Przemysław Furgacz
Poland

POLAND’S MILITARY SECURITY POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAIANIAN WAR: CHANGE OR CONTINUITY

Summary:
After nearly 25 years of relative calm in this part of the world, war once again stroke Eastern Europe. The annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and stirring up the revolt in Donbas inspired by Moscow against the government in Kyiv, unquestionably deepened the feeling of insecurity in states situated at the Eastern flank of NATO – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. This, in turn, inevitably had to exert some impact on military security policies of all the states mentioned above. Additionally, since the autumn of 2015 the hitherto opposition came to power in Poland. These two facts influenced Poland’s military security policy. We can distinguish two elements of continuity and change in Poland’s military security policy. On the one hand, Warsaw assiduously endeavours to make NATO’s presence in the Eastern flank more considerable and visible, on the other hand, clearly a modification of deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial strategy is on the horizon in Poland. One of the most crucial element of it, is a conceptual resurrection of territorial defence, which currently is being implemented in Poland. Undeniably, what currently is taking place in Poland in military aspects, will be reflected in other states of the region.

Keywords:
Russian-Ukrainian War, NATO, Poland’s military security policy

Introduction

The worsening political relations between Russian Federation and West, including the states of the so-called “New Europe”, inclined, the necessity of revise theirs security policies, according to adapt them to new challenges. Crucial challenge, which can be regarded as quite aged and frequent, taking under consideration the history of Europe, is the resurgent and increasingly aggressive Russia. She is determined to modify the border and impose her will on neigh-
bours, by using force. This perception has lately dominated the way of thinking about security in the Central and Eastern Europe. Poland – the biggest and the strongest state of the Eastern NATO flank – had to adapt its military security policy to the new situation in this part of the world, which once again appears to be quite turbulent, as it used to be for most of the past centuries.

The purpose of the paper, is to find answers for the following research questions:

- In which spheres and on what scale polish military security policy changed since 2014?
- What are the differences between the military security policy of the former Civic Platform-Polish Peoples’ Party coalition government and the current one of the Law and Justice?
- In what direction Polish military security policy evolves since 2014?
- What particular shifts can we expect in this field in the nearest future?

After scrupulous and comprehensive analysis and in-depth analysis basing almost exclusively on open sources, it is justified to come to conclusion that since the breakout of hybrid war between Russia and Ukraine. Polish military security policy changed in five chief aspects:

- formation of the Territorial Defence Force (TDF);
- reinforced efforts in the field of cybersecurity;
- intensified pressure put on Western powers aimed at strengthening the so-called Eastern flank of NATO;
- intensification in development of security relations amidst the states of the region, with particular attention to Romania and Ukraine;
- efforts oriented toward augmentation of Polish Armed Forces’ capabilities to deter aggression through punishment of the aggressor.

Accordingly, the paper proceeds in this five above-mentioned sections.

Generally speaking, strategists differentiate two fundamental kinds of deterrence: deterrence by denial and by punishment\(^1\). First of this meaning can be attained by two manners, one to make the territory of the defender more problematic to conquer, which is mainly practiced by commissioning advanced defensive weapons systems in adequate numbers. Classical examples are Chinese or Russian modern A2/AD systems (air defence or anti-surface missile systems, etc.) The second manner tells that defending country may also make it much harder to keep control over the taken or occupy territory. This sort of military denial is oriented toward making it impossible for the aggressor to wage short victorious war. Rather, the defender tries to pursue war of attrition, which would persistently deplete the adversary’s resources and will of fight over time.

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In this variant of denial the defending side focuses often on waging irregular, guerrilla warfare that would bleed the opponent and deprive the invader of willpower to continue the combat. The deterrence by punishment comes down to compelling fear in the potential adversary meaning that, if it decides to attack, it would automatically and inevitably meet with a very painful response, usually in the form of a series of devastating strikes on its critical military or economic infrastructure. These basics of deterrence strategy needed to be recalled to understand Polish military security policy. Poland appears to practice, primarily the deterrence by denial. Nevertheless – as it will be argued below – in recent years Warsaw, for the first time ever, has taken first steps toward implement some elements of the deterrence by punishment, also in Polish Armed Forces.

