universe; where the level of malice constantly rises even as it is being touted as good in the intensifying information flow; “post-truths” amend history as values are shifted and the past primitivized; “alternative

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<sup>8</sup> G. Pocheptsov, *Kak stroyat-sya illyuzii: vozhd, politika idemokratiya*, <[http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/trends/1411978127/kak\\_stroyatsya\\_illyuzii\\_vozhdi\\_politika\\_i\\_demokratiya/.7](http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/trends/1411978127/kak_stroyatsya_illyuzii_vozhdi_politika_i_demokratiya/.7)> (12.02.2018).

<sup>9</sup> G. Pocheptsov, *Kontrpropaganda kak ob"yekt*, <[http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/trends/1411978127/kontrpropaganda\\_kak\\_obekt/](http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/trends/1411978127/kontrpropaganda_kak_obekt/)> (12.02.2018).

<sup>10</sup> G. Pocheptsov, *Novyye puti razvitiyapropagandy*, <<http://psyfactor.org/lib/propaganda56.htm>> (20.02.2018).

truths” allow for multiple interpretations of modernity; communication becomes disrupted as dialog is rejected and the normal perception of life’s fundamental basics is destroyed and pluralism leads to a rejection of the truth. Even so, no matter the efforts made to mask one’s position in the postmodern text, the message must be adequately received by “one’s own” (adepts, sympathizers) and serve to strengthen their position, while simultaneously affecting the others and their view; therefore, the message must hold value markers. Therefore, we must seek to identify the subject’s masked intent by analyzing a discourse for value markers of particular cognitive and conceptual relevance. This is a formidable task for theoreticians and practitioners of political discourse science.

The theory of language of social practice has been profoundly researched within critical discourse analysis by Patrick Sériot, Yurii Stepanov, Ruth Vodka, Norman Fairclough, Tijn van Dijk, Olga Rusakova and her followers. Research has been done to identify language markers of a special mental world – the ‘wooden language’ of Soviet political discourse, the language of Margaret Thatcher’s authorities during her time in power; the language of social rejection of immigrants in 1990s Austria, the political discourse in Russia etc. Even asystematic verbalizers of a mental world served as colourful markers of the ‘mythology of an era’ (Yurii Stepanov).

Contemporary Russian and Ukrainian journalists, who practice mass-media communication daily, have remarked upon the effectiveness of discursive markers of value: ‘There is an easy way to see what stance a media outlet is taking. It is enough seeing the formulas and definitions being used’<sup>11</sup> or ‘when you say ‘na Ukrainu’, you are contributing a kopek into the war... When you call the Ukrainian people a ‘brethren folk’ and refer to our unified homeland, you contribute a thousand’’<sup>12</sup>. Vasyl Lyzanchuk with reference to Volodymyr Horbulin rightly states that, as Western mass media avoid objective definitions of the aggressor in the Crimea and Donbas, they keep inventing new words and phrases with the sole intention of not naming the Russian Federation as the aggressor and occupant<sup>13</sup>. Thus, this represents a search for forms concealing true value markers and the addresser’s true intent.

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<sup>11</sup> R. Tsimbalyuk, «Dozhdy» ne budet, <<https://www.unian.net/politics/1721791-dojdyane-budet.html>> (25.01.2018).

<sup>12</sup> A. Tverskoy, Vy – eto i yest' vojna: rossiyarin zhestko obratilsya k sograzhdanam iz-za Ukrainy, <<https://www.obozrevatel.com/society/36924-vyi-eto-i-est-vojna-rossiyarin-zhestko-obratilsya-k-sograzhdanam-iz-za-ukrainyi.htm>> (28.12.2018).

<sup>13</sup> V. Lizanchuk, Istorichna pravda – gumanitarna zbroya, <<https://dt.ua/SOCIUM/istorichna-pravda-gumanitarna-zbroya-.html>> (25.01.2018).

Material for the research is composed of value markers in ‘hidden hostility’ texts created during the ongoing undeclared worldview war waged by Russian political elites against Ukraine. It is known that information is a key constituent of this hybrid war. We have researched the content of the Vesti newspaper publications (information outlet connected with the Vesti TV program and the outlets Vesti. Reporter, Radio.Vesti, Vesti.RU) and the Internet source “Voyennoye obozreniye” (Military review) to search for value markers pointing towards the sender’s true intent. A continuous monitoring in March–November 2017 has yielded more than 2000 discursive phenomena concerning the current political situation. We have aimed to define the language media that these media outlets use to convey value-marked information of the sender and to covertly shape the recipient’s view.

### **Typology of value-marked means of the ‘other’s speech’: intentions, targets, strategic narratives**

Value markers identified through the “other’s speech” identification method were then grouped by sender’s leading intention and marked with asterisks (\*, \*\*, \*\*\*) to denote respectively low, medium, and high frequency of speech phenomena usage in the media. Seeing the markers grouped makes it easier to define chief targets and strategic narratives being forced upon society.

