II. ARTYKUŁY GOŚCINNE / GUEST ARTICLES

Summary:
The purpose of this article is to analyze general framework of NATO’s response to complex, non-military crises. The study will be conducted in the context of transforming security environment. The question of NATO’s doctrines and modus operandi will be raised to examine the operational patterns in several types of non-military contingencies. The main emphasis is put on disaster relief and the NATO’s specialized unit – Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre. Its origins and selected instances of operations are followed through with the aim to explore the question of NATO’s usefulness in challenging contemporary security threats. The author attempts to prove, that due to the complex and constantly changing nature of international system, NATO still has necessary means to be crucially important, and effective actor to provide security. The paper does not contend to status of a comprehensive study, due to the extensity of subject matter. It examines one element, although, as far as author’s opinion is concerned, the one of great importance to the whole subject.

Keywords:
NATO, non-military crises, civil planning, emergency management, disaster relief

Introduction

The security environment of 21st century is a complex structure with change as a defining attribute. Strategic shifts in international order, sustained by political and economic developments, social and technological evolution, and changes in natural environment, generate influence on security as a reality
and as a concept. In the “risk society”, as Ulrich Beck states, anxiety, is built not only by the threat of the use of nuclear device, terrorist groups or weaponization of deadly viruses or full-scale military confrontation.

According to U. Beck, these risks are by-products of the “modern system”, which constitutes a threat for itself. Climate change (already having status of “threat multiplier” in U.S. security perception\(^1\)), iterative natural catastrophes create complex emergencies, which scale is determined by concomitance of different types of crises. In multi-faceted systems defining contemporary life, composed of interacting agents, adaptability, self-organization, instability, influence of history, permeable boundaries, irreducibility\(^2\), risks have long latency period (temporal delocalization, according do Beck), transcend boundaries (spatial delocalization) with causes and effects extremely difficult to determine (social delocalization)\(^3\).

In complex emergencies, natural disaster may be followed by the failure of technological infrastructure (e.g. Fukushima nuclear powerplant), humanitarian crisis, atrophy of social bond or even a violent conflict. Contemporary crises are therefore complex, and the response for them must also be complex, and comprehensive. Consequences of crises may have impact on large communities, cross state’s borders, affect almost every sphere of life. What is more, the so called “cosmological episodes”, disrupt individual’s, group’s or institution’s beliefs and assumptions about how their surroundings works\(^4\). When the crisis begins and the events unfold, manpower and equipment deployed during the “hot phase” may become overwhelmed and the resources insufficient. National crisis management mechanisms’ efficiency (in all phases), especially in weaker states may need international help immediately. Global crisis response framework is based on the United Nations agendas, programs and mechanisms. UNDAC (United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination) first responders’ teams are deployed do provide coordination of efforts undertaken by other organizations acting under UN-led clusters\(^5\). What NATO, the largest and most powerful military alliance in the world can do about non-military crises? It occurs that extensive capabilities of NATO can and did serve in response for complex emergencies


\(^{5}\) *Ibidem*, pp. 136-38.
NATO and the emerging security environment

NATO is transforming accordingly to the abovementioned trends in global security environment. In its in-depth analysis form August 2015, Allied Command Transformation, indicated ten “Instability Situations”, marked as “equal in terms of importance”, which NATO must be prepared to face in 2030. Apart from violence military contingencies, one can find “Large Scale Disaster”. We can also treat “Disruptive Impact of Mass Migration, High Impact Cyber-Threat and Mega-city Turmoil” as non-military contingencies.

Crisis response plans must consider the situation, when complex emergency may be exploited by the hostile power – a state or non-state actor – which can take advantage of chaos. Therefore, NATO must be structurally prepared to face complex emergencies, which may be only a prelude to more dangerous events, threatening the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. What is more, non-military contingencies, crises, natural and technological disasters in the neighbouring regions (e.g. massive migration) may have the potential to pose a direct and severe threats to member states. As Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver claim: “many threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones. The impact of geographical proximity on security interaction is strongest and most obvious in the military, political, societal, and environmental sectors”. It is imperative to be prepared for a broad spectrum of crises, which can turn into cascade of events. Undergoing difficult process of general transformation, NATO leaders, along with governments and strategists of member states, are aware of the world’s complexity. Imminent threats and current operations requirements create obstacles, but from grand strategy level, through operational and purely tactical tiers, the structure learns and slowly, but consequently, adapts.