**Creation of the Territorial Defence Force**

The idea of the forming the Territorial Defence Force began to be implemented at the end of the centrist Civic Platform and the Polish Peoples’ Party rules. The new right-wing Law and Justice government has continued those actions, intensifying it to the extent that the TDF became apple of the incumbent Minister of National Defence’s eye. During the last political campaign in the run-up to a parliamentary elections in October 2015 the Law and Justice party which – as it later turned out – won the election promised to create the Territorial Defence component in the Polish Armed Forces. Unites of this new army formation, according to the assurances, were to be strictly bonded to the local area (counties and voivodeships) and based on volunteers training during selected weekends in the year. Such a solution would not disturb seriously their civilian professional work and would be convenient both for them and for their employers. It was assumed that the Territorial Defence component would cooperate during war with operational forces in which exclusively professional soldiers serve, but also independently secure minor stretches of front and, above all, wage irregular warfare\(^2\).

It seems that three factors were decisive in forming those forces:

a) commonly regarded as failed, project of forming the National Reserve Forces – the idea devised by the former government;

b) experience from the conflict in Ukraine, which proved how essential are secondary, auxiliary forces. One of the crucial lessons which should be taken from war in Crimea and Donbas, is the necessity to have a sort of civic army or militia. Ukraine in the first weeks and months of conflict

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\(^2\) T. Nowak, *Formowanie WOT (cz. 2)*, „Broń i amunicja” 2017, no. 2, pp. 23.
severely lacked such trained civic militia, that could be directed to fulfilling secondary military tasks (such as securing important critical infrastructure objects against the adversary’s subversion and sabotage). It leads to situation that better equipped and trained main operational forced can fulfil their main tasks on front line.

c) Polish government concluded that the country does not possess adequate element of the second type of deterrence by denial as it was discussed shortly in the introduction.

The experts constantly emphasize that Polish military is undermanned even to repel the restricted aggression of the Russian Federation. Of course, Russia is much more populated country than Poland and because of this simple fact is able to field bigger, more numerous army, nevertheless this fact cannot justify such disproportion entirely. Though Russian population is 3.75 bigger than Polish, Russian army – in term of personnel – is 11 times bigger than Polish Armed Forces.

There are three major options to eliminate this deficiency:
A. increase in the numerical strength of the professional army;
B. reimplementation of obligatory recruit service;
C. formation of the Territorial Defence Force.

Each of the above mentioned options has its pros and cons. The major disadvantage of the option A is that it is too expensive and, therefore unviable. The major disadvantage of the option B is that it is socially unpopular and, thus politically difficult to push through. Option C appears to be a golden midst between the two previous solutions. Its major advantage is that it seems to be the most cost-effective. With relatively low cost it enhances the armed forces potential entirely. Due to the fact that the service in the TDF will be voluntary, it is also much more socially acceptable. There are many young people in Poland who are willing to serve in the TDF, so certainly there will be no lack of volunteers.

According to current plans the TDF will consist of 21,000 soldiers gathered in 6 brigades to the end of 2017 and 53,000 soldiers in 17 brigades to the end of 2019. As yet 16,000 volunteers jointed the Territorial Defence component. Overall, the costs of creation of this new kind of the armed forces is going to reach PLN 3.6bn in the 4-year period 2016-19. That means annually the average cost will be PLN 0.9bn. In comparison with the planned budget of the Ministry of National Defence for 2017, at the level of around 29.8bn PLN and total military spending planned to equal PLN 37.2bn in 2017, that is not a high quota. Let us now compare it with the budget deficit. Compared with planned budget deficits for the year 2016 at PLN 54.6bn and for the next year at PLN

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59.3bn, we see that the creation of the TDF will be insignificant burden for the budget burden for the budget. To put this in a wider context, the flagship programme of the current government, called “Family 500+” is projected to cost taxpayers 23bn PLN every year. Accounting for more than one thirds of the whole budget deficit, it is a huge burden for the treasury.