- a) Intention of assaulting the dignity of a Ukrainian language speaker and his national conscious

The first group is made up of linguistic phenomena crafted with the intention of assaulting the dignity of a Ukrainian language speaker and his national conscious. The group includes the following.

1. Transliteration and intentional mocking russification and twisting of words and phrases from the Ukrainian language; else, conveying letters, sounds, words and phrases of Ukrainian with resources of the Russian alphabet and phonetics (formal hybridization), frequently involving a play on non-intrinsic inner forms<sup>\*\*\*</sup>: *Революция «гидности», гидная Краина, попрощаться с Щеневмерлой, щеневмерлики, украинские «херои», хатоскрайность, господа свидомые, цевропейцы, эуропэйци*. It should be noted that these tools are also used in reference to citizens of other nations: *«помяркоувные белорусы», «свядомые» белорусы, «Беларусь – гэта Еуропа», «свядомасць»*.

2. Grammatical\* (*на Украине, в Донбассе, украинцы сами себя, Порошенко сам себя, якобы российский контрактник, какая еще Украина, з «українською мовою» не сложилось*) and lexical (*Малороссия, малороссийский язык, украинская трезубая вилка*), including invectives (*бандерлоги, укрорагули*)\*\*, markers of disdain and feelings of inferiority towards Ukraine, its national symbols, language, government and people.
3. Non-capitalization with view to diminishing the significance or value of the object described\*: *так называемый майдан, президент України*. Conversely, the discourse of Russian mass media's political texts is rife with intentional capitalization of the first letter to elevate the significance of the object described\*: *Большой брат, Великая Русская Революция*. The pragmatics of denigration towards Ukraine persists in these contexts.
4. Using plural in place of singular forms: *жить без бандер*, singular instead of plural\*: *украинский и русский народ*.

The above mentioned means are all deployed towards one strategic narrative: a seemingly independent, especially post-Maidan, Ukraine and all adjacent concepts deserve to be seen with disdain, disparagement and ridicule.

b) Intention to ‘manage’ the recipient via ideological clichés

The second group is comprised of linguistic phenomena reflecting the speaker's intention to grasp the recipient's conscious into “the voice of ideology” by way of invoking now-defunct ideologies or creating new ideological clichés.

Activation of linguistic markers of the Soviet era\*\*\* – clichéd word collocations, ideologems and the like (*воссоединение с Россией, триединый народ славянский, братский украинский народ, мы с вами – один народ, исконно русские земли, объединенные экономики, разжигание межнациональной ненависти и вражды*).

Resources of Soviet-talk may be deployed towards a rejuvenation or installation of the following views in the recipient's conscious: brotherhood (*братский украинский народ, мы же братья*), unity (*объединение России и Украины, Украина с Россией вместе*), mutual interest (*общая история, интересы России и Украины совпадают*), the us-them opposition (*наши, русские*) with the “others” including the US and EU and specially the Kyiv government (*циничное бездействие киевских властей*).

The aforementioned means are deployed towards the strategic narrative about the alleged wholesome nature of the Soviet Union, worth longing back

to, bringing peace and concord between the brethren peoples of Ukraine and Russia. Blogging journalists have noted that the Russian authorities distinctly favour the Soviet subject and tend to borrow its propaganda...

The recipient's conscious is actively influenced through the formation of a new cognitive map, as newly coined norms and ideologems are introduced and continually reinforced by pro-Kremlin media\*\*\*. These ideologems are aimed against a range of targets.

One target is represented by the population of the Crimea, specially Crimean Tartars: *исконно русский Крым, крымско-татарский терроризм, крымско-татарский экстремизм, Крым принадлежит России*. Strategic narrative: the reunification of the Crimea with Russia is alleged to be historically motivated and just; Crimean Tartars are depicted as extremists and terrorists.

The other group targeted is – the population of temporarily occupied territories in the East of Ukraine (*свобода от Киева, Донецкая народная республика, Луганская народная республика, молодые республики*). Strategic narrative: allegedly, the autonomous republics – so-called DPR and LPR – emerged without Russian instigation as a form of protest against the Ukrainian post-maidan government.

This set of ideologems clash with another set, made of two sub-sets – A. the occupied territories are a domain of Russian interest (*ОРДЛО – зона естественного влияния России; до чего Украина довела Донбасс*). The words and collocations used point clearly towards the background idea: Donbas is an intervention zone of Russia similar to the Crimea (*зона естественного влияния, воссоединение народа*), трюїзми (*это все наша русская земля*), we note multiple parallel usages (*Кримнаш – Донбаснаш, путь домой, возвращается домой*). Ideologems in the B subset complement subset A; they stipulate that Ukraine has no control over Donbas, and any Ukrainian influence is flimsy, temporary and founded on genocide; Donbas will take back its territory (*действия ВСУ как геноцид мирного населения Донбасса, временно контролируемые Киевом территории*).

