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GEPOLITICAL IDEAS AND ENERGY SECURITY OF CENTRAL- EASTERN EUROPE

Abstract:

The paper addresses the issue of geopolitical ideas in term of energy security in the area Central and East Europe in the early 21st century. Main point of academic paper focuses on geopolitical dimension of “Nord Stream” and the chance of success of “Energy Intermarium” conception. Hence a considerable part of paper applies to the historical ideas and their influence on independence of states in Central Europe (“Intermarium” idea), especially in the face threat of cooperation between Germany and Russia.

Keywords:

energy security, Central and Eastern Europe, geopolitics

Energy security

An issue of energy security gained unique status at the beginning of the 21st century. Especially population of Central and Eastern Europe were recipients of popular analysis, reportages, news and public speaking was given this question. In accordance with the Act „Energy Law” with the 10th April 1997, energy security² is defined as the state of economy designed to accommodate demand on fuel and energy in technically and economically viable way, under the following conditions of environmental protection³.

The central importance of energy security has two elements: geographical (connection with supplies of energy resources with different directions and region) and infrastructural (connection with the necessity of creating technical

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² See: J. Ciborski, *Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne* [in:] *Energia w czasach kryzysu*, ed. K. Kuciński, Warszawa 2006, pp. 129-130.

³ *Ustawa z dnia 10 kwietnia 1997 r. – Prawo energetyczne*, Dz. U. 1997, nr 54, poz. 348, art. 3, pkt. 16.

infrastructure for transport of raw materials). Diversification of supply shall be understood with reference to entrench and secure supplies in the varied shape and with different direction, in an amount, which covers demand on domestic market⁴.

Conventional resources of gas in Poland are estimated at about 145 bn m³, and annual consumption of gas reaches a level 14.5 bn cubic meters⁵. It should be noted that gas in the Polish structure of consumption energy accounts for about 14%. As a comparison, consumption of gas in the United States is 24 %, and similarly in the European Union⁶. The Polish market can be regarded as prospective for suppliers of this raw material. The proportion of natural gas fuels will gradually increase in the next years. It is a consequence, above all, peer pressure to reduce emission of environmental pollution by manufacturing plants, which are intertwined with thermal energy or industry⁷.

“Geopolitics of pipelines”

Raw materials are the most important instruments of foreign policy of state in the twentieth and early 21st century. In the past a military factor was the salient instrument of foreign policy key function. Nowadays economic indicators play key role in this regard.

Transmission network of energy resources influences its potential recipients in Central Europe. The region is dominated by latitudinal trails of natural gas with gas fields on the East. “Geopolitics of pipelines” is one of last remnants of bipolar security system in Central-Eastern Europe⁸, which was built since the ‘70s of the 20th century.

During the Cold War pipelines were built on the westward in order to supply the Red Army with hydrocarbons to enable it to attack toward European Atlantic coast as well as operate efficiently and quickly in the event of war with NATO⁹. A dense network of pipelines stretched out from deposits of mineral resources (Siberia, Central Asia), across the Slavic republics of the Soviet Union and client states on the Central Europe, which were members of the

⁴ A. Toś, *Polska polityka dywersyfikacji dostaw gazu ziemnego – rozwiązania alternatywne*, Geopolityka.org, 20.08.2010, <www.geopolityka.org/analizy/544-polska-polityka-dywersyfikacji-dostaw-gazu-ziemnego-rozwiazania-alternatywne> (30.01.2018).

⁵ *Polska zasobna w gaz niekonwencjonalny*, PolskieLupki.pl, <<http://www.polskielupki.pl/aktualnosc-polska/89099/polska-zasobna-w-gaz-niekonwencjonalny>> (30.01.2018).

⁶ See more: P. Janusz, M. Kaliski, M. Sikora, *Wpływ dostaw LNG z USA na europejski rynek gazu ziemnego*, „Polityka Energetyczne” 2017, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 27-38.

⁷ A. Toś, *op. cit.* (30.01.2018).

⁸ This statement is consciously referred to book entitled *Geopolityka rurociągów. Współzależność energetyczna a stosunki międzypaństwowe na obszarze postsowieckim*, ed. E. Wyciskiewicz, Warszawa 2008.

⁹ Cf.: J. Batko, M. Kędzierski, *Energetyka wyzwanie dla Polski*, the 2nd seminar – 13.05.2011, „Instytut Aurea Libertas”, presentation possessed by author.

Warsaw Pact, up to the Federal Republic of Germany. On the other hand, it is still missing north-south connections over time.