The last NATO’s Strategic Concept, introduced after the Alliance celebrated its 60th anniversary mentions natural disasters, as a part of security environment, which emphasize, that the Alliance do not treat them as a future phenomenon, but a threat here and now: “Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to

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NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations”8.

The biggest and strongest military bloc in the globe has broader mission, than one can imagine. Non-military contingencies, disaster relief capabilities are less visible (or maybe underexposed) in the NATO’s “portfolio”. Notwithstanding, these capabilities are consistently developed and adopted to the changing world just as the Committee of Three Report stated in 1957: “From the very beginning of NATO, it was recognized that while defence cooperation was the first and most urgent requirement, this was not enough …. security today is far more than a military matter (…)”9.

**Civil planning and preparedness**

The critically important phase of crisis management is civil planning, which aim for NATO is to “collect, analyze and share information on national planning activity to ensure the most effective use of civil resources for use during emergency situations, in accordance with Alliance objectives. It enables Allies and Partner nations to assist each other in preparing for and dealing with the consequences of crisis, disaster or conflict”10. There are five areas of focus:

1. Civil support for Alliance Art. 5 operations.
2. Support for non-Article 5 crisis response operations.
3. Support for national authorities in civil emergencies.
4. Support for national authorities in the protection of populations against the effects of WMD.
5. Cooperation with Partner countries in dealing with disasters11.

Complex emergencies require close cooperation between civil and military authorities. Civil emergency planning in NATO creates awareness on strategic, operational and tactical levels. Each member state holds sole responsibility for civil planning (and readiness), but the NATO as a whole, must be prepared to face crisis of such extent, that single or even several states cannot effectively react, manage and take control of the situation. Collective effort might be necessary and because natural and technological disasters do not honour boundaries, some type of “fusion centre” is essential. In Cold War years, civil emergency planning in NATO meant, above all else, preparation for the conse-

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10 NATO’s Role in Civil Emergency Planning, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Brussels 2006, p. 2.
11 Ibidem.
quences of multiple nuclear strikes on both sides of the Iron Curtain, which had to trigger mass movement of people. Creation of “cold sites”\textsuperscript{12}, decontamination points and many more, required full-fledged military effort. The doomsday scenario did not come true, but the threat, although distinctly lower, still exist. As was pointed at the beginning of the present analysis, in today’s world, threats are multi-faceted. An outbreak, massive flood, earthquake, volcano eruption, technological disaster, power grid breakdown, terrorist attack can be exploited, aside of being a threat \textit{per se}, and bring about severe crisis in the Euro-Atlantic area, which, as per North Atlantic Treaty, is guarded by NATO. A fearsome vision of such situation, is presented in the Marc Elsberg’s belles-lettres, titled “Blackout”\textsuperscript{13}.

NATO must be “prepared for everything”. Civilian capabilities, reserves, know-how naturally replenish military potential. Constant coordination, reciprocal learning and, what is most important from military perspective, identification of relevant resources, which can be used during crisis response operations\textsuperscript{14}. Civil planning mechanism became a “force multiplier”, merging civil and military capabilities. NATO units often supports civil emergency operations. Civil structures assist soldiers in conducting their activities around the world. It creates “interoperability” – one of the most important aspects of the functioning in today’s security environment. “Civil Emergency Planning (CEP – author’s note) supports NATO’s Crisis Management Process and Organisation through specific crisis management arrangements”\textsuperscript{15}. NATO, with its CEP provides a forum for effective cooperation in this realm, harmonization of solutions in member states, raising the level of Alliance’s security, and constructing NATO potential to help its partners.