Ultimately, according to the present plans, the TDF will consist of 63 battalions. Professional military officers and non-commissioned officers will be a part of the cadres of these new units. Special officer courses have been initiated in the General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military Academy of Land Forces in Wrocław. Likewise, special non-commissioned officer course will soon be commenced in Poznań. So far 86,600 Beryl and Mini Beryl rifles has been ordered for the new soldiers in ‘Łucznik’-Radom Arms Factory LLC in Radom. As well rifle firesights, binoculars, thermal vision and night vision devices, radio equipment, helmets and ballistic vests – all for the newly formed units – have been commissioned yet.

The Polish TDF primarily are being created basing on the American and British experiences. The service in TDF units is modelled on British system of training reservists for operational troops. Some experts, along with Michał Likowski maintain that Territorial Defence component will be too small to be an appreciable factor of deterrence against invasion on Poland, nevertheless such voices are not prevailing.

**Heightened emphasis on cybersecurity**

The new Polish government had redefined the Polish Armed Forces Military Modernization Plan inherited from the previous ruling coalition. Even though the changes are not revolutionary, still they are noticeable. In comparison with the old plan two relevant shifts have been made, namely two new priority areas have been presented. The first one concerns the Territorial Defence Forces, which has been thoroughly discussed in the previous section of this paper. The second new priority area is named precisely “activities in cyberspace”. It consists of two operational programs called respectively: “Cyber” and “Krypto”. Project “Cyber” will be implemented over the years 2018-22,

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4 The programme assigns 500 PLN for every second and the next child in the family.
whereas project “Krypto” in the period 2017-22. Amongst the project Cyber the following things are to be done:

- establishment of special laboratory dedicated to conducting researches as well as development of information and communication systems and nets;
- realization and implementation of the system of NetFlow type for analysis of data transfers in the Internet;
- gaining an advanced Security Information and Event Management system;
- modernization of the existing information systems in Polish military, secret service, and government institutions.

As a matter of fact, that is all what is known regarding this issue. Unfortunately, polish Ministry of National Defence is probably less transparent in dimension of planned military modernization than on others. Not sufficient information about this priority area had been revealed to the public. Nevertheless, we may infer that the strong accent put on this domain is, to a substantial extent, an effect of the war in Ukraine.

The experiences of the Ukrainian war evidently indicate that Russian intelligence and army actively use cyberspace for espionage, war and sowing disinformation as well as disseminating the propaganda. The hostile activities in the cyberspace are one of the crucial elements in modern hybrid war.

Polish military environment certainly noticed that Moscow employs Ukrainians, as well as other nationalities to lead to disinformation. Russian propaganda machine frequently published fake or staged video materials in the Internet, especially in social media like a very popular in the post-Soviet states portal VKontakte. In general, this unfriendly activity was mainly aimed at mis-informing Ukrainian society and undermining its morale.

Russian hostile activity in the cyber domain directed against Ukraine was not limited to sowing propaganda and discord. Russian hackers went much further when they conducted the first cyber attack aimed at suspend the electric-

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ity in part of Ukraine’s territory. This exceptionally audacious cyber offensive operation was well noticed amidst cyberdefence experts both in Poland and in other NATO member states. As a result of the cyber-attack carried out on the 27th December 2015, 27 electric power distribution stations along with 3 powerplants in the Western Ukraine temporarily ceased to function. As it was later determined, the attack was initiated from the territory of the Russian Federation with the use of computer virus named BlackEnergy. Almost for sure the cyber-attack was executed by Russian hackers unified in the group codenamed Sandworm\textsuperscript{11}.