This state of things threatens with Russian monopoly on supplies of energy in Central and Eastern Europe. It is often forgotten that the exporting country is addicted to the sale of natural resources. It sometimes leads to extreme situation, which are stipulated as: „petro-state”¹⁰ or „the Dutch disease”¹¹.

In spite of what might seem *prima facie*, in reality Russia is not in a comfortable situation. Although the Russian Federation channels the most raw materials on domestic market, the biggest profit it gains from the sale of natural gas to Europe. Above described addiction is quintessential feature for developing state. The Russian Federation, which is shaping the European security architecture, fulfils conditions of being “petro-state”. Among factors defining “petro-state” a particular attention should be paid to significant share of fuel sector in GDP, underdevelopment of other sectors of the economy and low level of state institutions. The last factor plays important role in Russia¹². Hence, not only Europe cares that Russian gas flows to consumers.

“Nord Stream” as security threat

The most famous and token thing that undermines energy security of Eastern Europe states is gas pipeline “Nord Stream”, which Radosław Sikorski (in 2006 the Polish Defence Minister) summarized during summit between the European Union and the United States with the following words: „Poland is particularly sensitive to the Corridor and agreement over our heads. It was a tradition of Locarno and Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. We don’t want a repeat”¹³. For Central-Eastern Europeans such recall of the interwar period agreements is being associated with discrediting, by Germany, relatively short, only twenty years, Central-Eastern Europe subjectivity.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*. See more: I. Martinez, *The course of the petro-state: the example of Venezuela*, EconLib.org, 05.10.2005, <<http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2005/Martinezpetro.html>>, (30.01.2018).

¹¹ „The Dutch disease” – the phenomenon was observed in the Netherlands in the 1950s of the 20th century. A mineral deposit was discovered in the Dutch exclusive economic zone of the North Sea. In the following years the Netherlands constantly grappled with excessive appreciation of currency. It was a consequence of growing export incomes coming from selling of to the hydrocarbons. The excessive appreciation of Dutch currency made its export unprofitable. In extreme case it may even lead process of deindustrialization. G. Kaliszuk, *Holenderska choroba Rosji*, „Nowa Europa Wschodnia” 2009, vol. VIII, no. 6, pp. 67-73.

¹² See: Idem, *Rosyjskie surowce – biznes czy gra*, „Nowa Europa Wschodnia” 2010, vol. IX, no. 1, pp. 55-61; Idem, *Holenderska choroba...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-73.

¹³ A. Szczęśniak, *Donośny głos ministra Sikorskiego*, [Szczęśniak.pl](http://szczesniak.pl), 02.02.2018, <<http://szczesniak.pl/node/94>> (30.01.2018).

It should be noted that the comparison of gas pipeline “Nord Stream” with the agreement with 1939 seems to be problematic¹⁴. If we consider statement of the Polish Defence Minister as speech addressed to the public opinion in states of this region, it is clear that comparison fulfils its role. The statement let communicate inhabitants of Central and Eastern Europe clear message, which appeal to their emotions: building of gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea could have an important consequences for independence of region. In this context comparison “Nord Stream” to Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact seems to be accurate.

Construction of gas pipeline “Nord Stream” will entail loss of transition position by countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which concerns mainly: Ukraine, Belarus and Poland. The previous pipeline system enabled some influence on Russian authority, represented by Gazprom¹⁵, and extorted moment of reflections before taking decision to turn the gas tap off. In this way the Russian corporation deprived of supply not only its unreliable customers, as Kiev and Minsk, but also reduced gas transport for the most important partners: states of Western Europe, above all Germany¹⁶.

Construction of gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea is connected with other danger for states located on the coast of the sea. Namely, it is increased risk of environmental disaster, which will be enormous on account of minor and self-closed nature (the Danish straits) of this body of water. Thus, threat of disaster is not only an instrument of defence weaker Central and Eastern Europe states on the European Union forum but also a real challenge¹⁷.

It should be mentioned that in the vicinity of “Nord Stream” pipeline are remains of chemical weapons and other explosives laid there during the Second World War. Details are not known because the Red Army did not map. Apart

¹⁴ See: B.T. Wieliński, *Niemcy wściekle na Sikorskiego*, Wyborcza.pl, 04.05.2006, <<http://wyborcza.pl/1,75248,3321425.html>>, (30.01.2018)

¹⁵ A good deal of books was dedicated to the topic of Gazprom’s relations of with Russian establishment. For this reason, it is sufficient to recommend: W. Portnikow, *Dmitrij Miedwiediew. Władca z przypadku?*, Wrocław 2009.