Strategic narratives: allegedly, 1. DPR and LPR are *Novorossiya*, and it would only be fair from a historic viewpoint to recognize them as parts of Russia, where they are 'coming home' after a period of ruin (the simulacrum of *Novorossiya* will be considered below). 2. Ukraine is a sworn enemy of the DPR and LPR genociding its civilians through shelling; any control over a part of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions is temporary.

The ideological clichés above clash with others centring around the statement 'the situation in the East is an internal Ukrainian problem' (*недоразумение на Востоке Украины, бессмысленность войны в Донбассе*,

*гражданский конфликт между украинцами в восточных областях*). These ideologems install the worldview that the hostilities in Ukraine are a civil conflict, an incognizant misunderstanding; no war is being waged against Ukraine, this is an internal issue and crisis; the government can't and won't put an end to it, its inactivity is cynical and deplorable, it is a provocation aimed at quelling a local rebellion. Thus, from the Kyiv side we have not soldiers but militants while Donbas is being defended by local militias. Strategic narrative: allegedly the east of Ukraine is suffering from a misunderstanding of sorts, civil strife, an internal public conflict, an armed clash, a civil war, an uprising of Donbas – all in all, a wave of protests cynically provoked and now heartlessly quenched by the post-maidan government of Ukraine.

Another target the propaganda focuses on is Ukraine and Ukrainians. One set of ideologems concerns the Ukrainian government (*Майданная власть, незаконные власти Киева, госпереворот на/в Украине; правящий режим в Украине; военный «переворот» в Украине, украинские путчисты; бессилие украинской власти; кровавая фашистская Украина; нацистский переворот*).

Strategic narrative: the powers ruling Ukraine are allegedly of Nazi and fascist persuasion. At the same time, they are powerless. They are unlawful, empowered only by a *coup d'etat*, a takeover, a junta.

Another set of ideologems adds the following segment to the worldview map: Ukraine is weak and powerless; it is inept, on the brink of collapse, a disintegrating and failed state; its demise is deplorable; as a matter of fact, it does not exist (*единство Украины – утопия; Украина прекратила существование; Украины нет; украинского народа нет; Украина распадается*). Embedded strategic narrative: allegedly, Ukraine is a failed state in the process of disintegration and in mortal throes; it is falling apart, being divided, is an expendable asset for the USA and Europe.

The next set of ideologems builds on the idea of Oleksandr Zakharchenko, which in itself expands on the cornerstones of the Kremlin worldview map: Ukraine is a Russian borderland that centres on the DPR (*Малороссийская область; новое государство Малороссия*). Strategic narrative (temporary) – allegedly, the DPR is a centre of Malorossian (formerly Ukraine) statehood with its capital in Donetsk.

Ideologems describing Ukrainians are relatively few: *хуторянское мировоззрение, ксенофобия украинцев; экстремизм украинцев*. Strategic narrative: allegedly, Ukrainians are a backward nation of xenophobes who thrive on oppressing Russian-speaking persons; extremists, mankurts and hillbillies who are yoked by their own government. The Ukrainian language (*«Русские Донецк, Харьков, Луганск, Крым ... не успели заговорить на*

*неразвившейся, толком, «мове» – южнорусском наречии, загаженном польским говором*<sup>14</sup>) is depicted as a primitive dialect contaminated with polonisms.

A significant set of ideologems resurrects the old “skrepy” in a new historic context by outlining the only possible way for Ukraine as incorporation into Russia: *в российско-украинской войне виноваты обе стороны, присоединение Украины к России; решить украинскую проблему; интеграция Украины в российское пространство*. Strategic narrative: allegedly, the only way open to Ukraine is to follow the Russian vector, be integrated into the Russian sphere of influence, join Russia, support Russian Orthodoxy in Ukraine.

A limited set of ideologems refers to the European Union: *все зло от Евросоюза; мы другие, чем Запад; пагубность европейского выбора* and others constructing the outlook and strategic narrative “The USA and EU are evil”.

One is compelled to conclude that the ideological arsenal of the Kremlin is deployed at four targets in the order of importance: temporarily occupied territories, Ukraine, the Crimea, US and Europe. Ideologems make for a patchy and disjointed worldview map intended to disorient and confuse. The ideologems in each set are varied, ideologically laden, value-marked, emotionally overloaded. The different sets are not cross-aligned and clash with each other. The strategic narratives they introduce are alternative post-truths of today and post-truths of yester-yore. Ideological clichés are common and must be extensively commented on.