Civil planning in NATO is anchored in the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SEPC). This body is filled by the representatives of the member states, who oversee this sphere of NATO’s functioning. SEPC derives its authorization from the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The Committee often works in the format of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)\textsuperscript{16}. SEPC

\begin{footnotes}
\item[13] See: M. Elsberg, \textit{Blackout. Tomorrow will be too late}, London 2017. Sabotage of the SCADA systems in European and U.S. power plants almost leads to total collapse of political and social systems on the both shores of the North Atlantic.
\item[14] \textit{NATO’s Role in Civil Emergency}, op. cit., p. 2. Basing on the Civil Capabilities Catalogue.
\item[15] \textit{Ibidem}.
\end{footnotes}
also functions as a “fusion centre”, with 8 technical Planning Boards and Committees, which bring together experts from governments, industry, critical infrastructure operators, and military in concentrated effort to coordinate planning and create adequate readiness level in almost all areas of civil activity, which is important for the security:

1. Civil aviation.
2. Civil protection.
3. Food and agriculture.
4. Industrial production and supply.
5. Inland surface transport.
6. Medical matters.
7. Ocean shipping.
8. Civil electronic and postal communications\(^{17}\).

The most crucial issue within NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning is Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)\(^ {18}\). Preserving functionality of these assets and building their resilience are substantial for the continuity of governments and normal operation of the society. As one can discern, 8 boards and committees of NATO’s Civil Planning reflects the elements of Critical Infrastructure. Its facilities do not function separately. It consists of integrated, interdependent networks. Its preservation requires complex measures. Due to its network-centric structure, disruption to one element, for instance, in Germany, could induce cascading effects in large parts of Europe. Consequences would obviously hit also the U.S. There is no need to stress how important the Critical Infrastructure is for the Allied military’s operational capabilities and readiness. As it was stated at the beginning of the present article, the “risk society’s” level of technological saturation creates vulnerabilities, thus the task faced by NATO Crisis Management system is as difficult as important.

SEPC also dispose a very important instrument – Rapid Reaction Team (RRT). It takes 24 hours to deploy RRT wherever the crisis erupts. The team is recruited from Planning Boards and Committees, but may be supplemented by military personnel, in order to fully evaluate the needs of crisis-hit state\(^ {19}\).

\(^{17}\) NATO’s Role in Civil Emergency, op. cit., p. 2.
\(^{19}\) NATO’s Role in Civil Emergency, op. cit., p. 6.
ployed in the field, RRT can be a crucial vehicle for creating situation awareness for Crisis Management bodies within NATO.

**Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO)**

NATO has developed a doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations\(^{20}\). The document from 2010, provides Alliance with detailed framework for non-military operations. According to the Doctrine, “The Alliance’s military mission of NA5CRO is focused on contributing to effective crises management when there appears to be no direct threat to NATO nations or territories that otherwise would clearly fall under Article 5 “collective defense”. NA5CRO are a major part of the Alliance’s contribution to effective crisis management. NA5CRO are intended to respond to such crises in a timely and coordinated manner where these crises could either affect the security of NATO nations, or threaten stability and lead to conflict on the periphery of the Alliance. NA5CRO encompass the Alliance’s conduct of and participation in the full range of operations as directed by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Also, NA5CRO may be conducted by NATO in any part of the world, as opposed to the specific Euro-Atlantic area defined for article 5 operations; this implies that NA5CRO may have an expeditionary nature”\(^{21}\).

Apart from combat deployments of various NATO potentials in crisis response operations, enumerated in the Doctrine, e.g. Peace Support Operations, Counter Irregular Activities, there are several instances of the use of non-military capabilities or the use of military units without combat activities to support of civil authorities\(^{22}\). From the present article perspective, the most important dimension of such support in crisis situation, is NATO’s participation in Humanitarian Assistance Operations (HAO). The Doctrine defines HAO as “activities and tasks to relieve or reduce human suffering” are conducted “in response to earthquake, flood, famine, or manmade disasters such as radioactive, biological or chemical contamination or pandemic outbreak. They may also necessary as a consequence of war or the flight from political, religious ethnic persecution. The aim of HAOs is to “relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or endemic conditions that might present a serious threat to life or that can result