¹⁶ Suspension of supply to Ukraine also meant reduction of gas transported to Germany. Then it is possible that German companies, which are stakeholder of Gazprom, knew in advance about the plan reduction in gas exports during crisis in Ukraine and Belarus. According to some experts gas crisis was caused to prove that transit states are unreliable. In this way the Western Europe woul become more inclined to construct “Nord Stream”. See more: P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Polityka Unii Europejskiej wobec Rosji a interesy Polski 1991-2004*, Kraków-Warszawa 2008, pp. 558-559 – there are links to other sources.

¹⁶ *Oceany i Morza, Encyklopedia geograficzna świata*, ed. Z. Otałęga, R. Andruszko, E. Ryżewska et al., t. VII, Kraków 1997, p. 87; P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *op. cit.*, p. 518.

¹⁷ See: T. Walat, *Dzień w którym wypłynie ryba*, Polityka.pl, <<http://archiwum.polityka.pl/art/dzien-wnbsp;ktorym-wyplynie-ryba,375502.html>>, (30.01.2018).

from that the German Democratic Republic disposed the chemical warfare agents on the coastline until the late '60 of the 20th century¹⁸.

Central Europe states cannot depend on the solidarity with Western European countries on energy security¹⁹. It is a result of one factor. Our region is dependent on imports of Russian hydrocarbons far more. The average is not lower than 50-60% of total gas imports²⁰. The situation looks different, from the Western Europe's point of view. Share of imports of gas from Russia fluctuates around 30% of total gas consumption/imports. Hence, for Western European politicians supply security is more important than diversification of sources of supply²¹. The best option for Central Eastern Europe states would be achievement of similar situation as in France. This country has four main suppliers of natural gas (from 18% with Algeria to 28% from the Russia Federation)²².

It should be noted that economical cooperation between Germany and Russia reminds Central Europe of Treaty of Rapallo. This distant memory is a symbol of economic dependency of weak Central Eastern European states to powerful neighbours in Moscow and Berlin and shows the threat for small states. A figure that brought back the bad memories was a man who served as German Federal Chancellor between 1998 and 2005 – Gerhard Schröder. Firstly, he lobbied for “Nord Stream” as a head of government. Next he took up a position of chairman of the supervisory board of this project²³. This symptom is becoming increasingly widespread phenomenon in the Western Europe. Politicians accept the point of view of corporation rather than state that they should represent.

¹⁸ See: P. Świeboda, *Strategiczne wyzwanie dla Unii Europejskiej. Kształtowanie zewnętrznego wymiaru polityki energetycznej*, Warszawa 2006, p. 9.

¹⁹ It confirms fact that off-take gas for Germany took place with Russia on the Odra River and not on the Bug River. See: G. Kuczyński, L. Wojciechowski, *Energetyczne Międzymorze w: Rzeczpospolita na arenie międzynarodowej. Idee i praktyczne dylematy polityki zagranicznej*, ed. J. Kłoczkowski, T. Żukowski, Warszawa-Kraków 2010, p. 444 et al.

²⁰ See: *Rurą w płot*, „Tygodnik Forum”, 9-15.01.2006, pp. 4-6 [in:] N. Buckley, “Financial Times”, 04.01.2006.

²¹ See more: P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *op. cit.*, pp. 570 et al.

²² There are links to other sources: *Rurą w...*, *op. cit.*, p. 6; *Spółka Kreml zgarbia wszystko*, „Tygodnik Forum”, 18-24.07.2005, pp. 12-19 [from:] N.P. Walsh, “The Guardian”, 06.07.2005. It is worth noting that Gazprom routinely opts for long-term agreements with no possibility to resell gas to the third party in order not lose its influence. This policy is beneficial for Russia, because it secures supplier and make consumers in Central and Eastern Europe dependent on the imported resources. It can be added that Gazprom has enormous reserves of gas and busy magazines in key points of Europe. In this context Austria and the Netherlands may be mentioned.

²³ See: *Wiara w rurę*, „Tygodnik Forum”, 07-13.01.2008, pp. 4-5 for: „Die Zeit”, 03.01.2008; *Wielkie rury Europy*, „Tygodnik Forum”, 26.05-01.06.2008, pp. 4-8 for: J. Schmidt, „Suddeutsche Zeitung”, 18.03.2008.