- c) Intention to raise the “level of malice” of the language speaker and his national conscious

The third group comprises linguistic phenomena intended by the sender to raise the “level of malice” of speakers and carriers of the national conscious. Chief among these are negative emotiogens of varying reference, introduced into the discourse with several “language wrappers”\*\*\*.

1. Negative non-referenced emotiogens – words and collocations with an ‘empty reference index’, i.e. with a meaning so abstract that no specific existing phenomenon can be ascribed to it: *вот почему / когда*

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<sup>14</sup> G. Pocheptsov, *Gibridnaya vojna: kogda naseleniyeokazyvayet-sya tsel'yu*, <[http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/trends/1411978127/gibridnaya\\_vojna\\_kogda\\_naselenie\\_okazyvaetsya\\_tsel'yu/](http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/trends/1411978127/gibridnaya_vojna_kogda_naselenie_okazyvaetsya_tsel'yu/)> (22.12.2017).

сложилась такая ситуация (в Украине), что творится в Украине etc. To be noted specially in this sub-group are:

- Information about “horrors” of many kinds: *началась настоящая паника, что учудила Украина; новый позор Украины; жуть в Украине;*
- Information about horrifying fake news: *новости взорвали соцсети; раскрыта; украинские СМИ трубят новость; всплыла запись; украинцы должны узнать правду;*
- Frightening prophecies about the future of the world, Ukraine and its central political figures: *будущее Украины будет страшным; Украина рухнет; страшное предсказание про Украину; страшный прогноз для Украины.*

2. We note weakly-referenced emotiogens with a past or present modality: *атомный кризис Украины; издевательства украинского правительства; нацистский переворот / нацистский режим в Украине; военное преступление Украины; подготовка интервенции в Россию* etc. Weakly-referenced collocations differ from non-referenced ones in that they hold a specification that can help identify the subject being described, but not so clearly as to understand what exactly is being said in a highly emotional way. The group comprises weakly-referenced collocations with a sacral component regarding the country and its people, with a negative spin: *слово на языке оккупантов; лингвистическая психопатия; гетто для русскоязычных / русскоговорящих; геноцид украинской нации; Украина вымирает та подібні*. The group also includes associated predictors: *РФ стягивает войска; вошли российские танки, пагубность европейского выбора Украины*. They contain a veiled threat which the recipient is able to glean due to associative thinking.

Words and collocations with weakened or absent reference to actual phenomena are well-described as means of neurolinguistic programming: the negative emotiogen captures the attention of the recipient, and the word or collocation which refers to nothing much is inviting the recipient to fill its empty content holder with his private fears, frustrations and negative expectations.

3. Ideological newspeak – newly coined words reflecting a negative view of everything of independent Ukraine\*\*\*: *майданутые, майдауны, бандерлоги, свидомиты, свидомизм, укропаны, укрорагули, галицаи* and collocations: *секта свидетелей «истории успеха» во главе с Порошенко, страна свидетелей майдана (свидетели Иеговы),*

*пусть Незалежную в Европу (пусть Дуньку в Европу) and the like.*

These means introduce the strategic narrative that, allegedly, Ukrainians are mentally deficient, inferior and subservient to other nations; are pathetic, as is their governance. Ukrainian patriotism and nationalism is, to all intents and purposes, fascism and Nazism founded on the teachings of Stepan Bandera. Ukrainians passionately hate Russia and speakers of Russian. The Crimea and Donbas belong in Russia. Europe and the US are inherently amoral.

4. Very telling are cognitive metaphors containing a pseudo-identification of subject and object of the statement\*\*. They target Ukraine, its symbols of statehood, government, language and people. E.g., *Украина – страна-могильник, сшитый на коленке «Франкеништейн» по имени Украина, диагноз – Украина, Украина разваливается, бандеровская Галичина, надевшая на себя личину Украины; отель Украина (отель Руанда), Украина – Бандера истекает кровью на своем родовом ложе, Украина – Руанда, Украина – Югославия, Украина превращается в безлюдную пустыню, Украина захлебывается в коррупции, Украина рухнет, Украина – сшитое из разных лоскутов одеяло, судьба Украины – буферное государство; распавшаяся Украина, триста лет Украина лежала под Россией, почему бы теперь под Европой не полежать?* In the spectrum of metaphors of pro-Kremlin media, Ukraine is depicted as a living creature; as a woman capable of giving birth; as a whore; as a rape victim; as a mother dominated by her physicality – dead or dying, monstrous, sickly, bleeding and in the throes of death. The second line of metaphors paints Ukraine as disjointed, made of patches sliding apart; it is being delineated and dismembered; it is a land of strife, divided and depopulated, a dependent borderland. The third line of metaphors paints Ukraine as a domain of war and chaos, defunct or dying like Yugoslavia or 1990s Rwanda. The strategic narratives installed by these cognitive metaphors fall in this range: allegedly, Ukraine is doomed to die as a state; its statehood and sacred symbols hold no value. Its governing bodies, law enforcement and financial system are weak, clay-footed, avaricious and unjust. Ukrainians are deluded, foolish, dependent and doomed to be the US and EU's lab bunnies. The ideology of Ukraine is defined as Russophobic, deceptive, far-fetched, Galician by origin, treacherous and venal, brimming with aggression towards Russia and hate for Russia and Donbas. Russia, on the contrary, is the older, might-

ier land of prosperity capable of extending its bounty to the Crimea and Donbas. The Russian-speaking Ukrainians and the language itself are continually victimized.