Poland was also subject to cyber offensive operations that inflicted major damage on Polish national security. The Internal Security Agency – Polish civilian counterintelligence service – in 2013 detected that a lot of computers, servers and internal nets of the Defence Ministry have been hacked in a sophisticated way. The hackers – most likely from Russia – intercepted plenty of classified information, which was an acute and irretrievable blow to Polish national security. The former director of the Internal Security Agency – gen. Krzysztof Bondaryk – frankly admitted that an effectiveness, extent, breadth and very long duration of the cyber attack was shocking\textsuperscript{12}. This case mercilessly revealed the backwardness and unpreparedness of Poland in the sphere of cyberdefence. In this situation no one should be surprised that soon after the revelations the previous government enacted Cybersecurity Doctrine of the Republic of Poland in 2015\textsuperscript{13}.

Enhancement of the NATO Eastern flank

Since the annexation of Crimea Polish state leadership has redoubled efforts to convince their partners and allies in the West that the enhancement of NATO Eastern flank is a very urgent need. Polish diplomacy instigated a dé-marche oriented toward persuading the leading NATO powers that the cheapest and easiest manner to deter potential future Russian invasion on the Trans-Atlantic Alliance is to deploy additional troops to the most susceptible to invasion countries – the Baltic states and Poland. The later unexpected events in Donbas gave Polish diplomacy a strong argument in support of its stance. War-


saw argued that the more conspicuous presence of NATO military forces in the east will signal Moscow that the Alliance is determined and unwavering in its resolve to defend its weaker members in case of an aggression. Warsaw NATO summit in July 2016 was a breakthrough in the Alliance’s position on the matter. Generally, in Poland the resolutions of the summit are recognized as significant success of Polish diplomats. The leaders of NATO member states took a decision to build four battalion-sized battlegroups in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – one battalion to each of those mentioned states. This decision ought to be interpreted principally as a political strengthening of Poland and Baltic states, because from the purely military viewpoint the newly deployed battalions are not very mighty – in sum they consist of merely 1,000 soldiers. It would be far-fetched to believe that such a low number of troops could militarily endanger over 930,000 Russian army. Perhaps the most prominent in this context is the evolution observed in NATO policy from: reassuring its Eastern flank’ allies (which was previously agreed at the Wales NATO summit in 2014) to deterrence vis-à-vis Russia. Almost all reasons given from supporters of increasing NATO presence in its Eastern flanks all focused on issue that, if that, if the newly deployed troops were engaged in combat with potential Russian aggressors it would imminently and inescapably trigger the chain of NATO military response that would finally lead to an armed conflict of all NATO members with the Russian Federation. If authorities in Moscow will be convinced that, this is exactly what can happened, they would not dare to invade Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania or Poland. In particular, the first three states are perceived as the weakest link in NATO due to their very exposed and disadvantageous geographical localization along with their feeble military potential.

The battalion-sized battlegroup slated for stationing in Poland will consist of, first and foremost, American soldiers, which from Warsaw’s standpoint is very desirable. Polish government perceives Washington as its main security guarantor and thus is vitally interested in having very good relations with the global hegemon. The mentioned troops will be supplemented by British and Romanian companies. The headquarters of the all four battalion-sized battlegroups will form a brigade which will be localize in Poland.

Polish government also has managed to gain U.S. support in form of the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). Within this initiative, a U.S. division headquarters and the equipment of the heavy-armoured brigade – such as tanks, ammunition, etc., will be positioned in Poland. On top of that, the White House promised Warsaw that the U.S. soldiers will more often train in Poland with Polish troops in joint drills and exercises. Last but not least, the U.S. SM-3 missile defence base in Redzikowo – which is an important element of NATO mis-

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sile defence system – has been under construction since May 2016. Unsurprisingly, Moscow did not welcome well the decisions taken at the last NATO summit.

**Intensification of military cooperation with states of the region**

Since 2014 Warsaw has intensely been deepening military and security cooperation with other states of the region, especially with those, which shares similar perception about imminent threat from Russia. Those states are: Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Ukraine, which is, admittedly, outside NATO, nonetheless is treated by Poland as a pivotal strategic partner. Poland actively engaged in Ukraine Multinational Joint Commission along with Joint Multinational Training Group – Ukraine, both of which are special institutions formed by NATO to help Kyiv in successful transformation of Ukrainian Army and making it closer to the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. Except for Poland, the U.S., the United Kingdom and Lithuania are broadly involved in mentioned initiatives.