The extension of transmission infrastructure

The analysis of supplies directions indicated that the transmission network in Central and Eastern Europe was rather poor in 2008. Poland stood alone negatively in comparison to other countries – it had no interconnectors with Lithuania, Denmark, Sweden, the Czechs Republic or even Germany and Slovakia²⁴. Establishing common European natural gas market would ensure safe delivery to member states of the European Union, solve problem of diversification and eliminate exerting pressure of Gazprom on individual countries, which independently made a deal on supply²⁵.

The lack of interconnectors made rise of investments in energy industry beyond the region impossible. Their advantage is huge assets. It is worth to mention the project of network of interconnectors, that is combining small gas markets of Central Europe states²⁶.

In the source literature the plan has a name „Energy Intermarium”²⁷. This concept is associated with idea of ‘Intermarium’, which was introduced in the interwar period by Józef Piłsudski. At that time this conception was understood as cooperation between Central and Eastern Europe states, above all, at political and military levels and among states situated between the Soviet Union and Weimar Germany²⁸.

The principal challenge in plan of building so-called “Energy Intermarium” are interconnectors, in other words, pipelines connecting separated systems or markets. Resources can be shipped by interconnectors in both ways. They appear useful in case of crisis or time interval of supplies²⁹. Their functioning would encourage the largest energy companies to invest in infrastructure transmission of energy resources. It would increase strength of region in case of emergencies and allow trade between the main consumers in extreme cases.

Origin of construction of interconnectors is bound to series of crises between Ukraine and Russia. The most serious crisis took place on 2009. Then

²⁴ T. Leszczyński, *Dywersyfikacja dostaw gazu ziemnego w unii europejskiej*, „Biuletyn Urzędu Regulacji Energetyki”, July 2008, pp. 5-6.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

²⁶ I. D. Metzner, *Nabucco plus czwartym projektem energetycznym*, DW.World.de, 03.02.2011, <www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,14814276,00.html> (30.01.2018); *Rurą w...*, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

²⁷ G. Kuczyński, L. Wojciechowski, *Energetyczne Międzymorze* [in:] *Rzeczpospolita na arenie międzynarodowej. Idee i praktyczne dylematy polityki zagranicznej*, ed. J. Kłoczkowski, T. Żukowski, Warszawa-Kraków 2010, pp. 443-455.

²⁸ See: P. Okulewicz, *Koncepcja „międzymorza” w myśli i praktyce politycznej obozu Józefa Piłsudskiego w latach 1918-1926*, Poznań 2001.

²⁹ See: J. Bjørnmose, F. Roca, T. Turgot, D. S. Hansen, *Gas and oil pipelines in Europe*, Brussels November 2009, pp. 20-21.

the Balkan countries and also Slovakia felt victim to reduction of gas supply³⁰. Hence, Slovakia, which was ruled by Iveta Radičová, initiated construction of interconnector joining this country with Poland³¹.

Representatives of both governments signed an agreement in support of research into construction of gas interconnector on January 2011. The final decision was made in 2012, and the connection between two countries is to be established in 2018. In this period Warsaw is going to create similar interconnector with Lithuania³². Besides, the Polish authority completed project with Ukraine on gas pipeline Ustług-Zosin-Moroczyn in 2006. Latent defect of interconnector is low capacity (17.5 mln m³ gas per year)³³. At the same time, negotiations about interconnectors had been conducted between Hungary, Croatia and Romania³⁴.

Leaders of Visegrad Group met in 2009 on Energy Security Summit in Budapest. The declaration on the European energy security was signed by Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia and, of course, four states included in the Visegrad Group³⁵. The ministers of economy of the signatory states committed to lobby on the European Commission forum in favour of support construction of gas, oil and

³⁰ *Russia accuses Ukraine of siphoning gas to Balkans*, NYTimes.com, 02.01.2009, <<http://www.nytimes.com/marketing/ihl/search/?ihl2009>> (14.01.2009); *Russia warns of oil supply cut-off through, says Slovakia*, France24.com, 28.10.2009 <<http://www.france24.com/en/20091228-russia-warns-oil-supply-cut-off-through-ukraine-says-slovakia-petrol-europe>> (30.01.2018).

³¹ P. Bajda, M. Cichocki, P. Ukielski, A. Wołek, *Nowa Europa Środkowa? Analiza polityki państw regionu i ich miejsca w UE: krajobraz po wyborach na Węgrzech, Słowacji i w Czechach*, Kraków 2010. The record of discussion is held by author. See: *Slovakia, Poland look into 'Visegrad pipeline'*, EurActiv.com, 17.01.2011, <www.euractiv.com/en/energy/slovakia-poland-look-visegrad-pipeline-news-501292> (5.03.2011).