5. Collocations and idioms in a newly negative meaning\*\*: *Украине пришлось испить чашу горечи; дорвавшиеся до власти майданистики; делать Киеву «до свидания»; больное место Порошенко; раскачать лодку под Порошенко; Порошенко мечет молнии.*
6. Unveiled threats\*: *кандидаты в президенты – уроды, которых надо расстрелять; не будите русского медведя, Россия заберет Донбасс.*
7. Significantly above-average number of grammatical negative statements\*\*: *Украине не избежать, Украина не удержала, Никто не хочет спасать Украину.* The prevalence of negative forms occurs with a coefficient of 1.35 to 1.9 compared with texts of other discourses.

All in all, the most numerous group is one made up of non-referenced or weakly-referenced emotogens, which may point towards the subconscious as the main target of suggestive influence. Emphasis is placed on the process of auto-suggestion of the subject, whereby s/he is continuously humiliated, confused and driven by a cunningly woven ideological whip.

- d) The intention to disorient the Ukrainian language speaker and compromise his self-identity

The fourth group comprises linguistic phenomena utilized by the sender with the purpose to disorient; it includes the following sub-sets:

1. Metonymy deployed towards cognitive narrowing\*\*\*, is a common discursive marker of the views professed by Russian media. One typical example is the metonymy 'Kyiv' (the Kyiv powers) to denote the powers of Ukraine, centred in the capital. The metonymy *Kiiv* in pro-Russian media stands for something non-legitimate, vested with no rights to make decisions for Ukraine due to being illegitimate, harsh, manipulative, oppressive, lying, self-promoting, precocious, nationalistic, pro-European, transient, cowardly, cynical, provocative, inactive, hillbilly in nature and doomed to fail: *киевский режим, киевский нацистский режим, киевская хунта, проевропейский Киев, капризы Киева, Киев настигла расплата, киевская версия событий, временно контролируемые Киевом территории.* Cognitive metonymies intended to expand are chiefly built around words with

‘Rus-‘ as a prominent constituent: *государство «Русская земля», организация «Русь», русская весна, русский мир, русская земля / территория.*

2. A further way of introducing chaos and discord is hybrids of various origins. A number of these ‘chimeras’ point towards areas where the influencer’s interests are focused: *кацапо-бандеровцы, жидо-бандеровцы, Гейропа, украинская хунта, укроюгенд, одесская хатынь/Одесская Хатынь, бандеровский путч* and similar. The hybrids connect notions that are entirely incompatible, yet slide smoothly into the desired ideology.

The hybrid-speak often assails plain logic: *бандерівська смерть України* (Bandera himself having died at the hands of a KGB agent), revealing the speaker’s inert intentions.

Hybrid-speak has been detected on a purely formal level as well, such as transliteration or attempts to imitate the borrowed word with letters of another language (*грамадяны Низалежнай, – see comments at the article beginning*), tone-painting (*порвать непорванное, зрада зрадняя*) and polysemiotic contexts (combination of signs from different languages or semiotic systems): *«жаб’ячі прыжкі» осени-зимы, Россия – Україна.*

3. Quotation marks to implicitly deny their contents, and its sister phrase «the so-called»\*: *«оккупационная» природа русского языка, майданная «информация», так называемые сепары, так называемый майдан.*
4. Resources of sacral language, which are a relatively infrequent but powerful means of introducing chaos and discord into the consumer’s mental map. Here the actions of Russia are depicted as sacred, and of Ukraine as sinful: *Единая Святая Русь, отец народа ДНР, вразумляющий молебн, грехи украинской власти, сакральная жертва (миротворцы, Вороненков...)* etc.
5. Mental and linguistic games\* embodied by certain statements (e.g., *«предъявите ваши доказательства», «они первые начали»* and similar) are a way to lure the consumer into a rigidly outlined communication scheme with defined roles (after Eric Burn<sup>15</sup>) and is worthy of exploring further.

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<sup>15</sup> E. Burn, *Igry, v kotoryye igrayut lyudi*, Moscow 2016.