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\(^{22}\) *Allied Joint Doctrine*, *op. cit.*, p. 3-9. For instance, engineer units can be deployed as a support element in disaster relief operations, providing construction, electrical, mechanical help.
in great damage to or loss of property\textsuperscript{23}. The Doctrine limits the scope of HAO and programs it as effort to support national and international civil authorities or agencies (primary the UN) and NGOs. What is important and symptomatic, the Doctrine reserves the possibility to deploy combat-ready forces to protect, if it is necessary, HAOs, due to the fact, that the operations might be conducted, although on official request, in hostile territory. There can be is also a necessity of deployment the Command and Control systems to coordinate the relief effort. The Doctrine indicates several types of HAO:

1. Dislocated Civilian Support is an operation to assist internally displaced persons and refugees, forced to escape their homes as result of the one of aforementioned crisis situations (including armed conflicts). The aim of such mission is, \textit{inter alia}, to provide these persons with “the primary means of survival”. As it was discussed, NATO closely coordinates these activities with UN (namely within the framework of mentioned clusters).

2. Security Missions – defining and maintaining parameters of HOA, within which the relief operation is secured, undisrupted and effective.

3. Technical Assistance and Support – from non-military operations perspective, this type consists mostly of logistics and communication support.

4. Consequence Management – a set of activities aimed at restoration of critically important services, managing damages and consequences of disasters and catastrophes (along with terrorist incidents); very important realm of this type of mission is response for incidents with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials, by the deployment of specialized units.

5. Disaster Relief, which definition was discussed above, is considered by the Doctrine as a sequenced operation, which phases are conducted concurrently: emergency relief, sustained relief, recovery, rebuilding, sustained rebuilding, and return to normalcy. NATO structures, as it was discussed, could participate to certain extents in every phase. The most important NATO unit dedicated to disaster relief is the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), functioning at the NATO HQ\textsuperscript{24}.

**Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) and its origins**

Crisis management, as it was stated, covers wide range of o activities. Cri-ses have different anatomies, but NATO profile suggests, that as a military alli-

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 3-10.
\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Ibidem}, pp. 3-11 – 3-14.
ance, operational activities concentrate on collective defence, peacemaking, peacekeeping, counter terrorism, and other contingencies of this type. These tasks are obviously essential for NATO, an alliance established in Cold War realities, functioning in the shadow of constant threat of nuclear escalation. But the risk of exchange of nuclear strikes forced development of civil protection mechanisms in the early 1950s. These capabilities could and should have been adjusted to other disasters: technological, humanitarian, floods, earthquakes, volcanoes eruptions and many, many other.

In 1951, the Civil Defence Committee was established to deal with the question of protection of Allied states’ populations. After the disastrous, North Sea floods in 1953, governments of Alliance’ members agreed to create disaster assistance mechanisms. NATO Cooperation for Disaster Assistance in Peacetime was introduced in 1953, although without provisions to respond to a request from a non-NATO country. The revision of these procedures took place in 1971 with the improvement of cooperation mechanisms with international organizations. The importance of the use of NATO’s capabilities, resources was not questioned. As emergencies and disasters in the whole world showed, the greatest problem is effective coordination of the relief effort. Catastrophes, which took place in 1980s required international assistance. NATO countries took part in the relief operations, but evaluation of them brought clear message – the coordination of the robust capabilities of the Western states was essential (as it was in cases of earthquake in Armenia in 1988). Of course, in bipolar realities added political dimension all activities of the Alliance (e.g. tendency to depict assistance effort as pure propaganda). But after the end of the Cold War, NATO procedures were once again revised, basing on experiences of crisis response operations. In 1992, in the new security context, NATO reaffirmed the rules of involvement in disaster relief operations and introduced a new layer: if international organization requests NATO assistance in the crisis, the Alliance should be ready to deploy all needed resources outside of area covered by North Atlantic Treaty.

After the Cold War, NATO also willingly started to participate in UN-sponsored framework project - Military and Civil Defence Assets and its use in disaster relief operations. There were opinions circulating, that this step was a

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26 These procedures were used in the case of earthquakes in Turkey in 1975 and Italy 1976.
28 NATO’s role in Disaster Assistance, NATO Civil Emergency Planning, Brussels 2001, p. 10.
direct effect to the lack of substantive, core tasks of the Alliance after the collapse of the Soviet Union. But it can be also perceived in terms of general transformation of the global order and greater latitude of the usage of military resources.