³² *Od kwietnia gaz będzie mógł płynąć z Niemiec do Polski*, Biznes.Onet.pl, 21.03.2014, <<http://biznes.onet.pl/od-kwietnia-gaz-bedzie-mogl-plynac-z-niemiec-do-po,18567,5610287,1,news-detaj>> (30.01.2018).

³³ D. Grala, *Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne Polski na przełomie XX i XXI wieku w aspekcie dostaw surowców z obszaru postradzieckiego*, „Sprawy Wschodnie” 2007, no 1-2, p. 14; *108 mln euro na Gazociąg Polska-Słowacja*, Biznes.Alert.pl, 20.12.2017, <<http://biznesalert.pl/unia-wesprze-kluczowe-projekty-energetyczne-tym-polaczenie-gazowe-polski-slowacji/>; <http://biznesalert.pl/108-mln-euro-gazociag-polska-slowacja>> (2.02.2018).

³⁴ *Minister Szijjarto: Węgry będą mogły importować gaz z Rumunii*, Gazeta.Prawna.pl, 09.02.2018, <<http://serwisy.gazetaprawna.pl/energetyka/artykuly/1103403,minister-szijjarto-wegry-beda-mogly-importowac-gaz-z-rumunii.html>> (30.01.2018).

³⁵ A. Sęk, *Ja mam 20 lat, ty masz 20 lat, przed nami siódme niebo!*, Blogcim.WordPress.com, 16.02.2011, <blogcim.wordpress.com/2011/02/16/ja-mam-20-lat-ty-masz-20-lat-pred-nami-siodme-niebo> (30.01.2018).

electric power interconnectors combining with the North with the South of continent³⁶.

Member states of Visegrad Group desire to engage the European Commission in realization of the project of North-South energy route through assignation of the EU's funds. The first stage of the energy corridor is a construction of gas pipeline connecting the Czech Republic and Poland. The next stage will be an interconnector between Slovakia and Hungary. Overall, sixteen gas pipelines will be joined within the corridor. In this way, there will be a direct gas pipeline connection between the gas terminal in Świnoujście will and the gas terminal situated at the Croatian island of Krk³⁷.

Important element of "Energy Intermarium" is the gas terminal in Świnoujście. Its opening was planned on June 2014. However, it was opened on December 2015. Then, first supply of LNG was delivered by Qatargas Company³⁸.

However, one important problem complicated functioning of the gas terminal in Świnoujście. The Federal Office of Navigation and Hydrography issued a license on laying "Nord Stream" pipes in area, where "Nord Stream" criss-cross the Szczecin and Świnoujście ports approaching route. There is as threat, that this decision will disturb the gas carriers' disembarkation. Decision made by Germany threatens the safety of ships, which demand fairway almost 14.3 m deep.

The stance of the Polish authorities to require burying pipeline on the seabed was supposedly known to the German side. Nonetheless, the spokesman of the Federal Office declared that the possibility of solution was not considered. He justified that „burying the gas pipeline could be dangerous on environmental grounds”. The statement of German bureaucrat gave an investors' attitude towards Poland. It turned out that in other places, where gas pipeline intersect with shipping lines (for example nearby Gotland), appropriate safety solutions were adapted, and the danger of buried pipelines was not a question at all³⁹.

Pragmatism of medium-sized countries

The cooperation in energy policy in the Central and Eastern Europe is not so good as the project of Visegrad Group might suggest. It is sufficient to

³⁶ *Grupa Wyszehradzka w sprawie projektów energetycznych*, EurActiv.com, 27.01.2011, <www.euractiv.pl/politykaregionalna/wywiad/grupa-wyszehradzka-w-sprawie-projektow-energetycznych-002389> (30.01.2018).

³⁷ A. Sęk, *op. cit.* There are links to other sources.

³⁸ *Pierwsza dostawa katarskiego LNG dotarła do Polski*, Defence24.pl, 15.01.2016, <<http://energetyka.defence24.pl/281495,pierwsza-dostawa-katarskiego-lng-dotarla-do-polski>> (30.01.2018).