6. Rhetorical questions seeming to suggest a ready-made answer to the recipient and creating an illusion of communication\*: *Зачем Украине мобилизация? Хотят ли жители Крыма вернуться в Украину? Каким путём продолжает идти Украина?*
7. Manipulating modality\*\*\* is an effective semantic-grammatical way of affecting the recipient of information and may be counted as a trance-inducing tool used in neuro-linguistic programming. The Indicative Mood is perceived as opposite to the Subjunctive or Conditional Mood – consequently, playing around with the category of time goes unnoticed by the conscious, as does carrying over the semantics of one modality into the other (probability instead of improbability, causality instead of non-causality etc.). Information slides easily into the subconscious in its digestible package of the Indicative Mood, and it is this cognitive pathway that is particularly effective for installing simulacra and newly-minted ideologems intended to confuse the recipient of information.

Thus, it is the semantic and grammatical means of the Indicative Mood that are used to present the surreal as real (*Украины нет, украинского народа нет*), the absurd as normal (*Малороссия – выполнение Минска, Малороссия – преемница Украины*), the impossible as possible (*возвращение Украины под российский протекторат, «русская» Украина, отказ от евроинтеграции*), the deceptive as true (*армии РФ в Украине – нет, только добровольцы; украинские ополченцы сбили самолет*), the desired as existing (*в Донбассе начало полномасштабной войны; нежелание ОРДЛО возвращаться в Украину; крах Порошенко, режим Порошенко потерпел фиаско*).

The capacity of the Imperative Mood is restricted compared to the Indicative: it deals in a future possibility as can typically be directed at a “circle of insiders”; therefore, its use is relatively infrequent (*давайте отржем Донбасс, давайте признаем аннексию Крыма*).

Semantic modality may be of several kinds characteristic of programming texts: the modality of impersonal causality (*принято решении о присоединении Донбасса; решение по Украине принято; в Европу вздумалось*), indefinite causality (*Украине предрекли; у Порошенко придумали, в Украине надумали запретить*), coerced modality (*Россия вынуждена защищать русскоязычных в Крыму и на Донбассе, власть в Киеве должна быть пророссийской*), modality of possibility to focus on a negative prediction (*Путин может забрать Донбасс; украинцы могут потерять деньги; РФ готова*

*нанести удар; Украину может постигнуть второй Чернобыль; возможный отказ стран от Евровидения), modality of inevitability (Киеву не победить; без боя вернуть Славянск и Мариуполь, сдать Украину).*

#### 8. Simulacra\*\*\*.

A simulacrum is a self-referencing sign creating its own reality – “an image devoid of likeness; an image devoid of similarity”<sup>16</sup>; a clone of itself which does not reflect reality but creates it while involving both the sender and the recipient, twisting reality into its unrecognizably warped copy. We have classified simulacra noted before 2016 into 14 types<sup>17</sup>. In the following two years they evolved further. As forms of world warping, contemporary simulacra may be classed as invention simulacra and replacement simulacra. The former are:

- Simulacra of intrigue (*ужасная тайна; страшная паника*), which we analyzed as non-referenced emotiogens as ways of raising the level of malice.
- Simulacra of future threats: *Украину ждет очередной Майдан, досрочные выборы в Украине, распад украинской коалиции, досрочные президентские выборы*. Also includes predictions allegedly made by sages in possession of sacred knowledge, such as Vanga and mediums.
- Simulacra of the past (*Украина признала свои ошибки, Европа дорого обошлась украинцам, никакой дискриминации украинского не было*).
- Simulacra resulting from politically manipulating the past: *триединый народ славянский, Россия – миротворец*.
- New mythologies about today or the recent past (*Крым/Сирия – сакральная земля России, Иван Грозный/Сталин/Путин – выдающиеся руководители России*), which have grown more numerous and complex.
- Illogical chimera simulacras (*украинские путчисты, киевская хунта, славяно-нацисты*) analyzed above as hybrids.

Replacement simulacra are of the following types:

<sup>16</sup> Zh. Delez, *Platon i simulyakr*, “Novoye literaturnoyeobozreniye” 1993, No. 5, pp. 72-93.

<sup>17</sup> N. Slukhai, *The Semiotics of Consciential War in Modern Ukraine: Total Sign Suggestion and Means of Countersuggestion*, “ANTE PORTAS – Security Studies” 2016, No 1(6), pp. 62-68.