The legal framework at that point was not sufficient. Floods in Moldova in 1994, request of government and inability of NATO to act immediately, because the Alliance could deploy its resources and coordination capabilities only after member state asked for help on behalf of disaster-stricken Moldova. These events led to another comprehensive review of NATO stance toward disaster relief operations. Alliance introduced the new forms of cooperation with the partner states in the new Policy for Disaster Assistance in Peacetime approved in 1995 by the North Atlantic Council\textsuperscript{30}. The importance of international cooperation in disaster relief operations is critically important. In 1998, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council established Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre (EADRCC) with mission to coordinate relief effort in disaster-stricken areas of member or partner state was established\textsuperscript{31}. It is important to mention, that in compliance with general NATO position on the participation of Alliance in international relief operations, EADRCC is not an attempt to establish independent capabilities or add another layer to the global framework coordinated by the United Nations. EADRCC’s operations are closely coordinated with the UNOCHA.

EADRCC is led by the Director of the Civil Emergency Planning\textsuperscript{32}. In case of major crises, the Centre can be supported by various divisions of NATO structures or professionals sent by EAPC members authorities. This modal structure assures flexible and comprehensive operations pattern. EADRCC operates on proven procedural regulations\textsuperscript{33}. The Centre internal configuration is formed by four functional departments:

1. Situation desk.
2. Assistance desk.
3. Transportation desk.
4. General Policy desk\textsuperscript{34}.

Aside from close liaison with UNOCHA (and other international bodies responsible for disaster response), EADRCC is simultaneously a clearing-house


\textsuperscript{32} NATO's role in Disaster Assistance, op. cit., p. 21.

\textsuperscript{33} Standing Operating Procedures for the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), 07.06.2001, \texttt{<http://www.nato.int/eadrcc/sop/sop_eadrcc/sop_eadrcc.htm>}, (05.05.2017).

\textsuperscript{34} NATO’s role in Disaster Assistance, op. cit., p. 33.
system and information sharing hub for data about resources at the disposal of concerned states.

Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit (EADRU) was also set up as a non-standing, multinational formation, ready to fast deployment do area hit by crisis, natural or man-made. EADRU mirrors abovementioned UNDAC emergency teams. EADRU is a high-readiness unit, with clear operating procedures. Its composition and size, as per these procedures, is “determined by the requirements based on an assessment of each particular disaster”.

The Centre was used almost immediately after it was set up in the assistance mission to Kosovo refugees. The mandate of the EADRCC was consequently expanded accordingly to changes in the security environment. After the September 11, the Centre became responsible for coordination of international assistance from EAPC to response terrorist attack. In 2004, NAC, with ongoing active operation in Afghanistan, expanded the EADRCC’s mission to deliver assistance to the Afghan authorities, when dealing with natural disasters. The Centre’s mandate was once again widened in 2007 to all areas where the Alliance conducts military operations. Two years later, NAC decided to grant members of Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and the rest of international partners in 2011 access to the Centre.

Since its establishment, EADRCC participated in response for dozens of major and minor crises around the world. In 2008, Claudio Bisogniero, the then Deputy Secretary General of NATO, confessed, that the Centre is “one of the NATO’s unsung heroes”.

38 Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, <http://www.nato.int/cps/nl/natohq/topics_52057.htm> (05.05.2017).
EADRCC in action – instances of the operations

A catastrophic earthquake has hit the area of Van in Turkey in 23 October 2011 with 7.2 magnitude. Strong aftershocks repeatedly hit the area for couple of days. The death toll reached 644 and more than 4.000 injured with several villages completely destroyed. The Turkish government, facing crisis situation, requested and received international help from UN global emergency response mechanisms. In 26 October, 3 days after the earthquake, Turkey requested for specific help through EADRCC – rescue teams, prefabricated houses, winter tents, and living containers\(^{41}\). EADRCC (although not all of effort was managed by it) coordinated the supplies. The material was delivered by the entry points established by UNOCHA in Van (land) and Erzurum (airport). 30 states from NATO and its partners responded with assistance in a clear evidence of EADRCC’s efficiency and. The crisis (once again) showed, how the Centre is needed\(^{42}\).