³⁹ A. Ścios, *Gazoport. O wierze ministra Pawlaka*, BezDekretu.Blogspot.com, 27.01.2010, <bezdekretu.blogspot.com/2010/01/gazoport-o-wierze-ministra-pawlaka.html> (30.01.2018).

provide examples of two states. The Czechs decision-makers strive to construct interconnector with Poland in an area called Cieszyn. On the other hand, the same policy makers plan extension of "Nord Stream" with Germany to the Czech Republic – so-called gas pipeline "Gazela"⁴⁰. This conception seems to be bad. The country of natural gas origin will not to be diversified. It is still delivered only from Russia. However, the collection of Russian gas via Germany increases the guarantee of supply continuity. Russians treat German partner better than small and weak Central and Eastern European states. The other state which refused solidarity with the Central Europe in the issue of energy security is Latvia. This country as the only one Baltic states joined to the project "Nord Stream" and secured its access to offshoot of "Nord Stream"⁴¹.

Taking into account Marek Cichocki's opinion appears to be correct. Medium-sized states pursue pragmatic policy. Within certain limits they try to secure themselves in different ways, looking for strategic ally⁴². The position of Germany raises concerns in Central-Eastern Europe⁴³, but, on the other hand, the Germany is concurrently perceived as a priority partner, with many advantages. The main ones are good relationship with Russia (in generally on economic ground) or leading role on the forum of the European Union.

Poland took action on gas supply from the West. The Yamal pipeline can ship gas from Germany to Poland since April 2014. Then it was finished development of measuring station in Mallnow. In opinion of the Polish management of gas sector this solution fulfils a role of 'insurance certificate' in case of crisis. If this scenario has occurred, Poland would buy gas for example in Germany, France or the Benelux countries. This option gives the possibility of transmission of 5.5 bn m³ gas per year. For comparison, Poland imports a little over 10 bn cubic metres⁴⁴. Idea of gas pipeline Bernau-Szczecin does not

⁴⁰ G. Kaliszuk, *Co niedobre dla Gazpromu*, „Nowa Europa Wschodnia” 2011, vol. XV, no 1, p. 82 et al.

⁴¹ J. M. Nowakowski, cooperation: M. Fita-Czuchnowska, D. Ćosić, M. Michaliszyn, *Energetyczna zimna wojna*, "Wprost" 2006, no 19, Wprost.pl, 14.05.2006, <www.wprost.pl/ar/90039/Energetyczna-zimna-wojna> (30.01.2018).

⁴² P. Bajda, M. Cichocki, P. Ukielski, A. Wołek, *op. cit.* Record of discussion are held by author.

⁴³ Personal preferences make no difference in purchasing energy resources. The chief factor here is security. For example Bulgaria does not express commitment to Russian initiative. Together with Romania it has a plan to build LNG terminal in Konstanca, where will be delivered gas from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. Romania hold negotiations on participation in the project AGRI. According to this idea Azeri LNG gas will be exported across Georgia to Romania. In 2010 Azerbaijan, Georgia and Romania signed an agreement in Tbilisi on 12 May 2010. Cf. G. Kaliszuk, *Na południu Europy rozgrywa się batalia o dostawy gazu dla Unii...*, PolskaTimes.pl, 22.11.2010, <<http://www.polskatimes.pl/artukul/335273,na-poludniu-europy-rozgrywa-sie-batalia-o-dostawy-gazu-dla-unii,id,t.html>> (20.03.2014).

⁴⁴ *Od kwietnia gaz będzie...*, (22.03.2014).

create new possibility of diversification of gas supply due to country of origin, however it is well assessed by expert on account of low cost of investment⁴⁵.

Summary

It is necessary to pay attention on the East-West gas pipelines domination in Europe (over the North-South lines) which is a remnant of the Cold War. This situation indicates perceiving the world in terms of the East and the West. As a result it makes idea of “Energy Intermarium” difficult to conduct. Only reformulation of our mental maps, will demonstrate numerous completely new opportunities in energy security sphere. But it will take time.

Rancour among Central and Eastern Europe states on political level may become some obstacle. It seems that cooperation Visegrad Group, which was starting in the early 90’, undergoes redefinition before our very eyes. These states set the goals, which will be implemented basing on existing institutional foundations existing institutional base.

It is high time to look at the bigger picture. At that time we will break the pattern and take advantage on a larger scale with import of hydrocarbons from the Southern countries. Modern technology makes import of energy resources easier. Presented solutions have a chance to be implemented. The earliest opportunity is „Three Seas Initiative”, which was inaugurated on the 25-26 August 2016 in Dubrovnik.

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⁴⁵ A. Toś, *op. cit.*, (14.03. 2014).

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