- Descriptions of a pseudo-reality, glaring opposition to truth: *роковой безвиз, шенгенская трагедия Украины, кабальное соглашение об ассоциации с ЕС.*
- Mimicking the object: *геноцид населения Народной Республики, воссоединение народа Донбасса, заступиться за русскоязычное население Донецкой Республики.*
- Results of situational broadening or narrowing of the object: *киевские войска, русский мир.*

Additionally, we note:

- Reverse simulacra representing reality as changeable, fluctuating and flickering: *внутриукраинский конфликт, кризис на Украине.*
- Informocide simulacra quenching, diluting, dulling, retouching reality: statement made by Vladimir Putin on April 17 2014 «this is not Ukraine, this is Novorossiya. This Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Nikolayev, Odessa – in the tsar times they were not part of Ukraine but ceded to her later<sup>18</sup>, – is not true for Kharkiv, Luhansk or the Crimea (see more on maps of ‘Novorossiya’ in 1800<sup>19</sup>).
- Vortex simulacra circling around the object but not helping in its cognizance: *Майдан – военный «переворот» в Украине, нацистская массовка, наци-революция.*
- Associative simulacra intended to discredit: *зверства карателей киевской хунты, зверства Яценюка, зверства Турчинова.*
- Oppositive simulacra with marked emotional component: negative (*страшный и смешной недорейх, кровавая фашистская Украина*) and quasi-positive (*защита русскоязычных на Донбассе и в Крыму, Донбассу широкую автономию, возродить пророссийский вектор в политике Украины*).

There are two types of simulacra which dominate in numbers and effect, – neomyths and simulacra with a marked emotional component. Let us dwell on them more deeply.

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<sup>18</sup> *Novorossiya (konfederatsiya), Material iz Vikipedii – svobodnoy entsiklopedii,* <<https://bit.ly/2LBFYcI>> (18.01.2018).

<sup>19</sup> O. Gava, *Istoriya "Novorosii" ta її yetnichniy sklad u XIX storichchi,* <<http://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2014/05/7/142762/>> (22.12.2017).

## The neomyth as active subtype of modern simulacra; how it disorients the recipient

Neomyths occupy a core place among simulacra as a symbolic, socially and culturally relevant idea implanted into society's collective memory. A neomyth is a key element of the virtual narrative<sup>20</sup> introduced by specifying its time, a multitude of subjects and alleged presence in many locations.

Among neomyths of the ongoing hybrid war we find: old ones dating from soviet times (*старший брат, скрепы, украинцы и русские – один народ, Киевская Русь – колыбель трех братских народов*), further back in time (*Украина – окраина, украинское государство – искусственное, это ошибка истории*) and new ones (*Россия – преданный защитник угнетенных русскоязычных: «русская весна», «русский мир»*); specific, of locally sourced elements (as stated above) and constructed, out of elements created at different times or locations (*украинские фашисты, режим неонаци, нацистський мятеж в Києве, украинские палачи, киевская хунта, донецкие ополченцы*); targeting Russia – for internal consumption (*могучая непобедимая Россия, славное прошлое России, современная Россия – страна порядка, процветания и справедливости*), targeting the world – for external consumption (*в Украине внутренний конфликт*) and targeting the general public (*Россия (Москва) как Третий Рим, сакральная Корсунь, Москва – колыбель и защитник православия*); well developed (*колыбель трех братских народов – старший брат – младшая сестра – братские народы; в Украине неонацизм – хлеб не продают людям без национальной символики*) and poorly developed (*распятый мальчик, немецкая девочка Лиза*); isolated (*Россия поможет США бороться с ИГИЛ; киевская хунта*) and recurrent (*Крым – сакральная земля России; Сирия – сакральная земля России; русскоговорящие жители («русский мир») Украины/стран Прибалтики/Польши/Румынии/мира подвергаются репрессиям и призывают к защите*). We note a sharp increase in new neomyths for internal and external consumption, well and poorly developed ones.

<sup>20</sup> G. Pocheptsov, *Novyye puti razvitiya propagandy*, <<http://psyfactor.org/lib/propaganda56.htm>> (20.02.2018); Idem, *Ot propagandy 1.0 k propagande 2.0*, <[http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/trends/1411978127/ot\\_propagandy\\_10\\_k\\_propagande\\_20/](http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/trends/1411978127/ot_propagandy_10_k_propagande_20/)> (20.02.2018).

### Emotiogenic simulacra and their role in recipient disorientation

Worthy of being mentioned separately are emotiogenic simulacra. All types of simulacra include an intrinsic emotive component giving the suggestor unconditional tactical advantage in their use of black rhetoric<sup>21</sup>. Emotive content is not made sense of or critically processed, but taken at face value. Emotive suggestive influence beyond the limits of normal rational filtering of information means that “no rational counter-arguments work”<sup>22</sup>. Especially effective are highly exciting emotions, including, according to Jonah Berger, positive ones, such as awe, inspiration, contentment, humor and negative ones, such as anger and anxiety<sup>23</sup>. Fear is the highest degree of anxiety, be it true fear as a response to imminent danger or neurotic fear<sup>24</sup>.

Emotiogenic simulacra rely on a maximum reduction of a message’s cognizable content and the activation of “impassioned thinking” – a dampening of rational processing of the world. Among them belong emotiogenic quasi-qualifiers and emotiogenic inventions (installations).