In another instance, EDRCC was requested for help during the Ebola virus outbreak in Western Africa in 2014. This time, the request did not come from country stricken by the crisis, but from the coordinating body – UNOCHA, which asked for: “military or civil protection aircraft equipped with biological air transport (BAT) negative pressure isolation units with the capacity to transport asymptomatic as well as symptomatic Ebola patients, including a healthcare team to accompany the patient(s)”\(^{43}\). It shows that in case of complex emergencies, even global disaster relief organizations may be overwhelmed, and the need to cooperate as broadly as it is possible is evident. EADRCC responded with detailed information about the available resources. What is important, EADRCC determined, that the situation could have required the use of military assets, as mean of “last resort”\(^{44}\).

Other case of request for emergency support came from Serbia in December 2015. Serbia, which was stricken by the massive influx of refugees from the


war-torn Middle East. The Serbian government acted preventive, due to the coming winter. Of course, as in all emergencies of such extent, other actors provided help. Serbian authorities requested, *inter alia*, 40 mobile toilets, 8,000 pillows, 24,000 protective gloves, electric mud pumps, and 300 heaters for tents.\(^{45}\) Portugal and Bulgaria was the states that responded for the request processed by the EADRCC\(^{46}\).

EADRCC work on extremely different assistance requests. EADRCC. It can serve as very interesting example of how complex the relief effort is, and how broad its scope must be. Another example of this state of affairs is the emergency situation in Israel in late 2016. Due to the wild fires threatening densely populated urban areas, the government of Israel requested for information about “nations’ fixed wing aerial firefighting capabilities”. 11 countries provided support of various kinds, responding for the request circulated by EADRCC\(^{47}\).

Finally, the last exemplification of the EADRCC *modus operandi* - on 23 March 2017, fire in ammunition depot in Balaklia, Ukraine, initiated huge detonation of explosive ordnance stored in the facility. After the 24 hours, Ukrainian government sent request for immediate assistance in “protective equipment and detection devices” for the teams operating onsite\(^{48}\). List of required equipment consisted of, *inter alia*, “robotic system for mechanical demining, 2 Special trucks (6x6, 4x4 with hydraulic arm) having a load capacity of more than 2 tons, for the transport and disposal of ammunition, 5 Reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (quadcopter) for Humanitarian Demining 2, 12 Power

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generators 5-10 KW”. The Centre was one of the first contacts for Ukrainian authorities. It also proves, that the level of trust for the EADRCC is high.

This short review of instances of the EADRCC’s work can offer some insight in the day-to-day activity of the unit. It also shows, how differentiated is the field, on which the Centre operates. It is useful to draw some general conclusion concerning this part of NATO missions, which most often are not broadly noticed.

**Conclusion**

The article presented, although rudimentarily, framework of NATO’s conduct in the non-military contingencies. The main emphasis was put on disaster relief capabilities. As one can discern, the trajectory of security environment’s transformation, clearly points, that complex emergencies will become frequent phenomenon, and damaging effect of them will rise.

Climate changes, unrestrained technological progress and several other factors, will multiply the vulnerabilities. Efforts to build resilient infrastructure (also social) will not cope with the pace of changes. Therefore, we can expect more multi-faceted crises with cascading, “cosmological events”, where natural disaster will trigger technological catastrophe (as it was in the case of Fukushima in 2011), followed by the collapse and disintegration of local government structures (in extreme cases maybe a disintegration of the whole country, as it was in the case of earthquake in Haiti in 2010) and the possibility of the eruption of violent conflict. As it was discussed, paralysis of state can be exploited by the external forces. Aside of it, crises will hit large areas belonging to more than one country (e.g. pandemics). The response must be complex. It must be a combination of civil and military tools. NATO, with its robust structure, sophisticated military capabilities of the strongest alliance in the world, is predestined to perform a role of the responder. This role of NATO, managing wide range of crises, will rise. The potential developed around EARDCC with military backup, sustained by clear doctrine will consequently be more important asset, because NATO’s *raison d’etre* must evolve accordingly to the transforming security environment. Some say, that NATO is a relic of Cold War, useless in the 21st century realities. Despite failures (that is how ISAF mission in Afghanistan is perceived), direction of strategic changes in NATO is valid. The Alliance have the potential to become “toolbox” to manage problems of tomorrow.

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