Polish diplomacy resolutely opted for the augmentation of NATO-Ukraine military collaboration. Polish postulates, have been broadly discussed, at NATO Warsaw summit. Ukraine was included in five main areas: protection of critical infrastructure, reforming defence sector, education and training of troops, demining and countering improvised explosive devices and, disposal of explosive ordnance. At earlier 2014 NATO summit in Wales the Alliance took a decision to establish five trust funds, aimed for help Ukraine with cyberdefence, logistics, command and communication, medical rehabilitation of wounded and mutilated Ukrainian veterans of the Donbas war. Poland toget-

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er with Ukraine and Lithuania formed a joint military brigade (LITPOLUKR-BRIG)\(^{19}\). Even though this topic was not debating public, it is valid to speculate that Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, and Romanian intelligence services tightened their cooperation after the Russian-Ukrainian war erupted. We can suspect that such cooperation in recent three years has thrived.

One of the resolutions taken at the Warsaw NATO summit, the 205th Air Defense Battalion of Romanian Army will be deployed in Poland\(^{20}\) as an element of deterring Russia. In turn, Warsaw sent one of mechanismized company to Romania\(^{21}\). Gestures like the ones mentioned above are the manifestations of increasing military security cooperation of the Central and Eastern European states. It is also a signal addressed to Moscow that nations of the region tighten their military bonds. Intensified Polish-Romanian military and security partnership is encouraged by the U.S. authorities, which perceive both states as their most loyal (together with the United Kingdom) – but not the strongest – allies in Europe. It may reasonably be doubted whether the White House would decide to build crucial elements of the NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), if it was not profoundly convinced about the existence of truly strong grounds of its alliance with Warsaw and Bucharest. Polish and Romanian Ministries of Defence regularly consult each other about the BMD\(^{22}\).

**Enhanced deterrence by punishment**

Since the eruption of war in Ukraine at the beginning of 2014 Polish Ministry of National Defence has intensified its efforts to gain ability to conduct retaliatory strikes in case of Russian aggression. It is no coincidence that the same year the war in Ukraine broke out, Poland bought more than 40 – the precise quantity has not been revealed to the public – advanced air-to-ground stand-off missiles AGM-158A JASSM\(^{23}\) able to attack targets within the range of 370 km. In addition to that, at the end of 2016 Poland bought a packet of

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\(^{23}\) JASSM stands for Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile.
modernized AGM-158B JASSM-ER\textsuperscript{24} missiles officially having range 980-1000 km. The number of purchased missiles of this variant is estimated to be between 40 and 70. The cost of the latter purchase is around $230MM.

Opinions are divided, in fact, it is a subject of discussions among Polish military experts. Some of them indicate that the whole transaction is very expensive, does not bring any advantages to Polish economy, and its positive impact on military capabilities of Polish Air Force is exaggerated\textsuperscript{25}. The proponents of the transaction argue that thanks to the purchase Polish fighter jets F-16 C/D Block 52+ will gain a completely new capability to attack very distant targets. Polish fighter jets flying over Białystok situated in Eastern Poland near the border with Belarus, will be able to strike with AGM-158B JASSM-ER targets located as far as in Moscow. Notably, the purchased missiles were constructed with the wide use of stealth technology and, have a very low radar cross section, which makes them difficult to shoot down even by Russian air defence systems of the newest generation. Interestingly, so far, Poland is the only-state to which Washington agreed to sell the most advanced version of the missiles. According to the supporters of this transactions the purchase significantly enhances Poland’s ability to deter potential aggressor. Furthermore, it is reportedly also a proof for the U.S.’ trust towards Poland\textsuperscript{26}.

In case of war the expensive missiles will be used to destroy targets of special importance like command centres, ammunitions depots, key communication nodes, bridges over the biggest rivers, radars of the long range ground-to-air missile batteries and similar – all of them localized at the far hinterland of the adversary. Immediately after the announcement of the discussed transaction Russian ambassador to NATO Alexandr Grushko squarely criticized the purchase hinting that Russia will have to take into account this, as he called it, “considerable factor” in its military planning whatever he intended to express by that\textsuperscript{27}. Whomever we ascribe rightness in this dispute over the reasonability of these purchases, without doubt, its finalization indicates that Polish government will invest in the military deterrence by punishment.