Contemporary negative emotiogenic quasi-qualifiers:

- connected with Kyiv or Ukraine (allegedly of fascist or Nazi persuasion, Neonazi, bandera, extremist, xenophobic, nationalistic, bloody): *Украина в дурмане бандеровской идеологии, в Украине фашизм, бандеризация Украины;*
- connected with Ukrainians: *наглые украинцы, ксенофобия украинцев, экстремизм украинцев, антисемитизм и фашизм украинцев;*
- connected with authorities, armed forces and patriots of Ukraine: *диктатор Порошенко, кровавая марионетка, киевская хунта, украинские путчисты;*
- connected with Maidan: *военный «переворот» в Украине, нацистская массовка, наци-революция;*
- connected with Ukrainian mass media: *официальный Киев намеренно сообщает, киевская пропаганда.*

Emotiogenic quasi-positive installations:

<sup>21</sup> K. Bredemayyer, *Chernaya ritorika. Vlast' i magiya slova*, Moscow 2009, p. 15.

<sup>22</sup> L. F. Kompantseva, *Chorniy piar* [in:] V. M. Petrik et. al., *Sugestivni tekhnologii manipulyativnogo vplivu*, Kiev 2011, p. 149.

<sup>23</sup> Y. Berrer, *Zarazliviy. Psikhologiya virusnogo marketingu. Chomuidei ta tovari stayut' populyarnimi*, Kiev 2015, p. 115.

<sup>24</sup> S. G. Kara-Murza, *Manipulyatsiya soznaniyem*, Kiev 2003, p. 211.

- connected with Donbas: *ополченцам ДНР удалось, доброволец-ополченец, воссоединение народа Донбасса, малороссийская инициатива, защита русскоязычных на Донбассе и в Крыму, Донбасснаш;*
- connected with the Crimea: *воссоединение Крыма с Россией, защита русскоязычных на Донбассе и в Крыму;*
- connected with Russia: *Россия – миротворец, Россия – гарант спокойствия, братский русский народ, братья-славяне, наши русские, Русский мир, вразумляющий молебен, триединый народ славянский.*

Simulacra display a lack of distinction between nationalism and Nazism, quasi-synonymy of a military takeover, putsch, junta; quasi-synonymy of Nazism, Neonazism, Fascism, *benderivschyna*, *atamanschyna*, *makhnovschyna* and the situation in Ukraine, which demonstrated an almost random selection of masks applied on the object of pro-Kremlin media attacks.

### Conclusions

In general, among linguistic means of recipient misorientation we note, in descending order: simulacra, metonymies, resources of semantic-grammatical and semantic modality, logical, semantic and formal hybrids (chimeras), quotation marks and their verbal expression (the “so-called”), resources of sacral language, linguistic mind games, rhetorical questions. Confusion is achieved by using linguistic means in a non-typical function, where the most common are simulacra, metonymies and semantic-grammatical modality, and the most effective ones are hybrids of several kinds and mind games.

The persuasiveness of political discourse as a speech act meaning to effect a change or shape the recipient’s attitude to an event is realized not through conviction, argumentation and persuasion (Larisa Shchipitsyna) and not simply via “a verbal influence on the recipient’s mentality in order to effect a change in behaviour”<sup>25</sup>, but through a covert verbal and non-verbal suggestive influence in the conscious. Still, the view held by the suggestor may be exposed and the verbal masks cast away if we seek out and define narratives serving to fulfil a range of sender’s intentions. Among the narratives defining the ongoing stage of the worldview war against Ukraine we note the following: narratives intending to humiliate the dignity of Ukrainian speakers and the national idea, intend-

<sup>25</sup> I. Yu. Loginova, *Persuazivnost' kak mekhanizmvozdeystviya v politicheskom diskurse: programma politichesk*, “Interpretatsiya. Ponimaniye.Perevod”, Sankt-Petersburg 2005, p. 241.

ing to raise malice and chagrin in speakers, intending to confuse and disorient, intending to involve into ideologems of the past or present and future.

The above leads us to assert that humiliation of the recipient and introducing confusion and chaos into their world, raising the level of malice, ideological traps of old and new times in all their linguistic and semiotic variety are achieved by means which are but missiles for a suggestive, non-rationally-controlled introduction and promotion of pro-Kremlin narratives. Eventually, they are a case study for “population-centric warfare”<sup>26</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup> G. Pocheptsov, *Gibridnaya voyna: kogda naseleniye okazyvayet syatsel'yu*, <[http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/trends/1411978127/gibridnaya\\_voyna\\_kogda\\_naselenie\\_oka\\_zyvaetsya\\_tselyu/](http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/trends/1411978127/gibridnaya_voyna_kogda_naselenie_oka_zyvaetsya_tselyu/)> (22.12.2017).

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