The other evidence supporting this thesis is the current tender for the acquisition of 56 long range multiple rocket launchers known under cryptonym

\textsuperscript{24} JASSM-ER stands for Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles-Extended Range.
\textsuperscript{26} T. Dmitruk, op.cit., pp. 19.
Homar\textsuperscript{28}. In this purchase procedure the U.S. corporation Lockheed Martin offering HIMARS weapon with rockets GMLRS and missiles ATACMS competes with the alliance of Israeli enterprises Israeli Military Industries and Israel Aerospace Industries offering the Lynx launchers with missiles EXTRA, Predator Hawk and LORA. The Homars are expected to be capable of conducting high-precision attacks on targets at distances of up to 300 kilometres.

Last but not least, Polish Ministry of National Defence plans to buy three new generation submarines equipped with air independent propulsion as well as able to fire long range cruise missiles, in the program having code name Orka\textsuperscript{29}. This last requirement was a subject of heated contention inside Polish military circles, which emerged two camps. The first arguing that it is unnecessary and generates additional costs. The second argued that during potential war with Russia the Russian water transport at the Baltic Sea will quickly wither and in such a scenario Polish submarines would be largely useless. In contrast, if they will be able to launch cruise missiles from the undersea location they still will be a convenient means of war. Moreover, thanks to solely possibility of such an attack Russia will have to relocate at least some of its air defence systems farther from the front in order to secure potential targets of submarine-launched cruise missiles strikes. Another argument concerned the fact that submerged and mobile submarines are much more difficult to detect by the enemy forces and, therefore, much less vulnerable to attack than, for instance, Polish fighters basing permanently on the airfield which positions are very well known and which are susceptible to annihilation by exceptionally menacing Russian Iskander missile systems. The last argument was that, because of possessing such cruise missiles in its arsenal the Polish Armed Forces would gain the entirely new capability of attacking Russian military installations and Northern Fleet naval base situated at Kola Peninsula from submarines submerged somewhere in the central Baltic. The former Defence Minister Tomasz Siemoniak finally tilted toward the argumentation of the second camp and took decision to include this requirement in the tender. His successor at the post did not redefine this requirement thus far.

Examples drafted above prove that Polish political and military leadership is determined in its intent to augment Polish deterrence by punishment capabilities. Although not exclusively, to a large extent, it is the result of war in Ukraine.

\textbf{Conclusion}

It may, thus, be safely concluded that Polish military security policy after 2014 is more the continuation of the same policy before 2014 than a radical

\textsuperscript{28} Homar means in Polish lobster.

\textsuperscript{29} Orka means in Polish killer whale.
change. Of course, there is a shift but it actually comes down to the further intensification what existed before. The current and the former Polish governments do not differ fundamentally on the directions in which military security policy ought to advance. The new Polish government at most puts more emphasis on some capabilities or aspects that the former government did, as is the case with the Territorial Defence Force, as the process of its formation was instigated by the previous government and is being finished by the incumbent government. The current Polish authorities appear to be slightly more determined to magnify strength of the Polish Armed Forces. Good exemplification of it are announced plans of boosting military expenditures from the present level of 2% of GDP to 2.2% of GDP by 2020, and to 2.5% of GDP by 2030. Still, the shifts are not revolutionary, especially because they are expected to take place over the extended period of time. Doubtless, one of the newer and crucial element in Polish military security policy, which – to a substantial extent – is a consequence of the conclusions drawn from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, are attempts to gain rudimentary capabilities in the deterrence by punishment. On the basis of the above-mentioned facts is possible to infer that in the nearest future Poland will consistently seek for enhancement of its military capabilities, credibility of deterrence, strong and unimpeded cooperation with the regional countries, and will improve both offensive and defensive competences in cyberspace so neglected in the previous years.

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